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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses and gives philosophical context to claims regarding the truth-status 
of astrology – specifically, horoscopic astrology.  These truth-claims, and reasons for 
them, are sourced from advocates and critics of astrology and are taken from extant 
literature and interviews recorded for the thesis. 
The three major theories of truth from contemporary Western epistemology are the 
primary structure used to establish philosophical context.  These are: the 
correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories.  Some alternatives are discussed in 
the process of evaluating the adequacy of the three theories.  No estimation of 
astrology’s truth-status was found which could not be articulated by reference to the 
three.  From this follows the working assumption that the three theories of truth suffice 
as a system of analysis with which to define and elucidate the issues that have arisen 
when astrology’s truth-status has been considered. 
A feature of recent discourse regarding astrology has been the argument that it should 
be considered a form of divination rather than as a potential science.  The two accounts 
that embody these approaches – astrology-as-divination, and astrology-as-science – are 
central throughout the thesis.  William James’s philosophy is discussed as a congenial 
context for astrology-as-divination.  This includes his understanding of the pragmatic 
theory of truth and other elements, such as radical empiricism, which comprise his 
pluralist pantheistic philosophy.   
Compelling reasons from numerous commentators are presented according to which 
astrology should be judged not true.  These generally presuppose that contemporary 
scientific modes of analysis suffice for such an evaluation.  A case could be built upon 
James’s philosophy under which the individual would have a right to believe in 
astrology as a source of truth – albeit, this would not be the intersubjective or 
scientifically-validated truth which critics typically insist upon.        
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1   The Aim, Background and Originality of this Thesis 
 
This thesis is an investigation of claims regarding the truth-status of astrology.  These 
claims typically come from advocates of astrology and critics of astrology.  The terms 
‘astrology’, ‘advocates of astrology’ and ‘critics of astrology’ are defined in the next 
section; ‘truth’ receives an initial definition in section 1.7, and is further discussed and 
characterised throughout this thesis.  The enquiry presented here has grown out of my 
book Astrology in the Year Zero, in particular my contention that any evaluation of 
astrology ‘will be based on one’s view of issues such as: what is real; how we acquire 
knowledge; and how our knowledge relates to reality.  In other words, philosophical 
issues which are as old as philosophy itself.’1 
 
The implications of that suggestion are pursued in this thesis, in the context of Western 
philosophy. The period in which this thesis has been researched and written has 
coincided with considerable academic investigation into different facets of astrology; in 
the time since I began work on the thesis in 2003, PhD theses that deal to some extent 
with contemporary astrology have been completed by (in chronological order) Nicholas 
Campion, Kelley Hunter, Alie Bird, Bridget Costello, Kirstine Munk, Geoffrey 
Cornelius, Bernadette Brady, James Brockbank, Elena Kozlova, Keith Burke and 
Frances Clynes; also an MPhil dissertation was completed by Lindsay Radermacher.2  
                                                 
1 Garry Phillipson, Astrology in the Year Zero (London: Flare, 2000) p.195. 
2 Nicholas Campion, Prophecy, Cosmology and the New Age Movement: The Extent and Nature of 
Contemporary Belief in Astrology (unpublished doctoral thesis, Bath Spa University College, 2003); 
Kelley Hunter, In Search of Dark Mat(t)er: A Mythopoetic Study in Imaginal Cosmology (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Empresarial University, Costa Rica, 2003); Alison Gwendy Bird, Astrology in Education: 
An Ethnography (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 2006); Bridget McKenney Costello, 
Astrology in Action: Culture and Status in Unsettled Lives (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University 
of Pennsylvania, 2006); Kirstine Munk, Signs of the Times. Cosmology and ritual practice in modern, 
Western astrology (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Southern Denmark, 2007); Geoffrey 
Cornelius, Field of Omens: A Study in Inductive Divination (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of 
Kent, 2009); Bernadette Brady, Theories of Fate among Present-day Astrologers (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of Wales Trinity St. David, 2011); James Brockbank, The Responsive Cosmos: An 
Enquiry into the Theoretical Foundation of Astrology (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Kent, 
2011); Elena Kozlova, A Phenomenological Enquiry into the Process and Effects of Finding Meaning 
with Astrological Symbolism (unpublished doctoral thesis, Institute of Transpersonal Psychology – Palo 
Alto, CA, 2011); Keith Burke, Big Five Personality Traits and Astrology: The Relationship Between the 
Moon Variable and the Neo PI-R (unpublished PhD thesis, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 2012); Frances 
Clynes, Cyberspace and Dualism: An Examination of the Impact of the Internet on Modern Western 
 
 
 
2 
The discussion in this thesis relates to these works in a complex variety of ways.  Some 
of the works deal with historical or anthropological issues that impinge on my theme 
only incidentally.  Some are concerned, to greater and lesser extents, with the truth, 
reality, or value of astrological work and therefore are directly relevant to this thesis.  
The latter texts will be discussed further in the literature review in chapter 2. 
 
The originality of this thesis consists in three characteristics: it is the first work to 
explore, in detail, the relevance of the three substantive theories of truth in Western 
epistemology to astrology; the first to pursue the consequences for astrology of the 
confluence of pragmatic and pantheistic thought in the works of William James; and, it 
draws on forty original interviews with astrologers and critics of astrology in order to 
explore the variety of ideas and experiences that lie behind discussion of astrology’s 
truth. 
 
1.2   Definition of ‘Astrology’ 
 
Astrology is ‘the practice of relating the heavenly bodies to lives and events on earth, 
and the tradition that has thus been generated’ as the historian and philosopher of 
astrology Patrick Curry put it.3  I have adopted this, rather than one of many 
alternatives, as an introductory definition for this thesis because it focuses on 
astrology’s intrinsic function, without any attempt to define how astrology would work.  
To illustrate this point: David Pingree defined astrology as a relationship whereby ‘the 
planets, in their eternal rotations about the earth, transmit motion (change) to the four 
elements and to the assemblages of elements, animate and inanimate, in the sublunar 
world.’4  This characterises astrology as working through physical, causal forces that 
emanate from planets, and this is an explanatory model that will be explored in detail in 
what follows.  My contention however is that it would be unacceptable in a study such 
as this to begin with such a definition, insofar as it would preclude some (non-physical, 
                                                                                                                                               
Astrology (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 2015); Lindsay 
Radermacher, The Role of Dialogue in Astrological Divination (MPhil dissertation, University of Kent, 
2011). 
3 Patrick Curry, ‘Astrology’ in Kelly Boyd (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Historians and Historical Writing 
(Vol.1) (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999) p.55. 
4 David Pingree, From Astral Omens to Astrology, from Babylon to Bīkāner (Rome: Istituto Italiano per 
L’Africa e l’oriente, 1997) pp. 21 – 2.  
 
 
 
3 
non-causal) explanations of astrology from consideration.  This would render the entire 
study incomplete, because – as will be discussed in section 1.4 below – explanations 
which do not depend upon physical causality are believed to obtain by some 
commentators. 
 
The form of astrology that will be discussed in what follows is the system that was 
substantially codified in the ancient Mediterranean countries, most famously at the 
hands of the astronomer, astrologer and geographer Claudius Ptolemy of Alexandria (c. 
100 – c. 178 CE).5  In line with the prevailing convention this will be characterised as 
‘Western astrology’ in order to distinguish it from other traditions such as Indian, 
Chinese, and Mexican astrology.6  It is the form of astrology most widely used in 
Europe and North America.  Within that tradition, the focus will be on horoscopic 
astrology.  A horoscope (example at figure 1, below) is a graphic representation of the 
heavenly bodies in relation to the Earth, generally (as here) with the Earth at the centre 
of a circle, with the signs of the zodiac in the outer ring and the planets and other 
celestial bodies and mathematically-derived points in the ring within that.   
 
                                                 
5 For Hellenistic astrology generally, and the influence of Ptolemy in particular, see: Nicholas Campion, 
The Dawn of Astrology: A Cultural History of Western Astrology – Volume 1: The Ancient and Classical 
Worlds (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2008), Ch.13. 
6 For common usage see e.g. the titles of these books: Jim Tester, A History of Western Astrology 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1987); Nicholas Campion, The Dawn of Astrology, A Cultural History of 
Western Astrology: Volume I: The Ancient and Classical Worlds (Hambledon Continuum, London 2008); 
Nicholas Campion, The Medieval and Modern Worlds: History of Western Astrology Volume II (London: 
Continuum, 2009).  For a summary of the other traditions mentioned here, see: Nicholas Campion, 
Astrology and Cosmology in the World’s Religions (New York University Press, 2012) pp. 13 – 14. 
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Figure 1 
 
Horoscopic astrology is the practice of analysing horoscopes in order to gain insight 
into the entity – for example a person, a country, an organisation or a question – that 
came into existence at the time, date and place represented by the horoscope.7  People 
who work as consultant astrologers may discuss, with reference to their clients’ charts, 
issues such as family background, career and relationship issues, aptitudes and problem 
areas, generally with the aim of helping the client to make the best of their life.  There 
are however many different ways in which astrology can be applied and some examples 
of this work will be cited in chapters 4 to 7.   
 
The particular significance of the focus on horoscopic astrology is that Sun-sign 
astrology – the simplified form usually encountered in newspapers and magazines, 
which is often conflated with astrology per se, but which has only emerged since 1930 – 
is thereby bypassed.8   In taking this approach I follow the anthropologist of astrology 
Alie Bird who defined the research subject for her thesis as ‘real astrology, a term I use 
                                                 
7 The history and usage of the term ‘horoscopic astrology’ will be discussed in chapter 2. 
8 Failures amongst some of astrology’s critics to discriminate between Sun-sign columns and horoscopic 
astrology will be cited in chapter 3.  The origin of, and controversy surrounding, the contemporary 
newspaper Sun-sign column is discussed at e.g. Campion, Prophecy, Cosmology particularly chapter 7 
(pp. 132 – 151); Kim Farnell, Flirting with the Zodiac (Bournemouth: Wessex Astrologer, 2007) pp.117 – 
142; Campion, Medieval and Modern Worlds, pp. 259 – 261. 
 
 
 
5 
to differentiate it from its lightweight relative which, as a result of the widespread media 
exposure enjoyed by its Sun-sign horoscopes and entertainment forecasting, constitutes 
the public’s idea of what astrology is.’9  This also concords with the suggestion by one 
of astrology’s most eminent critics, Geoffrey Dean (a technical writer and editor with a 
PhD in analytical chemistry) that in order to ‘rise above the present shouting match’ 
between advocates and critics of astrology, ‘We have to go beyond the popular 
astrology of fairground tents and newspaper columns and seek out the serious astrology 
of consulting rooms and learned journals.’10  In similar vein Paul Thagard, a 
philosopher and critic of astrology, argued:  
 
It would be most unfair to evaluate astrology by reference to the daily horoscopes found in 
newspapers and popular magazines.  These horoscopes deal only with sun signs, whereas a full 
horoscope makes reference to the “influences” also of the moon and the planets, while also 
discussing the ascendant sign and other matters.’11 
  
The validity of Sun-sign work is in itself a matter of disagreement between astrologers.  
For instance the astrologer Dennis Elwell (1930 – 2014) stated that he would never 
write such a column because ‘I would fear for my immortal soul.  I think a special place 
in hell is being warmed over for those who cynically trivialise a great truth...’12  On the 
other side of the argument, the historian and anthropologist of astrology Nicholas 
Campion argued that ‘Sun-sign astrology is no less real than any other application of 
judicial astrology.’13   
 
This debate notwithstanding, my focus in this thesis will be upon astrology in the sense 
of horoscopic astrology.  By doing this I bypass the debate regarding Sun-sign astrology 
to focus on the form that – as has just been seen – is often taken to hold the most 
promise as a source of truth.   
 
                                                 
9 Bird (2006), p.80. Original emphasis. 
10 Geoffrey Dean, ‘Does Astrology Need to be True?  Part 1: A Look at the Real Thing’ Skeptical 
Inquirer Vol. 11 No. 2 (Winter 1986-7), p.167.  
11 Paul R. Thagard, ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1: Contributed Papers (1978), p. 223. 
12 Dennis Elwell quoted in Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 36 
13 Nicholas Campion quoted in Phillipson Astrology Year Zero, p. 36.  The significance of ‘judicial 
astrology’ will be explored in chapter 3. 
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When discussing perspectives on astrology’s truth-status I will use the terms ‘advocates 
of astrology’ and ‘critics of astrology’ (shortened on occasion to ‘advocates’ and 
‘critics’) to refer, respectively to: commentators who argue that astrology can be a 
source of significant truth; and commentators who contend that astrology as currently 
practised is not a source of significant truth.  The term ‘critics’ is used in preference to 
‘sceptics’ (‘skeptics’ in American usage), a term often used in self-reference by critics 
of astrology.14  The term harks back to Pyrrhonian scepticism, which advocated the 
withholding of all belief – as when, for instance, Sextus Empiricus (c. 160 – 210 CE) 
asserted, ‘we neither deny nor affirm anything.’15  In a discussion of scepticism, 
Campion cited an instance of astrological research being dismissed out of hand and 
remarked, ‘this is not so much scepticism as negative dogmatism’.16  In the light of such 
critiques (more will be considered in chapters 4 and 6), it seems best to withhold the 
term ‘sceptic’ because to use it is, implicitly, to prejudge the status of the critics’ 
positions.  The use of the binary pair of terms – ‘advocates’ and ‘critics’ – should not be 
allowed to obscure the multiplicity of positions that exists amongst all commentators on 
astrology: the picture is complex, as has already emerged somewhat and as will emerge 
further as the thesis progresses. 
 
Astrology enjoys a level of popularity in modern society that justifies continuing 
enquiry into the issues it raises.  For instance Gallup polls in America, Canada and the 
UK, conducted in 2005, suggest that 25% of people in each country believe in 
‘Astrology, or that the stars and planets can affect people’s lives’.17 Further, Campion 
suggested that this figure may be an underestimate and – whilst acknowledging the 
flexibility of the term ‘belief’ – argued that polls showing 70% of people to believe in 
astrology may be nearer the mark, depending on how the question is asked. In all 
                                                 
14 As seen for example in the name of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry and its journal, Skeptical 
Inquirer (http://www.csicop.org/si - checked 15th April 2017) which are regularly critical of astrology. 
15 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 1.4 (this translation: Benson Mates, The Skeptic Way: 
Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 90. 
16 Nicholas Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion in the Modern West: Prophecy, Cosmology and the 
New Age Movement (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) p. 95. 
17 Alec Gallup, Frank Newport (eds.), The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2005 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007)  p.221. Repeated at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/19558/paranormal-beliefs-come-
supernaturally-some.aspx (checked 12th August 2019). Campion referred to earlier polls in the UK, USA 
and France which also yielded a 25% acceptance rate for astrology: Campion, Astrology and Popular 
Religion, p.1 & p.157 – full analysis of sources is in the note to table 11.5 at p.157. 
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events, he remarked, astrology had become ‘an essential part of the language of popular 
culture and mass psychology.’18   
 
1.3  An Underlying Quandary   
 
In order to frame a quandary that informs this thesis, two responses to astrology need to 
be stated: First, many commentators consider it impossible that astrology could provide 
any significant truth, and regard this as overwhelmingly obvious; Second, many people 
find that when it is used, astrology seems to provide significantly truthful information.  
Although a fuller treatment of both issues awaits in subsequent chapters, both need to be 
examined briefly now, for the dilemma they constitute is central.   
 
1.3.1 Astrology as an ‘Enemy of Truth’ 
 
In a newspaper article published in 1995, the biologist and writer on science Richard 
Dawkins argued that ‘astrology is neither harmless nor fun, and... we should fight it 
seriously as an enemy of truth.’19  Although Dawkins presented arguments intended to 
demonstrate the impossibility of astrology providing truth, he also regarded this case as 
sufficiently obvious that he concluded the article by asking, ‘Why, actually, are 
professional astrologers not jailed for fraud?’20  The implication here seems to be that 
no contemporary Westerner in their right minds could seriously regard astrology as a 
means of gaining true information.  Dawkins’ arguments will be considered in the 
following chapters; for the purposes of this introduction the significant point is that his 
is a common attitude.  Thus when astrology is discussed in the media, writers often 
assume that it can and should be treated dismissively.  For instance:  
 
…the astrologers’ failure [to predict 9/11] will not surprise anyone acquainted with the essential 
idiocy of their occupation…21 
 
                                                 
18 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p.160. Discussion of the 70% figure particularly at p. 133, 
pp. 150 – 165. 
19 Richard Dawkins, ‘The Real Romance in the Stars’, Independent on Sunday, 31 December 1995, p.18.  
The article was substantially repeated in chapter 6 of Dawkins’ Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, 
Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder (London: Allen Lane, 1998). 
20 Dawkins, ‘Real Romance’, p.18. 
21 Bennett, Catherine, ‘Is Bin Laden a Pisces – or is he Cancer?’, Guardian, 13th December 2001, p.5. 
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Or, again: 
 
The infection [i.e. astrology] has spread, way beyond the intellectual slums in which it had its 
origins, to neighbourhoods that would once have been immune. The Observer touts a special 
astrological feature… In The Guardian's Media section, a peerlessly vacuous feature brings 
astrological flummery to the world of commerce… That this is a disease – a kind of scabies of 
the intellect – seems unarguable to me, even if its most serious consequence is mere mental 
disfigurement.22 
 
Many more examples could be cited.  The reaction against astrology by some 
commentators is so extreme that the question arises, whether astrology is then treated as 
heresy against a scientific world-view.  I have argued that this is the case in a recent 
article.23  Given the vehemence with which it is often dismissed, it seems necessary to 
dwell on the fact that, experientially, astrology can at least seem efficacious. 
 
1.3.2 Astrology Seems to Work 
 
Geoffrey Dean is one of the best-informed critics of astrology, having learned and 
practised horoscopic astrology and devoted many years to its analysis from a scientific 
perspective.  His status as an investigator, and critic, of astrology was established by the 
publication in 1977 of Recent Advances in Natal Astrology and he has authored and co-
authored many texts on astrology from then to date.24  He has been described as 
‘probably the leading critical investigator of astrology in the world’.25  Together with 
two of his fellow critics of astrology, Arthur Mather and Rudolf Smit, he stated that in 
the early days of their involvement with astrology,  
                                                 
22 Thomas Sutcliffe, ‘It’s in the Stars’, Independent, 9th January 2002. This article is quoted in Roy Willis 
and Patrick Curry, Astrology, Science and Culture (Oxford: Berg, 2004), p.96. 
23 Garry Phillipson, ‘Astrology as Heresy in Contemporary Belief’ Journal for the Study of Religion, 
Nature and Culture 13.1 (2019), pp. 12 – 30. 
24 Geoffrey Dean, assisted by Arthur Mather and 52 collaborators, Recent Advances in Natal Astrology: A 
Critical Review, 1900 – 1976 (Subiaco, Western Australia: Analogic, 1977). A note on usage: In addition 
to some texts written under his own name, Geoffrey Dean has also co-written texts on astrology, and 
participated in collaborative interviews on astrology, with a number of different co-authors in various 
combinations.  The full names of the individuals involved in each of the numerous articles etc. to be cited 
in this thesis would impair its readability were they to be cited fully in the body text at each citation.  For 
texts in which multiple individuals collaborated with Dean, I will generally therefore use ‘Dean et al’ to 
refer to all the groups in question, with more details of the contributors in the relevant footnotes. 
25 Bryan Farha in Bryan Farha (ed.), Pseudoscience and Deception: The Smoke and Mirrors of 
Paranormal Claims (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2014)  p. 171. Farha attributed the 
quotation to the professor of philosophy and secular humanist Paul Kurtz (1925 – 2012) but without a 
reference and I have not been able to verify this attribution.  
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…we calculated charts, saw that they seemed to work, and were hooked.  Astrology became our 
passion… we became more and more convinced that astrology worked.  Nothing we saw or 
experienced told us otherwise.  Astrologers were generally nice people, they seemed intelligent 
and well-educated, they spoke from the heart, and they based everything on practical 
experience.26 
 
And yet, when they began to test astrology, ‘We were dismayed to find that artifacts and 
errors seemed to explain everything.  Our beautiful world of astrology began to 
collapse.’27  Regardless of their eventual disillusionment, these eminent critics have 
known the experience that astrology works, or at least seems to work.   
 
The astrologer Deborah Houlding began with an attitude of disbelief towards astrology.  
She told me that, before exploring the subject at all, ‘I saw astrology as something only 
the “loopy set” believed in.’28  Even after some time learning and practising astrology in 
an evening class, ‘I was convinced that people placed too much emphasis on comments 
that essentially applied to everyone. I was very sceptical…’29  For two years after her 
introduction to astrology she continued ‘suspending my disbelief for the sake of the 
pleasure it gave me to study it’, at the end of which period, ‘I remember being struck by 
the realisation that astrology actually works! […] It was a very powerful moment in 
which I let go of my innate disbelief, suddenly realised I loved astrology, and trusted it 
completely.’30  In Houlding’s case, the conviction of astrology’s efficacy was slow to 
arise and did so in the face of her self-diagnosed scepticism. 
 
A similar case is the astrologer Bernadette Brady, who said that her initial attitude 
towards astrology was that ‘the whole thing was a load of garbage’.31  Having acquired 
an astrology book for the astronomical data it contained, she followed its instructions on 
how to calculate and interpret horoscopes.  She recalled: ‘I took the attitude of, “I’m 
going to disprove this.”’ After comparing numerous horoscopes to the people they were 
                                                 
26 Geoffrey Dean, Arthur Mather and Rudolf Smit describing their experience in Phillipson, Astrology 
Year Zero, p.125.  Although the interview was with five critics of astrology, they explained on the page 
cited that three of them - Dean, Mather and Smit - actually learned astrology. 
27 Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.126. 
28 Deborah Houlding, interview 2005. 
29 Deborah Houlding, interview 2005. 
30 Deborah Houlding, interview 2005. 
31 Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.21 
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for, however, she found that ‘The damned stuff kept working – that’s what really 
annoyed me.’32 
 
Where Dean, Mather and Smit moved from the position that astrology worked, to the 
position that it only seemed to work, Houlding and Brady followed a diametrically 
opposed trajectory, arriving at a conviction that astrology worked.  In each case, a 
dilemma arose from the experience that astrology seemed to deliver true statements, 
whilst at the same time the provenance of those statements was inherently implausible 
and problematic as a source of truth.  The philosophical stresses contained in that 
dilemma are the context for this thesis.  One consequence of their existence is the 
development of competing accounts of what astrology is and how, therefore, its truth 
should be evaluated. 
 
1.4   Two Versions of Astrology: as Science, and as Divination 
 
Different accounts of astrology’s nature may entail different approaches to the 
evaluation of its truth-status.  In this thesis I will distinguish between two accounts: 
astrology-as-science, and astrology-as-divination.  This distinction is manifest in the 
way the subject is defined in two contemporary encyclopaedias: Wikipedia states that 
‘Astrology is now recognized to be pseudoscience’ – which assumes that astrology 
could only be a science or a failed attempt at science – whilst the Encyclopedia 
Britannica’s definition begins, ‘Astrology, type of divination…’33  There is a range of 
opinions amongst astrologers, exemplified in Campion’s surveys which show that the 
percentage of astrologers at conferences who would define the subject as ‘a science’ 
varied with different cohorts from 24.5% to 87.5%, whilst those who would define it as 
‘a form of divination’ ranged from 15.2% to 72.9%.34   
 
In order to characterise these different accounts I will draw particularly on the thought 
of the astrologer, and philosopher of astrology, Geoffrey Cornelius. The significance of 
                                                 
32 Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.21 
33 Wikipedia contributors, 'Astrology', Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Astrology&oldid=909527658 (accessed 12 August 2019); 
Pingree, David E., and Robert Andrew Gilbert, ‘Astrology’,  Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/astrology (accessed 12th August 2019). 
34 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 178 
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Cornelius’s work is suggested by the anthropologist Roy Willis’s remark that his 
encounter with contemporary Western astrology, under the influence of Cornelius’s 
book The Moment of Astrology 
 
led me into an encounter with a set of ideas, indeed a whole climate of theories and paradigm-
challenging insights, strangely congruent with the philosophical radicalism associated with those 
anthropologists, including myself, who are presently seeking to interpret their first-hand 
experience of ‘spirit’ phenomena in Africa and elsewhere.35 
 
The astrologer, philosopher of astrology and historian of astrology Robert Hand wrote 
that The Moment of Astrology is: 
 
One of the most important astrological books of our time. It not only reshapes the view of 
astrology that astrologers might have; it challenges the entire notion of what constitutes knowing 
and knowledge in our civilization. It shows that astrology is not only important in and of itself, 
but also for what it reveals about the nature of truth and our experience of it in general.36 
 
The work of Cornelius, his partner Maggie Hyde, and the organisation they founded – 
‘The Company of Astrologers’ – is cited in several recent doctoral theses about 
astrology including those by Bird, Brockbank, Greenbaum, and Munk.37  The 
distinction between astrology-as-science, and astrology-as-divination, is central in 
Cornelius’s work.38  To take astrology as science first: Cornelius argues that this 
approach ‘seeks a “hard science” definition for astrology.  The orientation is towards 
physics, and/or empirical psychology, and the favoured methodology is statistics.’39  
 
The definition of science, and its relationship to theories of truth and to astrology, is 
complex and will be discussed in detail in this thesis, particularly in chapters 4 and 5.  
                                                 
35 Roy Willis in Willis & Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 23. 
36 Robert Hand quoted in: Geoffrey Cornelius, The Moment of Astrology (2nd edn.) (Bournemouth: 
Wessex Astrologer, 2003), back cover. 
37 E.g. Bird (2006) recounted her experience of studying with the Company of Astrologers, pp. 31 – 5; 
Brockbank (2011) introduced Cornelius and Hyde’s conception of astrology-as-divination, pp. 57 – 9;  
Dorian Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology (unpublished thesis, The Warburg Institute, 
University of London, 2009) cited Cornelius on astrology-as-divination, p. 91 n. 261 and p. 251 n. 179, as 
did Munk (2007), p. 111. 
38 Posited in these terms at: Geoffrey Cornelius, Maggie Hyde and Chris Webster, Astrology for 
Beginners (Cambridge: Icon, 1995) and discussed in detail throughout Cornelius, Moment of Astrology. 
39 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.45. (Cornelius uses the term ‘scientific astrology’ here; this is a 
cognate of ‘astrology as science’.) 
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For now, the salient feature of science vis-à-vis astrology can be illustrated by reference 
to a characterisation by the philosopher of science Karl Popper (1902 - 94) of what 
constitutes a scientific statement: 
 
Only when certain events recur in accordance with rules or regularities, as is the case with 
repeatable experiments, can our observations be tested – in principle – by anyone.  We do not 
take even our own observations quite seriously, or accept them as scientific observations, until 
we have repeated and tested them.  Only by such repetitions can we convince ourselves that we 
are not dealing with mere isolated ‘coincidence’, but with events which, on account of their 
regularity and reproducibility, are in principle inter-subjectively testable.40 
 
If this were the only way of thinking about the truth of astrology, the role of philosophy 
as regards astrology’s truth-status would be the secondary one of reviewing the design 
of tests and the analysis of their results.  The primary role would belong to statistical 
analysis.   
 
Cornelius, while not denying the possibility that scientific analysis of astrological data 
may yield true information, insists that the view of astrology as divination is more 
fundamental: ‘the main body of astrology’s practice, and especially the interpretation of 
horoscopes, is properly to be understood as a form of divination.  It is divination despite 
all appearances of objectivity and natural law.’41  The opposition that Cornelius thus 
posits between divination on one side and ‘objectivity and natural law’ on the other is 
key to the definition of ‘divination’ as he uses the term.  A definition of divination from 
Curry, which is consonant with that of Cornelius, will serve to draw out the implications 
of the view of astrology-as-divination: 
   
divination is a ritual (synchronically) and a tradition (diachronically) constituted by, and 
constituting, an ongoing dialogue with more-than-human agents.  It is enacted in order to ask 
them for guidance and/or discern their will in the matter at hand, to enable them to respond, and 
                                                 
40 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Routledge, 2002 [1959 for first English 
edition; 1935 for first publication as Logik der Forschung]) p.23. Popper suggests that his ideas follow 
those of Kant, though the relationship is not entirely as he thought – see Sergio L. de C. Fernandes (ed. 
Robert S. Cohen), Foundations of Objective Knowledge: The Relations of Popper’s Theory of  
Knowledge to that of Kant (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1985) pp. 165-67. 
41 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. xxii. 
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to permit intelligible interpretation of the response.  An indefeasible part of the ritual, following 
from those requirements, is an act of aleatory randomization.42 
 
The model of dialogue with ‘more-than-human-agents’ would invalidate inter-
subjective testing of astrological readings, for the person using divination under this 
account is not simply accessing information – as if reading the results of a search on 
Google – but is entering into dialogue, which is liable to change dependent on the 
approach of each party to the dialogue and on the nature, consequently unique, of that 
interaction.  Hence, for instance, Cornelius asserted that ‘the methods of interpretation 
given in divinatory systems such as the I Ching can hardly be compared with the 
universal laws sought in science, since the significance of each divination lies precisely 
in the unique circumstances in which the case arises.’43  It is this quality of uniqueness 
that characterises divination for Cornelius – as when, for instance, he stated that ‘the 
principle of the unique case... is at the heart of divinatory astrology.  It refers to that 
experience of reality that is essentially and of its nature irreducible to quantification.’44  
He defined this as antithetical to statistical analysis: ‘Whatever significance is involved 
[in divinatory interpretation of a horoscope], it is not amenable to scientific verification, 
and it is completely unreplicable.  The significance of the unique case exists once and 
once only in the context in which it is interpreted.’45  This definition characterises 
divination, and therefore much of astrology, as fundamentally different from science in 
Popper’s definition; Cornelius’s ‘unique case’ precisely excludes Popper’s ‘events 
which, on account of their regularity and reproducibility, are in principle inter-
subjectively testable.’46 
 
To the extent that it is seen as divination, astrology is close to being a form of religious 
practice.  This can be seen when, for instance, Cornelius suggested that ‘In its 
transmission from the Greeks astrology achieves the imagination of an ensouled cosmos 
revealing divine intention (its why)’.47  Further, that ‘Divination has always been a 
companion of practical philosophy or practical religion’; and, that ‘Christians and 
                                                 
42 Patrick Curry, ‘Embodiment, Alterity and Agency’ in Patrick Curry (ed.), Divination: Perspectives for 
a New Millennium (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp.114-5. 
43 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, pp.186-7. 
44 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 190 
45 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 195 
46 Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 23. 
47 Cornelius, Field of Omens, p.8. 
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astrologers share “the task of interpreting the ‘divine sign’, which is the original literal 
meaning of divination.”’48  The relevance of religious thought to astrology will be 
particularly focused on in chapter 6. 
 
1.5   Structure and Methodology of this Thesis 
 
The different perspectives on what astrology is, and how its truth-status should therefore 
be evaluated, raise several structural and methodological challenges.  I will now 
consider these and the approach I have taken.   
 
1.5.1   Interdisciplinarity; Nomothetic/Idiographic Distinction 
 
In order for it to be capable of investigating the truth-status of astrology, this is 
necessarily an interdisciplinary thesis.  It involves ethnography, epistemology, 
metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion.  The benefits of an 
interdisciplinary approach were identified by the researcher in theology Fiona Darroch 
as overcoming ‘blindness to alternative modes of analysis... by balancing between two 
or more positions, by speaking across several discourses, and by listening to the 
dialogue taking place across disciplinary borders.’49 
 
The primary division to be negotiated is that between the views of astrology-as-science, 
and astrology-as-divination.  Several dichotomies could be cited that offer parallels; the 
one I shall focus on is the distinction posited by the German philosopher Wilhelm 
Windelband (1848 – 1915) between nomothetic and idiographic approaches.50  The 
terms are derived from the Greek words ‘nomos’ meaning ‘law’, and ‘idios’ meaning 
‘private’.  In Windelband’s original definition, both are modes of scientific thought, 
oriented towards ‘the general in the form of the law of nature or the particular in the 
                                                 
48 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.278; Cornelius, Field of Omens, p.206. 
49 Fiona Darroch, Memory and Myth: Postcolonial Religion in Contemporary Guyanese Fiction and 
Poetry (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009) pp. 19 - 20. 
50 Wilhelm Windelband (tr. Guy Oakes), ‘Rectorial Address, Strasbourg, 1894’ History and Theory Vol. 
19, No. 2 (Feb. 1980), pp. 169 – 185. Source of translated text: Wilhelm Windelband, ‘Geschichte und 
Naturwissenschaft’ Präludien Band 2 (Tübingen: Möhr, 1924) pp. 136 – 160. 
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form of the historically defined structure’ in the cases of nomothetic and idiographic 
approaches respectively.51 
 
The definition of the terms acquired a life of its own after Windelband’s original 
formulation.  For him, ‘this methodological dichotomy classifies only modes of 
investigation, not the contents of knowledge itself.’52  As Charles Bambach put it, the 
terms were intended as ‘methodological distinctions, not absolute ones.’53  Subsequent 
usage has however seen an interpretative drift such that the terms have tended to 
become descriptors of irreducible characteristics of the world.  This approach was 
evident when, for instance, the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein wrote: 
 
The argument of the idiographic school is the ancient doctrine that ‘all is flux’.  If everything is 
always changing, then any generalization purporting to apply to two or more presumably 
comparable phenomena is never true... Conversely, the argument of the nomothetic school is that 
it is manifest that the real world (including the social world) is not a set of random happenings.  
If so, there must be rules that describe ‘regularities’, in which case there is a domain for 
scientific activity.’54 
 
Wallerstein thus represented the idiographic-nomothetic distinction as referring to 
versions of how the world really is; as an ontological issue, therefore.  This approach 
can also be seen in a discussion of prayer and miracle from the professor of psychology 
Richard L. Gorsuch.  He remarked that in Christianity, ‘God operates on an idiographic, 
individual level as well as on the level of nomothetic law.’55  In this analysis science is 
intrinsically incapable of judging the truth-status of acts of God, because ‘the method of 
science is replication.  If it replicates, then a scientific conclusion can be drawn.  If it 
does not replicate, then no scientific conclusion can be drawn.  By definition, God’s 
individual acts do not replicate.  So science can never identify them...’56  It would be 
possible to extrapolate from Gorsuch’s understanding of prayer in terms of ‘idiographic 
truth’, to an understanding of astrology-as-divination which would thereby be 
                                                 
51 Windelband, Rectorial Address, p. 175. 
52 Windelband, Rectorial Address, p. 175. 
53 Charles Bambach, ‘Neo-Kantianism’ in Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of 
History and Historiography (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) p. 480. 
54 Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘World-Systems Analysis’ in Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H. Turner (eds.), 
Social Theory Today (Stanford University Press, CA, 1987) p. 314. 
55 Richard L. Gorsuch, Integrating Psychology and Spirituality? (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002) p. 65. 
56 Gorsuch, Integrating Psychology, pp. 65 – 66. 
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characterised as existing beyond the epistemological jurisprudence of science.57  This 
possibility will be further discussed in chapter 2.  In terms of the structure and 
methodology of this thesis, in order accurately to characterise the extant discussion it is 
necessary to allow the possibility that idiographic truth may be relevant in this way; it is 
also necessary to allow that the truth-status of astrology can and should be entirely 
understood within a nomothetic framework.  Both views are – as will be shown – found 
in discussions of astrology’s truth-status, and a genuinely interdisciplinary approach 
must therefore entertain both possibilities, without prejudgement.  
 
1.5.2 Inadequacies of Extant Dialogue 
 
There has been a failure of dialogue between astrologers and their critics, arising largely 
from their different orientations towards the subject.  Many astrologers are not 
especially interested by the question of why astrology would work, nor by the 
consequences of this for its truth.  This lack of interest was remarked upon by the 
astrologer Robert Hand in 1989.  Speaking at a conference of astrologers, he 
acknowledged that many of Geoffrey Dean’s criticisms of astrology were valid, and 
continued: ‘We do not in fact formulate any alternative to conventional scientific 
investigation.  The reason is very simple.  Most of us aren’t scientists.  Most of us aren’t 
philosophers.  Most of us are people who apply a craft at a rather practical level.’58  The 
tendency of astrologers not to investigate astrology at a philosophical level was also 
reported by Alie Bird: ‘In my experience, the majority of practical astrologers do not 
spend much – if any – time assessing their practice from an exterior perspective as a 
social commentator might.’59  She judged that, as a consequence of this, astrologers 
often invoked science as the basis for astrology without having fully thought through 
the consequences of this claim: ‘many astrologers, if cornered by persistent sceptics at 
parties, will invoke science as an uncertain ally rather than admit to the divinatory 
nature of their practice.’60  
                                                 
57 The term ‘idiographic truth’ is used at e.g. Gorsuch, Integrating Psychology, p. 53; John Swinton and 
Harriet Mowat, Practical Theology and Qualitative Research (2nd edn.) (London: SCM Press, 2016) p. 
42. 
58 Robert Hand, ‘The Proper Relationship of Astrology and Science – Part II. The 1989 Carter Memorial 
Lecture.’ The Astrological Journal Vol. XXXII no. 2 (March/April 1990) p.99 
59 Bird, Astrology in Education, p.91. 
60 Bird, Astrology in Education, p. 111. 
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A related issue is that the way astrologers talk about astrology is potentially misleading.  
Thus for example Nick Campion suggested to the influential astrologer Liz Greene that 
under her understanding of astrology, it would be incorrect for astrologers to say that 
they are having a bad time because of Saturn’s current position in the sky (the planet’s 
‘transit’).  Greene replied: ‘Well, I say it too.  But I know what I mean when I say it.  To 
talk like that doesn’t really communicate what is going on.  It is shorthand.  We don’t 
have a bad time because of a transit.  The transit is just a symbolic signature of what we 
are experiencing.’61  A similar issue, in discussions amongst magicians rather than 
astrologers, was noted by Luhrmann in her study of members of a magical order in the 
contemporary West: 
 
All participants seem to have somewhat different ideas about what rituals do and why, and their 
differences are not sufficiently troublesome to cause any member of the group much concern… 
It is foolish to think of members of these groups as individually maintaining some list of 
theoretical assumptions even when the assumptions seem to be explicit.  They talk at some times 
as if one particular way of characterizing the world were correct, and within certain limits they 
are not severely challenged.  But the assumptions which remarks imply are not always the exact 
form of the premises for which the magician would argue.62 
 
For astrologers, as for Luhrmann’s magicians, prevalent modes of discourse can 
unintentionally obfuscate the nature of the subject.  This makes it difficult to evaluate 
astrology’s truth-status in a way that is consonant with astrologers’ views, because those 
views are disparate and in many cases not completely articulated.   
 
On the side of astrology’s critics, a major problem faced by anyone who would address 
the failure of dialogue identified above is that in many cases it is seen as acceptable to 
dismiss astrology as false in a peremptory fashion.  Further examples of this will be 
furnished in chapter 3 through the philosopher Saul Kripke, and in chapter 4 through the 
physicist David Mermin.  For the purposes of this chapter it will suffice to observe that 
astrology is often treated dismissively, with no acknowledgement of the experience of 
                                                 
61 Liz Greene, Nicholas Campion (interviewer), ‘An Interview with Liz Greene – Part Two: The Lens of 
Astrology’, The Mountain Astrologer (Issue 101, Feb/Mar 2002) pp. 39. 
62 T. M. Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) p.164. 
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astrologers that astrology seems to work, and that this pre-empts dialogue.  I should add 
that this characterisation does not apply to all critics of astrology, and in this thesis I 
will draw heavily on commentators who could not reasonably be accused of this failing. 
 
1.5.3 Interviews, and the need for them 
 
As a way of addressing the lack of clarity – noted above - in much astrological 
discourse about how astrology is believed to work, I have recorded forty interviews 
with astrologers and with critics of astrology to supplement the existing literature.  
These were recorded between June 2004 and March 2008 and vary in length between 
2,000 and 12,000 words.  The function of the interviews in this thesis is to exemplify 
the variety of perspectives in existence amongst astrologers and critics towards 
astrology’s truth-status – following the philosopher and psychologist William James 
(1842 – 1910) when he noted, apropos his extensive use of first-person accounts in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience: “examples will bring this home to one better than 
abstract description…”63.   
 
There is a plurality of incompatible positions regarding astrology, and a factor in my 
choice of participants was a desire to document this variety of perspectives, so as to 
give the reader a living sense of the range of perspectives in existence. I therefore 
sought out interviewees with as broad a range of views as possible.  In addition to direct 
approaches to individuals, invitations were placed in astrological magazines from the 
USA and UK – respectively, The Mountain Astrologer and The Astrological Journal - 
for astrologers who would be willing to answer some questions.   
 
The number of astrologers interviewed is considerably greater than the number of critics 
– thirty-eight astrologers to five critics.  (The apparent discrepancy between these 
figures and the total of forty interviews is accounted for by the fact that four critics 
collaborated on one interview.) 
 
                                                 
63 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (London: Penguin, 
1985 [1902]) p.64. 
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I interviewed more astrologers than critics for two reasons.  First, as I knew from 
recording the interviews for my book Astrology in the Year Zero, there is greater variety 
and sometimes less clarity in astrologers’ discussion of astrology’s truth-status; both 
factors which argue in favour of a larger number of respondents.  Second, I chose to 
interview critics who have some experience of astrology.  In addition to interviews 
recorded specifically for this thesis I have also drawn on the interviews (twenty-eight in 
total) recorded for my book, provided the respondents specifically gave permission for 
me to use the interviews in subsequent work. 
 
1.5.4 Interviews: Ethical Considerations 
 
The ethical issues surrounding interviews in this field are complex.  In characterising 
the issues facing an ethnographic study of astrologers Kirstine Munk quoted the 
anthropologist Michael Jackson: 
 
In every human society, the range of experiences that are socially acknowledged and named is 
always much narrower than the range of experiences that people actually have.  By implication, 
no worldview ever encompasses or covers the plenitude of what is actually lived, felt, imagined, 
thought.  The vantage points from which we customarily view the world are, as William James 
puts it, “fringed forever by a more” that outstrips and outruns them.64 
 
In this context, Munk suggested that astrological consultations provide ‘a setting 
enabling people to talk about issues that otherwise rarely surface in everyday 
conversation’ and remarked on the need to present ‘these marginal experiences’ in such 
a way as to ‘honour the autonomy and vulnerability of the people who have lent me 
their stories.’65  This expresses very well my perspective in interviewing both 
astrologers and critics of astrology, and in this study I have several measures in place to 
ensure as far as possible that my respondents are treated with respect, which I will now 
describe. 
 
                                                 
64 Michael Jackson, The Politics of Storytelling: Variations on a Theme by Hannah Arendt (2nd edn.)  
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2013) pp. 41 – 2. Cited in Munk, Signs of the Times, p. 61 n. 
84 (Munk refers to the first edition of the text from 2002). The quotation from James is from: William 
James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to ‘Pragmatism’ in: William James, Bruce Kuklick (ed.), William 
James: Writings 1902 – 1910 (New York, NY: The Library of America, 1987 [1909]) p. 888. 
65 Munk, Signs of the Times, p. 61. 
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The only material used to characterise the positions of astrologers and their critics are 
those made during interviews.  No material gathered in participant-observer mode (for 
instance in social gatherings of astrologers) is included.  In the context of this thesis, the 
approach of only quoting from interviews serves two purposes: by not including 
statements from people who were ‘off guard’ an ethical safeguard is provided; also, it 
tends to preclude ‘shorthand’ statements – the kind referred to by Liz Greene in section 
1.5.2 above – which astrologers might use between themselves but which they would 
not take to be accurate models of what astrology is and how its truth-status should be 
characterised.  In addition, each interviewee was able to review a transcript of their 
interview and make any changes they wished before giving permission for it to be used.  
This measure provides a further safeguard at both ethical and philosophical levels, 
helping to ensure that interviews would only contain material the interviewee was 
happy to espouse in the public domain.   
 
When I first mooted an interview to each potential respondent, I told them that they 
would have the opportunity to read through it and make any changes and deletions they 
wanted; that we could pass over any question they preferred not to answer; and further, 
that the interview would not be used by me in any way at all unless they gave their 
imprimatur on my ‘Interview Authority Form’.  The form gave interviewees the option 
to limit exposure of the interview to my thesis only, or to include the option that it could 
be used in other research, and/or to include the option of separate publication.  
Interviewees were also given the option to appear anonymously in each context. 
 
The format of the interviews is open-ended and semi-structured: that is to say, I had 
some questions that I wanted to ask each informant, together with a range of additional 
questions arising from their backgrounds and their responses to questions during the 
interview.66  Some interviews took place in person and some were conducted via e-mail.  
The thinking behind the methodology employed is as follows: I am not trying to model 
a representative population of astrologers.  Given the volatility of ideas regarding 
astrology suggested here, the approach taken to the interviews is qualitative, in line with 
Bryman’s account whereby  
                                                 
66 The terms ‘open-ended’ and ‘semi-structured’ are used here as at e.g. H. Russell Bernard, Research 
Methods in Anthropology – Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Lanham MD: AltaMira, 2006), 
pp.268-70 & p.212 respectively. 
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the qualitative researcher frequently conducts research in a specific milieu (a case study) whose 
representativeness is unknown and probably unknowable, so that the generalizability of such 
findings is also unknown.67 
 
The purpose of this qualitative approach is identified by Seidman:   
 
Because hypotheses are not being tested, the issue is not whether the researcher can generalise 
the finding of an interview study to a broader population.  Instead the researcher’s task is to 
present the experience of the people he or she interviews…so that those who read the study can 
connect to that experience, learn how it is constituted and deepen their understanding of the 
issues it reflects.68 
 
The approach taken with the interviews can be further characterised as 
phenomenological – that is, attempting to ‘describe and analyse the culture and 
behaviour of humans and their groups from the point of view of those being studied’ as 
Bryman puts it.69  Further, it is a ‘multi-sited’ approach in the straightforward sense that 
my interviewees do not live in the same geographical location, but more profoundly, 
that there are differences and nuances in the views of each that reveal them as believing 
they live in different universes.70  In the face of such a pluralistic and mutable field of 
study, an approach which does not attempt to model a representative population is 
appropriate and indeed inevitable.   
 
1.5.5 Reflexivity 
 
The professor of religious studies June O’Connor has encapsulated the role of 
reflexivity in studies such as this: ‘It’s not enough to tell me what you see.  I want to 
know where you are standing as you see and speak, and also why you stand there.’71  
                                                 
67 Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 
p.100. 
68 Irving Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research : A Guide for Researchers in Education and the 
Social Sciences (4th edn.) (New York NY: Teachers College Press, 2013), p.54. 
69 Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality, p.46. 
70 ‘Multi-sited’ is used in this way by e.g. George E. Marcus, ‘Ethnography in/of the World System: The 
Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography’ in Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol.24, 1995, p.95-117. 
71 June O’Connor, ‘The Epistemological Significance of Feminist Research in Religion’ in Ursula King 
(ed.), Religion and Gender (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) p. 48. This statement is discussed in relation to 
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The philosopher of anthropology and science Mark Risjord characterised reflexivity as 
‘a response to the recognition that, in the social sciences, the researchers are subject to 
the very same social forces they are studying... The claim is that if the interpreter can 
(somehow) recognize and reflect on these background conditions of the research, the 
research will be more epistemologically robust.’72  The positive function of reflexivity 
as part of the interview process has been asserted in recent theses in which astrologers 
were interviewed by Campion, Bird and Brady.73    
 
The particular focus of this study renders reflexivity problematic in the same way as has 
been seen above with the idiographic/nomothetic distinction; it would be easy to take a 
position that would pre-empt elements of the discussion that this thesis aims to develop.  
The reason for this is that a reflexive approach acknowledges and establishes the 
relevance of subjective knowing; this emerged for instance when the professor of 
medical humanities and religious studies David J. Hufford suggested that the central 
point of reflexivity is that ‘all knowing is subjective’ and that ‘Acknowledging the 
subjectivity of knowledge grants that points of view, perspectives, are inevitably a part 
of knowing.’ 74 
 
To take this as an unquestioned tenet of this study would be premature, insofar as the 
relevance of subjective knowing is in itself a central point of contention.  Thus for 
example Bricmont and Sokal, in discussing reflexivity, asserted: 
 
it seems to us that if sociologists start trying to explain why they hold their own beliefs without 
taking into account the evidence that those beliefs are somehow better or more objective than 
those of their critics, then we simply move from error to absurdity.75 
 
                                                                                                                                               
reflexivity in: Gavin Flood, Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion (London: Cassell, 
1999) p. 37. 
72 Mark Risjord, Philosophy of Social Science: a Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 
2014) p.62. 
73 Campion, Prophecy, Cosmology, pp. 9 – 10; Bird, Astrology in Education, pp. 22 – 24; Brady, Theories 
of Fate, pp. 37 – 39. 
74 David J. Hufford, ‘The Scholarly Voice and the Personal Voice: Reflexivity in Belief Studies’, Western 
Folklore Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jan 1995) pp. 57 – 8. 
75 Jean Bricmont and Alan Sokal, ‘Science and Sociology of Science: Beyond War and Peace’ in Jay A. 
Labinger and Harry Collins, The One Culture? A Conversation about Science (University of Chicago 
Press, 2001) p. 43 n.37. 
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And the professor of history John H. Zammito has suggested that ‘radical reflexivity’ 
tends towards ‘a fatal impasse’ for science studies: ‘Here we are not considering better 
accounts of science but a metatheoretical intervention that preempts empirical 
inquiry.’76  An approach that either enshrined or dismissed reflexivity as a perspective 
within this study would be partial and therefore problematic.  It would be problematic 
because it would not fully acknowledge the perspective of many of astrology’s critics 
and a small number of astrologers; the status of subjective knowledge is a central issue 
in discussions of astrology’s truth.  Critics of astrology often do not contest the 
subjective experience of astrology seeming true; but they deny that this has any 
relevance to what they see as actual, objective, truth. 
 
The issue faced by the study at this juncture is an extreme form of an issue that always 
shadows reflexivity.  Hufford remarked that an initial recognition of the limits to 
knowledge implied by reflexivity can engender a reaction whereby a view is sought that 
would ‘transcend perspective’.77  He remarked that such a view is what the philosopher 
Thomas Nagel called ‘the view from nowhere’.78  For Nagel, the idea of a ‘view from 
nowhere’ is a way of characterising, and caricaturing, the idea of purely objective 
knowledge – knowledge, that is, which ‘includes and comprehends the fact that the 
world contains beings which possess it, explains why the world appears to them as it 
does prior to the formation of that conception, and explains how they can arrive at that 
conception itself.’79  The idea of a ‘view from nowhere’ as a desideratum comes into 
focus in this study particularly because it exists largely at the interstice of two mutually 
exclusive positions, so that – as already discussed – any actual position I could take as 
researcher would be inimical to some degree, with only the idealised and unattainable 
‘view from nowhere’ entirely satisfactory.  The issues here can be elaborated, and 
clarified, by looking at them in terms of ‘insider-outsider’ issues. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 John H. Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-positivism in the Study of Science from 
Quine to Latour  (University of Chicago Press, 2004) p. 251. 
77 Hufford, ‘Scholarly Voice’, p. 60.   
78 Hufford, ‘Scholarly Voice’, p. 60.   
79 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) p. 70. 
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1.5.6 Insider-Outsider Issues 
 
The professor of religious studies Russell T. McCutcheon has characterised the insider-
outsider problem as ‘one of the most important issues confronting scholars who study 
human behavior, institutions, and belief systems.’80  For McCutcheon the central issue 
is ‘whether, and to what extent, someone can study, understand, or explain the beliefs, 
words, or actions of another.  In other words, to what degree, if any, are the motives and 
meanings of human behaviors and beliefs accessible to the researcher who may not 
necessarily share these beliefs and who does not necessarily participate in these 
practices?’81   
 
One major aspect of ‘insider’ knowledge in the study of astrologers was discussed by 
Bird in introducing the approach she took in her ethnographic study of astrological 
education: 
 
the initiation of my present project was predicated on my having that degree of 
familiarity with the astrological language, and experience of expressing myself in its 
terms to others of its speakers, which is the essential prerequisite for any researcher 
planning to embark upon an anthropological study of astrology and astrologers... 
My knowledge of the language of astrology was central to the design, development 
and execution of this research.’82   
 
What Bird described here is, I suggest, one level of insiderhood; in the passage quoted, 
she characterises the insider position as based on familiarity with astrological technique.  
Lindsay Radermacher, in her MPhil, characterised the insider position in a way that 
moves beyond familiarity with technique: ‘the deeper understanding and more subtle 
application of these [astrological] symbols requires a level of experience that can only 
be developed through practice, and over time.’83  For Radermacher, astrological 
understanding arises only through engagement with astrology, so that one needs to be a 
practising insider before one is in a position to assess astrology’s truth-status.  There is an 
                                                 
80 Russell T. McCutcheon (ed.), The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion – A Reader 
(London: Cassell, 1999) p. vii. 
81 McCutcheon, Insider/Outsider, p.2. 
82 Bird, Astrology in Education, p. 6. 
83 Radermacher, Role of Dialogue, p. 90.    
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echo here of the need for involvement in many religions and magical paths, a fact that 
Radermacher drew out when she wrote: ‘Our view is that gnosis – as spiritual knowledge or 
“knowing,” rather than rational knowledge or information – is closer to the practice of 
divinatory astrology.’84  A parallel between astrological knowledge, thus characterised, and 
a level of experience accessed through magical ritual (‘the otherworld’) can be seen when 
the anthropologist Susan Greenwood argued: ‘Just as the current scientific method is 
largely based on a rationality grounded in a logic associated with linear causality, so the 
otherworld is governed by its own logic and must be studied in its proper context.’85 
 
In these cases, Radermacher and Greenwood in effect give astrology and magic respectively 
idiographic status, under the interpretation of ‘idiographic’ that affords it ontologically real 
status.  Whilst they thus justified taking ‘insider’ approaches in their research, the 
orientation of the present study is necessarily more complex insofar as it comprises groups 
with contradictory views.  Thus, to the extent that I was an ‘insider’ to the subset of 
commentators on astrology who consider the scientific perspective on astrology’s truth-
status to be definitive, I would necessarily be an outsider to the subset who subscribe to 
Radermacher’s position.  It is logically impossible to be a true or complete insider to all the 
positions under consideration, and this necessitates a careful approach to the treatment of 
insider-outsider issues in this thesis. 
 
1.5.6.1 Approach to Insider-Outsider Issues in this thesis 
 
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926 – 2006) argued that it was not necessary to be 
entirely an insider in order to pursue ethnographic study: ‘Understanding the form and 
pressure of... natives’ inner lives is more like grasping a proverb, catching an allusion, 
seeing a joke – or... reading a poem – than it is like achieving communion.’86  This is 
the orientation I have taken to the ethnographic component of this study.  I believe the 
case for doing so is strong, for four reasons.  First, both groups of ‘natives’ – that is to 
say, astrologers and their critics – are predominantly Western, so that the differences 
between them arise from individual orientations within the same cultural milieu, rather 
                                                 
84 Radermacher, Role of Dialogue, p. 90. 
85 Susan Greenwood, Magic, Witchcraft and the Otherworld (Oxford: Berg, 2000) p.24 (p.23 for her 
characterisation of the ‘otherworld’). 
86 Clifford Geertz, ‘“From the Native’s Point of View”: On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding’, Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 28 No. 1 (Oct. 1974) p.45. 
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than being rooted in culturally-based positions that might remain opaque to the outside 
observer.  Second, this thesis’s focus on issues of truth tends to lift the issues out of the 
sanctum of inner belief, into a theatre of publically avowable and demonstrable 
reasoning - though it must be acknowledged that much stress is placed on the word 
‘tends’ in that sentence.  Third, given the impossibility that any individual could be a 
complete insider to both the groups involved simultaneously, this is the only basis upon 
which such a study could be conducted at all.  Fourth, there is precedent in 
anthropological literature for seeing motility between insider and outsider positions as a 
positive asset.  I will develop that point now. 
 
The sociologists Elizabeth McNess, Lore Arthur and Michael Crossley have commented 
on the notional nature of the insider-outsider distinction, remarking on the need ‘to 
recognise that neither the researcher, nor the subjects of analysis are fixed, stable and 
coherent but constantly shifting, incomplete, fragmented and contradictory in relation to 
both collective and personal existence’87  The lecturer in social work Caroline 
Humphrey has argued that ‘an acknowledgement of the insider-outsider hyphen is 
indispensable to researcher reflexivity when operating in complex territories.’88  
Following a precedent set by the professor of psychology Michelle Fine, Humphrey 
took the hyphen to represent potential relationship and change.89  In her work she found 
that ‘The perpetual crossing-over between life-worlds gave birth to a complex narrative 
which surpassed anything that I could have produced had I been simply an insider or an 
outsider.’90   
 
Although she did not cite Nagel, Humphrey’s discussion of the insider-outsider hyphen 
comes close to Nagel’s suggestion for the best way to proceed in cases where the 
standpoints of subjectivity and objectivity cannot be satisfactorily integrated:  
 
                                                 
87 Elizabeth McNess, Lore Arthur and Michael Crossley, ‘“Ethnographic Dazzle” and the construction of 
the “Other”: revisiting dimensions of insider and outsider research for international and comparative 
education’ in Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education Vol. 45 No. 2 p. 299. 
88 Caroline Humphrey, ‘Insider-Outsider: Activating the Hyphen’, Action Research Vol. 5 (1) 2007, p. 22. 
89 At p. 12 of her paper, Humphrey cites: Michelle Fine, ‘Working the Hyphens: Reinventing Self and 
Other in Qualitative Research’ in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (1st edn.) (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994) pp. 70 – 82. 
90 Humphrey, ‘Insider-Outsider’, p. 15. 
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I believe the correct course is not to assign victory to either standpoint but to hold the opposition 
clearly in one’s mind without suppressing either element.  Apart from the chance that this kind 
of tension will generate something new, it is best to be aware of the ways in which life and 
thought are split, if that is how things are.91 
 
This raises the question whether I am equipped to take such an approach.  In order to 
pursue that, I will first say a little about my relationship to the material under 
discussion. 
 
1.6 My Relationship to the Material 
 
I learned to calculate and interpret astrological charts in the 1970’s and have been 
involved in studying and using astrology since then.  I have attended numerous 
astrological conferences and seminars and have spoken at a number of them, as well as 
having numerous articles and interviews published in various astrological journals and 
websites in the UK, Europe and the USA.  This enables me to talk to astrologers as an 
‘insider’, in a similar way to Bird’s description of her own situation.  I will now note a 
caveat to that. 
 
My involvement with astrology was interrupted in 1986 when I became a Buddhist 
monk.  From then until 1993, when I left the order, I had no contact with the 
astrological community, and did not practise or read anything about astrology.  On 
emerging from the monastery and acquainting myself with developments in the 
astrological community I was struck by several things.  In the years before my 
ordination there had been considerable optimism amongst many astrologers that the 
truth of astrology was going to be established under a scientific frame of reference.  
This was based primarily on two developments:  
 
First, the statistical analysis of horoscopes by Michel and Françoise Gauquelin seemed 
to be showing a scientific basis for astrology (this will be discussed in chapter 4 of this 
thesis).  Second, the astrologer John Addey (1920 – 1982), who characterised the 
Gauquelin work as ‘mighty blows for the vindication and reconstruction of Astrology’ 
                                                 
91 Nagel, View from Nowhere, p. 6. 
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had developed the use of ‘harmonics’ in astrology - an approach which promised, 
through analysis based in number, to ‘illuminate the whole field of astrology, 
straightening out misconceptions, making good deficiencies and shedding new light on 
problems which had long perplexed us.’92  Addey’s work was being developed by the 
astrologer David Hamblin; I was in a small astrology group with Hamblin in 1985 – 6 
and took a particular interest in harmonics. 
 
When, after leaving the monastery, I began reacquainting myself with the world of 
astrology I was met with a most discouraging scene.  Michel Gauquelin had committed 
suicide in 1991, and there were rumours that this coincided with flaws in his approach 
being discovered.  These flaws eventually turned out to be minor and not to affect the 
validity of Gauquelin’s work.93  It took years for the full story to emerge however, and 
the impact of the human tragedy was emphasised by the expectation that I had had in 
1986, that Gauquelin’s findings would quickly lead to more scientifically-based 
evidence for astrology’s truth.  Not only had no further evidence been found, but the 
status of what had seemed so promising was now in doubt.  Indeed, the existence of any 
scientific basis for astrology was in doubt.  In addition to this, I found that David 
Hamblin had lost confidence in astrology.  He explained his position in a letter 
published in 1990: 
If astrology was true in the way that astrologers claim that it is true, then the simplest and most 
unsophisticated piece of research would be able to demonstrate a correlation between (for 
instance) Ascendant sign and personality traits. Since these correlations have not been 
demonstrated, it is plain that astrology does not work in the way that most astrologers say that it 
works, even if it may possibly work in some other way.  Hence, for the time being, I have given 
up astrology.94 
My expectation had been that, in the years I had been away from astrology, more 
evidence would have been gathered for its basis in science.  This had not happened, and 
                                                 
92 John Addey, ‘Michel Gauquelin strikes again (Part 1)’,  The Astrological Journal Vol. XVI No. 3 
(Autumn 1974), p. 2; John Addey, Harmonics in Astrology: An introductory text-book to the new 
understanding of an old science (Romford: L. N. Fowler, 1976) p. 11. 
93 For a concise summary with references to the full range of relevant sources: Nick Kollerstrom, ‘How 
Ertel Rescued the Gauquelin Effect’ and Suitbert Ertel, ‘Comment from Suitbert Ertel’ in Correlation 
Vol. 23 No. 1 (2005), pp.34 – 43 and pp. 43 – 44 respectively. 
94 David Hamblin, ‘Astrology as Religion’ (Letter), Astrological Journal  Vol. 32 No. 6; 
November/December 1990, p. 406. 
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instead there was a cloud over the Gauquelin work and harmonics, which had seemed so 
promising.  None of the astrologers I spoke to seemed to be much concerned by this 
situation, and perhaps – if I had been involved continuously in the astrological 
community – it would not have struck me as such a problem either.  As it was, however, 
I felt somewhat like an outsider, grappling with the fundamental improbability of 
astrology as a source of truth and the apparent obliviousness of its practitioners to this 
situation.  The contrast between the extremely monological belief-structure in the 
monastery and the heteroglossia of the astrological community probably served to 
heighten the cognitive dissonance I experienced.  
 
Hence my interest in examining the truth-status of astrology.  To this end, in 1996 I 
began working on Astrology in the Year Zero, which was published in 2000.95  This is 
largely comprised of interviews with astrologers and critics of astrology, aimed at 
articulating what the practice of Western astrologers consists of, and what pathways of 
thought there were for thinking about the truth-status of astrological work.  The book 
has been on the reading lists of several universities and has been quoted in many 
subsequent discussions of astrology including nine of the recent PhD theses, and the 
MPhil dissertation, cited above. 
 
My attempt to evaluate and present arguments for and against the truth of astrology 
resulted in both astrologers and critics of astrology looking at me askance.  For instance 
the astrologer Dennis Elwell remarked, apropos of the involvement of Geoffrey Dean 
and his associates in my book, ‘It was as if we (i.e. astrologers) were invited to a 
convivial meal, only to find Hannibal Lecter among the guests.’96  I suggested that we 
discuss the reasons for our different perspectives, and those discussions turned into an 
article.97  In addition, I offered to curate a dialogue between Elwell on one side and 
Dean et al on the other.  This resulted in a series of eight articles, amounting to more 
than 130,000 words in total, with an additional article from Suitbert Ertel (1932 – 2017) 
                                                 
95 Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero. 
96 Garry Phillipson and Dennis Elwell, ‘Self-Defence for Astrologers’ The Astrological Journal, Vol.43 
No.5, Sept/Oct 2001, p.14. This article is a discussion that ensued between Elwell and me regarding how 
criticisms of astrology should be approached. I subsequently curated a long discussion between Elwell 
and Dean et al., and hosted it on my website: http://www.astrozero.co.uk/astroscience/elres.htm (checked 
27th August 2014). 
97 Namely Phillipson and Elwell, ‘Self-Defence’. 
 
 
 
30 
that focussed on Elwell’s discussion of Gauquelin’s work.98  Although it raised many 
interesting issues, the exchanges between Elwell and Dean et al also embody a failure of 
dialogue between advocates and critics of astrology.  Thus for example towards the end 
of his final article, Elwell wrote: ‘From my side, I believe [the discussion] has been 
worth while. Some issues have emerged better defined, yet the gulf between “science” 
and astrology seems as unbridgeable as ever.’99  The concluding words from Dean et al, 
at the end of their final article in the series, was: ‘his four articles reduce to bluster 1, 
utility 0. A pity he did not terminate this waste of time earlier.’100 
 
On the basis of this background I believe I am well-equipped, both by orientation and 
by experience, to work in the middle ground between astrologers and their critics. Not 
that any of this could absolve me from the need to critically evaluate my own 
perspectives as I pursue the research.  One particular intellectual discipline I have taken 
on, which also forms a major structural element of this thesis, is to use the three major 
theories of truth from Western epistemology to analyse and contextualise the variety of 
ways in which astrology’s truth is discussed.   
 
1.7   Approach to Truth 
 
The need for a philosophical approach to astrology’s truth-status was argued for by the 
philosopher Bernulf Kanitscheider (1939 – 2017): ‘although those trained in science 
may have good grounds for rejecting astrology, it would be wrong for that reason alone 
to hold it to be fallacious.  The evaluation of astrology must be pursued through logical 
and epistemological analysis, irrespective of its social acceptance or rejection.’101 
 
                                                 
98 Dean’s co-contributors were: Ivan Kelly, Arthur Mather and Rudolf Smit. All articles were originally 
posted in 2001 and are indexed at: http://www.astrozero.co.uk/astroscience/elres.htm (accessed 15th 
August 2019). They are detailed individually in the bibliography of this thesis, under the names of the 
contributors. 
99 Dennis Elwell, ‘Memo to the Careful Ones’ (2001), 
http://www.astrozero.co.uk/astroscience/elwell_4.htm (checked 15th August 2019). 
100 Geoffrey Dean, Ivan Kelly, Arthur Mather and Rudolf Smit, ‘A Reply to Dennis Elwell’s “Memo to 
the Careful Ones”’ (2001), http://www.astrozero.co.uk/astroscience/researchers_respond_4_1.htm 
(checked 15th August 2019). 
101 Bernulf Kanitscheider, ‘A Philosopher looks at Astrology’, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews (1991), 
Vol. 16 No. 3, p. 260. 
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In what follows, questions about the truth of astrology will be taken to be questions as 
to whether the use of astrology results in true statements to such an extent that astrology 
itself has a viable claim to be characterised ‘true’.  The relationship between ‘truth’ and 
‘knowledge’ will be examined in detail in chapter 3.  Until then it can be said that the 
two terms overlap very substantially: if a proposition is true it conveys knowledge; and 
knowledge is knowledge only to the extent that what is known is true. 
 
Contemporary philosophers frequently remark that ‘truth’ is difficult to define.  For 
instance, truth is characterised as ‘an enigmatic creature’; ‘notoriously elusive’; and as 
leading to ‘endless paradoxes’.102  The first significant attempt to define it is often taken 
to have been made by Aristotle: ‘To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it 
is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.’103  
This, in turn, can be traced back to Plato: ‘the true [statement] says those that are, as 
they are [...]  And the false [statement] says things different from those that are.104  
Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the inherent difficulties in applying these 
definitions have resulted in the evolution of three major theories of truth.  These 
theories, together with reasons to characterise them as ‘major’ and some other theories, 
will be discussed further in chapter 3, but since they are a major structural element of 
the thesis it will be useful to introduce them now.  
 
1.7.1   Three Theories of Truth  
 
The three theories of truth are: the correspondence theory; the coherence theory; and the 
pragmatic theory of truth.  In philosophical texts these are often referred to collectively 
in such terms as ‘three major theories of truth’, ‘three traditional theories of truth’ and 
                                                 
102 Linda Martin Alcoff in: Linda Martin Alcoff (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998) p.309; Paul Horwich, ‘Theories of Truth’ in: Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, Matthias 
Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (2nd edn.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010 [1992]) p. 772; E. J. 
Lowe, ‘Truth’ in Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 
1995) p. 882. 
103 Aristotle, W. D. Ross (tr.), Metaphysics in: Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of 
Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, One Volume Digital Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995 [1984]), pp. 3437 (IV.7, 1011b 24-8). The passage is cited at e.g. Lawrence E. 
Johnson, Focusing on Truth (London: Routledge, 1992) p.6. 
104 Plato, Sophist 263b (statement made by the ‘Visitor’ to Theaetetus).  This translation: Nicholas P. 
White, in John M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis, IN Hackett, 1987) p.287. This is 
cited, and its similarity to Aristotle’s formulation noted, by e.g. Marian David, ‘Theories of Truth’ in 
Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonsen, Jan Woleński (eds.) Handbook of Epistemology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
2004) p. 337. 
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‘three main views of truth’.105  Very brief outlines of the three theories follow; more 
background will be provided in chapter 3, and then the theories will be applied to 
astrology’s truth-status in chapters 4 to 7. 
 
The correspondence theory of truth is generally traced back to the descriptions of truth 
by Plato and Aristotle, cited in the previous section.106  A more recent advocate of this 
theory, Bertrand Russell, characterised it when he argued that ‘truth consists in some 
form of correspondence between belief and fact.’107  
 
The coherence theory of truth is associated particularly with Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and 
Hegel; its essence consists in the assertion that ‘for a proposition to be true is for it to 
cohere with a certain system of beliefs.’108  
 
The most recent of the three theories is the pragmatic theory of truth, generally credited 
to Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey.  Under this theory, as James put 
it, ‘“The true,” to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, 
just as “the right” is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.’109 
 
At points throughout this thesis I will show that the principles behind the three theories 
of truth are each used regularly when astrology’s truth is discussed.  In order to 
accomplish this it will generally be necessary to extrapolate from the arguments as 
presented, to show that the argument rests on (for instance) coherence with science, and 
therefore the coherence theory of truth.  Such extrapolation is necessary because, to the 
best of my knowledge, the theories are not directly discussed – by name, in their 
                                                 
105 Reuben Abel, Man is the Measure – A Cordial Invitation to the Central Problems of Philosophy (New 
York: Free Press/Macmillan, 1976), p.74; Brian Carr, ‘Truth’ in G.H.R. Parkinson (ed.), An Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1988) p.89; Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science – The 
Gifford Lectures 1989 – 1991 Volume 1 (London: SCM Press, 1990) p.34; pp.34-5 for his description of 
the three theories. Original emphasis. 
106 For instance: George Englebretsen, Bare Facts and Naked Truths: A New Correspondence Theory of 
Truth (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) pp. 10 – 11. 
107 Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1959 [1912]) p. 70. 
108 Ralph C. S. Walker, The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, anti-realism, idealism (London: 
Routledge, 1989) pp. 41 – 101 for the role of Spinoza et al; p. 2. 
109 James, William, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking in: William James, Bruce 
Kuklick (ed.), William James: Writings 1902 – 1910 (New York, NY: The Library of America, 1987 
[1907]) p.583.  Original emphases. 
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philosophical context – by any commentator with the exception of Brockbank, who 
discussed them briefly.110   
 
1.8   William James 
 
William James has already been referred to a number of times in this chapter, and his 
thought will play a major role in the entire thesis, particularly in chapters 6 and 7.  The 
focus on James’s thought follows from precedent and principle.  Taking precedent first, 
the emphasis on James has grown to a significant degree from Patrick Curry’s 
references to James’s thought in relation to divinatory astrology.  Although Curry has 
never given a detailed exposition of James’s thought, his writing on astrology has 
returned repeatedly to James.  The relevance of James stems from his advocacy, 
particularly in The Varieties of Religious Experience, of the qualitative study of 
consciousness.111  Curry characterised James’s approach here as fundamentally opposed 
to the attempt, widespread in 20th century psychological thought and particularly 
embodied in Behaviourism, to reduce mind to mechanism – an issue that will be 
considered in chapter 5.112  In contradistinction, Curry lauded James’s emphasis on 
consciousness as key to any attempt fully to comprehend the universe and our place in 
it.113  Further, he cited James’s assertion that such an enquiry inevitably shades into the 
religious; James’s religious philosophy will be explored in chapter 6.114   
 
 
The potential for truth within subjective experience is key here, for if that is given then 
it would follow that there could be no single conceptual framework that would 
encompass all possible truth.  The case for pluralism in epistemology of the kind 
advocated by James would then be strong.  This is a recurrent theme in Curry’s work.115  
James’s philosophy of pragmatism will receive an extensive treatment in this thesis.  
Although pragmatism has not been much discussed by Curry in its own right, it is clear 
                                                 
110 Brockbank thesis.  The three theories are referred to at pp. 209 – 10. 
111 Curry in Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 139, p. 150. 
112 Curry in Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 139 
113 Curry in Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 110. 
114 Curry in Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 110. 
115 Curry in Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 69, p. 79, p. 117. 
 
 
 
34 
from his occasional references to it that he sees pragmatism as intimately linked to 
pluralism, and therefore the relevance of pragmatism is implicit in much of his work.116  
 
Pragmatic thought has been discussed in relation to astrology in three recent theses, 
albeit briefly in each case.  Thus Alie Bird argued that ‘astrological knowledge is 
subjective, partial and pragmatic, despite the fact that it masquerades as technical know-
how…’117  In similar vein, Kirstine Munk wrote: ‘I suppose that one reason why people 
hesitate in voicing complaints about astrology has to do with the nature of “truth” in 
divination: “Truth” in divination is pragmatic. It is something that, in the words of 
William James, happens to an idea.’118  Brockbank also considered James’s account of 
pragmatic truth very briefly.119  His conclusion was that it was incompatible with his 
definition of ‘astrological truth, which is true prior to the events.’120  I will discuss 
Brockbank’s treatment of astrological truth in chapter 3. 
 
The fact that James was a co-founder and major protagonist of the pragmatic theory of 
truth would suffice to guarantee his thought a significant role in this thesis; his religious 
thought – particularly the pantheistic and panpsychic elements therein – might also have 
been expected to play a part.  The confluence in his thought of these two elements 
accentuates the case for considering his thought. 
 
My discussion of James as a philosopher with much to contribute to contemporary 
discussion goes somewhat against academic fashion.  That fashion was remarked by the 
professor of history James Livingston when he asked: ‘Why do we foreground 
Heidegger and bracket James, as, for example, Anthony Giddens does in a 
chronologically perverse passage: “William James echoes aspects of Heidegger’s 
                                                 
116 Curry in Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 117; Patrick Curry, Ecological Ethics: An 
Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) p. 155. 
117 Bird, Astrology in Education, p.255. 
118 Munk, Signs of the Times, p.292.  James wrote, ‘The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent 
in it.  Truth happens to an idea’ in: William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of 
Thinking in: William James, Bruce Kuklick (ed.), William James: Writings 1902 – 1910 (New York, NY: 
The Library of America, 1987 [1907]), p. 574. 
119 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 209. 
120 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 209 n. 78. 
 
 
 
35 
view...”’.121  In choosing to focus on James I follow the professor of philosophy 
Charlene Haddock Seigfried’s  assertion that James, along with Nietzsche and Marx, 
‘helped inaugurate – long before Martin Heidegger – the end of philosophy as 
traditionally understood.’122  Although this is with the caveat, which Seigfried went on 
to add, that what is really discussed here is a ‘new configuration’ of philosophy rather 
than an end; James’s insistence that ‘The centre of gravity of philosophy must... alter its 
place.’123   
 
James’s actual knowledge of, and sympathy for, astrology seem both to have been 
slight.  To the best of my knowledge the subject crops up only twice in his 
correspondence and writings.  The first instance is in a letter from Edmund Gurney to 
James.  In discussing Richard Hodgson (a researcher for the American Society for 
Psychical Research), Gurney wrote to James: ‘he combines the powers of a first-rate 
detective with a perfect readiness to believe in astrology. (Dont quote this, as it might be 
misunderstood.  I should pity the astrologER whose horoscopes he took to tackling.)’124  
James’s reply, unfortunately, seems not to have survived and is not included in the 
volumes of his correspondence.  It is clear however that in the psychical research circles 
in which he sometimes moved, astrology was regarded as a possible – though 
unpromising – matter for research and enquiry.  The second reference to astrology I was 
able to find in James’s writings is his dismissive suggestion that, before the advent of 
science, ‘…alchemy, magic, astrology, imposed on every one’s belief…’.125   
 
James’s apparent lack of interest in or sympathy for astrology notwithstanding, I will – 
particularly in chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis – argue that his philosophy provides a 
context within which astrology-as-divination can be accommodated.  The quotation 
from Gurney’s letter in the previous paragraph introduced James’s involvement with 
                                                 
121 James Livingston, ‘Pragmatism, Nihilism, and Democracy: What is Called Thinking at the End of 
Modernity?’ in John J. Stuhr (ed.), 100 Years of Pragmatism: William James’s Revolutionary Philosophy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010) p. 155. 
122 Charlene Haddock Seigfried, William James’s Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy (State University 
of New York, 1990), p.21. 
123 Seigfried, James’s Radical Reconstruction, p. 21; James, Pragmatism, p. 57. 
124 Edmund Gurney, letter to William James 16th January 1887 in: Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. 
Berkeley (eds.), The Correspondence of William James: Volume 6, 1885 – 1889 (Charlottesville, VA: 
University Press of Virginia, 1998) p. 192. Sic throughout. 
125 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy in: 
William James, Bruce Kuklick (ed.), William James: Writings 1902 – 1910 (New York, NY: The Library 
of America, 1987 [1911]) p.993. 
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psychic research, and the extent of this – and its relevance to my discussion – requires 
comment.  One of James’s earliest published writings was a review of a book on 
spiritualism.126  He was a founder-member of the American Society for Psychical 
Research in 1884, and continued to investigate such phenomena until his final days.127  
The definition of ‘psychic’ and its cognates, and their relevance to astrology, will be 
discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis.  At this introductory stage in my discussion, the 
relevance of James’s involvement with psychic research is perhaps best characterised as 
an engagement on his part with a quandary similar to the one identified in section 1.3 
above, where it seems impossible to reconcile personal, apparently significant, 
experience with the need for intersubjective proof.  This is encapsulated in one of 
James’s letters.  After describing his attendance at a séance, and discovery of fraud on 
the part of the medium, he wrote: ‘If I go on investigating I should make anyhow an 
important discovery; either that there exists a force of some sort not dreamed of in our 
philosophy… or, that human testimony, voluminous in quantity, and from the most 
respectable sources, is but a revelation of universal imbecility.’128 
 
1.9   Structure of this Thesis 
 
Following this first, introductory, chapter the remaining chapters will be as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 is a literature review of sources I have drawn on in this thesis that deal in one 
way or another with astrology and issues related to its truth.  This will include recent 
PhD theses on contemporary astrology and the  interviews recorded for this thesis.   
 
                                                 
126 William James, ‘Sargent’s “Planchette”’ in: William James, Ralph Barton Perry (ed.), Collected 
Essays and Reviews by William James (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920) pp. 1 – 2. Article 
originally published in the Boston Daily Advertiser, 10th March 1869. 
127 James’s involvement in the ASPR: Robert D. Richardson, William James: In the Maelstrom of 
American Modernism – A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006) p. 259. His evaluation of his 
investigations, written in the year before his death: William James, ‘The Confidences of a “Psychical 
Researcher”’ in: William James, Bruce Kuklick (ed.), William James: Writings 1902 – 1910 (New York, 
NY: The Library of America, 1987 [1909]) pp. 1250 - 1265. This facet of James’s life and work is 
discussed in: Krister Dylan Knapp, William James: Psychical Research and the Challenge of Modernity 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2017). 
128 William James, letter to Catherine Havens 14th June 1874 in: William James; Ignas K. Skrupskelis and 
Elizabeth M. Berkeley (eds.), The Correspondence of William James: Volume 4, 1856 – 1877 
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1995) p. 496. 
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Chapter 3 is a literature review which deals with the philosophical sources upon which 
this thesis draws.  It considers the historical development of the three theories of truth, 
the relevance to this thesis of some other theories, and precedents for applying the three 
theories of truth to an examination of the truth of a particular practice.  It will also 
further introduce William James as a figure of relevance for this discussion. 
 
The next four chapters apply the three theories of truth to astrology.  The structure of 
these chapters is as follows: 
 
Chapter 4 – the correspondence theory of truth.  This chapter examines the ways in 
which correspondences between astrological statements and ‘facts’ have been expected 
to work, some of the tests that have been conducted on this basis, and their results.  It 
then considers the ongoing quest for a satisfactory definition of ‘fact’ in this context. 
 
Chapter 5 – the coherence theory of truth, part 1.  This focuses on the consequences for 
astrology if science is taken as the existing body of knowledge with which astrology 
would need to cohere if it were to be judged true. 
 
Chapter 6 – the coherence theory of truth, part 2.  This chapter deals with issues arising 
if divination is taken as the existing body of knowledge with which astrology would 
need to cohere if it were to be judged true.  William James’s philosophy of religion 
plays a central role here. 
 
Chapter 7 – the pragmatic theory of truth.  This chapter examines the relationship 
between the experience that astrology seems to work, and the judgement that astrology 
is true.  In particular, and in the context established by the previous chapter, it considers 
how astrology-as-divination might be expected to work. 
 
Chapter 8 – conclusion.  This chapter reviews the issues arising from applying each 
theory of truth to astrology, considers the relationship between the three theories, and 
whether this relationship in itself has any consequence for astrology. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review – Astrology and Truth 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter is a literature review of texts that discuss astrology’s relationship to truth.  
Its aim is to outline the current state of the discussion that will be explored in this thesis, 
and in order to do this I will focus on a relatively small number of influential texts.  The 
two characterisations of astrology – ‘astrology-as-science’ and ‘astrology-as-
divination’, briefly introduced in the preceding chapter – will be discussed and 
contextualised.  The next section below (2.2) will introduce the distinction between 
these two understandings of astrology as it is found in several sources.  The following 
two sections (2.3, 2.4) will elaborate upon the way in which each position has been 
presented by its protagonists.  It will then be possible, in section 2.5, to focus on the 
nature of the disagreements regarding the characterisation and status of the two 
positions.  The chapter conclusion, section 2.6, will review and distil the key concepts 
that have emerged. 
 
As a literature review, the ambition of this chapter is limited.  There is an element of 
literature review to this entire thesis because in order to illustrate the relevance of 
epistemology to astrology, it will be necessary to quote from and refer to both 
disciplines throughout.  What follows in the two literature review chapters formally 
identified as such (chapters 2 and 3), therefore, aims only to provide a grounding in the 
basic conceptual framework, upon which the rest of the thesis can build. 
 
2.2   Two Kinds of Astrology – Introduction, Context 
 
The truth-status of astrology is bound up in the distinction between astrology-as-science 
and astrology-as-divination, insofar as each is a way in which astrology would function, 
which has consequences for the way in which its truth or falsity would be decided.  The 
beginnings of this distinction can be seen in Hellenistic astrology, an approach which 
developed in the Mediterranean countries from the 2nd century BCE to the 6th century 
CE, and particularly in the Tetrabiblos of Claudius Ptolemy.  The professor of Latin 
Mark Riley argued that ‘Ptolemy is unique in his attempt to establish a scientific 
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foundation for astrology’.1  The movement towards science was a move away from 
another form, and the historian of science Otto Neugebauer  (1899 – 1990) alluded to 
both: 
 
To Greek philosophers and astronomers, the universe was a well defined structure of directly 
related bodies.  The concept of predictable influence between these bodies is in principle not at 
all different from any modern mechanistic theory.  And it stands in sharpest contrast to the ideas 
of either arbitrary rulership of deities or of the possibility of influencing events by magical 
operations.  Compared with the background of religion, magic and mysticism, the fundamental 
doctrines of astrology are pure science.2 
 
This basis in science notwithstanding, it was Neugebauer’s view that ‘the boundaries 
between rational science and loose speculation were rapidly obliterated and astrological 
lore did not stem – but rather promoted – superstition and mysticism.’3  The chronology 
here is open to debate; commenting on Neugebauer, Riley suggested that ‘the “loose 
speculation” came first and that the “rational science” was Ptolemy’s contribution.’4  
Riley argued that Ptolemy’s approach was scientific because it worked from ‘basic 
concepts’ to ‘the details of that system’, defining the characteristics of the horoscopic 
factors and ‘then showing how these characteristics can be used to forecast the weather, 
human nature in various climes, and some eclipse effects.’5  Ptolemy’s approach could 
thus fit Popper’s definition of science, cited in the previous chapter, insofar as it 
involves the establishment of rules and principles which could be intersubjectively 
tested.  A necessary part of this perspective was Ptolemy’s understanding of astrology 
as causally-based.  This is seen, for instance, in his characterisation of astrological 
influences being similar in kind to the Sun’s radiation of heat, so that ‘most events of a 
general nature draw their causes from the enveloping heavens’.6  
 
The astrological paradigm of Ptolemy has been cited by Geoffrey Cornelius to 
characterise astrology-as-science.  Thus in the first text in which Cornelius explicitly 
                                                 
1 Mark Riley, ‘Science and Tradition in the Tetrabiblos’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, Vol. 132, No. 1 (1988) p. 67. 
2 Otto Neugebauer, The Exact Sciences in Antiquity (Princeton University Press, 1952) p. 164. 
3 Neugebauer, Exact Sciences, p. 164. 
4 Riley, ‘Science and Tradition’, p. 67 n.2. 
5 Riley, ‘Science and Tradition’, pp. 67 – 8. 
6 Ptolemy, F. E. Robbins (ed., tr.), Tetrabiblos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940) p. 5. 
(I.1). Emphasis added. 
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argued that astrology should be considered a form of divination, he characterised this 
model in contradistinction to the causal model of astrology advocated by Ptolemy.7  
Cornelius argued that Ptolemy epitomised a view of astrology which was in 
fundamental opposition to the subject’s essential, divinatory, nature and which was an 
early version of scientific astrology: ‘Early on astrology disguised its divinatory 
foundation.  By the time of Ptolemy’s “Tetrabiblos”… it could lay claim to being the 
rational science of the physical influences of the stars upon the Earth.’8   
 
The essence of astrology-as-science thus involves the existence of causal influences 
from horoscopic factors which have, through observation, been codified as laws.  The 
nature of astrology-as-divination is more complicated to explain.  Cornelius suggested 
that it could be illuminated by considering horary astrology – a branch of astrology in 
which questions are answered by analysis of a chart drawn for the moment a question is 
presented to an astrologer.  An example used by Cornelius is a chart cast by the 
astrologer William Lilly (1602 – 81) to ascertain the whereabouts of some fish and 
onions which had been stolen from a warehouse after he bought them.9  According to 
Lilly’s description, his analysis of the chart revealed the appearance, profession and 
type of domicile of the fish-thief, whom he was therefore able to catch red-handed. 
 
It would be difficult indeed to fit this example of astrological interpretation into 
Ptolemy’s causal framework, not least because the astrological chart that described what 
happened came after the events themselves.  If astrology operated through the influence 
of causal planetary rays, those rays would need to work retroactively in such cases.  
Remarking on such problems, Cornelius suggested that the existence of horary 
astrology ‘throws the Ptolemaic model into disarray’, adding the inference that this 
would explain why ‘Ptolemy… does not allow horary, or anything like it, into the 
Tetrabiblos.’10  An advocate of an alternative explanation was Plotinus (204/5 – 270 
CE) who argued: ‘If the stars are held to be causing principles… then the birds and all 
the other things which the soothsayer observes for divination must equally be taken as 
                                                 
7 Geoffrey Cornelius, Astrology and Divination (the Oslo Paper) (1982), included in: 
www.cosmocritic.com/pdfs/Cornelius_Geoffrey_Oslo_and_Moment.pdf  (accessed 16th August 2019).  
8 Cornelius, Astrology and Divination, p.1. 
9 William Lilly, Christian Astrology (facsimile edition) (London: Regulus, 1985 [1647]) p. 397-9; 
discussed in Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, pp. 98 – 100. 
10 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 102; p. 103. 
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causing what they indicate.’11  This both cast doubt on the relevance of causality, and 
implied that astrology might be similar to divination.  It is possible that Plotinus wrote 
this as a direct critique of Ptolemy’s causal account of astrology in the Tetrabiblos.12  
Even if it was not aimed specifically at Ptolemy, it is clearly aimed at the approach he 
espoused. 
 
Cornelius has drawn particularly on the thought of the philosopher and astrologer 
Marsilio Ficino (1433 – 1499) in characterising astrology-as-divination, whilst 
acknowledging that Ficino was ‘following in the footsteps of Plotinus’.13  As the scholar 
of esotericism and religion Angela Voss wrote, ‘Plotinus’ analysis of astrological effect 
is a clear refutation of causal thinking.  Here, Ficino found confirmation of astrology as 
divination.’14  Ficino adopted Plotinus’s analogy of birds to illustrate the case for an 
astrology of signs: ‘many things are indeed indicated by the heavens yet are not caused 
by them… Such things, however, are often foretold through heavenly phenomena as 
signs, but not as causes; just as in auguries and auspices many things are considered to 
be portended through birds which are, however, in no way caused by the birds.’15   
 
The conflicting accounts of astrology from Ptolemy on one hand, and Plotinus and 
Ficino on the other, are reiterated in Cornelius’s characterisations of astrology-as-
science and astrology-as-divination, thus: ‘an astrology of causes, objective, universal, 
regular and astrologer-independent, and an astrology of signs, which is participatory, 
context-specific and irregular.’16  The description of astrology as divination categorises 
it as the same type of study as (in Cornelius’s words), ‘such diverse techniques as 
extispicy (entrails-divination), augury, omen-reading, sortes (the casting of lots)… 
reading tea-leaves, and laying out Tarot cards.’17  Such a perspective is shared by Darby 
Costello, an astrologer who spent time in South Africa with sangomas (diviners or 
                                                 
11 Plotinus, Stephen MacKenna (tr.), The Enneads: A new, definitive edition (New York: Larson/Paul 
Brunton Philosophic Foundation, 1992) p. 177, III.I.5. 
12 James Wilberding, Plotinus’ Cosmology: A Study of Ennead II.1 (40): Text, Translation and 
Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 5 n. 26.  
13 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 8. 
14 Angela Voss, ‘The Astrology of Marsilio Ficino: Divination or Science?’, Culture and Cosmos: Vol. 4 
No. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2000), p. 36. 
15 Marsilio Ficino, tr. Members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science, London, 
The Letters of Marsilio Vol. 6 (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1999) p. 27 (Letter 17); cited in part by 
Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 8. 
16 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.74. 
17 Cornelius, Field of Omens, p. 2. 
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witchdoctors) in South Africa.  She told me that a sangoma would ‘throw the bones’ (a 
collection of bones, stones and other small objects which have caught the sangoma’s 
eye) and then, ‘looking at the patterns made by the throw, they would begin to speak.  I 
could see at the time, that they were seeing patterns and translating them into words.  I 
could see I was doing the same thing with the [astrological] chart.’18   
 
When the distinction between astrology-as-divination and astrology-as-science has been 
discussed over the last fifteen centuries, the terms used have often been, respectively, 
‘judicial’ and ‘natural’ astrology.  The original purpose of the distinction between these 
terms was to segregate what might be seen as a supernatural element in the practice.  
Thus the historian T. J. Tomlin asserted, ‘the end result of early modern disputes over 
astrology was the creation of a clear dividing line, not between reason and astrology but 
rather through astrology, dividing it into acceptable (natural) and unacceptable (judicial) 
forms.’19  The roots of the distinction can be traced back beyond early modernity; 
Campion for instance has traced it to a statement by Isidore of Seville (c. 560 – 636 
CE): 
 
astrology is partly natural, and partly superstitious.  It is natural as long as it investigates the 
courses of the sun and the moon, or the specific positions of the stars according to the seasons; 
but it is a superstitious belief that the astrologers (mathematicus) follow when they practice 
augury by the stars, or when they associate the twelve signs of the zodiac with specific parts of 
the soul or body, or when they attempt to predict the nativities and characters of people by the 
motion of the stars.20 
 
An effect of the scientific revolution, felt from the seventeenth century through to the 
present day, has been to predispose both advocates and critics of astrology towards the 
view that a true astrology would by definition be either science or at the least proto-
science.21 
                                                 
18 Darby Costello, interview 2005. 
19 T. J. Tomlin, A Divinity for all Persuasions: Almanacs and Early American Religious Life (Oxford 
University Press, 2014) p. 30. 
20 Isidore of Seville; Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach  and Oliver Berghof (trs.), The 
Etymologies of Isidore of Seville (Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 99, Book III xxvii.  Cited by 
Campion, Medieval and Modern Worlds, pp. 13 – 14. 
21 A trend in the seventeenth century towards characterising and evaluating astrology in scientific terms 
was identified, for instance, by Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, Volume 
VII: The Seventeenth Century (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1958) pp. 559 – 563; Keith 
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Cornelius found that the terms ‘natural’ and ‘judicial’ substantially matched the views 
of astrology-as-science and astrology-as-divination, respectively, but argued that the 
historical nuances and connotations associated with the former pair of terms, from 
centuries of use, made it preferable – in the interests of clarity – to use the latter pair of 
terms.22  This is the usage I follow in this thesis. 
 
When he first laid out his case for seeing astrology as divination, Cornelius identified 
the former with the latter: ‘astrology is a phenomenon of experience rather than the 
experience of an objective phenomenon.’23  He subsequently moved back somewhat 
from this position, to allow some validity to astrology-as-science: 
 
some part of the phenomenon of astrology belongs to the natural world and is in principle 
amenable to scientific investigation. Nevertheless, the main part of what we do is the 
interpretation of symbols to arrive at particular inferences and judgments, whether about 
character or about events in life. And this practice is divination, not science.24 
 
The essentially interpretive, perspectival nature of divinatory astrology is brought out 
by an alternative term, ‘hermeneutic astrology’, coined by Curry in 1983.25  Curry 
characterised this in two ways: First, by its opposition to ‘science, particularly 
technological science, and accompanying practical-manipulative-realist attitudes’; 
Second, as ‘precisely and powerfully “true”, in the sense of spiritually helpful… a way 
of preserving and developing a “magical” attitude’.26  The involvement of the astrologer 
in a creative, interpretive capacity is integral to both, and the importance of 
interpretation was emphasised by Cornelius when he discussed hermeneutics in 
astrology: 
                                                                                                                                               
Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London: Penguin, 1991), p.769; and P. M. Harman, The 
Scientific Revolution (London: Methuen, 1983) p. 32. 
22 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 75. 
23 Cornelius, Astrology and Divination, p. 1.  Original emphases. 
24 Geoffrey Cornelius, Is Astrology Divination and Does it Matter? (2000) 
http://cura.free.fr/quinq/01gfcor.html (accessed 17th August 2019).  Delivered as a lecture at the United 
Astrology Congress, Atlanta, GA, 22nd May 1998; revised version published in The Mountain Astrologer 
(Issue 81: Oct – Nov 1998), pp. 38 – 45; published with further minor revisions on the CURA website in 
2000 – this is the version quoted from. 
25 Patrick Curry, ‘An Aporia for Astrology’ in M. Budd, P. Curry, G. Douglas & B. Jaye, Radical 
Astrology (London, Radical Astrology Group, 1983) 5.2. 
26 Curry, Aporia, 5.2A (original emphases). 
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Hermeneutics is the study of meaning, and of how we arrive at our interpretations of things.  In 
the context of astrology, the term implies a turning away from the common taken-for-granted 
assumption that a fixed astrological meaning is simply ‘there’, in front of us, as some sort of fact 
of nature.  The hermeneutic enquiry in astrology reveals the essential dependency of the meaning 
of symbols on the act of interpretation of that meaning.27 
 
The term ‘hermeneutic astrology’ therefore illuminates what is meant by ‘divinatory 
astrology’ and may indeed be clearer and less ambiguous; all the same, I will use the 
latter term in this thesis, not least because – as has already been seen in chapter 1 – there 
is substantial precedent for the use of this term in recent academic discourse.28 
 
A distinction similar to that between the models of astrology as science and as 
divination can be found in critical accounts of astrology.  Thus for instance in 1977 
Geoffrey Dean et al noted that ‘the majority of astrologers reject a scientific approach in 
favour of symbolism... intuition, and holistic understanding.’29  The French/American 
astrologer and composer Dane Rudhyar (1895 – 1985) was identified by Dean et al as 
‘perhaps the leading exponent of this view’ and his thought will be considered below.30  
The distinction drawn between scientific and non-scientific approaches to astrology was 
also made in a text written by two professors of astronomy, Roger B. Culver and Philip 
A. Ianna, Astrology: True or False? A Scientific Evaluation.31  Culver and Ianna 
referred to the two forms as the ‘correlational’ (or ‘non-causal’) definition and the 
‘cosmic forces’ definition, respectively.32  They defined the former, with reference to 
the works of Rudhyar, as taking ‘no interest in the physical causes and effects in 
celestial phenomena’, whilst the latter position was characterised by a quotation from 
the astrologer Nicholas deVore (1886 – 1960): ‘the science which treats of the influence 
upon human character of cosmic forces emanating from celestial bodies’.33  Culver and 
                                                 
27 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.xxiii. 
28 For instance discussion of astrology as divination is a central theme in these PhD theses: Bird, 
Astrology in Education, Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, Cornelius, Field of Omens. 
29 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.2. 
30 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.2 footnote. 
31 Robert B. Culver and Philip A. Ianna, Astrology: True or False? A Scientific Evaluation (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1988).  Originally published as The Gemini Syndrome: Star Wars of the Oldest Kind 
(Tucson: Pachart Publishing, 1979); revisions made for subsequent publication. 
32 Culver and Ianna, Astrology: True or False?, p. 2; p. 120 for ‘non-causal’. 
33 Nicholas deVore, Encyclopedia of Astrology (Totowa, NJ: 1976) p.28; cited in Culver & Ianna, 
Astrology: True or False, p. 2. 
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Ianna stated at the beginning of their text that ‘We shall subsequently concern ourselves 
with both views’.34  They took it as given that a ‘cosmic forces’ or ‘non-causal’ 
explanation should at least yield statistically significant data.35  This being so, it 
followed that a non-causal astrology – if true – would deliver statistically significant 
results as if it were causally-based, so that for Culver and Ianna the distinction between 
two forms of astrology was not a significant issue.  In consequence their investigation of 
a non-causal, ‘correlational’, model of astrology was perfunctory.  Their conclusion was 
that ‘the fundamental astrological principle… [is] the idea that human beings and their 
actions are influenced at least in part by celestial objects’ and that therefore, in order to 
be true, astrology would need to vindicate itself in scientific terms.36  Dean et al have 
proposed a different distinction between two forms of astrology: ‘subjective astrology’ 
and ‘objective astrology’ are their terms.37  This characterisation raises complex issues 
and will be treated separately in section 2.5.2 below. 
 
2.3   Literature that treats Astrology as Science 
 
As already seen in the case of Culver and Ianna, much of the literature that is critical of 
astrology takes it as given that the truth or falsity of astrological practice should be 
evaluated by scientific criteria.  A central text is Recent Advances in Natal Astrology 
published in 1977, compiled by Geoffrey Dean, with the assistance of Arthur Mather 
and the involvement of fifty-two collaborators.38  The text set out to address ‘The 
ultimate problem in astrology’, namely: ‘are astrological interpretations true or not?’39 
 
A starting point for the project was the premise that  astrology worked – or at least, 
seemed to work – in the experience of its practitioners.  Thus for example Dean referred 
to the apparent ability of astrologers to identify astrological themes in people’s charts 
simply from meeting them and stated that ‘Many of this book’s collaborators (including 
myself) have had considerable success in such diagnosis’.40  Further, he stated that 
                                                 
34 Culver & Ianna, Astrology: True or False?, p. 2. 
35 Culver & Ianna, Astrology: True or False?, p. 120. 
36 Culver & Ianna, Astrology: True or False?,  p.181. 
37 E.g. in Phillipson, Year Zero, p. 128. 
38 Dean et al, Recent Advances. 
39 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.23. 
40 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.24. It appears from this statement that Dean was writing from his own 
experience, hence the references to ‘Dean’ rather than ‘Dean et al’ in this and the following paragraph. 
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‘[astrological] charts are often so exactly right in such unlikely ways that coincidence or 
gullibility would seem to be ruled out.’41  That said, Dean believed that coincidence and 
gullibility did need to be definitively ruled out before astrology could be considered 
true.  Regarding his experiences of diagnosing astrological factors from meeting a 
person, he concluded that ‘no properly-controlled trials have been published, hence no 
conclusions are possible.’42  Thus after citing several astrologers testifying that 
astrology worked in their experience, Dean concluded that the question must arise, ‘how 
do astrologers know that astrology works?’43  The experience that astrology seemed to 
work was not in doubt; the task he took on was to evaluate the truth-status of such 
experiences. 
 
At the time of the composition of Recent Advances, there was considerable optimism 
that scientific research would demonstrate the truth of astrology beyond all doubt.  In 
addition to Dean’s remarks above, this can be inferred from the involvement of three 
astrological organisations, and many astrologers, in the preparation and publication of 
the text.  Dean’s perspective on science led him to dismiss some promising results from 
trials involving individual astrologers, arguing: 
 
it is clear that the significant blind trials have not demonstrated that astrology works but only 
that astrologers work.  Hence to adequately test astrology the participation of the astrologer must 
be eliminated.44 
 
The insistence on excluding the astrologer epitomises the focus, often encountered in 
critical evaluations of astrology, that in order to be true, astrology would necessarily be 
astrology-as-science.  From this it follows that any subjective input would introduce 
bias and as such should be eliminated from the evaluation of astrology’s truth.  Dean’s 
statement is controversial and has been specifically criticised by several astrologers 
                                                 
41 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.25 
42 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.24. 
43 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.24. 
44 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.554. 
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including Cornelius, Bernadette Brady and Dennis Elwell.45  It will be returned to in 
this chapter and throughout this thesis. 
 
In 2016 Dean et al published another encyclopaedic volume, Tests of Astrology: A 
critical review of hundreds of studies.46 In this it was made clear from the outset that the 
many studies of astrology referenced in the title yielded ‘quite consistent’ outcomes: 
‘they deny that astrology is a source of factual truth’, although the possibility that 
astrology could still be ‘meaningful’ at a subjective level – explored in section 2.5.2 
below – was also mooted.47  Dean and his collaborators have contributed critiques of 
astrology to many encyclopaedias, journals and other texts, so that their perspective is 
often implicitly presented as authoritative, and is drawn on by many critics of 
astrology.48  For instance, Culver and Ianna acknowledged having no experience of 
using astrology, and instead made extensive use of works by Dean et al.49   
 
Another prominent critic of astrology, cited in the previous chapter, is the biologist and 
popular science writer Richard Dawkins – well-known in the UK for his attacks on what 
he has characterised as ‘Enemies of Reason’, a category in which he included  
astrologers.50  Dawkins’ prominence as a critic of astrology derives from his status as a 
                                                 
45 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 62; Bernadette Brady, ‘The Newtonian Merry-Go-Round’ (2004), 
https://geocosmic.org/research/the-newtonian-merry-go-round/ (checked 11th May 2017); Dennis Elwell, 
‘The Researchers Researched’. 
46 Geoffrey Dean, Arthur Mather, David Nias, Rudolf Smit (principal compilers), Tests of Astrology: A 
critical review of hundreds of studies (Amsterdam: AinO Publications, 2016). The description ‘principal 
compilers’ is from p. 2; the contribution of numerous ‘helpers’ is also acknowledged at p. 1 and by 
reference throughout the text. 
47 Dean et al, Tests of Astrology, p. 3. 
48 Examples include: I. W. Kelly, ‘Astrology, Cosmobiology, and Humanistic Astrology’ in Patrick Grim 
(ed.), Philosophy of Science and the Occult (State University of New York Press: 1982) pp. 47 – 70; 
David K. B. Nias and Geoffrey A. Dean, ‘Astrology and Parapsychology’ in Sohan Modgil and Celia 
Modgil (eds.) Hans Eysenck: Consensus and Controversy (Philadelphia, PA: Falmer, 1986) pp. 361 – 
375; I. W. Kelly, G. A. Dean & D. H. Saklofske, ‘Astrology: A Critical Review’ in Patrick Grim (ed.), 
Philosophy of Science and the Occult (2nd edn.) (State University of New York Press: 1990) pp. 51 – 84; 
Geoffrey Dean, Arthur Mather and Ivan W. Kelly, ‘Astrology’ in Gordon Stein (ed.), The Encyclopedia 
of the Paranormal (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1996) pp. 47 – 99; G. A. Dean, D. K. B. Nias and C. C. 
French , ‘Graphology, astrology and parapsychology’ in Helmuth Nyborg (ed.), The Scientific Study of 
Human Nature: Tribute to Hans J. Eysenck at Eighty (Oxford: Pergamon, 1997) pp. 511 – 542; Geoffrey 
Dean, ‘The Case for and Against Astrology’ in Bryan Farha (ed.), Paranormal Claims: A Critical 
Analysis (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007) pp. 115 – 129; reprinted in expanded and re-
titled second edition, Bryan Farha (ed.), Pseudoscience and Deception: The Smoke and Mirrors of 
Paranormal Claims (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2014) pp. 87 – 106. 
49 Culver & Ianna, Astrology: True or False?, p. 220: ‘True, we haven’t practiced astrology…’ 
50 ‘The Enemies of Reason’ was the title of a two-part documentary on Channel 4 in the UK, first shown 
on 13th August 2007 and 20th August 2007 (parts 1 & 2 respectively). His most substantial critique of 
astrology was: Dawkins, ‘Real Romance in the Stars’. 
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popular exponent of science rather than any significant acquaintance with horoscopic 
work.  Indeed Dawkins acknowledged in 1996 that the focus of his criticism was Sun-
sign astrology, not horoscopic work, and added: ‘If there is good evidence… that some 
other kinds of astrology work, well and good.  I have to say that I’d be extremely 
surprised.’51  This point notwithstanding, his arguments are sufficiently broad – 
proceeding from laws of physics to the implausibility of a basis for astrology as a causal 
science – that they can easily be applied to horoscopic astrology, and his concise 
articulation of the issues provides a good reason for so doing.  His concision and his 
exclusive focus on basic scientific principles can be seen in the following statement, 
which epitomises the case for testing astrology’s truth in scientific terms, and for 
finding it to be wanting: 
 
For us to take a hypothesis seriously, it should ideally be supported by at least a little bit of evidence.  
If this is too much to ask, there should be some suggestion of a reason why it might be worth 
bothering to look for evidence… But astrology has nothing going for it at all, neither evidence nor 
any inkling of a rationale which might prompt us to look for evidence.52 
 
By this point in the article Dawkins had made it clear that what would count as 
‘evidence’ for him would be statistical data rather than the experiences of astrologers 
and their clients; and that a reason that would justify investigating astrology would 
necessarily take the form of a causal influence from horoscopic factors that might affect 
life on Earth.  His focus, therefore, was astrology-as-science. 
 
2.4   Literature that Treats Astrology as Divination 
 
As stated in chapter 1, I will draw particularly on Cornelius’s treatment of astrology-as-
divination in this thesis.  As regards both the subject, and my focus on Cornelius’s 
analysis, I follow several recent theses.  For instance Alison Bird argued that ‘Reflective 
theorists with a practical interest in the subject acknowledge that the “astrology as 
divination” model is – after all – the only serious contender for any kind of effective 
                                                 
51 Richard Dawkins, ‘Real Romance in the Stars’, footnote added to the article as reprinted in The 
Astrological Journal (Vol. 38 No. 3, May/June 1996), p. 141 n. 4. 
52 Dawkins, Real Romance in Astrology, pp. 17 – 18. 
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defence in formal terms.’53  James Brockbank characterised ‘the central argument’ of 
his thesis as being ‘that astrology is best understood as a form of divination.’54  Bird and 
Brockbank both draw heavily on Cornelius’s discussions of astrology as divination. 
 
The critical analysis of astrology by Dean et al was a major stimulus to Cornelius’s 
thought.  His development of a divinatory perspective provided a way of thinking about 
astrology that, whilst accepting much of the criticism of the subject advanced by Dean 
et al, did not see the validity of the entire subject thereby dismissed.  Thus for example 
Cornelius described Recent Advances by Dean et al as ‘vast and comprehensive’ and the 
‘archetypal text’ for the view of astrology as science; and accepted early in his first 
explicit argument for astrology-as-divination that ‘the scientific revolution has revealed 
the greater part of astrology as pseudo-science…’55 
 
In order to develop the context for Cornelius’s position it is necessary to discuss Dane 
Rudhyar in more detail.  Within astrology Rudhyar is particularly known for his 
integration of C. G. Jung’s thought into astrology.56  It is widely acknowledged that he 
had a major influence on contemporary astrology, with the journalist and lecturer Erik 
Davis arguing that he ‘decisively shaped modern astrology’ and Campion describing 
him as ‘possibly the most influential American astrologer of the 20th century’.57  
Cornelius holds Rudhyar in high regard for having developed the principles behind the 
model of astrology as divination, and has suggested that Rudhyar was ‘truly 
representative of the most significant shift in astrological attitude in modern times.’58  
The difference in approach between Cornelius and Rudhyar is subtle, with both 
distinguishing  between scientific and non-scientific forms of astrology.  In his preface, 
written in 1970, to the second edition of his 1936 book The Astrology of Personality, 
Rudhyar alluded briefly to a scientific conception of astrology but concluded that he 
would not be considering astrology as ‘a kind of age-old empirical and essentially 
                                                 
53 Bird, Astrology in Education, p. 85. 
54 James Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p.19.  At http://www.the9thhouse.org/theses.htm (checked 13th 
July 2015). 
55 Cornelius, Astrology and Divination, p.1. 
56 Deniz Ertan, Dane Rudhyar: His Music, Thought, and Art (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester 
Press, 2009) pp. 79 – 80. 
57 Erik Davis, ‘The Counterculture and the Occult’ in Christopher Partridge (ed.), The Occult World 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2015) p. 640; Nicholas Campion, Astrology and Cosmology, p. 197. 
58 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.95. 
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Events-Oriented science’ for the reason that ‘I do not believe that this type of astrology 
is what we need today’.59  He reiterated and expanded upon this conception of two types 
of astrology in The Pulse of Life, also published in 1970, arguing that the first 
considered ‘the realm of the sky as that of... controlling Powers which exert a constant 
influence upon the passive... realm of earthly activities’.60  The second type of 
astrology, he continued, considered that ‘There is order everywhere, but man is blind to 
it while he is passing from one type of order to the... more inclusive type.  What he feels 
as chaos on the earth-surface is the result of his incomplete vision.’61  Rudhyar dubbed 
the two positions, ‘events-oriented’ and ‘person-centered’ forms of astrology.62  He did 
not deny efficacy to an events-oriented astrology which ‘deals essentially with 
collective factors, with human nature as a product of biospheric conditions.’63  For him, 
however, astrology would only reach its potential when it was involved in the 
individual’s emergence from ‘the sphere where this human nature compulsively and 
unconsciously operates’, showing them how to ‘actualize as fully as possible [their] 
birth-potential.’64   
 
It remains unclear whether, for Rudhyar, the important role of subjectivity in astrology 
is an historical contingency, relevant only for a period in human history in which people 
are victims of ‘incomplete vision’, or whether this is an intrinsic quality of much 
astrological work.  Cornelius has argued that Rudhyar did not quite carry this insight 
through consistently into his philosophy of astrology, on the basis of the latter’s 
allusions to a mechanism at the back of astrology, and reference to ‘seed moments’ 
which suggested to Cornelius that Rudhyar’s shift ‘occurred within the broad limits set 
for us by Ptolemy’.65  The significance of the term ‘seed moments’ is found in 
Rudhyar’s argument that, in natal astrology, the moment the new-born takes its first 
                                                 
59 Dane Rudhyar, The Astrology of Personality: A Re-formulation of Astrological Concepts and Ideals, in 
Terms of Contemporary Psychology and Philosophy (3rd edn.) (Garden City, NY: 1970 [1936]), pp.xi. 
Original emphasis and capitalisation. 
60 Dane Rudhyar, The Pulse of Life (Berkeley, CA: Shambhala, 1970 [1943]) p. 14. 
61 Rudhyar, Pulse of Life, p. 15. 
62 Dane Rudhyar, From Humanistic to Transpersonal Astrology (Palo Alto, CA: The Seed Center, 1975 
[1972]) pp. 21-2. 
63 Rudhyar, From Humanistic to Transpersonal, p. 27. 
64 Rudhyar, From Humanistic to Transpersonal, p.29. 
65 Geoffrey Cornelius, ‘From Primitive Mentality to Haecceity: The Unique Case in Astrology and 
Divination’ in Patrick Curry and Angela Voss (eds.), Seeing with Different Eyes: Essays in Astrology and 
Divination (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007) p. 229; Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 
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breath ‘is to be regarded as the “seed moment” of the complete life-span of this 
organism.’66  He allowed some latitude for individual free-will to affect the way in 
which the seed grew; but the analogy, and his discussion of it, suggest a sufficiently 
concrete correspondence between horoscope on one hand, and character and life events 
on the other, to make it seem that similar seeds should show similar traits.  This might 
be expected to be detectable through statistical analysis, which would preclude the 
characterisation of astrology as beyond the reach of science. 
 
The furthest Rudhyar moved from the analogy of seeds came in his discussion of horary 
astrology.  In describing the process involved in such charts, Rudhyar wrote that ‘God 
(as personification of universal intelligence and spiritual vitality) always seeks to restore 
harmony and health in every individual... This... is the substance of “Grace”... Horary 
astrology is a dramatic presentation of the operation of this divine Grace.’67  It seems 
conceivable that an astrology which served purely as a way for divine grace to express 
itself might be inscrutable to human conceptions of truth.  This however would not be 
Rudhyar’s position, for two reasons.  First, he only characterised the horary form of 
astrology in this way.  Second, even where horary astrology was concerned, he 
emphasised the need for the chart to be ‘properly timed’, meaning that the horary 
question must be asked ‘at a significant time’.68  Even in Rudhyar’s view of horary 
astrology, therefore, there seems to persist an objective order with which the individual 
needs to connect in order for astrology to function. 
 
 
2.4.1   Two Forms of Divination: Artificial and Natural 
 
When astrology is discussed as a form of divination, a distinction between two forms of 
divination is implicated.  The two forms are: artificial divination (also known as 
                                                 
66 Dane Rudhyar, Person-Centered Astrology (New York, NY: ASI Publishers, 1980 [1972]), p. 176. 
67 Dane Rudhyar, The Practice of Astrology – As a Technique in Human Understanding (Boulder, CO: 
1978 [1968]) p.138. 
68 Rudhyar, Practice of Astrology, p. 138. Rudhyar suggested that the question of whether a horary chart 
was ‘properly timed’ be answered by reference to: a) the presence of close connections between it and the 
chart of the querent; b) by reference to a traditional element of horary astrology known as the 
‘considerations before judgement’, according to which some charts indicate that for one reason or another 
the question will not be answered by that particular chart.  Discussed in e.g.: Lilly, Christian Astrology 
pp. 121 – 123.  
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‘inductive’, ‘deductive’, ‘conjectural’, ‘noninspirational’, ‘learned’ or ‘technical’ 
divination), and natural divination (also known as ‘intuitive’, ‘inspirational’, ‘emotive’, 
‘untechnical’, ‘unlearned’ or ‘inspired’).69  The distinction may be seen in Plato’s 
Phaedrus, wherein Socrates characterised ‘sign-based prediction’, which involved 
observation of ‘birds and other signs’ coupled with reasoning on one hand, and 
‘prophecy’ on the other.70  The distinguishing feature of prophecy was that its 
exemplars, such as the prophetess of Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona, were ‘out of 
their minds when they perform that fine work of theirs… but they accomplish little or 
nothing when they are in control of themselves.’71  The distinction was repeated by 
Cicero (106 – 43 BCE): ‘there are two methods of divining; one dependent on art, the 
other on nature.’72  Artificial divination thus involves the use of a system, such as 
astrology, whereas natural divination works through possession, or inspiration, and 
therefore does not require a symbolic system such as astrology.  The terms ‘mechanical’ 
and ‘mystical’ are sometimes used and have similar connotations to ‘artificial’ and 
‘natural’ respectively.73  Similar distinctions between forms of divination are also found 
outside western culture, albeit they often emerge from the efforts of western 
anthropologists to understand the cultures they encounter.74 
   
Given this characterisation of the two forms, it will be evident that when astrology-as-
divination is discussed, it is artificial divination that is spoken of.  Thus for example in 
                                                 
69 Synonyms, and discussion: Giovanni Manetti (tr. Christine Richardson), Theories of the Sign in 
Classical Antiquity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993 [1987 as Le teorie del segno 
nell’antichità classica]) p.19; pp. 19 – 22; Rebecca L. Stein and Philip Stein, The Anthropology of 
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Complete Works (Indianapolis, IN, Hackett, 1987) p. 523 (244c). 
71 Plato, Phaedrus p. 522 (244b); 522-3 (244) for context. 
72 Cicero, On Divination, in: Marcus Tullius Cicero, C. D. Yonge (tr.), The Nature of the Gods and On 
Divination (Amherst, NY: 1997) p. 146, I.VI (cf p. 189, I. XLIX; p. 210, II, XI.) 
73 Jacob K. Olupona, ‘Owner of the Day’ in Michael Winkelman and Philip M. Peek, Divination and 
Healing: Potent Vision (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2004) p. 107. Olupona cited: L. 
Marshall ‘!Kung Bushmen religious beliefs’, Africa 32 (3) (1962), pp. 221 – 52; A. B. Child and I. L. 
Child, Religion and Magic in the life of traditional peoples (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997) p. 
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74 For different approaches to the categorisation of divination in African cultures which overlap with the 
distinction under discussion: Michael Winkelman and Philip M. Peek, ‘Introduction’ in Michael 
Winkelman and Philip M. Peek (eds.), African Divination Systems: Ways of Knowing (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 11 – 14.  For a specific parallel: the distinction between mediumistic 
divination and the chicken oracle in central Sukumaland, Tanzania, in Koen Stroeken, ‘In Search of the 
Real: The Healing Contingency of Sukuma Divination’ in: Winkelman and Peek, Divination and Healing, 
pp. 29 – 30. 
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his thesis, Cornelius stated at the outset that the term ‘artificial divination’ could serve 
to define his field of study, at least as an ‘approximation’.75  In order for artificial 
divination to be adequately characterised, it is necessary to add the qualification that the 
difference between natural and artificial divination is a difference of degree rather than 
of kind.  This is a point that Cornelius was keen to establish: ‘natural divination 
overlaps with artificial forms… so that a hard-and-fast distinction becomes misleading’; 
‘elements of “natural” divination are also fully at work in all inductive (“artificial”) 
divination’.76  In similar vein, the professor of classics Michael Flower remarked that 
any simple dichotomy between natural and artificial divination would be flawed, for ‘in 
many systems of divination ecstatic states and inductive methods can be combined in a 
way that is difficult to categorize.’77  Flower cited the anthropologist Philip M. Peek: 
 
a key to our understanding of divination is found in the continual reference to an intermediate 
category between the poles of mathematical calculation and spirit mediumship.  All analyses try 
to distinguish those forms involving ecstatic states from those performed in normal states of 
consciousness, yet the only real difference between them is that in ecstatic states the occult 
powers “speak” through the diviner rather than the divinatory apparatus.  All divination forms 
involve a non-normal state of inquiry which then requires a “rational” interpretation…78 
 
In Peek’s account therefore, divination is always innately hybrid insofar as it necessarily 
involves what he called the ‘divinatory apparatus’ and communication from ‘occult 
powers’.  This hybrid nature is crucial to the definition of artificial divination, and 
therefore to astrology-as-divination.  If it were simply a case of allowing ‘gods’ or 
‘occult powers’ to speak, there would be no role for astrology – an issue that was raised 
by Roy Gillett, an astrologer and President of the UK’s Astrological Association from 
1999 to date: 
 
If  the consultation… is a matter of “asking the gods ‘what should be done’”, what need is there 
for rigorous study of [the writings of the astrologer] Lilly, the Vedas, Hellenic astrology?  If 
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astrology is no more than divination, why not leave every adviser to make up their own models 
and images?79 
 
On the other hand, if astrology-as-divination could function without the involvement of 
‘gods’ or ‘occult powers’, there would be no reason not to evaluate astrology-as-
divination statistically, in terms of the accuracy of its readings.  This is a position for 
which Dean et al have argued, as will be discussed in section 2.5.1.  It may be unclear at 
this point why astrology-as-divination, understood as artificial divination in the hybrid 
form discussed above, would not be susceptible to scientific, statistical analysis.  In 
order to explore this it is necessary to return to Cornelius’s discussion of ‘the unique 
case of interpretation’, already mentioned in chapter 1. 
 
2.4.2   The Unique Case of Interpretation  
 
Cornelius defined the ‘unique case of interpretation’ as follows:80   
 
This is the participatory, context-determined and non-replicable instance of divination.  Like all 
'historical' events, or like any event of human and personal meaning, such as speaking or an 
action of an individual, it is singular and cannot be described from any other vantage point than 
its own.  Abstraction and quantification, lumping it together with other unique cases, risks 
obliterating it.81  
 
An account that suggests why astrological readings could have these qualities came 
from the astrologer Robin Heath: 
 
It is my view, formed over 25 years of being very interested in both the history and practice of 
astrology, that “doing a chart” is quite similar to the act of prayer.  The cosmos (sky, God, gods, 
the “above”, heaven) is being contacted, knows that this is happening, and responds accordingly 
to the circumstances prevailing at the time and the consciousness of the astrologer.82 
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In Heath’s description, astrology involves a participatory exchange between the cosmos 
and humans that proceeds from the context that exists at the time of the reading.  In this 
view each reading is necessarily unique, which would undercut the assumption often 
found amongst critics of astrology, and indeed many astrologers, that the function of 
astrology is simply to provide objective information.  In similar vein, Curry argued that 
‘every prediction is also an intervention’, and that ‘this truth precludes any fantasies of 
perfect and complete foreknowledge’.83  Developing this perspective, Curry suggested 
that ‘the paradigmatic divinatory question is not ‘What will happen?’ but ‘What should I 
do?’.84  The ‘unique case’ is central to the idea of astrology-as-divination, and will be 
returned to and explored throughout this thesis, especially in chapters 6 and 7.  The idea 
draws upon a number of parallels and they will be explored in the two following sub-
sections (2.4.3 and 2.4.4).   
 
2.4.3   C. G. Jung and Synchronicity 
 
Cornelius and Rudhyar both asserted the relevance of C. G. Jung’s thought for an 
understanding of astrology.  Rudhyar first became ‘fully acquainted’ with the thought of 
Jung in 1933, and it was a major influence on his approach to astrology thereafter.85  He 
stated, quoting Jung, that to live consciously was to integrate consciousness with the 
collective unconscious, which could be achieved through a ‘psychic process of 
development which expresses itself in symbols.’86  Rudhyar saw astrology as a suitable 
symbolic form – as did Jung, though Jung’s attitude was more variable and 
ambiguous.87  Jung’s theory of synchronicity is a possible explanatory mechanism for 
astrology, and this has been the primary focus of Cornelius’s involvement with Jungian 
thought.  Thus for instance he suggested that: 
 
As soon as astrology drops the illusion of a causal mechanism, its phenomena, like those of the 
more obviously divinatory practices such as reading Tarot cards and tea leaves, takes on a more 
                                                 
83 Curry in: Willis and Curry, Astrology Science and Culture, p.55. 
84 Curry in: Willis and Curry, Astrology Science and Culture, p.57. 
85 By Rudhyar’s account he began studying astrology in 1920, and first became ‘fully acquainted’ with 
Jung’s thought in 1933(Rudhyar: From Humanistic to Transpersonal, p. 9 & p. 11.) 
86 Dane Rudhyar, The Astrology of Personality p.113. Rudhyar quoted: C. G. Jung, ‘Commentary on “The 
Secret of the Golden Flower”’ in: C. G. Jung, R. F. C. Hull (tr.), Alchemical Studies (The Collected Works 
of C. G. Jung Vol. 13) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983 [1967]) p.21 [para 31]. 
87 Maggie Hyde, Jung and Astrology for analysis of the range of Jung’s perspective on astrology. 
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distinctly ‘paranormal’ quality.  Jung’s concept of Synchronicity (meaningful coincidence where 
there is no causal connection) may provide us with a key to the description of astrological 
phenomena.88  
 
Jung’s most detailed account of synchronicity is in an article published in 1952 (1955 in 
English translation), in which he defined it as follows: ‘Synchronicity... means the 
simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic state with one or more external events 
which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state – and, in certain 
cases, vice versa.’89  The concept of synchronicity was intertwined with astrology from 
early in its development, since Jung used astrological tests to develop the idea in his 
1952 article.90  The relevance of synchronicity as a possible explanation of astrology 
has since become widely established; for instance, Campion stated, ‘The concept of 
synchronicity… is frequently used to explain modern astrology’, and Culver and Ianna 
wrote, ‘the most popular of the non-causal explanations for the astrological influences is 
the concept of “synchronicity”.’91   
 
Rudhyar responded to synchronicity with initial enthusiasm but subsequent suspicion.  
Writing in 1971, he proposed it as a suitable explanatory model for astrology: 
 
What conceivable type of mechanism or process could explain the direct action of a particular 
planet upon a particular person...  To solve the problem, Carl Jung introduced the concept of 
“synchronicity”; that is, what happens at any moment of time carries everywhere the 
characteristic quality of this moment.  But when one advances into such a metaphysical concept 
one leaves the field of empirical science.92 
 
                                                 
88 Cornelius, Astrology and Divination, p. 3. 
89 C. G. Jung, ‘Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle’ [1952]in The Structure and Dynamics of 
the Psyche: Collected Works Vol. 8 (2nd. Edition) (London: Routledge, 1969) p.441/para 850. This is the 
third of three major texts on the subject by C. G. Jung, the others are: ‘Foreword to the “I Ching”’ in: C. 
G. Jung, R. F. C. Hull (tr.), C. G. Jung – Collected Works, Volume 11, Psychology and Religion: West 
and East (New York: Pantheon, 1958) pp.589 – 608 (964 – 1018) [first published 1950]; ‘On 
Synchronicity’ in: C. G. Jung, R. F. C. Hull (tr.), C. G. Jung – Collected Works, Volume 8, The Structure 
and Dynamics of the Psyche (2nd edn.) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 520 – 531 (969 – 
997) [1951].  
90 See particularly section 2, ‘An Astrological Experiment’ in Jung, Synchronicity: Acausal Principle, pp. 
459 – 484 (872 – 915). 
91 Nicholas Campion, The Practical Astrologer (Twickenham: Hamlyn, 1987) p.9, Culver and Ianna, 
Astrology: True or False?, p.120.   
92 Dane Rudhyar, Person-Centered Astrology, p. 74. 
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By 1973 however Rudhyar’s estimation of synchronicity had diminished and he 
described it as ‘a word that actually only adds to the mystery’.93  It seems likely that 
Rudhyar’s objections to Jung’s formulation of synchronicity derive from the 
compromises and obfuscations into which Jung found himself pitched by his attempts to 
put the theory on a scientific footing.  This trait in Jung’s approach was identified by 
Roderick Main when he referred to Jung’s ‘foregrounding of the scientific evidence for 
his theory and downplaying its nevertheless easily detectable religious influences’.94  
Jung desired to create dialogue between science and religion even though – at least 
some of the time – he regarded the two as ‘incommensurable’.95  In consequence there 
is a tension between the subjective and the objective in his definitions which mirrors 
that found when astrology’s nature is discussed.  This point was articulated by Hyde, 
whose analysis was cited by Cornelius.96  Hyde addressed the problem of 
synchronicity’s definition by observing that Jung offered two distinct formulations, 
which she dubbed ‘Synchronicity I’ and ‘Synchronicity II’: 
 
The first version (Synchronicity I) suggests that there is a relationship between an objectively 
observed psyche and objectively observed events.  If this was so, these interconnections could be 
studied objectively...the second version (Synchronicity II), acknowledges the subjective 
participation of the observing psyche, that is, the psyche of the one who seeks to observe this law 
at work.  This is evident in the lawless, one-off, uncanny, unpredictable, ‘just-so’ nature of 
synchronistic events of which Jung the diviner was only too aware.97 
 
This distinction between two forms of synchronicity parallels the two different models 
of astrology that were outlined in section 2.2 above.  Under ‘Synchronicity I’, it would 
be possible to confirm astrology’s truth under a scientific frame of reference.  
‘Synchronicity II’, however, by giving more emphasis to the subjective, is outside 
science’s reach and therefore perhaps better fitted to serve as an explanatory principle 
for astrology as divination.  An illustration of what this emphasis on the subjective 
                                                 
93 Dane Rudhyar, An Astrological Mandala: The Cycle of Transformation and its 360 Symbolic Phases 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1974 [1973]) p. 350. 
94 Roderick Main, The Rupture of Time: Synchronicity and Jung’s Critique of Modern Western Culture 
(Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2004) p. 106. 
95 C. G. Jung, letter to Pastor Max Frischknecht, 8th February 1946 in: C. G. Jung; G. Adler & A Jaffé 
(eds.), R. F. C. Hull (trans.), Letters of C. G. Jung: Volume 1, 1906 – 1950 (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1973) p.411 
96 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 78. 
97 Maggie Hyde, Jung and Astrology (London: Aquarian/Harper Collins, 1992), p. 128. 
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could mean can be seen in Jung’s suggestion that responses from the I Ching ‘take into 
account the hidden individual quality in things and men, and in one’s own unconscious 
self as well.’98  As Main noted, this means that the I Ching can sometimes address the 
‘unconscious preoccupations’ of the person who consulted it, regardless of the question 
explicitly posed.99  As was noted regarding the ‘unique case’ in the previous sub-
section, what transpires in divination is not necessarily the provision of an objective 
informational response to the question on the querent’s mind.  Hyde remarked a similar 
experience with astrological work: 
 
You have to practise your [astrological] work as if it were objective, and about other people and 
other things in the world, but every now and again that objective position is actually cut through 
by something else… you suddenly find that the symbols don’t just address that objective thing in 
the world, but… they are talking… about you and where you are coming from, and what you are 
up to, in something else quite different in your life.100 
 
In discussing precedents for the concept of synchronicity, Jung focused particularly on 
the concept from Chinese philosophy of  Tao as a fundamental universal principle; he 
emphasised Richard Wilhelm’s translation of Tao as ‘meaning’, and went on to 
characterise that meaning, in the Western tradition, as involving ‘the presence in the 
microcosm of macrocosmic events.’101  From there, Jung went on to discuss the 
principle of microcosm-macrocosm correspondence, or sympathy, as a precursor to 
synchronicity.102  This principle has also long been cited as a supportive cosmological 
context for astrology.  
 
2.4.4   Macrocosm/Microcosm 
 
Macrocosm-microcosm thought sees the universe as conscious, and posits sympathy or 
correspondence between it and individual members of the human race.103  The idea of 
                                                 
98 Jung, Foreword to the I Ching, p.596 [983].  
99 Main, Rupture of Time, p. 42. 
100 Hyde quoted in: Phillipson, Year Zero, p. 184. 
101 Jung, Synchronicity: Acausal Principle, p. 486 [917]. 
102 Jung, Synchronicity: Acausal Principle, pp. 489 – 502 [924 – 942]. For a more detailed account of the 
influences Jung acknowledged: Main, Rupture of Time, p. 90. 
103 Donald Levy, ‘Macrocosm and Microcosm’ in Donald M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2nd edn.) (New York: Thomson Gale, 2006) Vol.5, p.639.  For an historical account of the principle of 
sympathy from the ancient to the modern world: Seth Lobis, The Virtue of Sympathy: Magic, Philosophy 
 
60 
sympathy is often traced back to the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium (c. 334 BCE – 
c. 262 BCE).104  According to the biographer of philosophers Diogenes Laertius (fl. 3rd 
century CE) Zeno said: ‘The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united 
whole.  This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together 
things in heaven and earth.’105   
 
A contrary position was taken by Cicero.  He dismissed the possibility that divination 
was united with ‘the nature of things… so as to form one harmonious whole, which I 
see is the opinion of the natural philosophers, and especially of those who say that all 
things that exist are but one whole’.106  His comments seem to have been aimed 
primarily at the Stoics, particularly Chrysippus (c. 280 – c. 207 BCE) and Posidonius (c. 
135 – c. 51 BCE).107  Plotinus on the other hand asserted the existence and efficacy of 
sympathy, stating that magic spells could be explained ‘By the reigning sympathy and 
by the fact in Nature that there is an agreement of like forces and an opposition of 
unlike, and by the diversity of those multitudinous powers which converge in the one 
living universe.’108  This perspective was shared by Ficino, for whom ‘the parts of this 
world, like the parts of a single animal, all deriving from a single author, are joined to 
each other by the communion of a single nature.’109  The principle of sympathy was 
articulated, in different terms, by Cornelius when he argued: ‘An essential feature of the 
“divinatory attitude” would seem to be the understanding that there is an “active 
participation” between man and his world, to the extent that the two may not be finally 
differentiated.’110  From this perspective, pairs of terms that refer to the macrocosm and 
the microcosm (such as universe/individual or cosmos/person) refer to appearance only.  
                                                                                                                                               
and Literature in Seventeenth Century England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015) pp. 4 – 
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104 E.g. A. A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy 
(Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 130; P. G. Maxwell-Stuart, Astrology: From Ancient 
Babylon to the Present (Stroud: Amberley, 2010) p. 26. 
105 Diogenes Laertius, R. D. Hicks (tr.), ‘Zeno’ in: Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers Vol. 
2 (London: William Heinemann, 1925) p. 245, Book VIII para. 140. 
106 Cicero, On Divination, pp. 212-3 [II. XIV]. 
107 Georg Luck, Arcana Mundi: Magic and the Occult in the Greek and Roman Worlds (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) p. 270. 
108 Plotinus, Enneads, p. 369 [Ennead IV. 4. 40]. 
109 Marsilio Ficino, Sears Jayne (tr.), Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love (Woodstock, CT: 
Spring Publications, 1985) p. 127, Speech VI. Angela Voss observed that in addition to Plotinus, 
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Ficino, Angela Voss (ed.), Marsilio Ficino (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 2006) p. 21. 
110 Cornelius, Astrology as Divination, p. 1. 
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The separation of the two – and therefore the definition of each – would lack any 
ultimate ontological reality.  The philosophical and religious precedents for, and 
implications of, this will be explored in chapter 6.  In addition, there is a consequence 
for the terminology used in this thesis: when terms referring to macrocosmic and 
microcosmic entities are used in the context of astrology-as-divination, it is implicit that 
what is referred to may only be appearance, and that the use of the terms should not be 
taken to imply their reality as separate entities.  Terminological exactitude would argue 
for the use of qualified terms – such as ‘apparent individual’ and so forth – throughout.  
I have however chosen to use such formulations infrequently, on the grounds that the 
continual repetition of ‘apparent’ and its cognates would be more otiose than 
illuminative. 
 
The involvement of astrology with macrocosm-microcosm thought has a long history.  
For instance the historian of science David C. Lindberg (1935 – 2015) described 
astrology in the 12th century CE in the west as ‘Closely associated with the macrocosm-
microcosm analogy’.111    This relationship is sometimes summarised with the phrase 
attributed, in the Emerald Tablet, to Hermes Trismegistus: “That which is above is like 
to that which is below, and that which is below is like to that which is above, to 
accomplish the miracles of one thing.”112  This phrase has been invoked as a 
cosmological context for astrology and alchemy for several centuries.  For instance, 
William Lilly’s friend and supporter Elias Ashmole (1617 – 1692) cited it in a magical-
alchemical text in 1652.113  Nicholas Culpeper (1616 – 1654) cited it in Astrological 
Judgement of Diseases from the Decumbiture of the Sick in 1655.114  The phrase was 
quoted many times in HP Blavatsky’s (1831 – 1891) Theosophical texts, and a few 
                                                 
111 David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science – The European Scientific Tradition in 
Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450 (2nd edn.) (University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), p.214. 
112 This translation into English was made by Steele and Waley from a 12th-century Latin translation of an 
Arabic version, originally published in: Robert Steele, Dorothea Waley Singer, ‘The Emerald Table’, 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine Vol.21 (1928), p.42, also cited in: Stanton J. Linden, The 
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times in the works of the influential astrologer Alan Leo (1860 – 1917).115  Writing in 
1913, Leo characterised it as ‘the well-known Hermetic maxim’ and it has continued to 
be widely recognised.  For instance in 1988 the astrologer Liz Greene stated: 
 
This Hermetic World-view is familiar to all astrologers who have studied the antecedents of their 
art… You can find this same perspective in many astrological texts of the 20th century, because 
the schools of Theosophy, Rudolf Steiner, Alice Bailey et al. have retained the old Hermetic 
vision of reality.116 
 
Bernadette Brady, writing for astrologers in 1992, remarked that “‘As above, so below,’ 
is a statement we all know” and the astrologer Diana Collis, discussing the principle 
behind astrology, remarked: “Most people encapsulate it in the, these days, rather 
hackneyed term “as above so below”.”117  The axiomatic nature of ‘as above, so below’ 
for astrology is also recognised by astrology’s critics – as when, for instance, Dean et al 
used the phrase to summarise the ‘fundamental claim of astrology’.118   
 
The four words ‘as above, so below’ are often quoted as if they were a complete 
articulation of the Emerald Tablet’s statement on this point, and this formulation could 
be interpreted to imply a simple causal relationship from heavens to Earth.119  The full 
phrase as cited earlier in this sub-section (‘That which is above is like to that which is 
below, and that which is below is like to that which is above, to accomplish the miracles 
of one thing’) makes it clear that a participatory relationship is being described – as 
Robert Hand pointed out, according to this description ‘…we not only get created – we 
create’.120  The experiential consequence of this participatory relationship for a 
                                                 
115 E.g. H.P. Blavatsky, Isis Unveiled, (Pasadena: Theosophical University Press, facsimile of 1877 
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practising astrologer can be illustrated by the following from the contemporary 
astrologer Adrian Duncan: 
 
The astrologer maintains that there is a natural resonance between the evolving motion of the 
universe, and the development of the human soul. This is a very effective working hypothesis, 
and the astrologer who puts doubts about its effectivity aside and embraces the hypothesis 
wholeheartedly is rewarded by this intelligent universe. The clinical and objective approach of 
the sceptic will lead to very poor results in the interpretation process, whilst the enthusiastic 
believer will find himself in dialogue with a supportive universe, magically geared to his 
development.121 
 
In similar vein, Campion wrote: 
 
judicial astrology doesn’t work; it’s astrologers who work.  In this sense the horoscope usually 
functions as an ink blot on to which we project our ability to analyse human character and impart 
meaning to human situations.  However, and this is a very big however, there is something out 
there.  Astrology is like a game of chess with an invisible partner.  We set out the board and the 
rules, make a move, and then find that the pieces are moving themselves, as if by an invisible 
hand.122 
 
These quotations convey something of the sense of divinatory astrology as dialogical – 
‘a dialogue with the unknown’ or ‘dialogue with the divine’ as Curry has characterised 
it, whilst acknowledging the influence of Cornelius and Hyde on this aspect of his 
thought.123 
 
Obscurity in both the origins of the Emerald Tablet and the intentions of its author(s) 
have been cited by Arthur Mather as reasons to question the idea of the macrocosm-
microcosm principle as something that would be relevant to astrology.124  The charge of 
obscurity is undeniable.  The first known version of the text dates to an Arabic version 
in 934 CE, but this is widely thought to have been a translation of an earlier, lost, Greek 
                                                 
121 Adrian Duncan, ‘Is Astrology Reality?’ [1999] https://www.astrowow.com/blog/is-astrology-reality/  
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version.125  Needham’s argument that the text may derive from Taoist literature is a 
minority position, but regardless of its historical veracity it emphasises the conceptual 
congruence between macrocosm-microcosm thought and Taoism.126  It thus underscores 
Jung’s invocation of both as precedents for synchronicity.  That suggestion is echoed by 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s remarks that macrocosm-microcosm ideas ‘are universal and far 
from being limited to Greek, Islamic, or Christian cosmologies, [having] their exact 
counterparts in China, India, and elsewhere.’127  Congruence of ideas does not establish 
their veracity however, and the charge of obscurantism by critics remains as a major 
element in the failure of dialogue between astrologers and their critics.   
 
2.5   Failure of Dialogue 
 
The failure of dialogue between astrologers and their critics involves suspicions of bias 
on both sides.  Writing in 1961, Rudhyar suggested that people whose minds were 
‘conditioned by the type of “rigorous thinking”… which is the ideal of modern science 
will find such a thinking (as, for instance, the correspondence of microcosm and 
macrocosm) obscure, archaic and unconvincing.’128  In similar vein, Cornelius 
suggested that ‘divination’s epistemological claim to truth... is almost impossible for 
modern educated opinion to countenance’129  On the side of the critics, Culver and 
Ianna asserted (without substantiation) that ‘practitioners [of astrology] have almost 
never done science, have almost never learned to depend on objective evidence or to use 
experimental methods of verification to make observations to confirm ideas.’130  Belief 
in astrology was therefore, in their view, due to the preference of astrologers and their 
clients for a comforting illusion over the harsh reality exposed by scientific enquiry.  
Writing in 1977, Dean et al argued that in investigating astrology, ‘there is an especial 
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need for scepticism, method, thoroughness and competence.  Yet the opposite situation 
prevails [...] As a result astrology is permeated by fog.’131  Since then, Dean et al seem 
to have come to regard at least some astrologers as culpable for this state of affairs.  
Already in 1979, Mather wrote that ‘Some astrologers... fearing that science was 
catching up with them, have backtracked very rapidly, creating a smokescreen of 
symbolism, inner reality, holistic understanding, etc.’132  Mather’s statement was cited 
as fact ten years later by Kelly, Culver, Loptson.133  And when I interviewed Dean et al 
in 2000 the view that the obfuscation was smokescreen rather than fog – something for 
which astrologers were therefore more or less responsible – was asserted with reference 
to Kuhn: 
 
the philosopher Thomas Kuhn noted that when an idea is in crisis, its supporters retreat behind a 
smokescreen of speculation that sounds good but is actually empty.  This is precisely the 
situation with modern astrology.  Rather than demonstrate their claims under artifact-free 
conditions, or specify what research would be relevant or how controversies and disagreements 
might be dealt with, astrologers retreat behind a smokescreen of speculation about the nature of 
truth, reality, perception, language, and so on.  Talk yes, actual progress no.134 
 
The change from ‘fog’ to ‘smokescreen’ could then be taken as an index of increasing 
pessimism regarding astrology’s claims to truth on the part of this group.  In 1977 Dean 
had written, ‘The picture emerging suggests that astrology works, but seldom in the way 
or to the extent that it is said to work.’135  And in 1979 Mather had written, ‘The net 
result of our assessment is that several areas of traditional astrology appear to be valid, 
or at least strongly merit further investigation [although] with many areas... the evidence 
is against their validity.’136  These statements seemed to give some cause, albeit heavily 
qualified, for optimism regarding scientific vindication of some part of astrology.  By 
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2008, however, the verdict was that ‘The evidence that led to Recent Advances 
consisted essentially of promising results from uncontrolled studies; but subsequently 
none have been shown to give positive results when artifacts are controlled.’137 
 
Two issues need to be distinguished here.  The first is the judgement that scientific tests 
of astrology have failed to show any truth in astrology; discussion of this will follow, 
particularly in chapters 4 and 5.  The second issue is the conclusion that, science having 
delivered a negative verdict, there is nothing further to be said about astrology’s truth-
status – so that any philosophical discussion of the issues can and should be seen as ‘a 
smokescreen of speculation’.138   
 
2.5.1   Kinds of Truth  
 
A key issue, therefore, is whether scientifically-sanctioned truth is the only kind of truth 
that should be considered in evaluating the truth-status of astrology.  It is central to 
Cornelius’s approach that it is not, as is seen in his argument that ‘Geoffrey Dean 
commits the basic philosophical error of scientism, which is to assert or imply that there 
can be logically only one class of truth...’.139  Rudhyar put forward a similar perspective 
in a review he wrote of Dean and Mather’s Recent Advances.  He argued that the book 
was flawed ‘because it starts from a black-and-white, either-or opposition between 
“truth” (defined as objective and exact knowledge based on scientific research) and 
“belief”’.140  Further, he argued:  
 
The writers of the book (and probably most astrologers occupied with statistical research) seem 
to have a Newtonian idea of the universe. On page 2 they dispose summarily of the holistic 
approach which nevertheless is the foundation of the most recent physical theories in which the 
universe is shown to be a web of relationships, and all separate objects -- including even atomic 
particles -- are taken to be nothing but patterns of relationships.141 
 
                                                 
137 Geoffrey Dean, Ivan Kelly, and Arthur Mather – Interview, 2008. 
138 Dean et al quoted in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 152 (already cited above). 
139 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.189. 
140 Dane Rudhyar, review of Dean et al, Recent Advances, in ‘Astrology: A Review Symposium’, Zetetic 
Scholar Nos. 3 & 4, April 1979, p. 83. 
141 Rudhyar, review of Recent Advances,  Zetetic Scholar Nos. 3 & 4, April 1979, p. 83. 
 
67 
In response, Dean and Mather characterised Rudhyar’s approach as a rejection of 
science – and therefore of truth: ‘In a nutshell Rudhyar rejects science (and hence our 
book) in favor of symbolism, and hence accepts belief in lieu of truth.’142   
 
A similar argument arose regarding an article, ‘The Truth of Astrology’, by the 
psychotherapist and astrologer Mike Harding.143  Harding distinguished between 
‘computational truth’ – truth which can be arrived at by ‘deciding to sit down and think 
about it’ – and ‘meditative truth’, in which truth reveals itself, and ‘I cannot control 
what the world may or may not reveal.’144  This distinction will be further discussed in 
chapter 3.  For the present discussion, the significant issue is Harding’s suggestion that 
a mode of truth other than the scientific should be taken into account when astrology’s 
truth-status is discussed.  Harding’s article was not well-received by Dean, who 
suggested that Harding ‘implies that, when faced with the Emperor’s New Clothes, it is 
best to keep our heads in the sand… Harding’s prize-winning essay abandons 
scholarship and clear thinking in favour of muddle and misrepresentation’.145  Harding 
replied, ‘it is clear that Dean has little, if any understanding of either linguistic or 
Continental philosophy, (or possibly even recognises what can be meant by 
‘philosophy’…)’ and suggested that Dean ‘seems, almost wilfully, to misunderstand or 
misrepresent points being made in a manner described by Wittgenstein’s concept of 
“aspect blindness”.’146  (For Wittgenstein, ‘Aspect-blindness will be akin to the lack of 
a “musical ear”.’147)  This led him to question whether Dean’s evaluations of 
astrological research were trustworthy.148  The exchange exemplifies both a failure of 
dialogue between astrology’s advocates and critics, and the central role played in that 
failure by disagreement over whether it is valid to consider a mode of truth that is not 
defined by science in the sense established above. 
                                                 
142 Dean and Mather, ‘Response to Mr. Rudhyar’ in ‘Astrology: a Review Symposium’, Zetetic Scholar 
Nos. 3 & 4, April 1979, p. 98. 
143 Mike Harding, ‘The Truth of Astrology’ The Astrological Journal Vol. 39 No. 6, Nov/Dec 1997 pp. 
14 – 18. 
144 Harding, ‘Truth of Astrology’, p. 15. 
145 Geoffrey Dean, ‘The Truth of Astrology Competition: A summary of each entry, and some 
implications for researchers’ Correlation Vol. 16 No. 2, Northern Winter 1997/8 p. 56. Harding’s essay 
had won the competition. 
146 Mike Harding, ‘Dean has no understanding of either linguistic or continental philosophy’ (letter), 
Correlation, Letter Vol. 17 No. 1, Northern Summer 1998, p. 54. 
147 Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe (tr.), Philosophical Investigations (The German text, with a 
revised English translation) 3rd edn. (Malden: Blackwell, 2001 [1953]) p. 182. Original emphasis. 
148 Mike Harding, ‘Dean has no understanding…’, p. 56. 
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Accounts of a non-scientific kind of truth, by their nature, define a truth which cannot 
be tested and demonstrated objectively; it is to that extent obscure.  This obscurity is 
generally acknowledged by astrologers who argue for such a position.  For example, 
Rudhyar wrote: ‘The transpersonal philosopher-astrologer should always allow for the 
existence of the unknowable.  He is dealing with a mystery – with man’s essential 
freedom…’149  Cornelius took a similar position.  Towards the close of his book The 
Moment of Astrology, he remarked that he had not attempted to set out ‘a 
comprehensive and definitive theory of astrology’, suggesting that the theoretical 
constructions he has used throughout the book ‘are better seen as stepping-stones rather 
than resting places.’150  This is, in his view, an inevitable consequence of the view of 
astrology as divination: ‘Reorienting astrology as divination leads to a realm of 
uncertainty with few signposts to guide us.’151  For Harding, meditative truths ‘may… 
lie outside of speech.  They can be pointed to, they can be shown in the world, but they 
cannot actually be described in words.  Sometimes they show themselves only in 
silence…’152  Such arguments are often seen by critics as examples of the 
‘smokescreen’ they allege astrologers to create around their subject.  As was seen to be 
the case with Culver and Ianna, Dean et al have also argued that there is no valid 
argument for precluding astrology-as-divination from assessment by scientific testing.  
Thus when I put it to Dean et al that some astrologers regard astrology as not testable 
because ‘they see it as a divinatory tool more akin to a ritual that prepares the mind to 
intuit what needs to be said’, their perspective was that this was ‘hard to understand’, 
and that – properly seen – the issue was ‘whether the astrology ritual works better than a 
control ritual, e.g. by providing new information or by improving self-esteem.  Much is 
testable here.’153  The point was underscored when Dean, in a paper about astrology and 
divination, argued of the body of scientific tests of astrology, ‘not only do the results 
deny genuine astrological effects… they also deny god-dependent effects (so divination 
is fantasy).’154  The possibility that astrology-as-divination might be true in a way that 
                                                 
149 Rudhyar, Humanistic to Transpersonal, p. 65. 
150 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.303. 
151 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.277. 
152 Harding, ‘Truth of Astrology’, p. 15. 
153 Dean et al quoted in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 143. 
154 Geoffrey Dean, ‘Divination: Astrology shows clear links with divinatory practices (2010), 
http://www.astrology-and-science.com/A-divi2.htm (accessed 18th August 2019). 
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could not be captured through the methodology of science was dismissed because 
‘untestable gods are… indistinguishable from fantasy.’155   
 
2.5.2   The Nomothetic/Idiographic Distinction Revisited 
 
In order to add context to this discussion I return to the distinction between nomothetic 
and idiographic approaches discussed in the first chapter.  The position of Dean et al 
regarding astrology is that nomothetic (law-based) evidence should be the only arbiter 
of truth.  In their view, idiographic (private/unique) evidence may hold significance or 
meaning for the individual – this will be explored further in this section – but they see 
this as having no relevance to astrology’s truth-status.  This conflicts with Cornelius’s 
advocacy of the ‘unique case’, under which the individual perspective of the astrologer 
is integral to the understanding of astrology’s truth-status.  A parallel for this conflict 
may be seen in the observation of John Swinton and Harriet Mowat (professor of 
practical theology and research fellow in spirituality, respectively) that:  
 
nomothetic knowledge as it is embodied in the language and practices of science has become the 
public currency for knowledge and the verification of what is true and what is untrue.  However, 
the fact that there are powerful forces within culture pushing for the supremacy of nomothetic 
knowledge does not make nomothetic knowledge the only plausible form of knowledge 
(although it may often look that way).156 
 
Swinton and Mowat used the example of a scientist’s love for his wife to illustrate the 
two forms of knowledge.  Hence, ‘within his professional life, the scientist defines fact 
and truth in terms of replicability, falsifiability and generalizability’ – the nomothetic 
model.157  The scientist loves his wife and children, and believes it is true that he loves 
them, but, 
 
It is not possible for him to carry out a randomized control trial to test the theory and, even if he 
did, the love he shows for his wife and family would more than probably be quite different from 
                                                 
155 Dean, ‘Divination’. 
156 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, p. 40. 
157 Swinton and Mowat, Practical Theology, p. 40. 
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the love a stranger might show towards them, or even the love that he has showed them earlier 
on in their relationship.158 
 
It is possible to see, in the nomothetic/idiographic distinction, precedent and support for 
the idea that astrology-as-divination might not conform to scientific criteria for truth, 
yet might be judged true under a different set of criteria. Hence for example Curry made 
it clear that he regarded astrology-as-divination’s truth-status as precisely not a matter 
for nomothetic evaluation.  He argued that in tests of astrology as understood by Dean 
et al, ‘the claims at stake must be systemic, abstract, nomothetic ones.  But this would 
rule out just the kind of contextual, situated, embodied and embedded interventions of 
which astrology as divination consists.’159 
 
Dean et al have drawn a distinction between ‘subjective and objective astrology’ that is 
relevant here.160  According to their characterisation, ‘subjective astrology’ might bring 
direction, purpose and enrichment to people’s lives; yet, ‘To be accepted, subjective 
astrology does not need to be true.’161  ‘Objective astrology’, on the other hand, was 
characterised as something that ‘needs to be true’.162  A similar view of astrology was 
outlined by Culver and Ianna: ‘astrology seems to work for purely psychological 
reasons only… Just as taking a harmless sugar pill may “cure” an illness if you think 
you are taking the proper drug, believing astrology works may lead to a beneficial good 
feeling in the client.’163  (The analogy in that quotation, between astrology and a 
placebo, will be discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis.)  A feature of Dean et al’s 
distinction between subjective and objective astrology is that it accommodates the 
common experience, referred to above, that astrology works – or at least, seems to 
work.  This perspective is illustrated in an article by one of Dean’s collaborators, Rudolf 
Smit, who described how he learned and practised astrology, but eventually decided on 
the basis of scientific evaluation that there was no truth in the subject.164  After a long 
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159 Curry in: Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, pp. 96 -7. 
160 Dean et al in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.128; pp. 128 – 130 for the discussion of subjective 
and objective astrology. 
161 Dean et al quoted in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.129. Original emphasis. 
162 Dean et al quoted in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 129. 
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period of not practising astrology, he wrote that he was again using astrology, but in a 
way that would fit a ‘subjective astrology’ interpretation: 
 
As for me, after twenty odd years I have taken up again the reading of charts (now and then, that 
is), if only to experience again the wonderful feeling when such a reading turns out to be 
successful. However, I am not asking money for such sessions, and I tell my new "clients" in 
advance that I am offering them a Grand Illusion, which may be helpful nonetheless. If it is 
helpful, it is not because astrology itself is helpful, but because astrology sets a scene that helps 
me to be helpful.165 
 
 
At this point there is almost the basis for a rapprochement between some critics of 
astrology and advocates of astrology-as-divination.  Both deny causal power to the 
planets – at least, power of sufficient strength to explain how most astrology could 
work.  Both characterise astrology as a potentially useful tool, and emphasise the need 
for subjective engagement and reference to astrological technique and interpretive 
precedent as if it were an objective, causally-based science.  Yet the answer to Culver 
and Ianna’s question, ‘Astrology: True or False?’ would be ‘true’ from one side and 
‘false’ from the other.   
 
2.6   Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to chronicle some key arguments and texts 
pertaining to the truth-status of astrology, and to show what I mean by a ‘failure of 
discussion’ between the parties to this discussion.  If the overall impression is of a 
maelstrom of incompatible ideas, which might benefit from philosophical analysis, it 
has therefore succeeded.  The basis for a philosophical analysis will be considered in the 
following chapter, chapter 3. 
 
The main issues to arise are as follows.  Firstly, there is the question of whether or not it 
makes sense, in principle, to speak of more than one kind of truth.  Closely related to 
this is the question of science’s role in the evaluation of astrology’s truth: advocates of 
science as the arbiter of astrology’s truth often assume that, absent scientific validation, 
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astrology would necessarily be untrue; that there simply could be no other way for it to 
be true.   
 
An attempt to save the phenomenon wherein astrology seems to work, whilst keeping 
the subject segregated from ‘truth’, is the idea from Dean et al of a ‘subjective 
astrology’ which might be helpful even though not true.  The characterisation of 
subjectivity here is controversial, with different understandings evident between many 
of those who regard astrology as true, and those who do not.  For the former group, the 
subjective consciousness of the individual is capable of tapping into something beyond 
the individual – as described by the principle of microcosm-macrocosm relationship.  
Critics of astrology, on the other hand, typically assume that such a relationship is either 
not possible, or at any rate not relevant to astrology. 
 
All of the positions in this chapter rest upon epistemological and ontological 
assumptions that are seldom mentioned, or even noticed, by those who espouse them.  
My contention is that by bringing these assumptions into plain view, it may be possible 
to move beyond the failure of dialogue that currently characterises the field.  The central 
question here is how truth should be defined and applied.  A literature review of the 
philosophical concepts and sources to be deployed constitutes the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review – Philosophy 
3.1  The Role of Philosophy 
This chapter will define the conceptual framework that will be taken from philosophy to 
shed light on astrology’s truth-status.  In broad terms, the approach is along the lines 
delineated by Richard Fumerton, albeit applied to astrology: 
If you tell me confidently that there is a God, or that the CIA assassinated Kennedy, I’ll want to 
know how you know that that is so. I’ll want some reasons or justification for believing that it is 
true. I’ll want to know why you think that this is something a rational person ought to believe. 
It’s this fact about our pursuit of truth that makes plausible the claim that one simply cannot 
ignore epistemology…1 
Epistemology is ‘that branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge, its 
possibility, scope, and general basis.’2  The term was introduced in 1854 by James F. 
Ferrier (1808 – 1864), and is equivalent to terms such as ‘theory of knowledge’ and 
‘problem of knowledge’.3 
It began to emerge in the previous chapter that it is not clear how ‘truth’ should be 
characterised, nor what is really being said, and implied, when astrology is characterised 
as either true or false.  Hence the involvement of epistemology and, in particular, 
theories of truth.  Jamin Asay wrote that ‘a theory of the nature of truth will offer an 
account of what it is, if anything, that is shared by all truths, in virtue of which they are 
true.’4  This is to the point: in order to evaluate the truth-status of astrology, it is first 
necessary to arrive at a degree of clarity as to what the proposition ‘astrology is true’ (or 
false) would mean.  The definition of truth is a contentious issue for philosophers and 
any aspiration to final clarity should be tempered by that fact.   
After preliminary discussion and orientation, section 3.1.5 below (including its sub-
sections) will focus on the three major theories of truth.  These sections aim to introduce 
                                                          
1 Richard Fumerton, Epistemology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006) p. 2. 
2 D. W. Hamlyn, ‘History of Epistemology’ in Honderich (1995), P. 242. 
3 Jan Woleński, ‘The History of Epistemology’ in Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen and Jan Woleński, 
Handbook of Epistemology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004) p. 3; James E. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysic: 
The Theory of Knowing and Being (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1854); term introduced at 
p. 46. 
4 Jamin Asay, The Primitivist Theory of Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) p. 12. 
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the theories in as simple and concise a manner as possible, and therefore include very 
little discussion of their relevance to astrology, or of the criticisms that each theory has 
faced.  The theories will be looked at in detail in chapters 4 – 7, where more discussion 
of these issues will be found.  In section 3.1 – roughly the first half of this chapter – the 
discussion is kept relatively simple in order to establish an overview of the main 
philosophical concepts.  Section 3.2 – roughly the second half of this chapter – will then 
consider some of the challenges and complications faced by the simple account given 
up to that point, and the approach that will be taken towards them. 
The terms ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ have both been used already in this chapter.  In 
section 3.1.4 below I will argue that inevitably, in discussing the truth of astrology, one 
is also discussing whether astrology yields knowledge; that a true astrology would yield 
knowledge, and that it only makes sense to speak of astrology yielding knowledge if 
astrology is in a significant sense true.  Before pursuing this, or any other issue, 
however it is apposite – given this thesis’s focus on applying philosophical concepts to 
astrology – to review the discussion of astrology in recent books on philosophy.   
3.1.1 Astrology as it has appeared in Recent Philosophy Texts 
Geoffrey Cornelius wrote: 
It seems fair to say that there is no established academic philosopher who seriously raises as a 
primary epistemological question the possibility of truth-telling through practical inductive 
divination - astrology, Tarot cards, tea leaves and the like.5 
In my review of the philosophical literature I have not found a disproof of this assertion, 
and have found many examples of astrology being dismissed out of hand in 
philosophical texts.  Indeed astrology quite often serves as a touchstone for falsehood, 
with no significant latitude for discussion of its truth-status.  Thus for instance Peter 
Van Inwagen suggested that “it is hardly possible to suppose that there could be a very 
interesting debate about the truth-values of the claims made by astrologers.” 6  For him, 
‘It is clear... that someone who believes in astrology believes in something that is 
                                                          
5 Cornelius, Field of Omens, p. 8. Original emphasis. 
6 Peter van Inwagen, ‘“It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Anything upon 
Insufficient Evidence”’, Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.) Faith, Freedom and Rationality: 
Philosophy of Religion Today (Lanham Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996) p. 142. 
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simply indefensible.’7  Van Inwagen’s focus was not astrology; he simply used it as 
convenient shorthand for something that is definitely not true.   
Joshua Gert credited philosophers with particular insight into astrology when he wrote, 
‘It is not very mysterious that we human beings go in for astrology.  But it is not very 
controversial amongst philosophers that astrology is simply bogus: that our best 
philosophical theory of astrology would be an error theory.’8  Richard L Kirkham 
attributed the alleged knowledge of astrology’s falsity to the general populace when he 
wrote that ‘Most of us are skeptics about the predictions of astrology; that is, we think 
that these predictions are no more objectively justified than their negations.’9  Given the 
data (already referred to in chapter 1) that suggests belief in astrology in the West may 
be as high as 70%, astrology may not be the best example he could have chosen.10  
Joseph Tolliver offered what appears to be a more detailed analysis of the inherent 
problem with astrology.  He took the example of a hypothetical astrologer arguing that 
the fact of Einstein being a Pisces explained his discovery of relativity.11 This is 
something that astrologers have said, albeit usually with caveats and conditions.12  In 
algebraic notation he characterised Einstein’s discovery of relativity as d; the fact of his 
being a Pisces as e; and the hypothetical astrologer’s reasons for their view as r.  With 
this notation in place he announced: ‘But of course, r is a bad reason to believe that e is 
a good reason to believe d.’13  The formulation is more complex, but the substance 
remains the same – an assumption that there could not be such a thing as a good reason 
to believe in astrology. 
In some cases, philosophers have emphasised the role of science in revealing astrology 
not to be true.  Thus for instance Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970) wrote, ‘To any person 
with even the vaguest idea of the nature of scientific evidence, such beliefs as those of 
                                                          
7 Inwagen, ‘“It Is Wrong…’ p. 141. 
8 Joshua Gert, Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) p.16.  
9 Richard L. Kirkham, Theories of Truth (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1995) p.41. 
10 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 160. 
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astrologers are of course impossible.’14  In similar vein, Reuben Abel (1912 – 1997) 
posited a dichotomy whereby astrology was ‘nonsense’ because it was not ‘scientific’, 
and asserted that ‘the claims of astrology are not knowledge.’15  This quotation 
appeared as the epigraph of Kelly, Dean and Saklofske’s ‘Astrology: A Critical Review’ 
in 1990.16  W. V. Quine (1908 – 2000) took a position similar to that of Abel when he 
asserted that ‘Science tells us that our only source of information about the external 
world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces.’17  
He concluded, therefore, that ‘the epistemological question is in turn a question within 
science.’18  On that basis he asserted, ‘we should be wary of astrologers, palmists, and 
other soothsayers’.19  
Mark Risjord gave an historical perspective to what he saw as astrology’s negative 
truth-status when he wrote that ‘Alchemy and astrology were once proclaimed 
“sciences”, but nobody now takes their theories as knowledge’, while James Tartaglia 
posited a continuum of knowledge: ‘if we take experience as the foundation of 
knowledge, then we may rank science at the top of the cultural pecking order, astrology 
at the bottom, and Freudian psychoanalysis somewhere in between.’20 
3.1.2 Positivism 
The idea of a hierarchy of knowledge of the type advocated by Tartaglia belongs in the 
tradition of positivism, typically traced back to Auguste Comte (1798 – 1857).  Comte 
envisaged the human mind moving through an evolutionary process in which it ‘passes 
successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; 
the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive’, with each stage 
                                                          
14 Bertrand Russell, ‘On Astrologers’ in Mortals and Others, Volume I: American Essays 1931 – 1935 
(Oxford: Routledge, 1975) p.125 (first published in the Hearst Newspapers, 28th September 1932) 
15 Abel, Man is the Measure p. 126; p. 23. 
16 Kelly, Dean, Saklofske, ‘Astrology: A Critical Review’ p. 51. 
17 W. V. Quine, ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’ in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language: 
Wolfson College Lectures 1974 (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 1975) p. 68. 
18 W. V. Quine, Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1981) p. 72. 
Quine identified his position with naturalism on the same page. 
19 W. V. Quine, ‘Naturalism: Or, Living Within One’s Means’, Dialectica 49 (1995) p. 258. 
20 Mark Risjord, Philosophy of Social Science p. 7; James Tartaglia, Rorty and the Mirror of Nature 
(London: Routledge, 2007) pp. 16 – 17. 
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representing a step closer to truth and certainty.21  In the three stages, facts are 
understood respectively as the work of spiritual agents; in terms of powers, faculties or 
essences; and lastly in terms of empirical phenomena and the relations between them.22  
H. B. Acton (1908 – 74) observed that this three-fold sequence is in effect a theory of 
knowledge.23  It is a theory of knowledge under which religion and philosophy are 
superseded by science as final arbiter of truth.  Further, it is an account in which the 
goal is certainty; discussing astronomy as a paradigm of science (and therefore of truth), 
Comte remarked that ‘Its whole progress… has been by introducing more and more 
certainty and precision into its predictions… all science has prevision for its end – an 
axiom that separates science from erudition’.24 
At the age of 80, Bertrand Russell looked back on the philosophical endeavours of his 
younger self and remarked: ‘I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want 
religious faith.’25  This urge to stand on solid, certain, ground can lend the idea of 
reliance on scientific knowledge the status of a moral imperative.  This can be seen in 
the statement of W.K. Clifford (1845 – 79) that ‘It is wrong always, everywhere, and for 
anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.’26  The ramifications of this 
statement will be considered in chapter 7.   
3.1.2.1  Relativism and Dogmatism 
A corollary of the drive toward certainty is a desire to shun relativism, and a frequent 
concern arising from lowly estimations of astrology’s truth-status is that any 
consideration granted to it may unleash a destructive torrent of relativism.  A terse 
definition of relativism in an epistemological context is that ‘The truth value of 
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23 Acton, ‘Comte’s Positivism’, p. 303. 
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propositions varies from person to person.’27  Relativism is often traced back to the 
statement by the pre-Socratic philosopher Protagoras (c. 485 – 415 BCE) that ‘man is 
the measure of all things’, understood by Socrates to mean that ‘a thing is for any 
individual what it seems to him to be’.28   
The problem of astrology – taken as an agent of relativism – can be seen for instance in 
Simon Blackburn’s assertion: 
Today’s relativists, persuading themselves that all opinions enjoy the same standing in the light 
of reason, take it as a green light to believe what they like… dogmatisms feed and flourish on the 
desecrated corpse of reason.  Astrology, prophecy, homeopathy… and a thousand other cults 
dominate people’s minds…29 
In similar vein, Larry Laudan presented a dialogue in which the ‘Relativist’ argued that 
science’s successes should not be surprising because, ‘As Feyerabend pointed out some 
years ago, it just stands to reason that if you have enough clever human beings engaged 
in any activity, it’s going to produce impressive results sooner or later.’30  The dialogue 
continued with the ‘Positivist’ asking what impressive results ‘astrology, psychical 
research, or theology’ had to show; the ‘Relativist’ cited the popularity of horoscopes, 
and the ‘Positivist’ accused her or him of conflating popularity with ‘empirical 
success’.31   
Paul Feyerabend (1924 – 94), to whom Laudan referred, has sometimes been cited as a 
defender of astrology against scientific attack.32  The reason for this is to be found in 
five pages of his Science in a Free Society in which he criticised the attack on 
                                                          
27 Kirkham, Theories of Truth, p. 98. 
28 Plato, Theaetetus (tr. M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat) in Plato – Complete Works (ed. John M. 
Cooper), p.179; 160d-e, 161c. The centrality of this statement to contemporary discussion of relativism is 
asserted by e.g. Steven D. Hales, A Companion to Relativism (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p.1.  
29 Simon Blackburn, Truth – A Guide, (Oxford University Press, 2005) p.xiv; and cf. also pp.8, 34 & 196. 
30 Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p.168 
31 Laudan, Science and Relativism, pp.168. 
32 See for instance references to Feyerabend in: Patrice Guinard’s Manifesto 3/4 at 
http://cura.free.fr/10athem3.html#Ref110 (accessed 19th August 2019); Patrick Grim’s characterisation of 
Feyerabend as ‘among the opponents’ of individuals who are sceptical regarding ‘the occult’ (which he 
sees as including astrology) – Grim, ‘General Introduction’ in: Patrick Grim (ed.), Philosophy of Science 
and the Occult (2nd edn.) (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1990), p.5; Jim Lewis’s 
characterisation of Feyerabend as being opposed to the ‘unquestioned dogmatism’ that prevents a proper 
investigation of astrology – Jim Lewis, ‘And the Future Will be Nothing Less Than the Flowering of Our 
Inwardness’ in A. T. Mann (ed.), The Future of Astrology (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), p. 119. 
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astrologers contained in the ‘Statement of 186 Leading Scientists’ in the Sept/Oct 1975 
Humanist.33  Feyerabend cited evidence for the influence of solar flares upon life on 
Earth, and mentioned the sensitivity of oysters and potatoes to lunar rhythms.34  Aside 
from such phenomena, however, he made it clear that his remarks ‘should not be 
interpreted as an attempt to defend…Modern astrology [which] inherited interesting and 
profound ideas, but it distorted them, and replaced them by caricatures more adapted to 
the limited understanding of its practitioners.’35  And, later, he found it necessary to 
reiterate his lack of sympathy for astrology as currently practised, writing: ‘My use of 
examples from astrology should not be misunderstood.  Astrology bores me to tears.  
However it was attacked by scientists, Nobel Prize winners among them, simply by a 
show of authority and in this respect deserved a defence.’36 
The extent of Feyerabend’s interest in astrology should not therefore be overstated.  His 
discussion of astrology is best characterised as a means to the end of attacking 
authoritarian and objectivist tendencies in modern society, particularly from the 
scientific establishment – as seen in his assertion: ‘Science is one Ideology among many 
and should be separated from the State just as Religion is now separated from the 
State.’37   
It is certainly the case that some advocates of astrology have made statements which 
embody the ‘sinister challenge’ that, in the view of Richard Dawkins, is represented by 
relativism – ‘the view that scientific truth is only one kind of truth and it is not to be 
especially privileged.’38  Thus for example the astrologer Liz Greene argued that ‘it is 
irrelevant to attempt to define astrology as “science” or “divination”, since both 
paradigms are expressions of the archetypal story-making function of the human 
psyche.’39  Patrice Guinard argued that in the contemporary west, ‘Scientific ideology 
                                                          
33 Paul Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (London: New Left Books, 1978), pp.91 – 96. 
34 Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society, pp.93-4. 
35 Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society, p.96. 
36 Paul Feyerabend, Three Dialogues on Knowledge (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p.165. 
37 Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society, p. 106. 
38 Richard Dawkins quoted in James Randerson, ‘Dawkins’ Christmas Card List’, The Guardian 28th May 
2007: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/may/28/dawkinschristmascardlist (accessed 8th 
August 2019) 
39  Liz Greene, ‘Is Astrology a Divinatory System?’, Culture and Cosmos: A Journal of the History of 
Astrology and Cultural Astronomy Vol. 12 No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2008) p. 28. 
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claims a monopoly on knowledge’, and went on to contend that, despite this, ‘scientific 
rationality is not more “objective” than Sumerian cosmology or Bantu mythology.’40 
Whether the issue is explicitly acknowledged or not, discussion of astrology’s truth-
status is often accompanied by an undercurrent of concern that to cede any truth to 
astrology would be to open relativistic floodgates and see nonsense overwhelm and 
destroy the benefits of science, and western civilisation as we know it.  This perceived 
threat can lead critics to advocate a dogmatic approach towards astrology.  Such an 
argument was made by Saul Kripke: ‘sometimes the dogmatic strategy is a rational one.  
I myself have not read much defending astrology, necromancy and the like… Even 
when confronted with specific alleged evidence, I have sometimes ignored it although I 
did not know how to refute it.’41  Kripke’s conclusion was that it should be 
epistemology’s role ‘to delineate the cases when the dogmatic attitude is justified’ – 
raising the prospect that works such as this thesis may one day be consigned to an index 
of epistemologically proscribed works.42 
Cornelius’s assertion, cited at the beginning of this sub-section, seems to be 
substantiated therefore: there is little or no serious discussion by contemporary 
philosophers of the epistemological status of divination, or of astrology-as-divination.  
When astrology is mentioned at all, it is typically assumed that astrology-as-science 
would be the only viable explanatory model.  The subject is often mentioned only as an 
emblem of falsehood and relativism, and sometimes with the implication – made 
explicit by Kripke – that it is acceptable and even necessary to dismiss astrology, and 
subjects like it, as ‘not true’ without evaluating them. 
3.1.3 Truth in Philosophy 
The pursuit of truth was seen as central to the quest for wisdom, even before the term 
philosophia (the love of wisdom) had been adopted by followers of Socrates in the late 
                                                          
40 Patrice Guinard (tr. Matyas Becvarov), Astrology: The Manifesto 1/4. http://cura.free.fr/07athem1.html 
(checked 8th August 2019).  The text is based on his doctoral thesis, L’Astrologie: Fondements, Logique 
et Perspectives (Paris, Sorbonne: 1993). 
41 Saul A. Kripke, ‘On Two Paradoxes of Knowledge’ in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers 
Volume 1 (Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 49. 
42 Kripke, ‘On Two Paradoxes’, p. 49. 
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5th century BCE.43  Thus for example the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus (535 – 
475 BCE) asserted that ‘Wisdom consists in speaking and acting the truth, giving heed 
to the nature of things.’44  Socrates, in Plato’s account, stated that in order to become ‘a 
fine and good person’, the first prerequisite was ‘to be guided by the truth and always 
pursue it in every way’.45  The quest for truth was not however a simple matter – 
something made clear in the parable of the cave, wherein the human condition was 
equated to that of prisoners, able only to see shadows cast by puppets manipulated by 
their captors: ‘the prisoners would in every way believe that the truth is nothing other 
than the shadows of those artifacts.’46   
Although the discussion of truth thus has ancient roots in philosophy, the search for the 
essence of truth is a relatively recent phenomenon in philosophy.  As George Pitcher 
wrote, 
The great philosophers of history… although they had something to say about this concept 
[truth], said surprisingly little: they were far more interested in truths than in ‘truth’.  It was not 
until the end of the nineteenth century that the subject was discussed earnestly and with great 
thoroughness.’47   
Thus although earlier philosophers will be mentioned in what follows, the primary 
discussion will be concerned with the period in which the nature of truth emerged as a 
contentious issue, and how the ideas from that period have subsequently been treated.  
In taking this approach I conform to the contemporary treatment of basic epistemology 
for, as Burgess and Burgess remarked: 
In surveys of philosophical thought about truth one typically encounters early on a list of 
“theories” of truth represented by slogans loosely based on things that were said in a three-
cornered debate over truth about a century ago, in which the realist insurgent Bertrand Russell 
                                                          
43 Chronology from (e.g.) Gerald A. Press, ‘Plato’ in Richard H. Popkin, The Columbia History of 
Western Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) p. 35. 
44 Heraclitus in: Heraclitus, Philip Wheelwright (tr.), Heraclitus (Princeton University Press, 1959) p. 19, 
fragment 10. 
45 Plato; G. M. A. Grube, rev. C. D. C. Reeve (trs.), Republic in: Plato, John M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: 
Complete Works (Indianapolis, IN, Hackett, 1987) 489e – 490a p. 1112. Similar statement by Socrates 
about himself: Plato, Donald J. Zeyl (tr.), Gorgias in: Plato, John M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete 
Works (Indianapolis, IN, Hackett, 1987) 526d-e p. 868. 
46 Plato, Republic, 515c, p. 1133. 
47 George Pitcher (ed.), Truth (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964) p. 1. Cited at: Engelbretsen, 
Bare Facts Naked Truth p. 21. Similar statement at: Johnson, Focusing on Truth, p. 2. 
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attacked the dominant British idealism and American pragmatism of the day, as represented by 
the now-forgotten H. H. Joachim and the ever-famous William James.48 
The positions taken by Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970), Harold H. Joachim (1868 – 
1938) and William James (1842 – 1910) are known, respectively, as the correspondence 
theory of truth, the coherence theory of truth, and the pragmatic theory of truth.  These 
were introduced briefly in chapter 1, and will be discussed more fully in sections 3.1.5.1 
– 3.1.5.3 below.  The three protagonists wrote numerous critiques of one another’s 
positions regarding truth, and in addition there were personal connections between 
them: Joachim was a neighbour of the family of Russell, and gave the young Russell a 
reading list of philosophy books before he went to Cambridge university.49  When 
Russell visited the USA in 1896, he stayed with William James.50  And James 
conducted a lengthy philosophical correspondence with F. H. Bradley (1846 – 1924) – 
friend and colleague of, and primary influence upon, Joachim.51 
3.1.4   What is it that would be True or False? 
Although its general intent might seem clear, the involvement of the generalised term 
‘astrology’ makes it unclear how the question ‘astrology: true or false?’ would be 
approached in a philosophical context.  In particular, it is not clear what the truth bearer 
would be.  The definition of ‘truth bearer’ is a matter of contention between 
philosophers but a broad definition is that it is ‘an epistemological tool of which we can 
attribute the epistemic evaluation of being true.’52  Typical choices for truth bearer are: 
a proposition; a statement; or a belief.  For the purposes of this thesis I will follow 
Scruton’s argument that it does not matter greatly which of these is identified as the 
subject of a truth theory, for, ‘If we can say what it is for a sentence to be true, then we 
                                                          
48 Alexis G. Burgess & John P. Burgess, Truth (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011) pp. 2 – 
3. 
49 Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, Bertrand Russell’s Dialogue with His Contemporaries (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013 [1989]) p. 13. 
50 Bertrand Russell, John G. Slater (ed.) Last Philosophical Testament (London: Routledge, 1997) p. 185; 
also Eames p. 170. 
51 T. L. S. Sprigge, James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality (Chicago, IL.: Open Court, 
1993). 
52 Artur Rojszczak, Jan Woleński (ed.) From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Problem of Truth 
Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005) p. 27. Also see this work, particularly ch. 2 
(pp. 23 – 32) for the problems surrounding the term’s definition. 
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can extend our theory to the proposition that it expresses, the statement that it makes, 
the belief that it identifies, and so on.’53   
As good an approach as any, therefore, is simply to focus on the proposition – “the 
abstract entity which captures what is said by a sentence, what is believed by a believer, 
what is stated by a statement, and so on.”54  In recent epistemological texts, truth 
bearers are typically simple and uncontroversial propositions such as ‘snow is white’ or 
‘dogs bark’.55  This reflects a trend since the early twentieth century for epistemology to 
aim for an irrefutable definition of truth.  At this point the problem with the formulation 
‘astrology: true or false?’ in this context becomes clear.  Astrology is not a proposition 
at all, let alone a simple one, and to that extent it is not clear how it would be either true 
or false.   
The problem was identified by Curry in a discussion of a question very similar to 
‘astrology: true or false?’.  Commenting on the account by Dean et al of their having 
grappled with the question, ‘Was astrology true?’, Curry remarked:  
This question is itself peculiar, as can be seen if we imagine equivalent alternatives: ‘Is science 
true?’ ‘Is art true? Or ‘Is religion true?’  It is very difficult to imagine how one could possibly 
arrive at an adequate response to such a sweeping and (as it is stated virtually without 
qualification) impossible demand.56 
He illustrated this approach on the part of Dean et al by citing the questions they 
proposed to take the discussion forward, such as, ‘Is it true that positive [zodiacal] signs 
are extraverted, that an elevated Neptune is musical, that adverse Mars transits indicate 
accidents…?’57  The focus therefore was on the search for quantifiable, law-like, 
correlations between individual horoscopic factors and events in the world.  By framing 
the discussion in this way, the view of astrology-as-science was being assumed in 
advance and to that extent the view of astrology-as-divination was precluded.  Such an 
                                                          
53 Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy (London: Pimlico, 2004) p.99.  Also see e.g. Ralph C S Walker, 
‘Theories of Truth’ in Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) p.309. 
54 Scruton 2004, p.99. 
55 Examples from Paul Horwich, ‘Theories of Truth’, p. 510.  
56 Curry in: Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 96, quoting Dean et al in: Phillipson, 
Astrology Year Zero, p. 124. 
57 Dean et al in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 127, cited by Curry in: Willis and Curry, Astrology 
Science Culture, p. 96. 
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approach would indeed be a fundamental problem given my intention, stated in chapter 
1, to include both perspectives.  The way beyond this potential impasse can be seen in 
the way Curry used ‘truth’ and ‘astrology’ together: in a critique of historical discussion 
of astrology he suggested that ‘The historian should have experienced, for him- or 
herself, the truth of astrology in action, in practice…’.58  The reiteration ‘in action, in 
practice’ emphasises Curry’s position: from an astrology-as-divination perspective, 
what it would mean for astrology to be true would be no more or less than that specific 
astrological chart readings would be true. 
Curry’s position is open to challenge, and in order to illustrate the issue here I will 
introduce an example of a horary chart reading by John Frawley: 
an elderly woman had gone out wearing a valuable shawl; she had hung it up somewhere but 
forgotten where. The chart showed that it was in a French restaurant a couple of doors away 
from her house. This was without any indication that such a place existed or that she had even 
been to a restaurant.59 
In this case, therefore, there was an astrologically-derived proposition – ‘your shawl is 
in a French restaurant very near to your house’, and a subsequent discovery that the 
proposition was true in this particular instance.  Someone who had received such a 
reading might say, ‘the astrological reading was true’, but a gulf remains between that 
statement and the generalised assertion, ‘astrology is true’.  Critics of astrology do not 
usually deny that astrologers sometimes make statements which turn out to be factually 
correct.  What is generally in question is the provenance of these ‘successes’.  For 
instance, Geoffrey Dean presented a list entitled “Twenty-Six Ways to Convince Clients 
that Astrology Works”, none of which involved astrology actually working.60  So far as 
the present discussion is concerned, the most relevant item in the list is number six, 
‘Selective memory (Remember only the hits)’.  Dean explained: ‘In astrology the 
number of things that can exist in both chart and person is so large that some kind of 
striking hit is more than likely.  This will not be recognized as a statistical artifact and 
                                                          
58 Patrick Curry, ‘The Historiography of Astrology: A Diagnosis and a Prescription’ in Gunther 
Oestmann, H. Darrel Rutkin and Kocku von Stuckrad (eds.) Horoscopes and Public Spheres: Essays on 
the History of Astrology (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005) p. 267. 
59 John Frawley quoted in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 71. 
60 Dean, ‘Astrology’ in Gordon Stein (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Paranormal (Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 1996), p.92. 
 
 
 
85 
so will be remembered as evidence for astrology.’61  The assertion here is that specific 
readings that could be taken as evidence of astrology’s truth should rather be understood 
as due to the operation of chance; as someone who glanced at a broken clock would get 
the right time twice a day, so astrology will occasionally yield a true proposition.   
In terms of the philosophical principles which are the focus of this chapter, the sequence 
of events could then be understood as follows: In all likelihood, the client believed that 
astrology could be a source of true information at the outset – it is unlikely, otherwise, 
that she would have paid money to consult an astrologer.  The proposition ‘the shawl is 
in a French restaurant near your house’ (or words to that effect) was derived from an 
analysis of an astrological horary chart, and was conveyed to her.  She had enough 
belief in the truth of this proposition that she checked whether her shawl in fact was at 
the restaurant identified by the reading, and this turned out to be the case.  Therefore, 
the client had a true belief; she believed the statement, and it proved to be true.  But the 
crucial evaluation is then, was she justified in holding that belief in the first place?  
From the perspective of Dean et al, the belief was not justified; it presupposed that the 
truth of the proposition should be attributed to astrology, when in reality it should have 
been attributed to something else, such as the operation of chance, or ‘cold reading’ on 
the part of the astrologer.62   
Stepping away from astrology for a moment, an illustrative parallel for the problem of 
justification can be found in the Basenji, a species of dog that – due to the shape of its 
larynx – makes a sound that is often characterised as a yodel rather than a bark.63  If one 
were to consider only the Basenji one might arrive at the proposition, ‘dogs yodel’.  
This would not be warranted as a statement regarding all dogs.  Similarly, from the 
point of view of Dean et al, there is no more warrant for extrapolating from individual 
cases of astrology being true to the truth of astrology sui generis, than there is for 
extrapolating from the Basenji to the yodelling of dogs.  In each case (the argument 
                                                          
61 Dean, ‘Astrology’ (1996), p.92. 
62 Dean cited the psychologist Andrew Neher to characterise cold reading (at Dean, ‘Astrology’ [1996] p. 
91]). According to Neher, astrologers were often ‘astute, sensitive individuals who pick up subtle clues 
“leaked” by the client. Usually neither the reader nor the client is consciously aware of this 
communication process, which therefore can result in a reading that seems mysteriously perceptive’ 
Andrew Neher, The Psychology of Transcendence (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980) p. 230. 
63 Matt Weisfeld, The Object-Oriented Thought Process (3rd edn.) (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison-
Wesley, 2009) p. 133. 
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would go), there is not sufficient justification for moving from the individual case to the 
general.   
3.1.5   Knowledge and its Relationship to Truth 
By this point it has started to emerge that, in order to discuss the truth of astrology in 
general, the focus cannot be entirely on truth as it is discussed in epistemology, but 
must extend to knowledge.  Knowledge has typically been defined as ‘justified true 
belief’, a formulation that is often traced back to Plato: ‘it is true judgment with an 
account that is knowledge; true judgment without an account falls outside of 
knowledge.’64 
In a footnote to the above passage, the translators Levett and Burnyeat note that 
‘account’ in this sentence translates logos, ‘…which can also mean “statement”, 
“argument”, “speech”, and “discourse”.’65  Another valid translation would be 
‘reason’.66  In order to look at the truth of astrology as a generalised subject rather than 
at the truth of any given astrological reading, the term that has traditionally been added 
to truth in order to define knowledge – ‘justification’ – is necessarily invoked.  At this 
point the question could arise, whether the focus of this thesis should fall on 
‘justification’ rather than on ‘truth’; looking, therefore, at whether astrological beliefs 
are justified rather than whether they are true.  The approach I have taken is based on 
the observation that the terms are closely intertwined, so that even if the focus were 
nominally placed on ‘justification’, ‘truth’ would still be the dominant factor.  As 
Kirkham observed,  
It is part of the meaning of ‘justified’, ‘verified’, or ‘warranted’ that nothing is justified or 
verified or warranted simpliciter.  These participles require as a complement a prepositional 
phrase beginning with ‘as’.  If a law is justified, then it is justified as fair and useful… But what 
are statements or beliefs justified as or warranted as?  ‘As true’ is the answer vénérable.67 
So although theories of justification are a major subject within epistemology, it is 
theories of truth that provide the context for justification.  To quote Kirkham again: 
                                                          
64 Plato, Theaetetus, p.223/201c.  Gettier’s objection to this classic formulation of knowledge is 
discussed, below, in section 3.2.8 of the present chapter. 
65 Levitt and Burnyeat - Theaetetus, p.223 n.37.  
66 My thanks to Dorian Gieseler-Greenbaum for pointing this out (personal communication). 
67 Kirkham, Theories of Truth, pp.50-1. 
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…we cannot begin to judge the plausibility of these theories [of justification] unless we have 
some idea of what it is for a proposition to be true.  And we cannot have such an idea unless we 
have an idea of what the necessary and sufficient conditions of truth are... metaphysical theories 
of truth… make it possible to evaluate the plausibility of theories of justification.68 
To focus on justification without reference to truth would have the potential to obscure 
rather than clarify.  For instance, Dean and Kelly have argued that astrology provides 
the individual with ‘emotional comfort, spiritual support, and interesting ideas to 
stimulate self-examination.’69  If the focus were solely upon justification, such a 
statement could be taken to mean that belief in astrology is justified.  But this would be 
merely to bypass the concerns of many critics and advocates of astrology, as can be seen 
in Dean and Kelly’s subsequent observation: ‘note the dilemma – to get the benefits you 
have to believe in something that is untrue.’70  There is a significant sense here in which 
belief in astrology would not, ultimately, be justified because astrology is ‘something 
that is untrue.’71  Justification needs – as observed by Kirkham – to be conditional upon 
truth.  Hence the primary focus in the present work falls upon truth, and in particular the 
three theories of truth.   
3.1.6 Substantive Theories - Three Theories of Truth 
When truth is discussed in contemporary books on philosophy, the three theories of 
truth (correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories) are typically described first 
and treated as a group.72  The three theories are often characterised as ‘substantive’ – in 
the sense that they treat truth as ‘a real and important property’, whereas deflationary 
theories (to be discussed in section 3.2.4 below) argue that the nature of truth is a 
                                                          
68 Kirkham, Theories of Truth, p.44 (original emphasis). 
69 Geoffrey Dean and Ivan W. Kelly, ‘Is Astrology Relevant to Consciousness and Psi?’ 
http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2003/is-astrology-relevant-to-consciousness-and-psi/ (checked 10th 
October 2016). The online version is expanded from: Geoffrey Dean and Ivan W. Kelly, ‘Is Astrology 
Relevant to Consciousness and Psi?’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 10 No. 6 – 7 (2003), pp. 175 
– 198. This quotation only appeared in the online version. 
70 Dean and Kelly, ‘Astrology Consciousness Psi’. This quotation only appeared in the expanded online 
version. 
71 Dean and Kelly, ‘Astrology Consciousness Psi’. This quotation only appeared in the expanded online 
version. 
72 E.g. Burgess and Burgess, Truth, pp. 2 – 3 (cited earlier in this chapter); Scruton, Modern Philosophy, 
pp. 97 – 111; Anthony Harrison-Barbet, Mastering Philosophy (2nd Ed.) (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) 
pp149 – 154; Manuel Velasquez, Philosophy: a Text with Readings (11th edn.) (Boston MA: Wadsworth, 
2011) pp. 378 – 393; John P. van Gigch, Metadecisions: Rehabilitating Epistemology (New York: 
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pseudo-problem.73  Their opposition to deflationary theories sometimes leads to them 
being characterised as ‘inflationary’ – as when for instance George Engelbretsen 
referred to ‘inflationary theories, such as correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, that 
take truth to be substantive – to have a content worth accounting for by defining or 
analyzing’.74  As has already been seen, the three theories have been discussed as rivals 
since the early twentieth century.  The first text I have found in which all three appear 
under their present names is Joachim’s The Nature of Truth from 1906.75  The history of 
the theories and their association sometimes influences the collective term applied to 
them – for instance Scruton refers to them as ‘classical theories’ and Horwich, 
‘traditional theories’.76 
The following three sections are summaries of the three theories of truth.  In these I 
have attempted to focus on properties that the theories are widely agreed to possess, 
excluding most of the attempts made by philosophers to argue for one or another variant 
or permutation of a particular theory; the basic formulations will provide more than 
sufficient material for this initial investigation of astrology’s truth-status.  Also, the 
following sections contain no discussion of the criticisms to which each theory has been 
subject; these will be dealt with in chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis, where it will be possible 
to look at said criticisms in light of their relevance to astrology’s truth-status. 
3.1.6.1   The Correspondence Theory of Truth 
The essence of the correspondence theory, as Anthony Harrison-Barbet summarised it, 
is that ‘if a belief is to be true it must correspond to a fact of some kind which “exists” 
in the world’.77  Horwich illustrated the point by reference to snow and dogs: 
The belief that snow is white owes its truth to a certain feature of the world: the fact that snow is 
white.  Similarly, the belief that dogs bark is true because of the fact that dogs bark.  This sort of 
trivial observation leads to what it perhaps the most natural and widely held account of truth, the 
                                                          
73 Lowe, ‘Truth’, p. 882. 
74 George Englebretsen, Bare Facts and Naked Truths, p.67. 
75 Harold H. Joachim, The Nature of Truth: an Essay by Harold H. Joachim (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906). 
76 Scruton, Modern Philosophy, p. 109; Horwich, ‘Theories of Truth’, p. 772.   
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correspondence theory, according to which a belief (statement, sentence, proposition, etc.) is 
true just in case there exists a fact corresponding to it...78 
In the judgement of Richard Fumerton, ‘some version of the correspondence theory of 
truth has been implicitly accepted by the vast majority of philosophers throughout 
history.’79  In chapter 1 I cited statements from Plato and Aristotle as early attempts to 
characterise truth.  These are sometimes taken, more specifically, as early formulations 
of what came to be known as the correspondence theory of truth.  Thus, Plato’s ‘Visitor’ 
argued that a true statement ‘says those that are, as they are’ and a false one ‘says things 
different from those that are.’80  In similar vein, Aristotle asserted: ‘To say of what is 
that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of 
what is not that it is not, is true.’81  This conception of truth could subsequently be seen 
in St. Augustine’s statement: ‘falsehood is thinking something is what it is not… truth is 
that which declares what is.’82   
A caveat is in order at this point: the attribution of modern positions to historic 
philosophers inclines inevitably towards misrepresentation and anachronism, insofar as 
it typically proceeds by focusing on a particular quotation and taking that to be the 
definitive statement of that philosopher’s position, when statements at other parts of 
their work suggest divergent positions.  This issue will be discussed in section 3.2.6 
below. 
A more recent formulation, and endorsement, of the correspondence theory came when, 
in 1918, Russell cited as a truism, ‘so obvious that it is almost laughable to mention 
[it]’, that ‘the world contains facts, which are what they are whatever we may choose to 
think about them, and… there are also beliefs, which have reference to facts, and by 
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reference to facts are either true or false.’83  Despite Russell’s confidence, he was 
writing at a time when the correspondence theory no longer commanded unanimous 
support from philosophers.  In the words of George Englebretsen, ‘Attacks on 
correspondence came, late in the nineteenth century, generally from two directions: 
from the British Idealists and from the American Pragmatists.’84  I shall introduce each 
of the alternative theories of truth that had thus emerged – coherence and pragmatic 
theories – in the two following sections. 
3.1.6.2   The Coherence Theory of Truth 
The coherence theory of truth characterises truth in terms of the extent to which a 
proposition (or belief, judgement etc.) coheres with an existing body of knowledge.  
Joachim was the first to formulate the coherence theory under that name.  He began by 
stating that ‘Anything is true which can be conceived.  It is true because, and in so far 
as, it can be conceived.  Conceivability is the essential nature of truth.’85  Anticipating 
objections along the lines that a mythical creature such as a centaur can be conceived, 
he continued: 
To ‘conceive’ means for us to think out clearly and logically, to hold many elements together in 
a connexion necessitated by their several contents.  And to be ‘conceivable’ means to be a 
‘significant whole’, or a whole possessed of meaning for thought.  A ‘significant whole’ is such 
that all its constituent elements reciprocally involve one another, or reciprocally determine one 
another’s being as contributory features in a single concrete meaning.86 
More recently, a clear formulation was provided by Ralph Walker: 
The coherence theorist holds that for a proposition to be true is for it to cohere with a certain 
system of beliefs.  It is not just that it is true if and only if it coheres with that system; it is that 
the coherence, and nothing else, is what its truth consists in.87  
Elaborating on that last point, Walker concluded: ‘In particular, truth does not consist in 
the holding of some correspondence between the proposition and some reality which 
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obtains independent of anything that may be believed about it.’88  Coherence theorists 
are united by their rejection of the realism that is assumed by the correspondence 
theory. 
The historical roots of the coherence theory are a matter of contention amongst 
philosophers.  Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 1677) was suggested by Walker as a precursor 
of coherence, and whilst this is controversial, it is relevant to consider one of the close 
approaches in Spinoza’s thought to the coherence theory, both as an illustration of the 
general orientation of coherence, and in particular for the pantheistic context Spinoza 
brings:89 
the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind 
perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has this or that idea, not in so far as he is 
infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind…90   
For Spinoza, therefore, an idea in a human mind is ‘an adequate idea’ only to the extent 
that it matches an idea in God’s mind.91  While this may raise as many questions as 
answers, it certainly illustrates the central theme of coherence theory; that truth should 
be defined by referring the individual case to a larger system of some sort.  For Spinoza, 
that ‘larger system’ was the mind of an immanent God.   
An issue that arises as soon as the coherence theory has been presented is the flexibility, 
or vagueness, inherent in it due to differing ideas of what the supporting belief-system 
should be.  This point was made by Walker:  
what makes something a coherence theory of truth… is that it is a theory about the nature of 
truth, to the effect that for a proposition to be true is to fit in with some designated set of beliefs; 
but which set of beliefs is designated will vary from one version of the theory to another, as will 
the kind of fit required.92   
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By that point in his argument he had already remarked that the ‘designated set of 
beliefs’ would include a subset of our beliefs ‘that is particularly fundamental or 
indispensable, to our thinking’, with the primary candidates being ‘the system of beliefs 
that human beings will hold at the ultimate stage of their historical development’ or ‘the 
system of beliefs held by God or the absolute’.93  There is in fact, as Richard DeWitt 
remarked, ‘a large variety of very different coherence theories possible’, depending 
upon the system that is taken as providing the context for coherence; DeWitt illustrated 
this by reference to ‘individualistic’ and ‘group’ versions.94  In his analysis of ‘an 
individualistic coherence theory’, ‘truth is relative to the individual in question.  That is, 
what is true for Sara may not be true for Fred.’95  For ‘group versions of coherence 
theories’, DeWitt gave a ‘science-based’ example, whereby ‘a belief having to do with 
science is true if it fits in with the collective beliefs of the group of western scientists.’96  
His conclusion was that ‘there are different versions of coherence theories possible… 
since there is a wide variety of different ways of specifying whose beliefs count’.97  In 
terms of the categories already used in the previous chapters, therefore, a coherence 
theory could conform to either a nomothetic or an idiographic model of truth.  The 
discussion of coherence theory in this thesis will be divided on these lines, with chapter 
5 considering astrology’s coherence with science, and chapter 6 addressing its 
coherence with divination. 
3.1.6.3   The Pragmatic Theory of Truth 
The pragmatic theory of truth is a central part of pragmatism, a philosophical movement 
which began with Charles S. Peirce and William James.  When this theory of truth is 
presented in contemporary texts, it is typically described in such terms as, ‘the view that 
“true” means useful’; that ‘true propositions are simply those that “work,” in the sense 
that they are successful in practice’; that ‘truth is what works, and a true proposition is 
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one that works’ and that ‘true beliefs… are those which work out well in terms of 
practice’.98   
The advent of pragmatism is frequently traced to Peirce’s article, ‘How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear’ from 1878.99  Amongst those who make this attribution is William James, 
who, with Peirce, was a member of the ‘Metaphysical Club’ in which the ideas of 
pragmatism were first discussed, and who developed his own version of pragmatism 
and introduced it to a wider audience than had been reached by Peirce.100  The word 
‘pragmatic’ was taken by Peirce from the discussion by Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) 
of a doctor who, faced with a dangerously ill patient, needs to quickly evaluate the 
illness and act on that diagnosis, whilst knowing that they could be wrong; Kant dubbed 
this ‘pragmatic belief’ and observed that it was in effect ‘betting’.101  For him it was 
only one of several possible forms of belief; for Peirce and James however, the universe 
was an inherently uncertain place in which there was an element of betting behind every 
belief. 
Another precursor of pragmatism was John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873) with his 
philosophy of utilitarianism, whereby ‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness’; William James dedicated his book Pragmatism (1907) to Mill, 
‘from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to 
picture as our leader were he alive to-day’.102  Indeed James’s pragmatism transposed 
utilitarianism from ethics to epistemology – as Richard Rorty (1931 – 2007) wrote, 
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‘James and Nietzsche did for the word “true” what John Stuart Mill had done for the 
word “right”’.103 
Peirce characterised the fundamental nature of pragmatism in what has become known 
as the ‘pragmatic maxim’: ‘Consider what effects, which might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our concept to have.  Then, our conception 
of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’104  His understanding of 
how truth should then be defined under pragmatism is: ‘The opinion which is fated to be 
ultimately agreed on by all who investigate is what we mean by truth, and the object 
represented by this opinion is real.’105 
Peirce and James had different ideas about pragmatic truth.  The essential difference is 
that Peirce saw science as the ultimate arbiter of truth-claims, whereas James gave more 
importance to personal experience.  Thus Peirce made it clear that he saw the 
investigation, and ultimate agreement, of which he spoke as being the domain, not of 
philosophers – ‘These minds do not seem to believe that disputation is ever to cease’ – 
but of scientific research, wherein ‘Different minds may set out with the most 
antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of 
themselves to one and the same conclusion.’106  Indeed he argued that ‘Science and 
philosophy seem to have been changed in their cradles.  For it is not knowing, but the 
love of learning, that characterizes the scientific man; while the “philosopher” is a man 
with a system which he thinks embodies all that is best worth knowing.’107 
In the talk ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’ from 1898, James 
acknowledged Peirce as the originator of pragmatism but added, ‘I think myself that 
[the principle of pragmatism] should be expressed more broadly than Mr. Peirce 
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expresses it.’108  An idea of the extra breadth of definition that James desired can be 
glimpsed in the fact that, almost immediately, he was deep in a discussion of God’s 
existence.109  James was willing to allow much greater significance to subjective 
experience, including the religious and mystical – as might be expected from the author 
of The Varieties of Religious Experience.110  Slater formulated the difference precisely: 
James seems to have understood the [pragmatic] method’s key notion of practical effects in 
somewhat broader and looser terms than Peirce, who strictly identified the “practical bearings” 
of an idea with its sensible effects... [and yet] In order for there to be a meaningful difference 
between two ideas or theories, as James astutely observes, there need not be an empirically 
sensible or perceivable difference.’111 
There is precedent in the current literature on pragmatism for taking this division 
between Peirce and James as fundamental.  For example the philosopher Nicholas 
Rescher has argued that there are effectively two pragmatisms – a “pragmatism of the 
left” and a “pragmatism of the right”, representing the legacies of James and Peirce 
respectively.112  This is close to Susan Haack’s remark that ‘Peirce and James are very 
different kinds of thinker, and their conceptions of pragmatism are significantly 
different: Peirce’s logical and realist, James’s psychological and nominalist.’113  As the 
title of his book, The Two Pragmatisms – from Peirce to Rorty suggests, Howard 
Mounce also divides pragmatism into two forms, arguing that James’s pragmatism is ‘in 
conflict with the first Pragmatism [i.e. that of Peirce], not at incidental points, but in its 
essentials.’114  The explication of this fundamental difference between Peirce’s and 
James’s versions of pragmatism is directly relevant to the consideration of astrology’s 
truth-status and is therefore deferred until pragmatism is considered in chapter 7, below. 
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3.2  Precedents for Using the Three Theories of Truth 
The relevance of the three theories of truth to the evaluation of astrology’s truth-status 
can be illustrated in two ways, presented in the following two sub-sections.  In sub-
section 3.2.1 I will consider instances from discussions of astrology in which the author 
invokes the underlying principle behind one of the truth theories, often, it seems, 
without being aware that this is the case.  In sub-section 3.2.2 I will then survey some 
cases where the three theories (or a closely related set) have been used to evaluate truth 
in various other fields.    
3.2.1 Precedents from Discussions of Astrology 
An example of two of the three theories appearing in a discussion of astrology can be 
found in Dawkins’s statement, already cited in the previous chapter: 
For us to take a hypothesis seriously, it should ideally be supported by at least a little bit of evidence.  
If this is too much to ask, there should be some suggestion of a reason why it might be worth 
bothering to look for evidence… But astrology has nothing going for it at all, neither evidence nor 
any inkling of a rationale which might prompt us to look for evidence.115 
Dawkins’s ‘evidence’ can be understood as the ‘facts’ that define truth under the 
correspondence theory.  His ‘reason why it might be worth bothering to look’ would 
take the form of astrology’s coherence with some explanatory system, and would 
therefore belong to the coherence theory.  A little later in the article he suggests: ‘A 
pharmaceuticals manufacturer who marketed a birth-control pill that had not the 
slightest demonstrable effect upon fertility would be prosecuted under the Trade 
Descriptions Act…’.116  Here the emphasis falls on what he sees as astrology’s failure 
to work or be useful; this can therefore be understood as a criticism in terms of the 
pragmatic theory of truth. 
Similarly, the principles of the three theories of truth can be seen in the critiques of 
astrology by Dean et al.  Thus the correspondence theory is the underlying model when 
they discuss the testing of specific astrological claims – as when, for instance, they 
suggested that the reputed generosity of people born with the Sun in Leo could be tested 
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by looking at the size of the tips left by this group of people in restaurants.117  The 
coherence theory was evoked when they suggested that anyone who was undecided 
about the truth of astrology should: 
ask yourself which alternative is the more likely:  (1) That pervasive astrological influences exist 
which contradict known science (yet on whose nature astrologers spectacularly disagree), or (2) 
that the many known errors in human reasoning (of which most astrologers are spectacularly 
unaware) explain astrological beliefs.118 
A choice is proposed between two explanatory systems – one in which astrology would 
be true, and one in which astrology is not true, but – due to a combination of chance and 
human reasoning errors – sometimes appears true.  An appeal is made to the coherence 
of the latter position with the explanatory system of material science, and the argument 
can thus be seen as an example of the coherence theory of truth. 
When Dean et al looked at astrology from the perspective of pragmatic truth, their 
verdict was less damning than that of Dawkins: 
A warm and sympathetic astrologer provides non-threatening therapy that is sometimes hard to 
come by, especially as no admission of some physical, mental, or moral weakness is required, as 
with a doctor or psychiatrist or priest.119 
They also raised the possibility that various character flaws might cause astrologers to 
be unhelpful, and this is to the point insofar as what they characterise as useful (and 
therefore, potentially, true in terms of the pragmatic theory) is not astrology per se, but 
the astrologer and the human interaction they provide.   
3.2.2 Precedents from Other Fields 
In addition to the unacknowledged presence, in existing discussion about astrology’s 
truth-status, of the three theories of truth, there is another type of precedent and 
justification for the approach taken in this thesis.  This is the deployment of the three 
theories of truth (or sometimes, two of them) in discussion of truth-related issues in 
fields that range from religion to legal practice.  In the following survey, where a text 
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proposes a theory other than the three main theories, the additional theory will be 
discussed in sections 3.2.2 – 3.2.4. 
In Religions and the Truth, Hendrik M. Vroom (1945 – 2014) discussed the three 
theories of truth as a means to the end of fostering inter-religious understanding: ‘In 
order to arrive at a responsible theological appreciation… of other religious traditions, it 
is necessary to be aware of what other religious traditions think about truth.’120 
Louis Dupré took an approach aimed at characterising the truth-status of mystical 
experience within religion.  This saw him broach the possibility that, here, ‘Truth refers 
to being, rather than to knowledge’.121  He discussed the correspondence and coherence 
theories, finding them to be relevant to, but not sufficient for, an adequate 
characterisation of religious truth.122 
The three theories, characterised as ‘major theories of truth’, were discussed by Walter 
Kaufmann (1921 – 1980) in his Critique of Religion and Philosophy.123  Kaufmann’s 
investigation was primarily of the relationship between different religious traditions and 
philosophy.  Given his iconoclastic aspiration – ‘to show the utter inadequacy of the 
popular pictures, to see the familiar in new perspectives, to make suggestions for a new 
map – and to stimulate thought’, his focus was on the shortcomings of existing theories 
of truth.124 
The three theories were treated more sympathetically, and systematically, by K. N. 
Jayatilleke (1920 – 1970) in his Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge.125  Jayatilleke 
evaluated the three theories of truth primarily from an historical and scriptural 
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perspective, using them to characterise the senses that the word ‘truth’ might hold in the 
Theravada tradition’s Pāli Canon without finally deciding for one or another.126 
The work of both Kaufmann and Jayatilleke were taken as precedents by Roger R. 
Jackson who – in a substantial introduction to his translation of rGyal tshab rje’s 
commentary on the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikka  - 
applied the three theories to Buddhist thought in general and concluded in favour of the 
correspondence theory: ‘for all practical purposes saṃsāra and nirvāṇa must be assumed 
to be “the way things really are,” and thus in some meaningful way to “correspond” to 
actual states-of-affairs.’127  Jackson’s argument was subsequently criticised by José 
Ignacio Cabezón.128  Cabezón began by remarking that amongst all the theories of truth 
to be found in western philosophy,‘Three such theories – the correspondence, coherence 
and pragmatic theories – stand out prominently… as being the most important’.129  He 
argued, against Jackson, that ‘the pragmatic theory… represents the most promising 
option for the Buddhist theologian.’130 
In a different field, the philosopher David A. Jopling lamented the lack of a rigorous 
definition of truth in psychodynamic psychotherapy.  After reproducing numerous 
descriptions of insight from psychodynamic psychotherapy literature he remarked upon 
the absence of any discussion of the question of the truth criteria that are called 
upon when insights are evaluated as true or false.  None of these passages 
addresses the epistemic question of what it is that makes one insight true and 
another false, or the question of what it means to say that an insight is true or 
false.  Each [author] is silent on the question of whether the truth of insights 
consists (for example) in their correspondence with psychological facts (the 
correspondence theory of truth), or their internal coherence and consistency (the 
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coherence theory of truth), or their pragmatic value (the pragmatic theory of 
truth) – three of the more well-known theories of truth.131 
From an historiographical perspective, Megan Bishop Moore set out to investigate ‘how 
correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories of truth appear in histories of 
ancient Israel in order to help clarify the nature of the truth claims historians of ancient 
Israel are making.’132  She concluded that historians of ancient Israel tended primarily to 
presuppose the correspondence theory in their work, so that ‘history’s truth lies in its 
correspondence to reality’ – albeit, there is an increasing recognition amongst 
contemporary scholars that ‘historical representation is an imperfect and complicated 
task.’133 
In his recent book Truth in Marketing, Thomas Boysen Anker applied the three theories 
of truth to ‘marketing expressions and entities’, setting out to demonstrate ‘how three 
different theories of truth explain the truth properties of three overarching categories of 
marketing claims.’134  In common with each of the entries in this section, Anker’s text 
uses the theories of truth as a tool with which to analyse, characterise and understand 
the issues raised when the question ‘what is true?’ is raised in a particular area of 
enquiry; this is also what I aspire to do in this thesis. 
In addition to these texts, it is also relevant to remark the recent emergence of an 
academic field, ‘Judgment and Decision Making’, which studies the basis of judgments 
in different disciplines such as public policy, economics, legal applications and medical 
applications.135  Publications in the field often draw on the three theories of truth in 
similar ways to the texts discussed above, usually with an emphasis on the 
correspondence and coherence theories, with the pragmatic theory in the background.136  
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These studies are supported by the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, which 
was formed in 1980.137   
3.3    Additional Theories and Issues 
In order to give as straightforward a picture as possible of the basic epistemological 
approach I will use in this thesis, a number of theories and issues were temporarily set 
to one side in the first half of this chapter.  The most significant of these will now be 
considered. 
3.3.1 The Gettier Problem for the Definition of Knowledge 
The definition of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’, cited in section 3.1.4 above, has 
not been considered entirely adequate since an article by Gettier in 1963.138  Gettier’s 
fundamental point was that it was possible, albeit unlikely, that one could hold a belief, 
be justified in doing so, and the belief should prove true, yet that it was an unlikely 
series of coincidences which eventuated in the belief proving true, rather than the more 
plausible justification one held.  There can therefore be – as O’Brien puts it – instances 
wherein the truth of a justified true belief  should be attributed to luck, rather than 
knowledge.139  Gettier’s contention was that, this being the case, the formulation 
‘justified true belief’ would not suffice as a definition of knowledge.   
The example Gettier gave to illustrate his point is complicated.140  A more 
straightforward example was coined by O’Brien.  He imagined that, knowing that 
England had just started a football match against Germany, he then heard cheers from a 
nearby pub, and on this basis believed that England had scored.  It was true that 
England had scored at that moment, and his rationale for believing this to be the case – 
the assumption of a crowd in the pub watching the game on television and celebrating 
the goal – was strong, so that the belief was justified as well as true.  However, he then 
proposed that the crowd in the pub had been watching a karaoke competition rather than 
                                                          
137 History of the society on their website at: www.sjdm.org/history.html (accessed 21st August 2019). 
138 Edmund L Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ in Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Jun., 1963), pp. 
121-123. 
139 Dan O’Brien, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 13. 
140 Gettier’s example uses a belief which seems to lack justification, as discussed by: Alan Millar, ‘How 
Reasons for Action Differ from Reasons for Belief’ in Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New 
Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity (Oxford University Press 2009) p. 152. 
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football.  By coincidence, they applauded a performer at the moment England scored 
their goal.  In such a case – Gettier’s argument would contend – there is justified true 
belief but not knowledge, and this discrepancy invalidates the former as a complete 
definition of the latter. 
I believe this to be a case wherein the continuing quest for a formally impeccable 
philosophical structure diverges from the issues which have significant consequences 
for a study such as this one.  If the aim is to find philosophical terms which define 
concepts such as ‘knowledge’ with infallible logic and reliability, then the issue Gettier 
raises is a problem.  In its application to the problem of truth-issues in astrology, 
however, the theoretical possibility of a misapprehension similar to that of Gettier 
intruding is not problematic.  Gettier’s problem arises only in cases where a belief is 
true and justified, and refers by definition to an anomalous situation.  Since the primary 
focus of this thesis is on the truth-status of astrology on the whole, rather than on any 
specific instance of astrology, it can be said that the Gettier problem only begins at a 
point where the present enquiry would already have finished. 
3.3.2 Propositional and Non-propositional Knowledge 
So far in this chapter, ‘knowledge’ has meant ‘propositional knowledge’ – also known 
as ‘factual knowledge’ and ‘knowing that’.  As the name suggests, this is concerned 
with knowledge that can be expressed through propositions.  Propositions hold the 
promise of being either true or false, and hence propositional knowledge holds out the 
prospect of getting to the truth of things, making it the kind of knowledge that 
philosophers have generally been most concerned with.141  There are however other 
forms of knowledge. 
The works of Plato and Aristotle contain an array of terms for different forms of 
knowledge – for instance in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle lists five: art (technē), 
knowledge (epistēmē), practical wisdom (phronēsis), philosophic wisdom (sophia), and 
comprehension (nous).142  The terms carry different connotations in different texts and 
                                                          
141 This position is asserted by Fumerton in his Epistemology, p. 2. 
142 Aristotle, W. D. Ross (tr.), J. O. Urmson (revisions to tr.) Nicomachean Ethics in: Aristotle, Jonathan 
Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, One Volume Digital 
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it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to be certain of the intended nuances.  An example of 
this is to be found in Cristina Ionescu’s discussion of the terms sophia and phronēsis, 
which are generally both synonymous with ‘wisdom’; in the Meno, however, Socrates 
uses phronēsis for wisdom properly understood, and sophia for popular misconceptions 
of wisdom.143  When J. C. Spender – aiming to apply the concept of knowledge to the 
understanding of contemporary business firms – surveyed the array of relevant terms to 
be found in ancient Greek philosophy he concluded that, for a real-world investigation: 
‘The problem here is that we have too many alternatives and the relations between the 
types of knowledge are unclear.’144 
A simpler distinction between two forms of knowledge was mooted in 1865 by John 
Grote (1813 – 66), and was subsequently used and developed by William James.145  
This is the distinction between ‘knowledge-of-acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge-about’ as 
James called them.146  The former is direct and experiential, whereas the latter is 
conceptual.  James characterised the difference between the two forms of knowledge 
with a vivid illustration: 
In training-institutions for the blind they teach the pupils as much about light as in ordinary 
schools… But the best taught born-blind pupil of such an establishment yet lacks a knowledge 
which the least instructed baby has.  They can never show him what light is in its ‘first 
intention’; and the loss of that sensible knowledge no book-learning can replace.147 
A similar distinction was subsequently made by Russell, though without reference to 
James or Grote.148  A variation on the theme, which gave a more dynamic orientation to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995 [1984]), p. 3862 (Book VI, 1139b15 – 
1139b17). 
143 Cristina Ionescu, Plato’s Meno: An Interpretation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007) p. 33 n.6. 
144 J. C. Spender, ‘Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm’, Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 17 (Winter Special Issue) 1996 p. 49. 
145 John Grote, Exploratio Philosophica: Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science, Part 1 
(Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co, 1865) pp. 60 – 1. First discussed by James in: William James, ‘On the 
Function of Cognition’, Mind Vol. 10, No. 37 (Jan. 1885) pp. 27 – 44, Grote cited at p. 31; subsequently 
in: William James, The Principles of Psychology Vol. I (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890) pp. 
221 – 2 and recurring in his works thereafter. 
146 James, ‘Function of Cognition’, p. 43 (and passim). 
147 William James, The Principles of Psychology Vol. II (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890) p. 
4. 
148 Bertrand Russell, ‘On Denoting’, Mind Vol. 114, No. 456 (Oct 1905) pp. 873 – 887; Bertrand Russell, 
‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Vol. 11 (1910 – 11) pp. 108 – 128. Discussion of the parallels and differences between James’s and 
Russell’s conceptions is discussed in: Ian Proops, ‘Russellian Acquaintance Revisited’, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy Vol. 52 No. 4 (2014), pp. 779 – 811. 
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knowledge-of-acquaintance, was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in 1946, without reference 
to Grote, James or Russell.149  Ryle distinguished between ‘knowledge how’, defined as 
‘the discovery of ways and methods of doing things’; and ‘knowledge that’, defined as 
‘the discovery of truths or facts’150  The essential point is that knowledge of 
propositions (‘knowing that’) is somewhat distinct from knowledge of how to do things 
(‘knowing how’): ‘a man might accept any set of hypothetical propositions and still not 
know how to cook or drive a car.’151  This distinction was subsequently developed and 
promulgated by Michael Polanyi (1891 – 1976), using the terms ‘explicit knowledge’ 
and ‘tacit knowledge’.152 
The relevant point for this discussion is that there is substantial precedent for 
distinguishing between propositional knowledge and knowledge that is direct and 
experiential rather than propositional. The former possibility informs a theory of truth 
that has not so far been considered, and to which I now turn. 
3.3.3 Theories of Truth as Revelation/Disclosure 
Martin Holbraad has argued for a revelatory model as the most appropriate way to 
consider the nature of truth in divination, and James Brockbank – following Holbraad – 
has applied this to astrology as divination.153  Louis Dupré argued that it was necessary 
to consider truth as disclosure in order properly to characterise truth in religion, and in 
doing so he drew particularly on the thought of Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976).154  
Although Holbraad does not discuss Heidegger in this context, their views show 
significant parallels. 
                                                          
149 In: Gilbert Ryle, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 46 
(1945 – 6), pp. 1 – 16.   
150 Ryle, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, p. 4; subsequently developed in: Gilbert Ryle, The Concept 
of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), pp. 25 – 61. 
151 Ryle, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, p. 10. 
152 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1966). Polanyi acknowledged Ryle’s 
precedent (Tacit Dimension, p. 7) and also the parallel with different words for ‘knowing’ in different 
languages – he gave the examples of ‘wissen’ and ‘können’ in German, which had also been remarked by 
Grote (1865) Vol. 1 p. 60 and James (1885), p. 31. For the connection between James and Polanyi: G. 
William Barnard, ‘The Varieties of Religious Experience: Reflections On Its Enduring Value’ in Michel 
Ferrari (ed.), The Varieties of Religious Experience: Centenary Essays (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2002) 
p. 60 n. 7. 
153 Martin Holbraad, Truth in Motion: The Recursive Anthropology of Cuban Divination (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 207 – 10; Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, pp. 203 – 209, p. 222. 
154 Dupré, Religious Mystery, pp. 33-4. 
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Holbraad characterised what he termed ‘the representationist account of truth’ – of 
which he cited the correspondence and coherence theories as examples – as involving ‘a 
comparison between representations and facts in order to ascertain a match of some 
sort.’155  This is not entirely correct – it would be more accurate to say that the 
coherence theory involves a comparison between specific representations and 
systematised representations – but that does not affect his basic argument, which is that 
there is a fundamental problem: ‘how can tokens of distinct ontological types be 
brought into relation with one another, as, for example, truth-matches would 
require?’156  This critique of conventional truth theories is substantially the same as is 
found in Heidegger.  Thus for instance Heidegger, speaking of a proposition about a 
coin, asked: ‘How can what is completely dissimilar, the statement, correspond to the 
coin?  It would have to become the coin and in this way relinquish itself entirely.’157  
For him, ‘“Truth” is not a feature of correct propositions that are asserted of an “object” 
by a human “subject” and then “are valid” somewhere, in what sphere we know not’.158 
The critique offered by Heidegger, and subsequently Holbraad, of conventional truth 
theories is thus essentially the same, with the caveat that Heidegger was concerned with 
truth in general, whilst Holbraad made it clear that divinatory truth was his focus and 
that he did not wish to take a position regarding the viability of ‘representationist’ 
accounts of truth in other contexts.159  That point aside, the positive theses that Holbraad 
and Heidegger advanced are also at the least close to one another, being characterised 
by ‘revelation’ or ‘disclosure’ respectively.  Thus Holbraad stated, regarding the model 
of truth he saw as appropriate for the understanding of divination, ‘I venture to call the 
truth in question “revelatory”… for at issue here is not the veracity of the way things are 
thought about or represented, but rather the capability that things… have to reveal 
themselves in particular ways…’160  
                                                          
155 Holbraad, Truth in Motion, p. 205; p. 206; p. 205. 
156 Holbraad, Truth in Motion, p. 206. 
157 Martin Heidegger, John Sallis (tr.), ‘On the Essence of Truth’ in: Martin Heidegger, William McNeill 
(ed.), Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1967 as Wegmarken]) p. 140. 
158 Heidegger, ‘Essence of Truth’, p. 146. 
159 Holbraad, Truth in Motion, pp. 206 – 7. 
160 Holbraad, Truth in Motion, p. 207. 
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Heidegger asserted that ‘truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness 
essentially unfolds’.161  He argued that the Greek word alētheia – usually translated as 
‘truth’ – should rather be translated as ‘unconcealment’; in his view this translation was 
not only more literal, but also had the benefit of implying ‘the directive to rethink the 
ordinary concept of truth in the sense of the correctness of statements and to think it 
back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings.’162  For both 
Heidegger and Holbraad, then, there is a truth that can only be experienced, that cannot 
be understood through propositions.  In the terms already discussed, this would be 
idiographic truth.  In Heidegger’s view, this was the fundamental nature of truth for 
ancient Greek philosophers including Plato and Aristotle.  He argued this thesis at 
length with regard to Plato’s parable of the cave: ‘there is nothing here about 
resemblance, correctness or correspondence.’163  It may be remarked in passing that the 
idea of ‘knowledge by presence’ is also a significant theme in the writings of Plotinus 
(204 – 270) and al-Suhrawardi (1153 – 1191).164  The relevance of Heidegger’s 
perspective on truth to astrology has been touched on – and endorsed – by Mike 
Harding and Geoffrey Cornelius, though neither developed a full treatment of it.165   
Brockbank’s discussion and application of Holbraad, is the fullest account of a 
revelatory model of truth in relation to astrology, and I will therefore focus on that.  
Brockbank characterised his view of astrology as a divinatory one, and acknowledged 
the influence of Cornelius.166  Given that in speaking of astrology one is speaking of 
divination, he stated that ‘Holbraad considers divinatory truth revelatory and we accept 
his understanding.’167  A consequence of that is that conventional theories of truth are 
not applicable to astrology: ‘The answer to the statement [sic] ‘is astrology true’ is 
neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ but that “astrology aims at astrological truth”’.168   
                                                          
161 Heidegger, ‘On the Essence of Truth’, p. 146. 
162 Heidegger, ‘On the Essence of Truth’, p. 144. 
163 Martin Heidegger, Ted Sadler (tr.), The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus 
(London: Continuum, 2002 [1988 as Vom Wesen der Wahrheit]), p. 23 
164 E.g. Plotinus, Enneads, p. 701 (VI. 9.4.1-2); Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi, The Principles of Epistemology in 
Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence (New York: SUNY, 1992) p. 24.  
165 E.g. Michael Harding, Hymns to the Ancient Gods (London: Arkana, 1992) pp. 81 – 2, Harding, ‘Truth 
of Astrology’, pp. 14 – 15; Cornelius, Field of Omens, p. 280. 
166 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 76. 
167 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 222. 
168 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, pp. 201 – 2. 
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‘Astrological truth’ is characterised by being direct, which is to say non-propositional; 
but there is more to it than this, for according to Brockbank it also necessarily involves 
a ‘responsive cosmos’.169  This is a key concept for astrology-as-divination, and I will 
refer to it throughout the remainder of this thesis.  In every case when I use the term it 
carries the meaning given to it by Brockbank: ‘A non-human agency is involved in the 
coming together of astrologer, astrological chart, client and context in a way that will 
enable the astrologer to provide relevant guidance on the matter being considered.’170  
Brockbank argued that under the theory of astrological truth, predicated upon a 
responsive cosmos, ‘astrologers when they practice assume the truth of astrology before 
they start’, and are right to do so for ‘there is no essential difference between the 
assumption of the Responsive Cosmos and the assumption that truth is ascribed through 
the interpretive process.’171  In other words, given the premise that we live in a 
responsive cosmos, and given that astrology is defined as a medium through which the 
responsive cosmos responds, then if and when astrology occurs, that is by definition a 
response from the cosmos.  For this reason, Brockbank’s model of astrological truth 
precludes negative evaluation: ‘astrology is not subject to empirical verification, is non-
falsifiable and is not directly concerned with accuracy.’172  A similar position was 
espoused by the astrologer John Frawley: ‘it is an inescapable consequence of the very 
premises of horary [astrology] that the judgment given will be the right one, whether it 
be ‘correct’ or not.’173 
This is a challenging position.  The extent of the challenge was illustrated by Brockbank 
with reference to a case reported by Holbraad, as follows.  A follower of Santería in 
Cuba told Holbraad that in a divinatory séance (itá) she had been told her that she 
needed to beg forgiveness from her mother for terrible misdeeds, when neither she nor 
her mother were aware of any problem.174  Holbraad argued that the right way to take 
this was one wherein ‘the woman’s divinatory fiasco is articulated not as a matter of the 
                                                          
169 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 7. As evidenced on that page, Brockbank capitalised the term when 
preceded by the definite article (‘the Responsive Cosmos’), and used lower case for the indefinite article 
(‘a responsive cosmos’). When not quoting Brockbank directly I will use lower case for the term.  
170 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 76; also similar statement at p. 7. 
171 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 212-3; p.  212. 
172 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 212. 
173 John Frawley, ‘Neptunia Replies’, The Astrologer's Apprentice No.17 (2000), p.45.  Discussed at: 
Bird, Astrology in Education, p. 154 n. 124; Garry Phillipson, ‘Modern Science, Epistemology and 
Astrology’, Correlation Vol. 23 No. 2 (2006), p. 17. 
174 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 214, citing: Martin Holbraad, ‘Definitive Evidence, from Cuban 
Gods’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute Vol. 14 (2008) p. 105. 
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world giving the lie to the divination, but rather as a refusal on the woman’s part to 
accept the oracle’s reinvention of her.’175  Brockbank applied this to astrology and 
concluded, ‘There is no contradiction in saying that an interpretation is astrologically 
true but representatively false because we are using different criteria.’176 
I believe the approach taken by Brockbank does not finally address the question of 
astrology’s truth-status but rather relocates it.  Thus, at the core of Brockbank’s thesis is 
his assertion that in the evaluation of different explanations for the experience of 
astrology (apparently) working, the explanation of a Responsive Cosmos should be 
preferred to the explanation suggested by Dean et al – judgment errors, or reasoning 
errors.177  But the question could then be asked, how one is to evaluate the truth of that 
assertion, without which, the idea of ‘astrological truth’ lacks a footing.  Brockbank 
recognised this and discussed the issue at some length.178  Although he did not 
explicitly draw on the major theories of truth in that discussion, the way he 
characterised the arguments could well be presented in terms of a coherence theory of 
truth, and the choice between coherence with science against coherence with religious 
experience.  In summing up he stated that the idea of a Responsive Cosmos ‘moves into 
an area which remains outside the scope of empirical enquiry, conducted in accordance 
with the strictures of science.  Therefore, whether we accept it as a hypothesis becomes 
more a matter of belief’.179  
Brockbank’s discussion is centred on the experience of astrologers, and the moment in 
chart interpretation when the astrologer ‘sees that the astrological symbolism fits the 
context.  The horoscope will [then] come alive and he/she will “know” that this 
interpretation is correct.’180  This is what Cornelius refers to as ‘the moment of 
astrology’.181  It is this direct experience which defines astrology – for Brockbank, if the 
‘moment’ does not occur, astrology does not occur – and also guarantees the truth of 
                                                          
175 Holbraad, ‘Definitive Evidence’, p. 105. 
176 Brockbank Responsive Cosmos p. 215. 
177 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, stated at p. 16; argument developed in chapter 5 (pp. 138 – 194). 
Brockbank uses the term ‘judgment errors’ throughout; Dean et al often use the term ‘reasoning errors’, 
e.g. Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, pp. 132 – 136. 
178 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 190 – 4. 
179 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 194. 
180 Brockbank, Responsive Cosmos, p. 110. 
181 Brockbank states this at Responsive Cosmos p. 111. Cornelius’s characterisation of the ‘moment’ is at 
e.g. Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 295. 
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astrology.  This raises a question however about the scope of Brockbank’s astrological 
truth.  The ‘moment of astrology’ as defined here is experienced only by a practising 
astrologer.  If a client visits an astrologer, the interaction may well consist simply in the 
astrologer supplying them with propositional information.  The question arises therefore 
of whether, under Brockbank’s account of astrological truth, astrology might sometimes 
be true for astrologers but not true for the clients of those astrologers.  This issue will be 
further considered in chapter 6. 
3.3.4 Deflationary Theories of Truth 
A type of theory about truth is the group of theories known as ‘deflationary’.  A simple 
way to characterise these theories is a negative one, namely, that they deny validity to 
the substantive theories of truth with which we have been concerned so far.  Dorothy 
Grover stated that  ‘Deflationists... defend a thesis that is negative relative to the 
substantive versions of correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories.’182  
Kirkham stated, ‘The deflationary thesis holds that there is no property of truth… since 
there is no such property as truth, there cannot be a theory of what truth is.’183  It seems 
likely that this is what Kaufmann had in mind when he mentioned a fourth position, in 
addition to the main theories of truth, under which ‘there is no truth’.184   
Deflationism only emerged as a major issue for epistemologists in the last century, but 
the basic idea has a longer history and can be found in a work by the thirteenth century 
scholar William of Sherwood (c. 1200 – c. 1262).185  William argued, ‘it is the same 
thing to say ‘Socrates is running’ and “it is true that Socrates is running”, for if it is false 
that Socrates is running, then Socrates is not running.’186  This exemplifies the 
redundancy theory, which is the simplest and oldest form of deflationism; other theories 
typically classified as deflationary include the performative theory, disquotationalism, 
                                                          
182 Dorothy Grover, ‘On Locating Our Interest in Truth’ in Richard Schantz (ed.), What is Truth? 
(Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy, Vol. 1) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001)  p.120. 
183 Kirkham, Theories of Truth, p. 107. 
184 Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy, p. 76; pp. 74 – 6 for the three theories. 
185 Kretzmann gives William’s dates as: born between 1200 – 1205; died between 1266 – 1272. William 
of Sherwood, Norman Kretzmann (tr.), William of Sherwood’s Introduction to Logic (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press 1966) p. 3. William’s thought is identified as deflationary by e.g. Marian 
David, ‘Theories of Truth’, pp. 378 – 9. 
186 William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, p. 41/I.23. 
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the prosentential theory and the minimalist theory.187  These theories differ in the ways 
they frame the logical and semantic issues at stake, but agree on the essential 
deflationary principles that (as Lynch put it) ‘truth is a simple logical property with no 
underlying nature’, and that ‘truth is not a property that does any explanatory work’.188  
In what follows I will focus on the redundancy theory as a representative of all forms of 
the deflationary theory.  The modern expression of this theory is generally traced to 
Frank P. Ramsey (1903 – 30) who defined it, much as did William of Sherwood, by 
observing that, ‘the propositional function p is true is simply the same as p’.189  The idea 
was given wider currency by A. J. Ayer (1910 – 89), according to whom ‘the traditional 
conception of truth as a ‘real quality’ or a ‘real relation’ is due, like most philosophical 
mistakes, to a failure to analyse sentences correctly.’190 
Deflationism has been seen as a prelude to relativism or pluralism, which – as already 
seen above – is sometimes seen as opening the door to astrology and generally being a 
threat to civilisation.  Thus for instance, Pascal Engel argued: ‘the danger to which we 
are exposed, with a deflationist theory, is that of an extreme pluralism... If  truth were so 
radically pluralistic... We would just be happy to say that there is truth in astrology, in 
theology, in parapsychology, and all other pseudo-sciences.’191 
                                                          
187 Following Michael P. Lynch, ‘Deflationary Views and their Critics: Introduction’ in Michael P. Lynch 
(ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001) 
pp. 422 – 428.  
188 Lynch, ‘Deflationary Views’, p. 427. Each of the four theories characterises the redundancy of the 
term ‘true’ in a different way, thus: The performative theory holds that the attribution of truth should be 
understood, not as a description, but as an action – an assertion or endorsement of an associated 
proposition; Disquotationalism characterises ‘true’ and its cognates as meaningful only in sentences 
which generalise – such as, ‘everything he said is true’. When specific information is conveyed, ‘true’ is 
redundant, so that e.g. the sentence ‘it is true that “snow is white”’ contains no significance beyond ‘snow 
is white’; The prosentential theory draws on grammatical analogy to suggest the term ‘true’ in ‘it is true’ 
is anaphoric. This is to say that its role is comparable to ‘so’ in ‘it is so’. Like ‘so’ in this context, ‘true’ in 
every context has no independent significance but depends for its sense on a framework of meaning 
which will (if the discourse is coherent) already have been established; The minimalist theory takes its 
primary orientation from logic. It contends that all there is to say about truth derives from instances of the 
equivalence schema, ‘<p> is true if and only if p’. A complete theory of truth would therefore be infinite, 
since it would by definition subsume every such axiom.  The term ‘truth’ is then seen as useful precisely 
and only because its use (albeit as a generalisation) makes discussion less convoluted than would 
otherwise be the case. 
189 F. P. Ramsey in F. P. Ramsey and G. E. Moore, ‘Symposium: Facts and Propositions’ Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 7, Mind, Objectivity and Fact (1927) p. 158.  
190 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (2nd edn.) (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1971 [1946]) p. 119. Ayer 
included a footnote acknowledging the influence of Ramsey’s contribution (at Ramsey and Moore, ‘Facts 
and Propositions’ pp. 142-3) on his thought here. 
191 Pascal Engel, Truth (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014 [2002]) p. 59. 
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I am not aware of an instance in which a deflationary theory of truth is explicitly used to 
argue for a position regarding astrology’s truth-status.  Brockbank’s approach to the 
truth of astrology is, in a significant sense, deflationary: under his account, in a 
proposition such as ‘astrology is true’ the words ‘is true’ would be redundant, because 
astrology by definition could not be false.  That redundancy would entail deflationism.    
A deflationary position is also sometimes approached when astrology is characterised as 
a language.  Campion’s research between 1999 and 2011 showed that the number of 
astrologers who would agree with the statement, ‘astrology is a language’, varied from 
80.3% to 93% so clearly it is a popular perspective.192  It is common to find statements 
in astrology books along these lines: ‘Astrology is a language.  Learning astrology is 
like learning any foreign language.’193  This sometimes becomes an epistemological 
position – as when, for instance, the astrologer Pam Gregory wrote about the experience 
of being asked if she really believed in astrology: ‘This is a nonsensical question to me.  
It’s like saying “You don’t really believe in French, do you?”  Astrology is a 
language… I can feel the same process happening in my brain whether I’m translating 
French or astrology.  It is a language.’194 
Whilst it does not invoke deflationism in regard to truth generally, this position is 
deflationary with specific regard to astrology.  To equate astrology with language in this 
way is to deny that it is the type of thing that could be true or false.  This is not a tenable 
position however, because astrology as it is generally understood is not simply a 
language; if that metaphor is used, then astrology would also involve something or 
someone that communicates through astrology.  The question that arises is, as Campion 
put it: ‘If astrology is a language that we can read, then who – or what – is doing the 
writing?’195  An answer to that question from Rudhyar, who was responsible for 
spreading the idea of astrology as a language, was that the natal horoscope is ‘the 
                                                          
192 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 181, Table 12.7. 
193 David Pond, Mapping Your Romantic Relationships: Discover Your Love Potential (Astrology Made 
Easy) (St. Paul, MN: Llewellyn, 2004) p. 4. 
194 Pam Gregory, You Don’t Really Believe in Astrology, Do You? How astrology can reveal profound 
patterns in your life. (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2013) p. xiii 
195 Nicholas Campion, What Do Astrologers Believe? (London: Granta, 2006) p. 66. 
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message of the universe to you – a message in the celestial language of symbols.’196  
This involves more than a simple characterisation of astrology as a language. 
For the most part, advocates of deflationary theories have assumed their position in the 
context of the twentieth century quest to distil and formulate the essence of truth.  This 
is a quest whose trajectory is away from discussion of what particular things in the 
world are, and are not, true.  This abstraction from real-world issues can be illustrated 
by reference to Richard Rorty (1931 – 2007).  Rorty asserted that ‘truth is not the sort of 
thing we should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about’, and on the 
basis of such statements is often characterised as holding a deflationary position.197  Yet 
Rorty did not feel obliged by his reservations about truth to reserve judgement on 
astrology – witness his statement that ‘astrology is useless’, which, given his 
pragmatism, could reasonably be translated as ‘astrology is not true’.198   
In similar vein, Paul Horwich – an advocate of minimalism, and dubbed ‘king of the 
deflationists’ by one interviewer – remarked that ‘“progress” is a notoriously slippery 
term’ and in order to illustrate the point stated, ‘There has presumably been ‘progress’ 
in the development of astrology, and acupuncture, and Talmudic law – as judged by 
those engaged in those practices.  But skeptics about the point of being so engaged 
won’t be much impressed.’199 
It seems warranted to infer that Horwich’s sympathies are with the skeptics, and that his 
deflationism does not preclude him from evaluating the truth of astrology.  Thus, whilst 
the quest for the ultimate truth about truth has led some philosophers to discard the term 
‘truth’ itself, it seems likely that in their lived experience they would continue – as did 
                                                          
196 Dane Rudhyar, ‘The Birth Chart as a Celestial Message from the Universal Whole to an Individual 
Part’ (talk given to the 1976 Convention of the American Federation of Astrologers) 
http://www.khaldea.com/rudhyar/astroarticles/celestialmessage.shtml (accessed 25th June 2016). An 
earlier e.g. of the language analogy in Rudhar’s work occurs at Astrology of Personality, p. 48. 
197 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) 
p. xiii. Rorty is characterised as deflationary by e.g.: Michael P. Lynch, True to Life: Why Truth Matters 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 105. 
198 Richard Rorty, ‘Pragmatism as Anti-Representationalism (Introduction)’ in John P. Murphy, 
Pragmatism from Peirce to Davidson (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1990) p. 3. The full sentence is: ‘For to 
say that astrology is out of touch with reality cannot explain why astrology is useless; it merely restates 
that fact in misleading representationalist terms.’ 
199 Paul Horwich, Richard Marshall (interviewer), ‘Deflationism and Wittgenstein’ (2014) 
https://316am.site123.me/articles/deflationism-and-wittgenstein?c=end-times-archive (accessed 22nd 
August 2019); Paul Horwich, ‘Williamson’s Philosophy of Philosophy’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXII No. 2, March 2011, p. 525. 
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Rorty, and probably Horwich – to use ‘true’, ‘false’, and cognates thereof when faced 
by an issue such as the truth-status of astrology.  William Alston, contemplating the 
semantic orientation of contemporary philosophers, observed that a man who was afraid 
of policemen would find no actual reassurance from the knowledge that ‘one could 
avoid locutions like “There is a policeman around the corner” in favor of 
“Policemanship is exemplified around the corner”’.200  Similarly, it seems unlikely that 
anyone concerned with the truth of astrology would be satisfied by being told that the 
word ‘truth’ was redundant.  As Lynch remarks, ‘Just because one can dispense with a 
word doesn’t itself show anything about what does or doesn’t exist in the world.’201  
The sentences ‘astrology is true’ and ‘astrology is false’ may be somewhat problematic, 
and need clarification, but it is fundamental to the present thesis that they point to an 
issue which merits discussion and evaluation.  I am therefore in sympathy with 
Scruton’s assessment of the redundancy theory: ‘The theory is… deeply unsatisfying: 
we do have an intuitive idea of what the classical theories are saying, and we recognise 
the choice between them as not only a real one, but the most fundamental choice in the 
whole of metaphysics.’202 
3.3.5 Naïve Realism 
Naïve realism is not a theory of truth, except insofar as it tends towards the view that 
theories of truth are not needed, giving it a certain resemblance to deflationism and 
making it apposite to discuss at this point.  In Audi’s words, naïve realism ‘has been 
thought to represent common sense: it says roughly that perception is simply a matter of 
the senses telling us about real things.’203  This is a position that is sometimes adopted 
by Dean et al.  In the 2016 book Tests of Astrology, they defined ‘Truth’ as follows in 
its glossary: ‘In this book truth is what ordinary people define as truth.  It is true that 
you are reading this page and that Mars has no canals.  It is not true that you are on 
Pluto and that rain never falls on New York.’204  Similarly, when I interviewed them in 
2008 they asserted: ‘After all, in everyday life the meaning of “true” is pretty obvious, 
                                                          
200 William P. Alston, ‘Ontological Commitments’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for 
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 9 No. 1/2 (Jan – Feb 1958) p. 13. 
201 Lynch, True to Life, p. 106.  Lynch acknowledges that this statement ‘stems from’ that of Alston at p. 
194 n. 18. 
202 Scruton, Modern Philosophy, p. 109. 
203 Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, p. 38. 
204 Geoffrey et al, Tests of Astrology, p. 462. 
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for example it is true that today is Thursday and you are watching BBC 2.  Nobody 
feels the need to hedge such statements with theories of truth even when swearing on 
the Bible.’205 
It is difficult to see how the obviousness of truth, and its being common currency for 
‘ordinary people’,  can be reconciled with other statements from Dean et al about the 
elusiveness of truth, for instance, ‘We want to avoid being misled, and avoiding being 
misled is part of what being scientific is about… Things are not always what they seem, 
a point most astrologers seem unaware of.’206  At this point a statement from Joseph 
Tolliver is relevant: ‘there would be no problem of knowledge if everything always had 
been, were, and always would be just as we believe it to be.  In one way or another the 
problem of knowledge is motivated by our familiarity with the gap between appearance 
and reality.’207  The gap which Dean et al allege to exist between astrology’s 
appearance and its reality means that their approach is substantially predicated on the 
existence of an epistemological issue, and this undermines their invocation of naïve 
realism.   
3.3.6 Epistemic Pluralism 
Epistemic pluralism (sometimes called ‘alethic pluralism’) is the view that ‘the nature 
of truth is not uniform across domains’ as Pedersen put it.208  The insight in this position 
is that although it is often assumed that a valid theory of truth would need to apply in all 
situations, this may not in fact be the case.  As Pedersen and Wright put it,  
what property makes propositions true may vary across domains, or from subject matter to 
subject matter.  Corresponding with reality might be the alethically potent property – the 
property that can make propositions true – when it comes to discourse about ordinary, concrete 
objects.  On the other hand, cohering with the axioms of Peano arithmetic and being endorsed 
most widely might be the relevant properties for discourse about respectively arithmetic and the 
goodness of consumer goods.209 
                                                          
205 Dean et al, interview, 2008. 
206 Dean et al quoted in Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 132. 
207 Tolliver, ‘The St. Elizabethan World’, p. 160. 
208 Nikolaj Jang Pedersen, ‘Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism’, The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 60 No. 238 
(January 2010), p. 92. 
209 Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen and Cory D. Wright, ‘Introduction’ in Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen and Cory D. 
Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (Oxford University Press, 2013) p. 2. 
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The origin of this perspective is often traced back to Hilary Putnam’s 1994 paper, ‘The 
Face of Cognition’.210  The need for it may have arisen from the competitive enthusiasm 
that developed for theories of truth in the early twentieth century, for prior to that point 
it was normal to consider truth in different ways.  For instance, David Hume (1711 – 
1776) wrote: ‘Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the 
real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact.’211  If it were transposed 
into contemporary terms, this could easily be interpreted as advocating both the 
coherence theory (‘relations of ideas’) and the correspondence theory (‘matter of fact’) 
within a single sentence.  The main point here is that there used not to be a problem 
with an individual philosopher deploying different models of truth in different 
situations.  A subsidiary point was well made by Margaret Wilson when, after surveying 
a range of differing opinions regarding Spinoza’s affiliation to different theories of 
truth, she concluded that it was ‘unproductive to try to type his views in relation to this 
rather anachronistic contrast’.212   
 
Although epistemic pluralism is often  seen as an epistemological innovation of the 
early 21st century (as when, for instance, Lynch’s Truth as One and Many was reviewed 
as offering ‘a new theory of truth’), it can also be seen as a return to the approach that 
was implicitly assumed by most philosophers before the 20th century.213  It is also an 
articulation of the position explicitly advocated by the early exponents of pragmatism, 
Peirce and particularly James: 
 
There is nothing improbable in the supposition that an analysis of the world may yield a number 
of formulae, all consistent with the facts. […]  Why may there not be different points of view for 
surveying [the world], within each of which all data harmonize… A Beethoven string-quartet is 
truly, as someone has said, a scraping of horses’ tails on cats’ bowels, and can be exhaustively 
                                                          
210 Hilary Putnam, ‘Dewey Lectures, Lecture III: The Face of Cognition’, The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 
91 No. 9, Sept 1994, pp. 488 – 517. Cited as the first instance of alethic pluralism by e.g. Michael P. 
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211 David Hume, Ernest C. Mossner (ed.), A Treatise of Human Nature (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969 
[1739 – 40]) p. 510/Book III Part 1 Sect. 1. Original emphases. 
212 Margaret D. Wilson, ‘Spinoza’s theory of knowledge’ in Don Garrett (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Spinoza (Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 135 n. 25. 
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described in such terms; but the application of this description in no way precludes the 
simultaneous applicability of an entirely different description.214 
The status of Peirce and James as epistemic pluralists is sometimes acknowledged by 
contemporary commentators, and I will consider this subject further as part of my 
discussion of the pragmatic conception of truth in chapter 7 of this thesis.215 
 
3.3.7 The Complexity of the Three Theories of Truth 
As I have already indicated, the idea of there being three major theories of truth is a 
simplification.  There are other theories, some of which I have just discussed.  In 
addition, the closer one looks the greater the number of variant versions of each of the 
three theories of truth there are to be found.  The distinctions involved are typically 
abstruse and – I contend – of little or no relevance to the discussion of astrology’s truth-
status, and accordingly I will give just an indication of the conceptual proliferation in 
this section. 
Bertrand Russell acknowledged that he revised the way he thought the correspondence 
theory should be formulated, under the influence of William James.216  The case has 
been made that Russell’s characterisation of this theory actually varied many more 
times.217  A full account of the variants of the correspondence theory would require 
considerably more description.218 
The coherence theory of truth is similarly subject to a wide range of slightly differing 
accounts.  Thus for example Richard Fumerton argued: 
                                                          
214 William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy in: William James, 
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One gets different versions of a coherence theory of truth depending on how one uses belief to 
restrict the relevant class of propositions with which a proposition must cohere in order to be 
true.’219   
He went on to suggest that six major variants of coherence theory could be 
characterised, depending on who holds the belief, at what time the belief is held, and 
what process of enquiry informed said belief.220 
In the account, above, of the pragmatic theory of truth I noted two major forms of 
pragmatism, deriving from Peirce and from James.  Many more forms have, however, 
been considered to exist by some commentators.  This can be seen from the title of 
Arthur O. Lovejoy’s article from 1908, ‘The Thirteen Pragmatisms’, and yet more from 
a response to Lovejoy published later that year, ‘The Exact Number of Pragmatisms’ in 
which Max Meyer concluded that ‘there are as many pragmatisms as there are 
pragmatists’.221  Meyer’s observation was reiterated by the pragmatic philosopher, 
friend and associate of William James, F. C. S. Schiller in 1927 and it is frequently 
encountered in contemporary accounts of pragmatism, usually attributed to Schiller.222  
More recently the philosopher Richard Bernstein (1932-) has argued (in a commentary 
on the thought of philosopher Richard Rorty (1931 – 2007), which met with Rorty’s 
approval), ‘I do not think there is any “essence” to pragmatism – or even a set of sharply 
defined commitments or propositions that all so-called pragmatists share’ and that ‘the 
                                                          
219 Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham, MA: 1995) p. 136 
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pragmatic movement has always been characterized by a conflict of narratives and 
metanarratives.’223 
3.3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed a world of philosophical detail.  I have argued that, in terms 
of philosophical principle, it is at least plausible that the three theories of truth will 
suffice as a basis upon which to evaluate astrology’s truth-status.  At the least, none of 
the other positions I have touched on offers a compelling case for inclusion.  I have also 
cited precedents in which studies of truth – more or less comparable to this one – have 
used the three theories. 
On this basis I will proceed with the working hypothesis that the three theories suffice 
for my purpose.  This will be tested at a practical level as numerous astrological 
examples are tested  in the following chapters, four through seven.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
223 Richard Bernstein, ‘The Conflict of Narratives’ in Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. (ed.), Rorty & Pragmatism 
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Chapter 4: Correspondence Theory   
 
4.1   Introduction to the Correspondence Theory 
 
In this chapter I will define the correspondence theory of truth and consider the ways in 
which it has been, and can be, applied to the evaluation of astrology’s truth-status.  
Historically, this has often involved tests of astrology and therefore several tests will be 
outlined on an indicative basis: which is to say that, given the philosophical focus of 
this thesis, I will not attempt to give a comprehensive account of these tests, but will 
include sufficient detail only to show the epistemological issues arising from them.   
 
The correspondence theory defines truth as correspondence between a proposition and a 
fact – as, for example, the proposition ‘snow is white’ is made true by the fact of snow’s 
whiteness.1  One of the theory’s main advocates, Bertrand Russell, characterised it as a 
way to avoid error: ‘Since erroneous beliefs are often held just as strongly as true 
beliefs, it becomes a difficult question how they are to be distinguished from true 
beliefs.  How are we to know, in a given case, that our belief is not erroneous?’2  
Russell’s proposed way of avoiding error was to preclude the human mind from the 
definition of truth.  Consequently truth’s independence from mind is central to his 
definition of the correspondence theory: 
 
minds do not create truth or falsehood. They create beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, 
the mind cannot make them true or false, except in the special case where they concern future 
things which are within the power of the person believing, such as catching trains. What makes a 
belief true is a fact, and this fact does not (except in exceptional cases) in any way involve the 
mind of the person who has the belief.3 
 
Further, Russell – espousing a position similar to that of Peirce, cited in chapter 3 – 
preferred science to philosophy as the arbiter of truth: ‘It seems to me that science has a 
much greater likelihood of being true in the main than any philosophy hitherto advanced 
(I do not, of course, except my own).  In science there are many matters about which 
                                                 
1 The example of snow, from Horwich, ‘Theories of Truth’, p. 510  was cited in the previous chapter. 
2 Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p.69. 
3 Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p.130. 
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people are agreed; in philosophy there are none.’4  There is a snag in this passage which 
will echo through this chapter: the assertion that science should be preferred to 
philosophy is itself a philosophical one, so to that extent Russell was excepting his own 
philosophy from his critique of the genus.  The application of scientific tests to 
astrology sees metaphysical questions (such as the definition of ‘fact’) arise and 
challenge hopes of reaching certainty through science alone.  As John Passmore (1914 – 
2004) put it, ‘throw metaphysics into the fire, and science goes with it, preserve science 
from the flames and metaphysics comes creeping back.’5   
 
Such considerations notwithstanding, science is often intertwined with the 
correspondence theory, as it was for Russell.  This follows from the realist ontology that 
usually underpins the theory.  In the words of Schantz, ‘This theory is typically and 
naturally associated with metaphysical realism – the view that there is an objective 
reality, a reality whose existence and structure are independent of our language and 
thought.’6  Jeffrey Ketland described it as an ‘attractive feature of a correspondence 
view’ that ‘it permits truth to depend upon mind-independent reality.’7  Specifically, 
this makes the correspondence theory attractive to commentators who seek to defend 
science as the ultimate arbiter of truth – and indeed in such quarters it is often simply 
presupposed.  Thus for example Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont (professors of 
mathematics and physics respectively) wrote that: ‘scientists rarely use the word 
“realist”, because it is taken for granted: of course they want to discover (some aspects 
of) how the world really is!  And of course they adhere to a “correspondence” notion of 
truth (again, a word that is barely used)…’8 
 
In similar vein, when the professor of philosophy George Englebretsen championed 
correspondence theory in 2006, he characterised it as a way to ‘objective, non-
relativistic truth about the world, the kind of truth worth attaining’, which was also 
                                                 
4 Bertrand Russell, ‘Logical Atomism’ in J. H. Muirhead (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy: 
Personal Statements (First Series) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1924) p. 377 
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‘what science cares about’.9  He characterised this position as an antidote to the ideas of 
‘Postmodernists and New Agers’, whose ideas he saw as ‘a hodgepodge of intellectually 
viral memes’ with ‘a built-in avoidance reaction to facts and an intolerance of even the 
notions of fact and truth.’10  Englebretsen saw this dichotomy between science and 
postmodernism as having been epitomised in the debate that occurred in the 1990’s 
about the epistemological role of science, which came to be known as the ‘science 
wars’.11   
 
The realist version of the correspondence theory, typically characterised as a way of 
avoiding error, is central for most critics of astrology, as articulated for instance by 
Dean et al: 
 
we [i.e. humanity] are so bad at judging correspondences.  Even if the correspondence is strong, 
as between human height and weight, we are still bad at judging it accurately.  We can also see 
correspondences where none actually exist, so a system such as phrenology can seem to work 
even though it does not.  This is why researchers have to be so careful.  They cannot afford to be 
misled.12 
 
As has already been described, this led Dean et al to undertake their own tests into 
astrology, in order to find out whether the subjective impression of correspondences 
between horoscopes, and character traits and events, stood up to scrutiny.13  In doing so, 
as was seen in chapter 2, they took the position that ‘to adequately test astrology the 
participation of the astrologer must be eliminated.’14  The desideratum of excluding 
subjectivity accords with the typical, realist, version of correspondence theory 
advocated by Russell.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Englebretsen, Bare Facts and Naked Truths, p. 150. 
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4.1.1   Intuition as a Problem  
 
It is relevant at this juncture to define how subjectivity and mind are characterised in 
discussions of astrology; what, therefore, it would mean to eliminate the participation of 
the astrologer.  The essential idea is that in order to evaluate the existence of 
correspondences between horoscopes and biographical traits and events, the role of the 
astrologer should be restricted to the deductive processing of horoscopes in terms of 
established rules.  Such a process would be replicable, and could – in principle at least – 
be performed by a computer program.  The involvement of an astrologer’s mind at a 
purely deductive level is not generally seen as a problem. 
 
The point at which mind becomes a problem is when what is often referred to as 
intuition appears, or is suspected to appear.  The central idea behind intuition, as 
formulated by the professor of human development and consciousness studies Marcie 
Boucouvalas, is that it ‘represents a way of direct knowing that seeps into conscious 
awareness without the conscious mediation of logic and the rational process.  What is 
claimed here is a way of knowing outside the conscious rational/logical/analytic 
process.’15  Or, as Jung put it: ‘In intuition a content presents itself whole and complete, 
without our being able to explain or discover how this content came into existence.’16  
These definitions make clear that the provenance of intuition is innately difficult or 
impossible to define, and it is this quality that is problematic for the realist 
correspondence account when applied to astrology.  It makes it possible that any given 
‘astrological proposition’ that an astrologer pronounces may not have been arrived at 
through astrology.  Hence, from a realist perspective, the involvement of intuition 
serves only to erode the integrity of the three terms of correspondence – the proposition, 
the relationship of correspondence, and the fact to which a proposition would 
correspond – thereby making it difficult or impossible to test astrology.  This is why 
intuition is sometimes seen as a problem to be excluded at all costs – as when, for 
instance, I asked the former astrologer Terry Dwyer what changes he would like to see 
                                                 
15 Marcie Boucouvalas, ‘Intuition: The Concept and the Experience’ in Robbie Davis-Floyd and P. Sven 
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within the world of astrology, and he said: ‘a proper scientific attitude and the abolition 
of so-called intuition.’17   
 
The potential for dispute regarding the source of propositions is a problem that does not 
generally arise in epistemological discussion.  It arises here because, as was discussed in 
chapter 3, it is not possible to address the question ‘astrology: true or false?’ directly.  It 
is necessary to evaluate specific astrological propositions and extrapolate from these to 
a conclusion regarding astrology per se; and when those propositions come from 
astrologers, the possibility arises that some or all of said propositions should not be 
attributed to astrology, but to something else – with ‘intuition’ often doing service for 
this ill-defined ‘something else’.  This in turn raises questions such as, how astrology 
should be defined, and whether indeed it is valid to segregate it from intuition.  
Campion found that, at three astrological conferences, the percentage of astrologers who 
agreed with the statement ‘Intuition is necessary for a good astrological reading’ was 
81.1%, 64.5% and 80%.18  In terms of astrologers’ experience, therefore, there is a good 
case not to segregate intuition from astrology.  The epistemological status of intuition, 
and its relevance to astrology, are large questions that are bound up with the models of 
astrology-as-science, and astrology-as-divination, that have already been discussed in 
this thesis and that will be treated in detail in the following two chapters.  Whilst it is 
not possible to discuss the correspondence theory without some reference to intuition, 
therefore, a full treatment must be deferred to chapter 6 of this thesis.  
 
The correspondence theory of truth has been criticised by many philosophers, and as 
this chapter progresses I will examine the principal issues.  These are summarised in 
Horwich’s critique of the basic idea of correspondence between proposition and fact: ‘if 
it is to provide a rigorous, substantial, and complete theory of truth… then it must be 
supplemented with accounts of what facts are, and what it is for a belief to correspond 
to a fact; and these are the problems on which the correspondence theory of truth has 
foundered.’19  Since the realist version of the correspondence theory has been the 
dominant one in the history of philosophy, and also since it underpins most criticisms of 
                                                 
17 Terry Dwyer interview. 
18 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 181, table 12.7 (ix). The conferences were, respectively, 
in the UK in 1999; in the USA in 2001; and in the UK in 2011. 
19 Horwich, ‘Theories of Truth’, pp. 772 – 3. 
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astrology’s truth-status, I will focus on that interpretation for most of this chapter.  The 
alternative, a non-realist correspondence theory, will be discussed in section 4.3. 
 
4.2   The Realist Version of Correspondence Theory 
 
When the correspondence theory is applied to astrology, it brings with it the issue of 
what it is that might correspond to a fact in the world: what element of astrology will 
take the role of the proposition, whose correspondence to fact constitutes truth.  The 
most basic option is to consider a simple combination from the horoscope – for 
instance, the planet Mars and its diurnal position (usually defined as one of twelve 
sectors, the astrological ‘houses’).  Such simple combinations are what differentiate one 
horoscope from another; every horoscope has the planet Mars and a sector of roughly 
30° below the western horizon known as the ‘first house’, but only one in twelve 
(roughly) will have Mars in the first house.  There are many astrology books that 
provide descriptions of such simple combinations: planets in signs, planets in aspect to 
one another, planets in houses and so on.  Books of this type are widely referred to as 
astrological ‘cook-books’ by astrologers.20  Thus for example a book written by Alan 
Leo in 1908 defined Mars in the first house as giving ‘strength and courage to the 
native, and when rising [it] always makes him confident of his abilities; sometimes too 
consequential and assertive’.21  Seven decades later, the corresponding section in a work 
by Frances Sakoian and Louis S. Acker stated that ‘This position of Mars gives a love 
of sports and other forms of strenuous physical exertion.  The body is often robust and 
muscular, with an appearance of strength and ruggedness.’22   
 
This type of correspondence between simple astrological combinations and facts in the 
world has a long history, being found in some of the earliest records of astrological 
readings – from Mesopotamia before the 7th century BCE, for instance: ‘When Mars 
approaches Scorpio, the prince will die by a scorpion’s sting (or) will be captured in his 
                                                 
20 A fact remarked by Bird, Astrology in Education, p. 183 and p. 183 n. 153. 
21 Leo, How to Judge a Nativity, pp. 103 – 4. 
22 Frances Sakoian and Louis S. Acker, The Astrologer’s Handbook (London: Penguin, 1981 [1974]) p. 
154. 
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palace…’23  When they discuss the subject’s origins, astrologers often assert that it 
began with the observation of just such correspondences, for instance: ‘[astrology] 
began when events in the sky were first observed to affect events here on Earth’.24  It is 
thus plausible that such simple astrological combinations should be taken as the 
‘propositions’ whose correspondence to facts about people and the world they inhabit 
would determine the truth-status of astrology.   
 
4.2.1 The Work of the Gauquelins  
 
Michel Gauquelin (1928 – 1991) and Françoise Gauquelin (1929 – 2007) undertook the 
best-known and most substantial analysis so far conducted of correspondences between 
simple astrological combinations and facts in the world.  Gauquelin characterised his 
approach as seeking an answer to one question: ‘Is it possible to observe common 
positions in heavenly bodies for the births of individuals who have manifested common 
tendencies throughout their lives?’25  Individuals’ occupations  seemed promising as ‘a 
precise activity in human life which can be observed from the outside, that is to say, 
objectively.’26  He excluded employment in (for instance) construction work and 
banking on the grounds that one may do such work without having any deep connection 
to it; ‘I chose the occupations which are above all an objective manifestation of a 
personal interest, a powerful vocation… science, art, politics, war, and so on.’27  The 
Gauquelins thus aimed at the evaluation of correspondences between simple 
combinations in the horoscope and features of the lives of the subjects to whom the 
horoscopes belonged, focusing on those that were a matter of public record.  As far as 
possible, therefore, subjective judgement was excluded and their approach could 
exemplify the realist correspondence theory of truth in action.   
                                                 
23 R. Campbell Thompson, The Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers of Nineveh and Babylon in the 
British Museum: Vol. II, English Translations, Vocabulary Etc (London: Luzac and Co, 1900), No. 272 p. 
lxxxviii. 
24 Rick Levine, Jeff Jawer, Your Astrology Guide 2010 (New York: Sterling, 2009) p. 14. 
25 Michel and Françoise Gauquelin pursued much research jointly and a number of texts were published 
under both their names. In referring to the author(s), as with e.g. ‘his approach’ here, I have followed the 
form of identification used in the text concerned. Michel Gauquelin, Gillian Hargreaves (tr.), Written in 
the Stars: The Proven Link Between Astrology and Destiny (Wellingborough: Aquarian, 1988) p. 42. This 
book comprises Gauquelin’s first two books: L’Influence des Astres – Etude Critique et Expérimentale 
(Paris: Editions du Dauphin, 1955); and Les Hommes et Les Astres (Paris: Denöel, 1960), in English 
translation. 
26 M. Gauquelin, Written in the Stars, p. 42. 
27 M. Gauquelin, Written in the Stars, p. 43. 
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The Gauquelins collected and analysed a huge amount of data.  Towards the end of his 
life, Michel Gauquelin referred to ‘having collected half a million dates of birth from 
the most diverse people’.28  Collections from their work totalling 145,228 timed births 
are now available online.29  From all this data, the most persuasive evidence of an 
astrological correspondence was found in an analysis of the birth charts of 1,485 sports 
champions.  This showed a preponderance of Mars placements in the 12th and 9th houses 
(respectively the 10 o’clock and 1 o’clock positions in Figure 2 below), which 
Gauquelin estimated to have a probability of occurring by chance of less than one in 
five million.30   
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Mars in 1,485 sports champions’ horoscopes31 
 
This came to be known as the ‘Mars effect’ and was the strongest instance of a 
correspondence that Gauquelin discovered, though there were others: Jupiter with 
politicians and actors, and Saturn with scientists, for instance.32  These findings 
however were the exception rather than the rule; Gauquelin found these effects only 
appeared in the case of individuals who were eminent in the relevant field.33  Further, 
                                                 
28 Michel Gauquelin, Neo-Astrology: A Copernican Revolution (London: Arkana, 1991), p.20. 
29 Michel and Françoise Gauquelin, curated by Patrice Guinard, ‘Archives Gauquelin: Birth and Planetary 
Data gathered since 1949: http://cura.free.fr/gauq/17archg.html  (2015 [2001 – 2]) (checked 23rd August 
2019). 
30 M. Gauquelin, Written in the Stars, p. 111. 
31 From M. Gauquelin, Written in the Stars, p. 111, figure 20. 
32 M. Gauquelin, Written in the Stars, p. 16 for ‘Mars effect’, p. 17 for Jupiter and Saturn. 
33 M. Gauquelin, Written in the Stars, pp. 72 – 7. 
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the majority of astrological factors, such as zodiacal signs and geometric ‘aspects’ 
between horoscopic factors did not have any significant correspondence in the lives of 
people.34  Further, the effects disappeared for people born after 1950 – a fact which 
Gauquelin tentatively attributed to the increase of medical intervention in births after 
that date, resulting in children being born at what was in effect the wrong time: ‘medical 
interference annihilates the influence of the cosmic indicator.’35  In his last book, 
Gauquelin summed up his findings: 
 
I have been able to observe that the majority of the elements in a horoscope seem not to possess 
any of the influences which have been attributed to them.  Is astrology then based on erroneous 
premises?  Not entirely, I believe.  Although there is a large percentage of errors, a small 
percentage of facts remain correct, as elusive as a grain of sand lost in the sand…36 
 
The response to the Gauquelin findings of Suitbert Ertel – a professor of psychology 
and sometime collaborator with Geoffrey Dean – shows their potential impact: 
 
For a long time, I had been reluctant to consider astrological claims worthy of any scientific 
attention. I thought they would never find empirical support. I stumbled over Gauquelin data, 
incidentally, but my prejudice prevented me from examining his work in any detail.  Finally, 
after ten years of procrastination, I decided to give him a "fair trial". The results of thorough 
subsequent research (Ertel, 1988) forced even a hard-headed skeptic like me to abandon my 
previous mind-set. 37  
 
The reception for the Gauquelins’ findings has been polarised.  Commentators 
sympathetic to astrology have tended to exaggerate their significance as when, for 
instance, John Anthony West wrote: ‘thanks to Michel Gauquelin, astrologers now 
know that in principle astrology is justified.’38  On the other side there have been 
numerous critiques which have denied all validity to the Gauquelins’ findings.  The 
most high-profile of these came from three three skeptic groups: The Comité Belge pour 
l’investigation scientifique des phénomènes réputés paranormaux (often shortened to 
                                                 
34 M. Gauquelin, Written in the Stars, pp. 251 – 3. 
35 Michel Gauquelin, Sarah Matthews (tr.), The Truth about Astrology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) p. 147. 
36 M. Gauquelin, Neo-Astrology, p.20. 
37 Suitbert Ertel, interview. Reference, supplied by Ertel, is: Suitbert Ertel, ‘Is there no Mars effect? The 
CFEPP´s verdict scrutinized with the assistance of six independent researchers.’ Correlation 17 (2), 
(1998/99), pp.4-23. 
38 John Anthony West, The Case for Astrology (London: Penguin, 1992 [1970]) p. 318. 
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‘Comité Para’); the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the 
Paranormal (CSICOP – renamed CSI, the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry, in 2006); 
and the Comité Français pour l’Étude des Phénomènes Paranormaux (CFEPP).  These 
groups’ analyses of the Gauquelin findings, and their attempts to replicate them, 
involved failings that could be attributed to incompetence or bias.39  Thus in their study 
of astrology, the psychologists Hans Eysenck (1916 – 97) and David Nias concluded 
that  
 
the critics [of the Gauquelins] have often behaved in an irrational and scientifically unusual 
manner, violating principles they themselves have laid down, failing to adhere to their own 
rules… We have not found any similar misdemeanour on the part of the Gauquelins, who seem 
to have behaved throughout in a calm, rational and scientifically acceptable manner…40 
 
In a detailed analysis of flawed critiques of the Gauquelin work, Ertel argued that six 
tactics were employed to skew the findings against the Gauquelins: ‘Set up an 
insufficient design’; ‘Collect unfavourable data’; ‘Prevent positive results from 
emerging’; ‘Ignore positive results’; ‘Obliterate positive results by reinterpretation’, and 
as a last resort, ‘shotgun attacks’, meaning an indiscriminate seizing upon minor issues 
in order to create an unjustified impression of fatal damage to the findings.41  More 
recently, Dean et al provided a parallel account of attempts to undermine the Gauquelin 
work, concluding that in their critiques, the skeptic groups each ‘behaved less like 
scientists and more like a secret society with an agenda.’42  All such attempts to rebut 
the Gauquelins’ findings have thus far failed, and the Mars effect (and other similar 
planetary effects) remain as facts in need of explanation.43  Michel Gauquelin lamented 
the arduous path that he and his wife Françoise had faced in conducting their research, 
and subsequently in defending their findings against what he described as ‘hostilities’ 
                                                 
39 For accounts: Suitbert Ertel and Kenneth Irving, The Tenacious Mars Effect (London: Urania Trust, 
1996), particularly pp. KI – 14 to KI – 32, and pp. SE – 13 to SE – 46, Dean et al, Tests of Astrology, pp. 
79 – 83. 
40 H. J. Eysenck, D. K. B. Nias, Astrology: Science or Superstition? (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 
1982), p. 202. 
41 Suitbert Ertel, ‘How to Suppress the Gauquelin Mars Effect?’, Correlation Vol. 15 No.1 (Northern 
Summer 1996), pp. 2 – 17. The four forms of malpractice are presented as section headings at: p. 6, p. 7, 
p. 9, p. 11, p. 12. 
42 Dean et al, Tests of Astrology, p. 83. 
43 In the interests of brevity I have not included an attack on the Gauquelin work based on possible bias in 
the selection of data, which was eventually rebutted – as discussed in: Kollerstrom, ‘How Ertel Rescued 
the Gauquelin Effect’.  
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from numerous critics, who often seemed to be motivated by a desire to overturn 
Gauquelin’s findings at any price.44  Hence Ertel’s assertion: ‘My impression is that 
research on extraordinary claims, conducted by prominent members of skeptical 
organizations… is likely to suffer from bias and fact-distorting procedures.’45  When 
there are difficulties in policing the definition of ‘fact’, the seemingly simple idea of 
truth being characterised by correspondence between proposition and fact will become 
contentious and fraught. 
 
4.2.1.1 The Gauquelins’ Work and Interpretive Inertia 
 
The anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann coined the term ‘interpretive drift’ which she 
defined as the ‘often unacknowledged shift in someone’s manner of interpreting events 
as they become involved with a particular activity.’46  On a similar basis, by 
‘interpretive inertia’ I refer to a tendency for people – specifically, here, critics of 
astrology – to resist shifting their interpretive model, despite that model being 
challenged by data such as the Gauquelin findings.  The ways in which interpretive 
inertia can manifest ranges from the discreetly dismissive to the confrontational and 
accusatory. 
 
Thus for example, at the discreet end of the spectrum, Richard Dawkins stated that 
astrology needed the support of ‘good evidence (i.e. better than the often quoted but 
non-robust Gauquelin attempt)’ but gave no reason for regarding the Gauquelin work as 
‘non-robust’.47  Alan Sokal justified his similarly dismissive attitude by citing a book by 
Benski et al which he called ‘a critical and detailed factual examination of the “Mars 
effect”.’48  That work was however based on the study by the CFEPP, mentioned above, 
                                                 
44 Gauquelin, Neo-Astrology p. 38; pp. 32 – 40 for his account of attacks on his work. 
45 Suitbert Ertel, ‘Appraisal of Shawn Carlson’s Renowned Astrology Tests’, Journal of Scientific 
Exploration, Vol. 23, No. 2, (2009) p. 134. 
46 Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft, p. 312. 
47 Dawkins, ‘The Real Romance in the Stars’, The Astrological Journal (Vol. 38 No. 3, May/June 1996) 
p. 140 n. 4. The comment was added to this reprinted version of the article, and did not appear in the 
original. 
48 Alan Sokal, ‘Pseudoscience and postmodernism: Antagonists or fellow-travelers?’ in Garrett G. Fagan 
(ed.), Archaeological Fantasies: How Pseudoarchaeology Misrepresents the Past and Misleads the 
Public (Routledge: London, 2006) p. 357 n. 128; reprinted in: Alan Sokal, Beyond the Hoax: Science, 
Philosophy and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 332 n. 233. The text referred to is: 
Claude Benski et al, The Mars Effect: A French Test of over 1,000 Sports Champions (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus, 1996). 
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with critical flaws that had been publicly recognised for ten years before the publication 
of Sokal’s article; flaws described by Ertel as amounting to ‘a remarkable example of 
how facts may become distorted by the abuse of scientific tools.’49  
 
Interpretive inertia thus causes people to depart from a primary requirement of the 
correspondence theory of truth – namely that facts alone should determine what is and 
is not true.  This can be further illustrated with exchanges between a group comprised of 
Barry Barnes, David Bloor and John Henry – professors of sociology, science studies 
and history of science respectively – and professor of physics David Mermin.  In their 
book Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, Barnes, Bloor and Henry wrote: 
‘Michel Gauquelin’s statistical evidence in support of astrology would perhaps be a 
serious embarrassment to scientists if they were not so good at ignoring it.  But one day 
it could conceivably come to be accommodated as a triumph of the scientific method.’50  
In reviewing the book, Mermin reported that it had prompted him to spend an hour 
‘leafing through’ The Truth About Astrology by Gauquelin. He remarked: ‘The 
correlations described there between planetary positions at the minute of birth and 
subsequent careers in medicine are absolutely amazing – far beyond what could happen 
by chance…’51 
 
Mermin went on to question whether this called for a major re-assessment of our 
understanding of the world, or whether there could be ‘a simpler explanation’; ‘could it 
be that the book is a work of fiction?’52  In a subsequent article, with specific reference 
to the above suggestion, Bloor wrote: ‘notice that (short of attempting to replicate the 
work) Mermin is not in a position to say this other than by taking for granted the 
acceptability of current forms of understanding.’53 
 
                                                 
49 Ertel in Ertel and Irving, Tenacious Mars Effect,  p. A1 – 11. A full account is at pp. A1 – 1 to A1 – 15; 
also at Dean et al, Tests of Astrology, pp. 82 – 3. 
50 Barry Barnes, David Bloor & John Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis (London: 
Athlone Press, 1996), p.141. 
51 N. David Mermin, ‘The Science of Science: A Physicist Reads Barnes, Bloor and Henry’, Social 
Studies of Science (Vol. 28, No.4, Aug 1998), p.622. The text referred to is Gauquelin, Truth about 
Astrology. 
52 Mermin, ‘The Science of Science’, p.622. 
53 David Bloor, ‘Changing Axes: Response to Mermin’, Social Studies of Science (Vol.28, No.4, Aug 
1998), p.626. 
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With this, Bloor effectively identified Mermin’s position as being due to interpretive 
inertia.  In response, Mermin quoted Barnes Bloor and Henry’s comment in their book, 
that ‘[Gauquelin’s work seems to imply] the existence of forces and interactions 
unrecognised by current scientific theory’ and characterised this as their ‘gloss on 
astrology’.54  He remarked that this ‘fails adequately to convey the truly spectacular 
degree to which compelling evidence in support of astrology would require a massive 
radical reconstruction of our current understanding of the world.’55  Given this, Mermin 
argued that it was reasonable to reject Gauquelin’s claims without attempting to 
replicate them, citing ‘the gross inefficiency of investing extensive time and resources 
in an attempt to refute overwhelmingly improbable claims.’56  Mermin’s point here is 
the same as that of Kripke cited in chapter 3, which also arose in face of the Gauquelins’ 
work – that in cases such as astrology, ‘the dogmatic attitude is justified’. 57  The 
argument is that in practice, one has to work from assumptions about what is and is not 
likely to be true, so that any evidence that was at all supportive of astrology might be 
automatically disqualified from consideration. 
 
I have dwelt on this point because of its implications for theories of truth.  The 
correspondence theory’s principle of straightforward correspondence between 
proposition and fact has proved difficult – practically, impossible – to implement as a 
complete definition of truth.  In order to define what is and is not fact, the scientist 
Mermin and the philosopher Kripke invoked ideas about what is likely to be true, 
working from first principles.  At that point, truth was no longer being defined purely in 
terms of correspondence between proposition and fact.  The coherence of the 
Gauquelins’ findings with physical science, taken as an established – and complete – 
body of knowledge was considered.  Because the findings were not coherent with 
existing knowledge, they were judged not to qualify as factual. 
 
                                                 
54 N. David Mermin, ‘Abandoning Preconceptions: Reply to Bloor and Barnes’, Social Studies of Science 
(Vol.28, No.4, Aug 1998), p.642.  Words in brackets are omitted in Mermin’s citation.  The source for the 
passage quoted by Mermin is: Barnes, Bloor & Henry, Scientific Knowledge, p.141. 
55 Mermin, ‘Abandoning Preconceptions’, p.642. 
56 Mermin, ‘Abandoning Preconceptions’, p.642. 
57 Kripke, ‘On Two Paradoxes’, p. 49. In a footnote (n. 29) on this page Kripke added: ‘What I had 
glanced at was a piece by Hans Eysenck professing to prove the theories of a particular French 
astrologer.’  
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Kripke’s acknowledgement and advocacy of a ‘dogmatic attitude’ may begin to indicate 
why it has proved so difficult for the Gauquelin findings to receive due 
acknowledgement, and why they have often been dismissed on the basis of little or no 
serious evaluation.  The consequence that begins to emerge is that the correspondence 
theory cannot be a complete basis upon which to evaluate truth, for even commentators 
who advocate a relentless examining of evidence fall short of that ideal.  For example in 
an earlier publication, Mermin had taken the position that ‘everything, no matter how 
evident or obvious, should be doubted, questioned, viewed with suspicion… 
unexamined truths are likely to be falsehoods’. 58  Yet in his discussion of the Gauquelin 
work he abandoned that philosophical position, proving unwilling to doubt or question 
his own certainty about the invalidity of any phenomena that might support astrology. 
 
What has started to emerge here is a major objection to the correspondence theory, 
namely that what the term ‘fact’ points to can never be the pristine, unmediated and 
definitive entity that the correspondence theory would require it to be, if that theory 
were to be a complete account of truth.  This point was articulated by Brand Blanshard 
(1892 – 1987): ‘If truth does consist in correspondence, no test can be sufficient.  For in 
order to know that experience corresponds to fact, we must be able to get at that fact, 
unadulterated with idea, and compare the two sides with each other.’59  This is 
problematic because, ‘When we try to lay hold of it [i.e. the fact whose correspondence 
would validate experience], what we find in our hands is a judgment which is obviously 
not itself the indubitable fact we are seeking, and which must be checked by some fact 
beyond it.  To this process there is no end.’60  The problem of defining ‘fact’ in an 
astrological context has only begun to emerge at this point.  It is considered further in 
the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 N. David Mermin, Boojums all the Way Through: Communicating Science in a Prosaic Age 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990)  p. 32 
59 Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought (Vol. 2) (London: George Allen, 1939) p. 268.  
60 Blanshard, Nature of Thought, p. 268. 
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4.2.1.2 The Gauquelins’ Work as Social Artifact 
 
A new interpretation of the Gauquelins’ findings was proposed by Geoffrey Dean in 
2000.61  Dean’s starting point was that the Gauquelin findings were significant – that is, 
they could not be explained by ‘artifacts of astronomy, demography, bias, data selection 
or fraud’; and yet, ‘it seems impossible to explain how planets (not all of them, just 
some of them) could have an effect on people (just eminent people, not the 99.994% 
who on Gauquelin’s figures are not eminent).62 
 
Dean suggested an interpretation whereby the Gauquelin findings would involve 
astrology only indirectly.  In this account the findings should be attributed to social 
factors based on astrological belief, rather than to any actual relationship between life 
on Earth and astrology.  He proposed ‘three attribution artifacts’: Self-attribution (for 
instance, people pursuing vocations that suited their horoscopes); Parental tampering 
(due to such phenomena as parents wanting to avoid recording the birth of a child on 
what would have been considered an unlucky day in 19th-20th century Europe); and 
prenatal control – the exercise of controlling measures by mothers and midwives to 
prevent birth at an unlucky date or time, or to achieve birth at an auspicious date or 
time.63 
 
Suitbert Ertel argued against Dean’s case, concluding: ‘The message is alleged with an 
appearance of historical competence while its substance is actually pure invention, 
fraught with contradictions and laced by lacunae of missing links.’64  The disagreement 
between Ertel and Dean further illustrates Blanshard’s critique of the role of ‘fact’ in 
correspondence theory: that it always requires interpretation.  With interpretation, 
human subjectivity – generally supposed to be excluded in a realist understanding of 
correspondence theory – reappears, and with it, a plurality of incompatible perspectives 
                                                 
61 Geoffrey Dean, ‘Attribution: a pervasive new artefact in the Gauquelin data’ in Astrology Under 
Scrutiny, a special issue of the Dutch journal Astrologie in Onderzoek (Vol.13, Issues 1 & 2, October 
2000) pp. 1 - 72.  
62 Dean et al, Tests of Astrology, p. 91. 
63 Dean, ‘Attribution: a pervasive new artefact’, p. 1. The term Dean uses is ‘perinatal’ but since the focus 
is entirely on what happens before birth it seems Ertel’s suggestion that ‘prenatal’ is the term that should 
be used is correct. (Suitbert Ertel, ‘Gauquelin Planetary Effects – Brought Down to Earth? On Geoffrey 
Dean’s Dealing with Stubborn Facts’, Correlation Vol.23 (1), 2005, p. 28 n. 9). 
64 Suitbert Ertel, ‘Gauquelin Planetary Effects’, p.26.  
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on what is and is not factual.  The problem can be exemplified by citing Ertel.  I asked 
him about his involvement in the interview for Astrology in the Year Zero, where he had 
appeared as one member in a group of five critics of astrology, headed by Geoffrey 
Dean. 65   He said: 
 
I ended up thinking that I had misjudged Geoffrey Dean’s motivation and approach and that of 
my fellow interviewees. I began to wonder if the goal was to simply remove any empirical 
indication of possibly unexplainable correlations between planets and human affairs. Dean 
certainly appeared to act as though Gauquelin’s correlations were obstacles to be got rid of. The 
ways in which he tried to remove them rested upon interpretations which stretched the limits of 
rationality and, above all, involved empirically most questionable interpretations, for example 
“parental tampering”, fathers being deemed to report wrong birth times at the registration offices 
(Dean, 2000).66 
 
It did not appear that Geoffrey was able to accept any of my numerous objections based on 
empirical evidence which I published in six articles in CORRELATION (overview in Ertel, 
2005). Any further debate with Dean and authors aligned with him appeared futile. For myself, I 
can only say that I should have liked to continue debating in a rational manner, but my 
“opponent” ceased replying to my questions and requests, as did the French and Dutch skeptics, 
when I pointed at “devils in their details”. I simply wanted them to face facts.67 
 
The disagreement between Ertel and Dean illustrates the problem, introduced in the 
previous sub-section, with the idea of correspondence theory as a sole theory of truth, 
complete in itself: the definition of ‘fact’ inevitably involves interpretation and personal 
evaluation.  The ongoing disputes about the validity, and significance, of the Gauquelin 
work illustrates this point.  
 
4.2.2 Statistics and Uniqueness  
 
The ‘New York Suicide Study’ was a research project conducted by astrologers under 
the aegis of the NCGR (National Council for Geocosmic Research) headed by the 
group’s Research Chairman Nona Press, which commenced in 1974 and was described 
                                                 
65 Phillipson, Astrology in the Year Zero, chapters 9 & 10 (pp. 124 – 166). 
66 Suitbert Ertel interview. The reference, ‘Dean (2000)’ – that is, Dean, ‘Attribution: a pervasive new 
artefact’ – was provided by Ertel. 
67 Suitbert Ertel interview. The reference to Ertel (2005) was provided by Ertel; the text is: Suitbert Ertel, 
‘Gauquelin planetary effects – brought down to earth?  On Geoffrey Dean’s dealing with stubborn facts’, 
Correlation Vol. 23 (1), (2005), pp. 7 – 33.  
 
135 
in an article published in 1978.68  The study was based on the data for 311 certified 
suicides in New York City between 1969 and 1973, this being the number for whom 
birth times were available, from a total population of 2,250.69  The authors wrote: “Our 
overall hypothesis was that there would be some pattern discernible in the astrological 
charts of suicides that would be absent in those of a control group.”70  An example of 
the type of correspondence for which they searched is Carter’s suggestion that affliction 
by Uranus gives a tendency to suicide.71  The search for such factors was very thorough; 
Dean et al estimated that their tests encompassed about 100,000 chart factors.72  At the 
end of their exhaustive tests, Press concluded: “we did not find any [astrological] factor 
that was a valid indicator of suicide.”73 
 
In our interview, Nona Press said that in the study ‘there were not statistically 
significant differences in positions or aspects between the suicides & controls, but when 
you took the whole story into account, those positions & aspects reflected that story.’74  
In other words, for any individual suicide, it was possible to see in the horoscope a 
description of the individual traits and events which eventuated in their 
killing themselves.  But because each person's story was so different, and the relevant 
astrological factors so disparate, nothing registered in the overall statistical analysis.  
She continued: ‘For example, as I remember, a middle-aged man who lived with his 
mother drowned himself in the bathtub and slit his wrists.  His chart showed that the 
sign Cancer, the Moon and Mars were very prominent in his chart, which fit with the 
circumstances of both his life and death.’75 
 
A similar position regarding statistics in astrology was put forward by the astrologer and 
biostatistician Kyle Pierce: ‘statistical significance and astrological satisfiability are two 
very different things. The clearest difference is that satisfying the astrological criteria, as 
                                                 
68 Press, N., Michelsen, N.F., Russel, L., Shannon, J., Stark, M. ‘The New York Suicide Study’, Journal 
of Geocosmic Research Vol.2 No.2 (1978), pp.23-47. Reproduced, with addenda, in: Nona Press, New 
Insights into Astrology (San Diego: ACS Publications, 1993), pp.311-329. The quotations that follow in 
this chapter are from the latter text. 
69 Press et al, ‘New York Suicide Study’, p. 312. 
70 Press et al, ‘New York Suicide Study’, p.311. 
71 Charles E. O. Carter, An Encyclopedia of Psychological Astrology (4th edn.) (London: Theosophical 
Publishing House, 1954 [1924]), p. 172; cited at Press p. 316. 
72 Dean et al, Tests of Astrology, p. 208 
73 Press et al, ‘New York Suicide Study’, p.317. 
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exemplified in the question of radicality, cannot take place outside the context of the life 
situation that is under study.’76  This theme can be elucidated through Mike Harding’s 
comments on the theoretical possibility of seeing the potential for murder in an 
individual’s horoscope: 
   
I would be very surprised if it could be demonstrated, because I don’t think murder is a fact, in 
the sense that I don’t think it’s one category of something.  I think someone who sits down and 
plans to kill their auntie to inherit a fortune is a totally different kind of person from someone 
who, in one moment of madness, lashes out and happens to connect with somebody’s head, kills 
them, and spends the rest of their life in the deepest remorse.77 
 
In the analysis of Press, Peirce and Harding, there is a problem in categorising unique 
instances of human behaviour as essentially ‘the same thing’, insofar as it fails to model 
the complexity of that behaviour.  It may be the case that this complexity is sufficient to 
render tests of simple astrological combinations inadequate.  The ‘fact’ to which an 
astrological ‘proposition’ would correspond might need to allow for greater variation 
and nuance than simple terms such as ‘suicide’ or ‘murder’.   
 
Under a realist correspondence theory, the consequence of greater complexity in the 
facts under discussion is that it may be necessary to include more horoscopic factors in 
formulating the astrological propositions that would correspond to those facts.  A 
corollary of this is that the poor results generally found in astrological research could be 
due to a lack of sophistication in the astrological model that is applied.   
 
David Cochrane is an astrologer who sees it as essential that astrological analysis should 
include a high level of complexity.  He specifically referred to complexity in the 
astrological aspects that are considered: 
 
the mechanisms by which astrology operate are very complex, far more complex than 
astrologers seem to be willing to acknowledge. In my own astrological analysis, I use aspects up 
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to the 180th harmonic, without which I feel like I am almost completely unable to see anything in 
the chart.78 
 
The term ‘harmonic’ is a way of describing the geometric relationships, known as 
‘aspects’, between horoscopic factors.  Thus for example if there is an aspect of 120° 
between two planets, that divides the chart’s circle by three and as such belongs to the 
‘third harmonic’.  Western astrology has typically considered aspects based on a 
division of the circle by two, three, four, six, eight and twelve.79  The addition to this of 
all the harmonics up to 180 would add great complexity to the network of relationships 
between planets and other points in the horoscope.  It seems plausible, under this 
understanding, that the complexity of analysis required would make it likely that a 
computer program would be capable of processing the information more accurately than 
a person.   
 
In 1993, writing about research into astrology generally and the New York Suicide 
Study in particular, Nona Press wrote: ‘Maybe if we had a large enough computer to put 
in all the data, we could see the patterns [in astrology]’.80  Twelve years later I asked for 
her perspective on this.  She said: 
 
Scientific/statistical research could potentially prove astrology in the future.  The asteroids add 
more factors to the equations, but those added factors are specific principles, rather than the 
general ones of the planets.  Maybe with ‘a large enough computer to put in all the data’, 
meaningful macros could be calculated to combine these various factors. 
 
The complexity created by including asteroids in horoscopic work is considerable.  
Contemporary astrological software makes it possible to include over 38,000 asteroids 
in a chart, and there are estimated to be 796,640 bodies in the asteroid belt.81   
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When I asked Cochrane if he thought a computer program would eventually be able to 
out-perform a human astrologer, he said, ‘For some specific situations that day has 
already come.’  He went on to describe a particular program his company has 
developed, which ‘uses a sophisticated analysis of harmonic and midpoint patterns that 
would take a person days to calculate without a computer.’  He continued: ‘I have 
witnessed people watch the Live Mini Reading of their own chart and feel stunned by 
the accuracy of the information.’82  For Cochrane, there is more to come from astrology 
as computer technology makes increasingly complex analysis possible.  He said: 
 
astrology has the ability to evolve into a system that can predict measurable results without the 
involvement of the practitioner. Astrology some day will, I believe, be able to predict human 
behaviour or perhaps weather, fluctuations in the stock market, or other measurable behaviour 
based on a formula rather than the intuition of a practitioner.83  
 
With this, Cochrane characterised astrology as being capable of having its truth-status 
proven within a realist, correspondence model – with the caveat that greater complexity 
of astrological analysis is needed. 
 
4.2.3 More Complex Statistical Analysis  
 
The need for a more complex and sophisticated form of astrological analysis is a 
perspective that could also have been adopted by Mark McDonough, a software 
designer and astrologer who conducted a major test to find out which horoscopic 
factors, from a set of 300,000, occurred (or were absent) with above chance frequency 
in the charts of alcoholics.  As he put it, ‘the stuff that came back was weird!  It was not 
what you would expect at all’.84  In other words, although there were statistically 
significant correspondences between the presence, or absence, of certain horoscopic 
combinations and alcoholism, the factors involved were not at all those which 
astrology’s received wisdom suggested should be found.  (An account of those factors 
was subsequently provided by Terri McCartney.85)   
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Rather than pursuing a revised version of astrology that would accommodate his 
findings, McDonough preferred to argue that it was the statistical approach rather than 
astrology that needed to be revised, arguing that ‘astrology is a non-linear 
phenomenon’.  He explained this: 
 
In algebra you might have an equation such as 3x + 2y + z = the final result.  If some of those 
variables are non-linear, then they should be squared, or to the one half power.  That would 
mean that some variables would interact more complexly than you might think.  If you have a 
ton of oxygen and just a little bit of hydrogen, you’re not going to make a lot of water.  There’s a 
proper ratio where, all of a sudden, bang! – you’ve got water.86   
 
After citing the relative youth of statistics as a field of study, and its potential to 
develop, McDonough concluded: 
 
It’s my belief that, as we do genetic research, that the mathematics of pattern-recognition will be 
pushed to another level.  And when those things become available in the public domain, and not 
just in someone’s laboratory, then we will have something that might be strong enough to 
resolve astrology.87   
 
McDonough said that he found this entire experience – both the failure of his research 
to support astrology, and the failure of astrologers to (as he sees it) properly address his 
findings – ‘very dispiriting’, adding, ‘the truth is, I never got over the fact that I got 
these weird results, and there was no way to explain it.’88  He faced a dilemma faced by 
many astrologers – that of being convinced through experiences that astrology can 
provide truth, whilst being unable to demonstrate this within a realist correspondence 
model.  Thus he said: ‘Do I think I disproved astrology?  No.  I have seen far too many 
amazing ‘coincidences’ in astrology to believe that it doesn’t work.’89 
 
4.2.4 The Problem of Methodological Diversity in Astrology  
 
There is a structural issue in astrological technique that is severely problematic for any 
attempt to accommodate astrology within a realist correspondence theory.  This is the 
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fact that different astrologers practise in different ways, using different understandings 
of horoscopic factors and different combinations of astrological techniques with which 
to judge charts.  To illustrate: Cochrane and Press have been cited above advocating 
techniques (harmonic aspects, asteroids) that were developed in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  For other contemporary astrologers such as John Frawley however, 
this is the wrong direction entirely and astrologers need to return to ‘the methods of the 
true astrological tradition… rather than their distorted modern counterparts.’90  (By 
‘astrological tradition’ he refers to the approach to western astrology that is largely 
epitomised in the writings of William Lilly (1602 – 1681)).  For Frawley, harmonic 
aspects are ‘irrelevant’ and use of asteroids ‘has not provided the slightest increase in 
accuracy of astrological judgement’.91  Similarly, Ben Dykes contended that ‘there is 
too much flim-flam in modern psychological astrology.  Modern astrologers have too 
often lost the old techniques of delineation and prediction, while heaping new planets, 
asteroids, and whatnot into a chart – which cannot then be reliably delineated.’92  In his 
view, ‘we would help ourselves more through the translation and teaching of traditional 
[astrology] texts, and a deeper learning of traditional [astrological] techniques.’93 
 
In the face of such disagreements amongst astrologers, Dean et al. observed that 
‘astrologers disagree on nearly everything’ and suggested, ‘This again is why tests are 
needed – to sort out the mess.’94  Some astrologers are in substantial agreement with 
this position – for instance Dennis Elwell remarked, ‘Given our pretensions, it is crazy 
that we cannot reach a consensus on what astrology says, rather than what this particular 
astrologer says.’95  Cochrane argued that by using ‘more sophisticated interpretive 
techniques’ in astrological research, ‘We will reach a more consolidated view of how 
astrology works […and], I believe, achieve statistical significance and replicability of 
research results, and this will form the basis of a body of literature and knowledge upon 
which virtually all astrologers agree.’96  In explaining why this was necessary, he 
explained: 
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In my opinion astrology as practiced today is a complex conglomeration of different things: 
intuition and ESP capabilities, rationalization, gullibility of clients, divination, and accurate and 
valid astrological techniques. The probability of the accurate and valid astrological techniques 
outweighing the other factors at work is, I think, extremely unlikely. 
 
Although they did not use the term, in these passages Dean et al, Elwell, and Cochrane 
were discussing astrology in terms of its capacity to yield nomothetic truth: the 
emphasis was on a search for laws and principles within astrology which would equip it 
to be evaluated and understood as a type of science.  In terms of the correspondence 
theory of truth, the quest was for astrological propositions that would reliably 
correspond to facts in the world.   
 
The capacity of contemporary statistical science to evaluate such correspondences is 
also sometimes questioned.  This has already been seen in comments by McDonough in 
the previous sub-section, 4.2.3.  Whilst McDonough was hopeful that statistics would 
eventually develop so as to be able to track the significance in astrology, Pierce was less 
sanguine.  Referring to the New York Suicide Study, and its failure to produce 
significant evidence, he said: 
 
I think there is a basic problem in expecting that some quite predictable or consistent relationship 
will show itself when looking across many charts to correlate celestial motions with human 
behaviours. This kind of expectation forces one to assume that we live in a far more 
deterministic world than is in fact the case. In the final analysis that kind of world would seem 
like a much less interesting place to live. Given the complexity of the world, I’m not sure that we 
will ever be smart enough to turn astrological insights into reliable predictive formulas or 
models, or if this is possible.97 
 
There is thus an argument that statistical analysis of the kind that has been considered so 
far in this chapter is not currently, and perhaps cannot ever become, a suitable tool with 
which to evaluate the existence of correspondences between astrological propositions 
and facts.  This would mean that tests of the kind considered thus far in this chapter 
exclude an essential element of astrology and therefore give a misleading impression of 
astrology’s truth-status.  In order to allow for reservations such as this, the scope of 
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astrological tests would need to broaden, and this could mean allowing the involvement 
of astrologers. 
 
4.2.5 Tests of Astrology through the work of Astrologers 
 
Numerous tests have been made of astrology which involve an astrologer, or 
astrologers, reading charts.  This type of approach treats astrology as a black box for the 
purpose of the test – a system whose functioning is left mysterious, with attention paid 
only to the inputs and outputs.98  Such an approach was described by Nicholas Rescher: 
 
even altogether “unscientific” types of prediction (via tea leaves, palmistry, astrology, or other 
occult factors) can in principle be subjected to scientific quality control.  Every sort of predictive 
resource can and should be tested: one can cogently assess its merits both as regards the 
questions at issue and as regards their answers.  And only if it fares well in this regard does a 
predictive source deserve credence.  And the crux is that we can manage to learn that the black 
box works without ever learning how it works.99 
 
Some instances of such tests are considered in the three following sub-sections. 
 
4.2.5.1 Tests of Astrology through the work of Astrologers: Leo Knegt 
 
A case which seemed as if it could promise vindication for astrologers is that of the 
Dutch astrologer Leo Knegt (1882 – 1957).  Knegt agreed to be tested by a lawyer, 
Cornelis Petrus van Rossem (1892 – 1944), who published an account of the experiment 
in 1933.100  Knegt had analysed the horoscopes of ten individuals who were not known 
to him, and whose birth data had been provided by Rossem.  In an article which 
introduced this case to a modern audience, and particularly an English-speaking one, 
Rudolf Smit noted that Knegt’s chart readings were ‘both accurate and at times 
amazingly specific’, and suggested that ‘Knegt seems to have been an astrological white 
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crow, living proof of the impossible.’101  Smit’s ‘white crow’ refers to William James’s 
illustration of the principle that ‘a universal proposition can be made untrue by a 
particular instance’ – which James illustrated by the observation that a law whereby all 
crows are black would be disproved by a single white crow.102 
 
Knegt’s readings showed a level of correspondence to facts in the subjects’ lives which 
– if it were demonstrated more regularly by astrologers – might easily be judged to 
provide a basis for characterising the work of astrologers ‘true’ under the 
correspondence theory.  For example, one subject was a woman who had only been able 
to find work as a stewardess on a passenger ship.  Knegt’s reading stated: ‘Perhaps the 
best job for her is in the travel industry… she will succeed best in the hotel world or in 
some position on a passenger ship’.103  The results for nine out of the ten test subjects 
also included remarkably specific and accurate factual information; the one subject for 
whom this was not the case, was also the one for whom no accurate time of birth had 
been available.104  Astrologers would generally expect the lack of a birth time to make 
the interpretation of a chart less accurate, so that Knegt’s one poor result could be seen 
as consistent with the existence of correspondence between horoscope and biography.  
 
Although Smit judged Knegt’s results sufficiently impressive to merit further research, 
he stopped short of characterising it as a ‘white crow’ for astrology.  In particular he 
cited the fact of it being only a blind test, not double blind – meaning  that Rossem was 
in a position to bias the overall result by (for instance) presenting positive 
correspondences and suppressing failures.105  The involvement of human subjectivity 
had therefore not been entirely excluded, and – in effect following a realist version of 
the correspondence theory – Smit therefore judged that the case of Knegt would need to 
be replicated before it would count for anything.   
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In an attempt to test and replicate Knegt’s results, Smit invited astrologers to analyse 
five of the Rossem/Knegt  charts and explain, for each, what astrological factors Knegt 
had seen that led him to the particular reading he delivered.106  Further, Smit invited 
astrologers to match parts of Knegt’s readings to the birth data upon which the reading 
was based.107  Few astrologers took up the challenge, and the results were only slightly 
better than chance – 29 ‘hits’ out of 105 possible, when chance would be 21.108   
 
There are two distinct perspectives in the writings of Dean et al on the question of how, 
and if, cases such as that of Knegt could establish the existence of correspondence 
between the work of astrologers and facts in the world.  The first perspective is found in 
Smit’s argument: ‘Find an astrologer who can consistently get it right and the opponents 
[of astrology] would be forced to reconsider their views.’109  It is also seen when, in 
2000, Dean et al stated that ‘hundreds of negative studies’ of astrology ‘would be 
instantly overturned if an astrologer could be found who delivered the goods under 
conditions where reasoning errors and other artifacts did not apply.’110  They went on to 
describe the test of Knegt as one that would qualify for this role if it could be 
replicated.111 
 
A different perspective was in evidence when, in 2008, I asked Dean et al about the 
Knegt case.  They said: ‘even if Knegt had produced his results under controlled 
conditions, it would not outweigh the many similar studies that have been negative, so it 
would establish only that there was something worth investigating. One swallow does 
not make a summer.’112 
 
The modulation of avian metaphor – from white crow to solitary swallow – signals a 
variation in terms for the meaning of ‘fact’.  In the first (‘white crow’) account, if tests 
were to establish that an astrologer can produce significantly true information then that 
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information counts as factual, and the correspondence between the astrologer’s work 
and these facts would suggest that something in astrology was true.  The second (‘one 
swallow’) account denies that tests of astrologers could have so much significance.  No 
matter how impressive the output of factual information might be, a point would never 
be reached at which this served as a basis for judging astrology to be (in part) true. 
 
Attempting to get clear on this point, after mentioning the cases of Knegt and also 
Frawley’s location of a missing shawl (discussed in the previous chapter), I asked Dean 
et al: ‘what steps are involved in moving from specific readings where details are 
provided by an astrologer, to a general evaluation of astrology as "true" or "not true"?’  
They said: 
 
To start with, one would need positive evidence under controlled conditions for a wide variety of 
specific astrological claims, which would then lead to studies in which researchers tried to find 
out what the effective factors were. Indeed, experimental psychologists solved this one a century 
ago, and their procedures are described in countless books on experimental psychology. Recall 
that the ‘Argument from Personal Experience’ is the most convincing to astrologers, and the 
least convincing to anyone knowledgeable about psychology.113 
 
In this view, no matter how impressive the results produced by astrologers, astrology 
should not be judged true – unless it had also been possible to see how astrology 
worked at the level of simple combinations.  Hence the conclusion of Dean et al: ‘If 
people (not just astrologers) wish us to believe what they claim, there are accepted ways 
of doing it. Telling stories is not one of them. To put it another way, astrology (like 
anything else) is not proved by examples.’114  
 
4.2.5.2 Tests of Astrology through the work of Astrologers: Vernon Clark and 
Shawn Carlson 
 
The psychologist Vernon E. Clark (1911 – 1967) conducted three tests of astrologers 
which involved them in matching horoscopes to biographical facts.115  This pioneering 
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work resulted in Clark becoming synonymous with such tests, so that for example Smit 
described his test of Knegt’s interpretations as ‘the 43rd in a series of similar tests, 
usually known as Vernon Clark tests.’116  Probably the best-known tests of this type 
after Clark were conducted by the physicist and science writer Shawn Carlson.117 
Carlson’s work tested for correspondences between horoscopes and character profiles 
according to the California Personality Inventory.  
 
The presentation and interpretation of the results from these studies has seen a pattern 
that will be familiar from the Gauquelin work: some glimpses of correspondence 
between astrology and fact, followed by wrangling about the interpretation of the 
findings and selective reporting.  Thus for example Campion remarked that ‘Carlson’s 
conclusions are regularly cited in sceptical literature as conclusive that astrology does 
not work, but astrologers’ rebuttals are never mentioned.’118 
 
The initial results of Clark’s own tests seemed positive for astrology; on the basis of 
them he contended that ‘astrologers, using only the horoscope… can make better than 
chance identifications of individuals and at a high level of confidence.’119  On the other 
hand Carlson wrote that in the light of his tests, ‘We are now in a position to argue a 
surprisingly strong case against natal astrology as practiced by reputable astrologers.’120  
Arguments have subsequently been made that challenge each position.  Thus for 
example, Dean et al argued that Clark’s results did not involve enough horoscopes to be 
significant, and that they should therefore be subsumed into a meta-analysis of all such 
tests, in which case the appearance of significance disappeared.121  Ertel evaluated 
Carlson’s work and concluded: ‘The design of Carlson’s study was unfair.’122  Ertel 
even found a significant correlation in one of Carlson’s tests which gave reason ‘to take 
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into account the probability that the astrologers were able, to some extent, to 
successfully match birth charts with CPI profiles.’123 
 
There are two issues of philosophical import here.  The first is that, as with the 
Gauquelin work, there is a need to interpret what shall and shall not count as ‘fact’, and 
this need for interpretation means that the correspondence theory cannot function here 
as a sole, sufficient, theory of truth. 
 
The second issue is a recurrent suspicion that, despite the best efforts of those who 
designed these tests, the astrologers’ minds may have contaminated the purportedly 
sterile test environment.  Thus although in 1977 Dean et al were sufficiently impressed 
by Vernon Clark’s tests to write that ‘the results appear to provide convincing support 
for astrology’, they continued: “In fact however this conclusion is not justified… the 
results could be due to intuition and not astrology.”124  This judgement was based 
primarily on the case of Lee, who scored highly in one of Vernon Clark’s tests and 
whose approach seemed to involve more intuition than interpretation of astrological 
symbols.125  Similarly, when Ertel commented upon Carlson’s tests, he suggested: 
‘Correct astrological diagnoses, if they occur, might be due, e.g., to paranormal 
intuitions of psi-gifted astrologers.’126  The definition, and possible relevance to 
astrology, of the terms ‘intuition’, ‘psi’ and related terms will be discussed in chapter 6 
of this thesis. 
 
By the time I interviewed Dean et al in 1999-2000, the shift in their evaluation of 
Vernon Clark-type work, remarked above, remained in place: “Vernon Clark’s results 
and those of most other matching tests have fatal problems due to their small sample 
sizes…”.127  Their central point was that whilst individual Vernon Clark-type tests 
produced results which appeared positive for astrology, when the results were put 
together in a meta-analysis, the appearance of significance disappeared and “the results 
                                                 
123 Ertel, ‘Appraisal of Shawn Carlson’s Tests’, p. 131. 
124 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p. 554. 
125 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p. 20. 
126 Suitbert Ertel, ‘Appraisal of Shawn Carlson’s Tests’, p. 134. In support of this thesis, Ertel cited: 
Suitbert Ertel, ‘Astrologie und Psi. Fallstudie verstärkt die Zusammenhangshypothese’, Zeitschrift für 
Anomalistik Vol. 4 (1 – 3) (2004), pp. 52 – 101. 
127 Dean et al in Phillipson (2000), p.145. 
 
148 
are no better than chance”.128  The correspondence between astrology and facts in the 
world, which appeared to be real, was therefore judged to be illusory.  This in turn rests 
upon a model of how ‘facts’ should be defined, and – as with Knegt – it is a model 
which effectively discards positive findings on the basis that they are infrequent – 
adopting, therefore, the paradigm of the lone swallow rather than that of the white crow. 
 
4.2.5.3 Tests of Astrology through the work of Astrologers: Terry Dwyer 
 
The subject of this sub-section is not a test in a sense that would be recognised by a 
statistician.  It is, however, a test of the type that astrologers frequently ask for.  The 
assertion is often met with amongst astrologers that by practising astrology one comes 
to know from experience that peoples’ horoscopes correspond to their characters and the 
courses of their lives, even if this is difficult to prove to non-astrologers.  For instance, 
the astrologer Nicholas DeVore (1886 – 1960) stated that ‘No one has ever been known 
to make a serious study of Astrology and then reject it’.129  The astrologer Gerasime 
Patilas, in his valedictory editiorial for the UK Astrological Association’s Journal, told 
his readers: ‘don’t worry about what sceptics may say, because we know better.’130 
 
It is problematic for this line of argument when an experienced astrologer renounces the 
subject, and therefore it is relevant to discuss the case of Terry Dwyer.  Dwyer took up 
astrology in 1975, and retired early from a college teaching position in order to pursue it 
intensively.  He estimated that, by the time he abandoned astrology in 1988, he had 
worked such long hours in his studies that he had probably accumulated about thirty 
years’ worth of normal learning experience.131  He gained the Mayo School’s Diploma 
in astrology, then became a tutor for the school for about five years.  He taught at 
summer schools, conferences of the UK’s Astrological Association, wrote many articles 
for the Astrological Journal and Harmonic Astrology Newsletter, and a book, How to 
Write an Astrological Synthesis.132  He was also the Research Editor of the Astrological 
                                                 
128 Dean et al in Phillipson (2000), p.146 where this point is explained and illustrated. 
129 DeVore, Encyclopedia of Astrology, p. viii. 
130 Gerasime Patilas, ‘Editorial’, Astrological Journal, Vol.50 No.5, Sept/Oct 2008 p. 4. 
131 Terry Dwyer, ‘Stop Deluding Yourself’ in Polarity Vol. 1 No. 1 (August 1990) p. 2. 
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Journal for several years.  He founded the Leicestershire Astrological Society, gave 
many talks there, and also provided one-to-one chart consultations for many clients.  He 
also was a pioneer in the application of computer technology to astrology.  His major 
work in this field was the creation of Starword – a program that generates fully 
synthesised natal chart interpretations – but he also wrote a number of programs for 
Astrocalc, the astrological software company which he co-founded with Colin Miles.  
His involvement with astrology, therefore, certainly met DeVore’s criteria of ‘a serious 
study of Astrology’.133   
 
In 1990, a new astrological magazine carried an article by him entitled ‘Stop Deluding 
Yourself’, with sub-headings including ‘How I gave up astrology’, ‘Astrologers do not 
like hard facts’ and ‘Why we won’t admit astrology has failed’.  When I interviewed 
him, Dwyer stated that he began to doubt astrology because of a number of experiences 
in which astrology did not work – for instance, ‘forecasts for clients or for myself, 
which did not turn out right.’134  Such cases included a client for whom ‘a marital 
break-up’ seemed certain, but which did not happen; and a couple he knew for whom 
the synastry (analysis of compatibility between horoscopes) suggested that he should 
find one congenial and the other not – when in fact the opposite was the case.  Dwyer 
went on to comment on the problematic nature of astrological knowledge: 
 
Why do astrologers believe that their work is valid? Is it that every time they give a reading they 
are proved right, either by an observable event, or by confirmation from a client? Of course not. 
Such confirmations are few and far between, but when they do happen they are seized on by the 
astrologer and remembered or quoted. What the astrologer does not remember or quote are the 
numerous statements which have not been confirmed. Astrologers’ biggest failing is selective 
perception. Believe what works and ignore what doesn’t.135 
 
Any thorough evaluation of astrology’s truth-status will need to accommodate and 
explain such experiences of astrology failing to work for an experienced astrologer. 
 
 
                                                 
133 Nicholas DeVore, Encyclopedia of Astrology, p. viii (referring back to previous citation of this 
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134 Terry Dwyer, interview, 2004. 
135 Terry Dwyer, interview, 2004 – original emphases. 
 
150 
4.2.6   Time-Twins as a Simple Solution 
 
Another way of approaching the issue of correspondence is to look at time-twins.  These 
are people who, whether siblings or not, were born sufficiently close in time and space 
that their horoscopes are virtually identical – in some cases, so close that an astrologer 
would not distinguish them as different in any way.  This would seem to cut out many 
of the problems in testing astrology.  By looking at time twins it is possible to evaluate 
the viability of correspondences between charts and the lives and characters of the 
subjects to whom they belong, without relying on any specific form of astrology.  This 
is because in looking at time-twins one implicitly looks at two kinds of correspondence, 
the first of which does not involve astrology.  The first type of correspondence is 
between the lives and characters of given pairs of time-twins.  The second type of 
correspondence is between the horoscope that is shared by the time-twins, and their 
shared characteristics and life events.  To the extent that the first type of correspondence 
does not exist, the possibility of astrology is rendered null – for so long, at least, as 
astrology is expected to deliver straightforward objective correspondences between 
horoscopes and individual lives.   
 
This case was made by St Augustine (354 – 430 CE), who wrote that when he heard 
about the lives of a pair of exact time-twins it ‘marked the final end of all my doubts’ 
about astrology, and that henceforward he was convinced that any astrological readings 
which proved correct, did so only by ‘luck’ or ‘chance’, not by ‘skill’.136  His evaluation 
of astrology’s truth followed the structure of the correspondence theory of truth: it 
happened that his high-born friend Firminus had been born at the same time as the son 
of a slave born in the household of a friend of Firminus’s family.137  Augustine 
observed that their lives had subsequently been characterised by freedom and slavery 
respectively, so that if the interpretation of the horoscope they shared described one set 
of life-circumstances, it ipso facto did not describe the other.138  The relationship of 
correspondence between horoscope and life-circumstance that would, in Augustine’s 
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view, need to exist in order for astrology to be true had thus been destroyed on the horns 
of a dilemma. 
 
On this point Augustine developed an argument made by Pliny the Elder (23 – 79 CE), 
who had the advantage of access to census records: ‘every day, and in every part of the 
world, with respect to men that are born in the self-same hour; masters and slaves, kings 
and beggars, come into the world at the same moment.’139  In similar vein, Sextus 
Empiricus (fl. 200 CE) observed that, of people born at the same time, ‘some… have 
been kings while others have grown old in chains. Thus, though many throughout the 
world were born at the same time as he, none was equal to Alexander of Macedon, nor 
to the philosopher Plato.’140  
 
The challenge posed to astrology by time-twins has also exercised astrologers, and 
formed the basis of an early attempt to reform astrology in the wake of the scientific 
revolution. In his almanacs for 1664 and 1665, John Gadbury asked his readers to send 
in the birth data and chief ‘accidents’ of children born on September 4 and 5, 1664, to 
assist him in his project to rebuild astrology along more scientific lines.141 Just over 
three centuries later, John Addey remarked: ‘If astrology is true then those born close 
together in time must have similar elements in their lives....’, and characterised the 
comparison of time-twins as an important way of evaluating ‘the truth or falsity of the 
astrological hypothesis’.142  He acknowledged that many factors in a horoscope would 
change in the course of a day, so that whilst people born on the same day might be 
expected to show some similarities, ‘one would expect to find really exceptional 
similarities of life and temperament only in those born almost exactly at the same time 
and in the same locality.’143  Addey detailed a number of interesting cases of parallels in 
the lives of people with similar horoscopes, but concluded only that more research was 
needed. 
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Subsequent research has seen a pattern broadly similar to that seen in other astrological 
research already discussed in this chapter: a lack of vindication for astrology on the 
scale astrologers might have wished for and expected, and disagreement about whether 
there was or was not any evidence that would merit further investigation of astrology.  
Thus for example Peter Roberts (1928 – 2014) and Helen Greengrass concluded that 
their 1994 study was generally ‘disappointing’ so far as astrology was concerned, but 
that it offered some evidence that could support a ‘new astrology’.144  A series of 
exchanges ensued with Christopher French, Antony Leadbetter and Geoffrey Dean, 
which concluded with that group’s assertion: ‘we agree with Roberts that his data 
contain measurable effects, but we disagree that astrology is needed to explain them.”145  
When, in 2000, I asked Peter Roberts for his perspective on his research and criticisms 
of it, he stated that: 
 
we found a small but important group of ‘close resemblers’ – and those occurred more 
frequently among pairs born close together than for those born far apart.  French et al have tried 
to discredit this finding by arguing that an inappropriate statistical test was applied.  However, it 
emerges that they want to test a different model and therefore propose a different test 
procedure.146 
 
In short, here – as with the Gauquelin work – there is disagreement between experts in 
the field about how the data from studies should be interpreted.  Much the same can be 
said of a study of time-twins conducted by Suzel Fuzeau-Braesch, who was sufficiently 
convinced of an astrological effect in her statistical analysis to claim that ‘a new 
scientific fact has emerged’.147  This proved contentious.148  There is therefore a grey 
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area where the existence of similarities is a subject of debate.  As with the Gauquelin 
work, though, the possible existence of some significance should not obscure the lack of 
major similarities between time-twins that would support astrology as it is practised.    
 
4.2.7 Conditionality and Time Twins 
 
The astrologer Bernard Eccles has twin daughters who were born so close together in 
time that they share the same ascendant degree.149  He told me that they have 
considerably different characters, and that the explanation which works best in his 
experience is to say that the first-born takes the horoscope for the moment of birth, 
whilst the second-born takes that chart after it has been ‘turned’, so that the cusp of the 
third house (the house of siblings) becomes the ascendant.  The younger twin, therefore, 
has a chart which is changed and defined by the fact of being a sibling.  
 
A similar idea, albeit with wider scope for differentiation between siblings’ charts, was 
proposed by Frank Clifford: ‘My feeling about twins, having looked at them for years, 
is that they tend to polarise the chart – they tend to hold onto different corners of the 
chart… that’s my experience.’150  To illustrate the idea of holding onto ‘different 
corners’ of the chart, Clifford gave the example that one twin, wishing to distinguish 
themselves from their sibling, might choose to do this by identifying more with the 
Moon in their horoscope than with the Sun.   
 
The idea, then, is that an individual’s horoscope would not define their life and 
character in an absolute way, but that it would be one factor amongst several, and that 
the way in which the chart manifested would be conditioned by these other factors.  One 
example of such ‘other factors’ would be that someone who is born as a younger twin 
may have their chart significantly affected by that fact.  That would not explain the 
difference in character between time-twins born to different families, and in fact 
Clifford remarked that time-twins from different families sometimes resemble one 
another more closely than time-twin siblings because of the absence of a drive to 
differentiate oneself from a sibling. 
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The idea that any given individual would need to be characterised by factors other than 
the horoscope is found in Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos: 
 
if the seed is generically the same, human for example, and the condition of the ambient the 
same, those who are born differ much, both in body and soul, with the difference of countries.  
In addition to this… rearing and customs contribute to influence the particular way in which a 
life is lived.  Unless each of these things is examined together with the causes that are derived 
from the ambient… they can cause much difficulty for those who believe that in such cases 
everything can be understood, even things not wholly within its jurisdiction, from the motion of 
the heavenly bodies alone.151 
 
There is thus precedent, in the astrological tradition represented by Ptolemy, for the 
principle that two horoscopes which are practically identical may yet manifest 
differently.  For Ptolemy it is the ‘ambient’ – which in this context signifies the 
configuration of planets and stars – that has ‘the greatest influence’.152  The principle 
remains, however, that the significance of a horoscope would not be entirely self-
contained, but would be conditioned by non-horoscopic factors.  This is also a common 
view amongst contemporary astrologers.  In his survey of astrologers’ attitudes, 
Campion found that the statement ‘Astrology should take other factors, e.g. 
environment and heredity, into account’ was agreed to by 61%, 75% and 71.7% of 
respondents at three astrology conferences.153 
 
As was seen above, Augustine complained that astrology did not show the respective 
social stations of a pair of time-twins. But in Ptolemy’s account, the ‘rearing’ of the 
individuals should be included as something that would condition the way in which the 
horoscope would manifest.  So that rather than complaining that the time twins’ shared 
horoscope did not show the fact of one being the child of slaves and one from a wealthy 
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family, in this view Augustine should have applied these disparate conditions to 
establish a context within which to read the chart. 
 
This establishing of context is something that an astrologer might do in the first few 
minutes of meeting a client.  Thus for example the astrologer Noel Tyl (1936 –2019) 
suggested that, at first meeting, the astrologer should be aware of elements in their 
client’s behaviour such as:  
 
Punctuality, lateness; speech patterns and word choice, i.e. educational background; direct or 
indirect gaze; smiles; graciousness with compliments or the lack of them; color choice in 
clothing; neatness or sloppiness; is the client a nail biter, a foot-wiggler; did the woman wash her 
hair that morning?  Did the man have his shoes shined?  What about jewelry accents?154 
 
Tyl gives these as examples of a process in which the astrologer observes ‘what within 
the client’s astrology is becoming obvious as client and astrologer come together?’155 
 
In order to fit within the realist paradigm, tests of astrology are typically designed to 
exclude that type of interaction.  Typically, the only factor that an astrologer under test 
conditions will be told is the gender of a subject – hence for instance in the test of 
Knegt, the information with which Van Rossem supplied him for each subject was the 
birth data, and whether the subject was male or female.156   
 
There could be latitude here for increasing the amount of information that would be 
given to astrologers about test subjects.  This could take place within a realist 
correspondence framework – the extent of the additional information, and its impact on 
the astrologers’ readings, would then be a technical issue for test design, not a 
philosophical one.  The other possibility, which does invoke a philosophical distinction, 
is that it could be a mistake to attempt to exclude mind from evaluations of astrology – 
that the realist paradigm in some way distorts the functioning of astrology. 
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4.3 Non-Realist Correspondence 
 
Although, as stated in this chapter’s introduction, the correspondence theory of truth is 
usually based on a realist ontology, this is not necessarily the case.  Thus for example 
Lynch remarked that facts could be defined as partially or even wholly mind-dependent, 
in which case, ‘propositions would still be made true by, e.g., the obtaining of a certain 
set of affairs; that this state of affairs is mind-dependent is irrelevant.’157  The same 
point was made by Kirkham: 
 
Historically, most correspondence theories, like Russell’s and Austin’s, have been Realist 
theories; but…correspondence theories are not intrinsically Realist… It is perfectly possible to 
hold that truth consists in correspondence with facts and to hold also that facts are mind-
dependent entities.158   
 
There have not been many philosophers who have advocated a non-realist version of the 
correspondence theory.  One who did was J. M. E. McTaggart (1866 – 1925) for whom 
‘truth… is a relation of correspondence to a Fact’ whilst at the same time,   ‘nothing is 
true but mental states’.159  The contemporary philosopher Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson has 
summarised McTaggart’s position: ‘truth becomes only one more relation between the 
substances existing in Absolute Reality.  This… is perfectly in line with his idealism, 
according to which everything is spirit.’160  A non-realist ontology does not however 
need to go as far as McTaggart in the direction of idealism; if mind plays a significant 
role in the constitution of facts, then by definition a realist approach to correspondence 
will not suffice.  Applied to astrology, this would mean that Dean et al’s requirement to 
eliminate astrologers’ subjective input to chart reading would exclude something 
essential to the proper evaluation of astrology’s truth. 
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4.3.1 Meaning as Characteristic of Divination 
 
The fundamental divide reappears here, between the views of astrology as science and 
as divination.  This appears clearly in a critique by Cornelius of the tests made by Clark 
and Carlson.  Cornelius observed that the tests were designed to allow ‘zero contact 
between astrologer and test client.’161  He elaborated the difference thus created 
between what usually happens when astrologers do astrology, and what happens in tests 
of astrology: ‘In life, astrology and clients emerge within a definite context of 
meaningfulness for both parties [i.e. both astrologer and client].  The interpretation will 
‘matter’ for both.  In the test, the only context is the experiment… It is not clear for 
whom the interpretation matters.’162  Elaborating the implications of this approach as 
regards significance, or meaningfulness, Cornelius observed: 
 
Since an omen is only an omen if it is recognised as such, it is clear that its significance is 
dependent on the participation of those for whom it is present.  Its validity does not depend in 
any way on some general or theoretical law governing the production of omens.  Its power 
comes precisely from its unique appearance ‘for us, here, now’.163 
 
Tests of astrology have typically searched for phenomena that are replicable and 
(therefore) objective.  Meaning has often been characterised as a purely subjective 
phenomenon and as such, has been segregated from truth – as when, for instance, Dean 
et al suggest that the evidence from tests of astrology ‘deny that astrology is a source of 
factual truth, which is not to say it cannot be meaningful.’164  In the view of astrology as 
divination, however, this approach excludes the essence of astrology from tests of 
astrology.  This case was made by Curry:  
 
insofar as astrology is divination, it cannot be treated as if it was putatively, potentially or 
actually science… it cannot survive being treated as… algorhythmic, (sic) universal or strictly 
propositional knowledge… In other words, if it is a firm desideratum to take astrology seriously 
as such, those approaches, which are guaranteed to destroy it (within their ambit), must be 
rejected.165 
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Cornelius has suggested that the significance of tests of astrology might not relate to 
their ostensive content (namely the evaluation of astrology in some way).  Rather, the 
significance of such tests would be conditioned by and relate to ‘the attitudes and 
desires of the participants.’166  If astrology is really ‘a phenomenon of experience rather 
than the experience of an objective phenomenon’ it is difficult to see how this 
conclusion could be avoided.167  Subjective experience would be the primary, or sole, 
repository of the ‘facts’ to which astrological propositions would correspond. 
 
The distinction proposed here can be found in the writings of Augustine.  As has been 
seen, he criticised astrology in the light of the differences between time-twins, pointing 
out that the same horoscope did not correspond to the same destiny.  He then wrote: 
 
O Lord, though neither the astrologers nor those who consult them know it, by your secret 
prompting each man, when he seeks their advice, hears what it is right for him to hear.  For… 
you know what is right for him, because you can see the hidden merits of our souls.168 
 
Augustine therefore introduced a literal Deus ex machina, framing astrology as a way of 
engaging with the divine.  Although the person consulting an astrologer might not 
realise it, therefore, God was conveying ‘what it is right for him to hear’ through the 
medium of the astrologer and astrology.  In the terms used in this thesis, Augustine 
attacked the idea that astrology could deliver nomothetic truth, characterising it rather as 
a source of idiographic truth; astrology-as-divination, therefore, not astrology-as-
science.  And indeed Cornelius has suggested that there is ‘a great perception in 
[Augustine’s] particular line of criticism of astrology’ on this point.169  A partial parallel 
to Augustine’s position can also be seen in the comments of Dean et al, and Ertel, all of 
whom – as was seen in section 4.2.5.2 above – mooted intuition or psi as explanations 
for astrology seeming to work in the Vernon Clark and Carlson tests.  The parallel is 
that the existence of some truth is acknowledged, albeit not a kind of truth that would be 
capable of being repeated and intersubjectively tested. 
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Augustine eventually abandoned the idea that the agent behind astrological truth was 
God, and in a work completed twenty-five years after the Confessions he identified a 
different agency: ‘when astrologers give replies that are often surprisingly true, they are 
inspired, in some mysterious way, by spirits, but spirits of evil…’.170  The replacement 
of ‘God’ with ‘spirits of evil’ raises complex issues.  On one hand, for Augustine there 
was truth in what astrologers said in either case.  On the other hand, the intention of the 
spirits was ‘to instil and confirm in men’s minds those false and baleful notions about 
“astral destiny”.’171  For Augustine, therefore, the road to hell could be paved with 
propositions that corresponded to facts.  There is an issue here for the correspondence 
theory of truth that is not limited to a religious context, namely that a binary, yes-or-no 
focus on whether propositions correspond to facts neglects the context of meaning in 
which those facts necessarily exist, and can therefore be incomplete. 
 
4.3.2 Meaning and Correspondence Theory 
 
Brand Blanshard saw ‘meaning’ as a problem for the correspondence theory of truth.  
He wrote that where meaning and truth are concerned, ‘one entails the other… truth is 
the adjective of meaning and follows it like a shadow.’172  Developing the relevance of 
this to the idea of facts and the correspondence theory, he suggested that what we take 
as fact is always conditioned by our present context.173  He illustrated this with the 
analogy of a proposition which might be considered to correspond to a fact - ‘Napoleon 
lost Waterloo’.174  For a schoolboy, he continued, the meaning of this might be that ‘a 
plucky little fighter in a cocked hat and riding a big white horse had to gallop off at top 
speed to get away from pursuing red-coats.’175  Yet as that child grew older and studied 
the subject in more detail, the same proposition – ‘Napoleon lost Waterloo’ – would 
now stand for ‘a complicated set of military evolutions… [and] the dominance of 
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Europe by new political and national ideals.’176  Blanshard therefore criticised the view 
in which a ‘fact’ to which a proposition would correspond must have an absolutely 
fixed significance, dissociated from its meaning for particular individuals at particular 
times. 
 
The relevance of this to astrology began to emerge in the discussion of Augustine in the 
previous section: if a person consistently hears true statements from astrologers, but 
those statements come from evil spirits and the net result is to instil a pernicious view in 
that person and lead them away from God, then the simple correspondence between 
propositions and facts is not a full depiction of that situation.  A more positive and 
contemporary illustration can be found in an astrological consultation undertaken by 
Mike Harding for a man in his forties who had devoted his life to the family business, 
and whose demeanour, according to Harding, was very serious and career-oriented.177  
Seeing that the client’s Moon was in Gemini – which, in line with the usual astrological 
understanding, he associated with ‘a light-hearted side’, Harding chose to focus on the 
existence of this side to the client’s personality, which he judged the client to feel 
should not be there.178  Harding concluded:  
 
After the session, I suppose a few weeks later, he rang me and said that he had thought a lot 
about our meeting.  He realised that this [Gemini] was a side of himself, it wasn’t something he 
should try and educate himself out.  There was a playful, enjoyable, light-hearted side to him, 
and he made enormous changes in his life.  He said that he felt really happy for the first time, 
and couldn’t praise astrology highly enough.179 
 
There is a parallel here with Blanshard’s observations on the battle of Waterloo: For 
many people, being told that they had a light-hearted side to their nature might strike 
them as true, but trivial.  If it was encountered in an astrological test the proposition 
would often be ruled out since it could be explained as an instance of the Barnum 
Effect, whereby ‘people tend to be inordinately impressed with the accuracy of… vague 
                                                 
176 Blanshard, Nature of Thought (Vol.2), p. 309. 
177 Harding expressed this using astrological terminology: ‘it was as if he had ten planets in Capricorn in 
the tenth house.’ – Harding quoted in Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 64. 
178 Harding in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 65. 
179 Harding in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 65. 
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statements’.180  For Harding’s client, however, the information had deep meaning with 
ramifications in many areas of his life.  It is quite conceivable that after the experience, 
he would have held the belief ‘astrology is true’ because of the way in which an 
astrological proposition (the interpretation of Moon in Gemini) corresponded to a 
meaningful fact about his character.  The idea of ‘meaning’ points towards the broad 
human context within which individual facts exist.  The suggestion is that to focus on 
facts without allowing for meaning is to neglect a significant part of the picture.  The 
coherence and pragmatic theories of truth are more concerned with meaning, and this 
issue will therefore be explored in chapters 5 to 7. 
 
4.4  Conclusion 
 
The correspondence theory of truth, underpinned by a realist ontology, is the 
epistemological basis on which astrology’s truth-status is often evaluated by critics of 
astrology.  Some astrologers also accept it as an adequate basis on which to evaluate 
astrology’s truth-status.   
 
The results of tests conducted under this framework, taken overall, show very little 
evidence of correspondence between astrological propositions and facts.  Several 
hypotheses are available to account for this, including a need for greater complexity in 
astrological analysis, a need to return to traditional astrological methodology, and a 
need for greater complexity in statistical analysis.  In each case there is not a 
philosophical problem, only a technical one of improving astrological or statistical 
techniques.  Another possible conclusion is that sufficient astrological propositions have 
been tested and found not to correspond to facts, that astrology per se can be judged to 
be not true.  This position however rests upon assumptions such as: how the term ‘fact’ 
should be defined; and whether astrology should necessarily be credited as the source of 
astrological propositions (rather than e.g. intuition, psi, or God).   
 
Hence an application of the correspondence theory to astrology has vindicated Horwich 
when he stated,  ‘if it is to provide a rigorous, substantial, and complete theory of 
                                                 
180 Peter Glick, Deborah Gottesman, ‘The Fault is Not in the Stars: Susceptibility of Skeptics and 
Believers in Astrology to the Barnum Effect’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 15 No. 4, 
1989, p. 573. 
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truth… then [correspondence theory] must be supplemented with accounts of what facts 
are, and what it is for a belief to correspond to a fact.’181  Applying the correspondence 
theory of truth to astrology has raised a host of salient issues and brought  the discussion 
into focus as regards the need for enquiry into the underlying frame of reference that 
should be applied.  The two contenders for this role, astrology-as-science and astrology-
as-divination, will be evaluated – respectively – in chapters five and six, which follow 
directly.  This evaluation will be pursued in the context of the coherence theory of truth 
throughout both chapters.  In this way the coherence theory will bring perspective to the 
definition of astrology’s truth-status, whilst at the same time, the practical issues raised 
by the discussion of astrology will illuminate the coherence theory of truth. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
181 Horwich, ‘Theories of Truth’, p. 773. 
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Chapter 5: Coherence Theory Part 1 – Coherence with Science 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter and the next will discuss the coherence theory of truth and its application 
to astrology, with section 5.2 below introducing and defining the coherence theory.  The 
present chapter will focus on science as the system with which astrology’s coherence 
would be evaluated, whilst chapter 6 will consider divination as an alternative for this 
role.  In order to develop and analyse a full account of what it would mean for astrology 
to cohere with science, a fivefold definition of science will be set out in section 5.3.  
The definition of science in this context necessarily implicates the ‘new science’ – 
specifically, quantum and chaos theories.  The reasons for this, and the relevance of the 
new science, will be discussed in section 5.4.   
 
5.2   Definition of the Coherence Theory 
 
The coherence theory of truth characterises truth in terms of the extent to which a 
proposition (or belief, judgement etc) coheres with other propositions.  Typical 
definitions from recent texts are that ‘a statement is true if it “coheres” or “fits in” with 
other statements thereby forming a complete system’; and that the coherence theory is 
‘the view that either the nature of truth or the sole criterion for determining truth is 
constituted by a relation of coherence between the belief (or judgment) being assessed 
and other beliefs (or judgments).’1 
 
The proposal of a discrete theory of truth by the name of the coherence theory did not 
occur until 1906, as discussed in chapter 3.2  It is however possible to discern the central 
idea in Sextus Empiricus’s observation, made around 200 CE, that a fever is detected 
and defined by a ‘cluster’ of symptoms ‘such as a high temperature as well as [rapid] 
pulse and soreness to the touch and flushing and thirst and similar things’3  He used this 
                                                 
1 Harrison-Barbet, Mastering Philosophy, p.149; Bonjour, Laurence, ‘Coherence Theory of Truth’ in: 
Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd edn.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999 [1995]), p.153. 
2 In Harold H. Joachim, The Nature of Truth. 
3 Sextus Empiricus, Richard Bett (tr., ed.), Against the Logicians   (Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 
37 [Book 1, 179]. The clarifying addition of [rapid] is by Bett. 
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example to illustrate his assertion that ‘an appearance is never monadic – rather, one 
hangs on another, like a chain’.4  As the translator of this passage emphasised, ‘the 
coherence of multiple appearances is the point at issue.’5 
 
This principle of coherence, whereby several factors combine to demarcate truth, has 
been illustrated by several modern philosophers through the analogy of building a case 
in a court of law.  For example, in a discussion of coherence, Robert C. Pinto stated that 
‘the force of each individual item [of testimony and physical evidence] lies in the 
contribution it makes to an overall story, a story that can be told only if all or most of 
the items are taken together and taken to be interconnected in the way the prosecutor 
wants us to see them interconnected.’6 
 
The primary criticism of the coherence theory is the ‘isolation objection’, defined as 
follows by Pojman: ‘the coherence of a theory is an inadequate justification of the 
theory, because by itself it doesn’t supply the necessary criteria to distinguish it from 
illusory but consistent theories.’7  This is the criticism that Bertrand Russell levelled at 
the coherence theory: ‘it seems not uncommon for two rival hypotheses to be both able 
to account for all the facts.’8  On this basis, Russell concluded that ‘coherence as the 
definition of truth fails because there is no proof that there can be only one coherent 
system.’9  Russell’s example of a coherent, but untrue, system was a dream; amplifying 
the same point, Abel remarked that ‘Astrology constitutes a coherent system… so do 
Grimm’s fairy tales; and so do the delusions of the psychotic; but we do not take them 
to be true.’10  Similarly, Pojman chose dreams, hallucinations and astrology as examples 
of systems which may be coherent but not therefore true.11 
                                                 
4 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, p. 37 [Book 1, 176]. 
5 Richard Bett in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, p. 37 n. 77. 
6 Robert C. Pinto, Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal Logic (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2001) p. 64. 
7 Louis P. Pojman, ‘Theories of Justification (I): Foundationalism and Coherentism’ in Louis P. Pojman 
(ed.), The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings (2nd edn.) (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth, 1993) p. 190. More advocates of the isolation objection are detailed in: Paul Moser, ‘Lehrer’s 
Coherentism and the Isolation Objection’  in John W. Bender (ed.), The Current State of the Coherence 
Theory: Critical Essays on the Epistemic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence Bonjour, with replies 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989) , particularly pp. 31 – 6.  
8 Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p.71. 
9 Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p.71. Examples of this position in recent texts are detailed at: 
Harrison-Barbet, Mastering Philosophy, p.149. 
10 Abel, Man is the Measure, p. 75.  
11 Pojman, ‘Theories of Justification’, p. 190. 
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A case can be made that this objection is not fatal to the coherence theory, and that hope 
can be found by taking in a broad range of statements (or beliefs, judgements etc.).  This 
can be illustrated by returning to the analogy of a trial in court.  In his discussion of 
coherence theory, Robert Kirk observed: 
 
In a criminal trial, one side often argues that the other side’s case does not hang together: it 
involves improbabilities or even inconsistencies.  For example, it requires the accused to have 
been in two different places at the same time.  If the defence manages to persuade the jury that 
the prosecution’s case is incoherent, or contains too much that is improbable, or implies actual 
contradictions, the jury is likely to acquit.12 
 
The parallel suggested by Kirk is that in a court of law, and in the application of the 
coherence theory, what is at stake is not only the consistency of statements with one 
another, but also the consistency of those statements with a broader, and generally 
accepted, frame of reference.  Hence, in Kirk’s example, it is generally accepted that a 
person could not be in two places at the same time.  Applied to coherence theory, the 
argument is that the isolation objection can be addressed by allowing ‘coherence’ a 
wide frame of reference that is able – so to speak – to tether a specific proposition or set 
of propositions to reality.  Paul Thagard has argued for an interpretation of coherence 
whereby ‘coherence can lead to truth… under the assumption that natural science is the 
major source of human knowledge.’13  This is the approach to coherence that is 
discussed in this chapter.  In consequence therefore (unless explicitly stated otherwise), 
‘astrology’ in this chapter means ‘astrology-as-science’.  The following chapter will 
then consider what it would mean for astrology to cohere, not with science, but with 
divination. 
 
5.3   The Definition of Science: Introduction 
 
In order to evaluate the coherence of astrology with science, it is necessary to define 
what is signified by the term ‘science’.  David Lindberg observed that ‘a definition of 
                                                 
12 Robert Kirk, Relativism and Reality: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 1999) p. 28. 
13 Paul Thagard, ‘Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge’, Philosophy of 
Science Vol. 74 No. 1 (Jan 2007) p. 29 (reprinted in: Paul Thagard, The Cognitive Science of Science: 
Explanation, Discovery, and Conceptual Change (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012) p. 82.). 
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“science”... turns out to be surprisingly difficult to come by’, and this difficulty will be 
shown in the remainder of this chapter.14 
 
In some cases, ‘science’ denotes a cosmology.  This approach is epitomised in Robert 
Kirk’s outline of what he called ‘the Core Scientific Story’ (abbreviated to ‘CSS’).15  
According to this, the physical universe began with the Big Bang, planets and stars 
formed, life began and evolved through ‘blind natural forces’, with language eventually 
marking humanity off from the rest of life on Earth, making us ‘seem vastly superior, in 
intellectual capacities’.16  Kirk continued: 
 
If we hold the Core Scientific Story, our broad theory of the world hangs together pretty well.  
The CSS has been tried and tested, and provides a remarkably reliable basis for explaining and 
predicting a great deal of what happens.  It strikes most of us as so compelling that we tend to 
reject claims which conflict with it… and to be favourably disposed to claims which fit in with 
it.17 
 
It is sometimes the case that the truth-claims of astrology are rejected because they are 
seen as conflicting with ‘science’ in this broad sense.  This position is frequently 
encountered in critiques of astrology – witness Dawkins’ assertion that ‘Astrology… 
demeans astronomy, shrivelling and cheapening the universe with its pre-Copernican 
dabblings.’18  Up to this point however, the argument cannot be philosophically 
conclusive.  What astrology is accused of is (to return to the legal idiom), guilt by 
association – being associated with a cosmology which has largely been vanquished in 
the West.  This evokes further questions, chief among them being whether astrology is 
indissolubly wedded to pre-Copernican cosmology, or whether it could be vindicated 
through scientific investigation. 
 
 In order to pursue such questions it is necessary to define ‘science’ in a more precise 
and specific way, and then to consider whether astrology coheres, or not, with science 
thus defined.  As I remarked in chapter 3, although he does not seem to have drawn on 
                                                 
14 Lindberg, Beginnings of Western Science, p.1. 
15 Kirk, Relativism and Reality, pp. 16 – 17. The abbreviation is Kirk’s own. 
16 Kirk, Relativism and Reality, p. 16, p. 17. 
17 Kirk, Relativism and Reality, p. 28. 
18 Dawkins, Real Romance in the Stars, p. 18. 
 
167 
epistemological literature, Dawkins exemplified the basic approach of the coherence 
theory when he suggested, in regard to astrology, that in the absence of concrete 
evidence, ‘there should be some suggestion of a reason why it might be worth bothering 
to look for evidence.’19  In order to merit any consideration, then, astrology would need 
to be plausible in a scientific context – in other words, to cohere with science.  He 
illustrated the principle by contrasting graphology and astrology: in the case of 
graphology, he wrote, since ‘The brain is the seat of the personality and the brain 
controls handwriting… it is not in principle unlikely that style of handwriting might 
betray personality.’20  By contrast, he continued, astrology lacked such an explanatory 
mechanism, having ‘nothing going for it at all, neither evidence nor any inkling of a 
rationale which might prompt us to look for evidence.’21  In order to explore this 
argument more fully it will be necessary to define the term ‘science’ more precisely, 
and I turn to that now. 
 
5.3.1 The Relevance of Legal Precedent to the Definition of Science 
 
A basic definition of science was given in chapter 1, in Popper’s description of a focus 
on ‘events which, on account of their regularity and reproducibility, are in principle 
inter-subjectively testable.’22  The application of these criteria to astrology was 
exemplified in chapter 2 by reference to Dean et al’s argument that ‘to adequately test 
astrology the participation of the astrologer must be eliminated.’23  In order to pursue 
and further define the ‘science’ to which these remarks refer, it is necessary to plunge 
into an account of multiple proposals by philosophers for such a definition, and 
disagreements between them.  I will do this in what follows, using as a unifying thread 
Judge William Overton’s 1982 ruling in a US court on how science and pseudoscience 
should be defined and demarcated.24      
                                                 
19 Dawkins, Real Romance in the Stars, p.18. 
20 Dawkins, Real Romance in the Stars, p. 18. 
21 Dawkins, Real Romance in the Stars, p. 18. 
22 Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p.23. Popper suggests that his ideas follow those of Kant, though 
the relationship is not entirely as he thought – see Sergio L. de C. Fernandes, Foundations of Objective 
Knowledge: The Relations of Popper’s Theory of  Knowledge to that of Kant (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1985) 
pp. 165-67. 
23 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.554. 
24 Judge William R. Overton, ‘United States District Court Opinion – McLean v. Arkansas’ in Michael 
Ruse, But is it Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (Amherst: 
New York, 1996), p.324 and p.327. Overton’s full judgement is chapter 20 of Ruse, But is it Science?, pp. 
 
168 
 
I see several benefits to referring to this legal precedent.  First, it was informed by 
discussion with philosophers of science, particularly Michael Ruse who appeared as an 
expert witness in the case.25  Second, Overton’s analysis has subsequently emerged as a 
focus for discussion amongst philosophers.26  Third, Overton’s analysis has a close 
connection to Popper’s discussion of science and how it should be demarcated – and 
Popper is a central figure in attempts to define science.27  Fourth, the fact of Overton’s 
ruling having taken place within a legal context has two implications for the analysis in 
this chapter: at a philosophical level it makes it possible to pursue the legal analogies 
that are sometimes used in describing the coherence theory; and, it will help to bring out 
the moral and legal implications of the debate over astrology’s truth-status.  This last 
point requires explanation. 
 
Astrologers have been tried in courts in the past, and this may happen in the future. 28  
When, in 2008, the EU’s ‘Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations’ were 
introduced to the UK, the Times carried an article which stated that ‘Fortune-tellers and 
astrologists will… have to tell customers that what they offer is “for entertainment 
only” and not “experimentally proven”.’29  This may recall the words, cited in chapter 1, 
of Richard Dawkins: “Why, actually, are professional astrologers not jailed for 
fraud?”30  In similar vein, in their 2008 interview Dean et al concluded: 
 
No astrologer can ethically continue in traditional practice in light of this overwhelming weight 
of contrary evidence.  But when might the false pretences stop? If astrologers have to fool 
                                                                                                                                               
307 – 331; also at: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/529/1255/2354824/  (accessed 
24th August 2019).   
25 Michael Ruse, ‘Prologue: A Philosopher’s Day in Court’ in: Michael Ruse, (ed.), But is it Science? The 
Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1996) p. 13. 
26 As evidenced by the volume cited above: Ruse, But is it Science?; also e.g. Kenneth R. Foster and Peter 
W. Huber, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 
1999) p. 54; Alexander Bird, Philosophy of Science (London: UCL Press, 1998), p.3.  
27 The influence of Popper upon Overton is remarked, e.g., by Foster and Huber, Judging Science, p. 54.  
28 For historic instances of astrologers being challenged as to the legality of their work, see e.g.: Curry, 
Prophecy and Power, p.52 for William Lilly’s interrogation by a Parliamentary committee in 1666; 
Patrick Curry, A Confusion of Prophets: Victorian and Edwardian Astrology, (London: Collins & Brown, 
1992) pp.145 – 157 for the two trials of Alan Leo; and Karen Christino, Foreseeing the Future: 
Evangeline Adams and Astrology in America (Amherst, MA: One Reed, 2002) pp.85 – 100 for the trial of 
Evangeline Adams. 
29 ‘Fortune-tellers targetted in new Consumer Protection Regulations’, The Times 23rd May 2008; 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/fortune-tellers-targetted-in-new-consumer-protection-regulations-
jwk8ffjpbdz (checked 24th August 2019). 
30 Dawkins, Real Romance in the Stars, p.18. 
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themselves and their clients to get results, how much longer can they go on doing so?... 
Longevity seems assured only if any fictional content is clearly identified… Or, alternatively, as 
is presently the case, if the education and law enforcement systems are too busy with other 
things to bother with astrologers.31 
 
In the wake of the 2008 EU regulations, the UK’s Astrological Association felt it 
necessary to issue advice to their members on how they should characterise the 
relationship between astrology and science.  The central point in their suggestion for a 
disclaimer that astrologers should use is: ‘To date, this analysis is not supported by 
experiments using the conventional research methods of hard science.  Some scientists 
and most astrologers consider such test methods to be inappropriate for the subject 
matter and flawed for a variety of reasons.’32  Transposed into the terminology of this 
chapter, the statement acknowledges that astrology has not proven coherent with 
science, but interposes a caveat that the ‘science’ which has found astrology wanting, is 
‘flawed’.  The possibility that the science that has been brought to bear on astrology is 
somehow wanting will be considered in what follows, particularly in section 5.4. 
 
5.3.1.1   Issues Concerning the Term ‘Pseudoscience’  
 
Before setting out Overton’s ruling, some discussion of the term ‘pseudoscience’ is 
needed.  The term has already been encountered in this thesis, and it will emerge in the 
remainder of this chapter that the definition of science is often bound up with the 
definition of pseudoscience; science can be defined by contrast with what it is not.  The 
term and its usage are at the same time central to the philosophical definition of science, 
and problematic for the unbiased evaluation of astrology’s truth-status.  This sub-
section attempts to tease these two threads apart, whilst elucidating each. 
 
Karl Popper began to grapple with the problem of how to demarcate science from 
pseudoscience in 1919, a primary factor being his dissatisfaction with the prevalent 
definition of science as ‘inductive, proceeding from observation or experiment.’33  
                                                 
31 Dean et al, interview, 2008. 
32 Roy Gillett, ‘Astrology, that EU Directive and Consumer Law: An Update and a Response’ in Transit – 
The Astrologer’s Newsletter, Sept/Oct 2008, p. 6. 
33 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (3rd edn.) (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969 [1963]) pp. 33. Original emphasis.  Popper hyphenated ‘pseudo-science’ 
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Popper first publicly used the term ‘pseudoscience’ in 1953, and used the distinction 
between astrology and astronomy as his primary example of the distinction between, 
respectively, pseudoscience and science.34  He referred to the struggle to separate 
science and pseudoscience as ‘the problem of demarcation’, or ‘demarcation 
problem’.35 
 
Although many philosophers have disagreed with the reasoning that led Popper to his 
characterisation of pseudoscience, use of the term ‘pseudoscience’ as a tool for the 
definition of science has continued, as has the use of astrology as an example of 
pseudoscience.  Astrology has been taken as the paradigmatic example of a 
pseudoscience since Popper coined the term – thus for example Peter Pruzan could 
remark of astrology, ‘This is the classic case in almost all writings on non-
science/pseudo-science.’36  In fact the use of astrology as an emblem of pseudoscience 
has been more consistent than the definition of ‘pseudoscience’ – as evidenced when, 
sixty years after Popper’s introduction of the term, Sven Ove Hansson wrote:  
 
Scientists have no difficulty in distinguishing between science and pseudoscience.  We all know 
that astronomy is science and astrology not… Scientists can draw the line between science and 
pseudoscience, and with few exceptions they draw the line in the same place.  But ask them by 
what general principles they do it.  Many of them find it hard to answer that question, and the 
answers are far from unanimous.37 
 
So it is that most philosophical discussion of astrology’s truth-status does not take the 
truth of astrology as a live issue; its falsity is taken as given.  This is largely because 
astrology is regarded as the epitome of pseudoscience - in fact, as per Hansson, it may 
be that a stereotypical idea of astrology defines pseudoscience for many people, more 
                                                                                                                                               
but subsequent usage frequently makes it a compound word. Hacohen has suggested that 1932 is a more 
accurate date for the emergence of this focus in Popper’s thought: Malachi Haim Hacohen, Karl Popper – 
The Formative Years, 1902 – 1945: Politics and Philosophy in Interwar Vienna (Cambridge University 
Press: 2000) p. 198, particularly n. 82. 
34 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 33 – 4. 
35 E.g. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 11; Karl Popper, Patrick Camiller (tr.), All Life is Problem 
Solving (London: Routledge, 1999 [1994 as Alles Leben ist Problemlösen] p. 16. 
36 Peter Pruzan, Research Methodology: The Aims, Practices and Ethics of Science (Cham, Switzerland: 
Springer, 2016) p. 34. 
37 Sven Ove Hansson, ‘Defining Pseudoscience and Science’ in Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry 
(eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 2013) p. 61 
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than does any actual definition of pseudoscience.  The fact of astrology’s truth-status 
commonly being taken as a dead letter is shown by the title and content of a 
philosophical paper by Paul Thagard, ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’.38  Thagard 
took it as given that astrology was pseudoscience: ‘Most philosophers and historians of 
science agree that astrology is a pseudoscience, but there is little agreement on why it is 
a pseudoscience.’39 
 
The repetitive characterisation of astrology as pseudoscience tends to cement in place 
the idea of an exclusively binary choice concerning astrology, that it must either be 
science, or pseudoscience.  This is demonstrably a distortion.  Pigliucci and Boudry 
stated that ‘if a theory strays from the epistemic desiderata of science by a sufficiently 
wide margin while being touted as scientific by its advocates, it is justifiably branded as 
pseudoscience’ (my emphasis).40  As has emerged in this thesis, there is a variety of 
opinions amongst astrologers regarding whether or not their subject is science, yet to 
characterise astrology as ‘pseudoscience’ is to presuppose a particular understanding of 
astrology (‘astrology-as-science’) as the only one possible.  The term can even show 
that discussion and analysis is being pre-empted, for – as Cioffi put it - ‘pseudoscience’ 
is often used as ‘a term of epistemic abuse’.41  The point was developed by Laudan: 
 
No one can look at the history of debates between scientists and “pseudo-scientists” without 
realizing that demarcation criteria are typically used as machines de guerre in a polemical battle 
between rival camps.  Indeed, many of those most closely associated with the demarcation issue 
have evidently had hidden (and sometimes not so hidden) agendas of various sorts… [for 
instance] Popper was out to “get” Marx and Freud.  In every case they used a demarcation 
criterion of their own devising as the discrediting device.42   
 
                                                 
38 Thagard, ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’, pp. 223 – 234. 
39 Thagard, ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’, p. 223. 
40 Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry, ‘Introduction: Why the Demarcation Problem Matters’ in: 
Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the 
Demarcation Problem (University of Chicago Press, 2013), p. 2. 
41 Frank Cioffi, ‘Pseudo-science’ in Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p.726. 
42 Laudan, Larry, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’ in: Michael Ruse, (ed.), But is it Science? 
The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1996), p. 
344. (Paper originally in: Cohen, R. S., L. Laudan, Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in 
Honor of Adolf Grünbaum (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983) pp. 111 – 127.) 
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The reason for exploring the term ‘pseudoscience’ in this sub-section is to mark the 
term’s implication, through repeated usage, of a binary choice for astrology, whereby it 
would either be science or pseudoscience – with the additional proviso in many cases 
that the choice has already been settled and that astrology is the very definition of 
pseudoscience.  When a thoroughgoing philosophical analysis of astrology’s truth-status 
is attempted, it is necessary to exclude such a freight of presumption from the term 
‘pseudoscience’ and to take it, neutrally, as one possibility amongst several. 
 
The focus in this chapter on astrology-as-science means the option of astrology being 
either science or pseudoscience is of prime importance.  Even here, it is not necessarily 
a binary choice, because of the possibility of a third position – a ‘neo-astrology’ – 
discussed in section 5.3.2.2.   
 
5.3.2 Judge Overton’s Demarcation of Science and Pseudoscience in the case of 
McLean v. the Arkansas Board of Education 
 
The need to define science emerged as an issue for the USA’s legal system in the 
twentieth century, due to the conflicts between the creationist, and evolutionary, 
accounts of the emergence of life on Earth.  In such a case in 1982, McLean versus the 
Arkansas Board of Education, Judge William Overton handed down a ruling on how 
science and pseudoscience should be defined and demarcated.43  He stated that the 
essential characteristics of science were as follows: 
 
(1) It is guided by natural law; 
(2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law; 
(3) It is testable against the empirical world; 
(4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final word; and 
(5) It is falsifiable.44  
 
Foster and Huber argued that ‘Overton’s criteria are probably as good a definition of 
science as one can develop for use in the courtroom.  However, the philosophical 
disputes that underlie them are deep and unresolved, and attempting to demarcate 
                                                 
43 Overton, ‘McLean v. Arkansas’, p.324, p.327. 
44 Overton, ‘McLean v. Arkansas’ p. 318. The numbering is Overton’s. 
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science from nonscience requires one to run across a philosophical minefield.’45  In this 
section I will look at the definitions of Overton’s five categories, and in the process 
survey some of the main examples of ‘philosophical disputes’ to which Foster and 
Huber alluded.  I have reversed the order in which Overton’s final two categories are 
treated, since this allows for a clearer account of their chronological emergence, and of 
the philosophical relationship between them.  In sections 5.3.2.1 to 5.3.2.4 I set out 
Overton’s criteria in a relatively straightforward manner; some of the complications 
with the definition as a whole are then looked at in section 5.3.3. 
 
5.3.2.1   Science Defined Parts 1 and 2: Natural Law  
 
Overton’s first two characteristics of science are that ‘It is guided by natural law’; and, 
‘It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law’.46  In considering astrology the 
focus is usually upon the second of these two – a point to which I will return once I 
have defined them.  In his testimony to Overton, Ruse stated: 
 
the most important characteristic of modern science is that it depends entirely on the operation of 
blind, unchanging regularities in nature.  We call these regularities natural laws… any reliance 
on a supernatural force, a Creator intervening in a natural world by supernatural processes, is 
necessarily not science.47 
 
Overton’s subsequent distinction between two applications of ‘natural law’ is not 
entirely clear, and Laudan remarked that he found the formulation on this point to be 
‘rather fuzzy’.48  A close reading shows that the distinction is primarily concerned with 
the sequence in which events occur.  In the first case (‘guided by natural law’), the 
natural law comes first and guides the formulation and prediction of a phenomenon 
through which it manifests; in the second case (‘explanatory by reference to natural 
law’), the claim of a phenomenon comes first with natural law then being developed 
and/or applied as explanation.  The two cases are referred to, albeit briefly, in Overton’s 
                                                 
45 Foster and Huber, Judging Science, p. 54. 
46 Overton, ‘McLean v. Arkansas’ p. 318. 
47 Ruse, Michael, ‘Witness Testimony Sheet: McLean v. Arkansas’ in: Michael Ruse, (ed.), But is it 
Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 
1996) p. 301. 
48 Larry Laudan, ‘Science at the Bar – Causes for Concern’ in: Michael Ruse, (ed.), But is it Science? The 
Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1996) p. 353.  
(Paper originally in: Science, Technology & Human Values Vol. 7 No. 4 (1982), pp. 16 – 19.) 
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discussion of the creationist claim of there being only a fixed number of plants and 
animals.  He remarked that ‘There is no scientific explanation for these limits which is 
guided by natural law and the limitations, whatever they are, cannot be explained by 
natural law.’49   
 
When these principles are applied to astrology it becomes evident that the first case 
(‘guided by natural law’) is rare.  An example would be John Addey’s attempt to 
‘revolutionise the study [of astrology] and pave the way for a period of new growth’ 
through the introduction of ‘harmonics’.50  This began with the idea of wave-forms as 
astrology’s fundamental law, and developed a significantly new approach to chart 
analysis on that basis.  It therefore stands as a rare example of astrologers beginning 
with natural law and building technique upon it.  It is however an exception, and when 
natural law is discussed in relationship to astrology, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on 
the second of Overton’s ‘natural law’ categories: astrology is a pre-existing body of 
technique and interpretation, and the focus is on whether this can be explained by 
natural law.   
 
Contemporary physics recognises four ‘natural laws’, or fundamental forces: the nuclear 
force; the electromagnetic force; the weak force; and the gravitational force.51  
Chaichian, Rojas and Tureanu stated, ‘All other interactions observed in Nature can be 
reduced to these four forces.’52  Scientists typically dismiss all four as potential 
explanations for astrology – for instance Bless stated, ‘one of the many reasons that 
scientists dismiss astrology… is that such phenomena fall outside the action of the four 
basic forces; another force would be required and none is known.’53   
 
The idea that astrology does not cohere with science because it lacks explanation in 
terms of natural law was asserted by Carl Sagan in 1973 when, in dismissing astrology, 
he argued that ‘We know now that [celestial bodies’] light and gravity have negligible 
                                                 
49 Overton, ‘McLean vs. Arkansas’, p. 319. 
50 Addey, Harmonics in Astrology, p. 11.  
51 Masud Chaichian, Hugo Perez Rojas, Anca Tureanu, Basic Concepts in Physics: From the Cosmos to 
Quarks (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014)  p. 279. 
52 Chaichian, Rojas and Tureanu, Basic Concepts in Physics, p. 279. 
53 Robert C. Bless, Discovering the Cosmos (Sausalito, CA: University Science Books, 1996), p.537. 
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influence on a newborn babe.’54  A similar point was made two years later, in the article 
‘Objections to Astrology’ by Bok, Jerome and Kurtz published in The Humanist.55  
Bok, Jerome and Kurtz argued that in the modern era, since the distances between 
celestial bodies and the Earth had been established, ‘we can see how infinitesimally 
small are the gravitational and other effects produced by the distant planets and the far 
more distant stars.’56  The difficulty of establishing an entirely satisfactory definition of 
‘science’ can also, however, be seen here.  When he was invited to add his name to the 
list of scientists who supported Bok, Jerome and Kurtz’s ‘Objections to Astrology’ 
Sagan refused, commenting, ‘The statement stressed that we can think of no mechanism 
by which astrology could work.  This is certainly a relevant point but by itself it’s 
unconvincing.’57 He went on to cite the theory of continental drift, which lacked a 
mechanism when it was proposed by Alfred Wegener.58  Paul Thagard repeated Sagan’s 
example of continental drift, also arguing that the lack of a physical mechanism was not 
a sufficient philosophical basis upon which to categorise astrology as a pseudoscience.59  
Thagard added the example of the link between smoking and cancer, which was arrived 
at through statistical analysis without a principle that would account for 
carcinogenesis.60  His point was that both cases would now be regarded as examples of 
science, even though neither was able to point to a basis in ‘natural law’ when first 
proposed.  Therefore for Thagard, as for Sagan, the absence of an explanation for 
astrology in terms of natural law did not suffice to define it as pseudoscience. 
 
The idea of natural law as the basis for any truth in astrology is found in an article by 
Bernulf Kanitscheider (1939 – 2017).  He presented many reasons why astrology could 
not be explained in terms of ‘F-rays’ – a term he introduced as ‘a supposed type of 
stellar influence (F for fate determinant)’ which would be required if astrology were to 
                                                 
54 Carl Sagan, The Cosmic Connection: An Extraterrestrial Perspective (New York: Doubleday, 1973) p. 
147. 
55 Bart J. Bok, Lawrence E. Jerome and Paul Kurtz, ‘Objections to Astrology: A Statement by 186 
Leading Scientists’, The Humanist Vol. 35 No. 5 (Sept – Oct 1975A), pp. 4 – 6. Republished in Bart J. 
Bok and Lawrence E. Jerome, Objections to Astrology (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1975B) pp. 9 – 
10. 
56 Bok and Kurtz, ‘Objections to Astrology’, p. 4 (p. 9 in book of the same name). 
57 Carl Sagan, ‘Objections to Astrology’ (letter to the editor), The Humanist, Vol. 36 No. 1 (Jan/Feb 
1976) p. 2. Reprinted in: Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark (New 
York: Ballantine/Random, 1995) pp. 302 – 3. 
58 Sagan, ‘Objections to Astrology (letter)’, p. 2. 
59 Thagard, ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’, p. 225. 
60 Thagard, ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’, p. 225. 
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function.61  Yet despite the arguments he presented he acknowledged that ‘there can 
never be a priori proof that F-rays are impossible… negative existential statements in 
science never mean analytical proof that the entities in question cannot exist; it is just a 
short way of saying that there are no good reasons for believing in the existence of those 
entities.’62   
 
Further illustration of the lack of finality offered by critiques of astrology in terms of 
natural law can be found in the work of Percy Seymour.  Seymour proposed a model 
whereby an embryo’s brain would be ‘etched’ with the ‘all-pervading and constantly 
fluctuating magnetic field of Earth’, which would itself be affected by the solar wind 
emanating from the solar magnetic field, which in turn would be affected by the 
planets.63  Seymour thus favoured the electromagnetic force as an explanation; a crucial 
step in his argument is his use of what he termed ‘magneto tidal resonance’ to explain 
how the tiny fluctuations of electromagnetic force could be significant in terms of 
astrological effects on Earth.64  The principle of resonance is typically illustrated by 
examples such as a singer breaking a wine-glass through the dynamic force of their 
voice, or the modest impact of people walking on a bridge causing it to sway or even 
collapse.  In each case, a relatively weak force is amplified to spectacular effect in its 
interaction with a body.65  Seymour argued that the weak electromagnetic force of the 
planets resonates in the Sun’s magnetic canals, thus gaining sufficient amplitude to 
influence life on Earth.66 
 
The significance of Seymour’s theory for this chapter takes two forms, neither of which 
depends on the truth or falsity of the theory in itself.  Firstly, the theory illustrates an 
argument he made that extant evaluations of astrology in terms of natural laws are 
simplistic: ‘scientists set up a very simple theory, then they shoot down their own 
theory, and from this they conclude that no scientific theory can be constructed to 
                                                 
61 Kanitscheider, ‘A Philosopher Looks at Astrology’, pp. 261 – 2.    
62 Kanitscheider, ‘A Philosopher Looks at Astrology’, p. 262. 
63 Percy Seymour quoted in: Percy Seymour, Bronwyn Elko (interviewer), ‘The Magus of Magnetism: An 
Interview with Dr. Percy Seymour’, http://cura.free.fr/decem/09seym.html (checked 24th August 2019). 
(Originally published in: The Mountain Astrologer (Aug/Sept 1998, Issue 80).). 
64 Seymour, ‘The Magus of Magnetism’. 
65 Michael M. Woolfson, Resonance: Applications in Physical Science (London: Imperial College Press, 
2015), pp. 18 – 23. 
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explain any part of astrology.’67  Secondly, ‘It is impossible to rule out all possible 
physical explanations by considering a limited set of possible physical explanations.’68  
 
The limitation of Seymour’s model of magnetic resonance was captured by Victor 
Mansfield: 
 
more sophisticated models of physical mechanism for astrological influence, such as proposed 
by Percy Seymour, have far too many speculative links that lack quantitative detail to allow for a 
reasonable judgment of their value. At this stage it is only a promise of a theory, not a fullblown 
quantitative physical explanation.69 
 
In other words, the most that can be said is that it has not been finally and absolutely 
proven that there could be no as-yet-undiscovered ‘natural law’, or combination of 
existing laws, that would explain astrology.  In itself this mitigates the challenge posed 
to astrology’s truth-status by the ‘natural laws’ critique.  The crucial next step would be 
to consider whether testing revealed evidence of an expected effect; hence, Seymour 
remarked, ‘What my theory does is to propose an interpretation… which can be 
scientifically tested.’70  The testing of theories is Judge Overton’s next category. 
 
 
5.3.2.2   Science Defined Part 3: Testability  
 
Overton included in his ‘five essential characteristics of science’ the requirement that 
science needs to be ‘testable against the empirical world’.71  In elucidating how this 
counted against creationism he remarked: 
 
The scientific community consists of individuals and groups, nationally and internationally, who 
work independently… Their work is published and subject to review and testing by their peers. 
The journals for publication are both numerous and varied. There is, however, not one 
                                                 
67 Percy Seymour, The Scientific Basis of Astrology: Tuning to the Music of the Spheres (London: 
Quantum/Foulsham, 1997), p. 242. 
68 Seymour, Scientific Basis of Astrology, p. 241. 
69 Victor Mansfield, ‘An Astrophysicist’s Sympathetic and Critical View of Astrology’, The Mountain 
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70 Seymour, Scientific Basis of Astrology, p. 264. 
71 Overton, ‘McLean vs. Arkansas’, p. 318. 
 
178 
recognized scientific journal which has published an article espousing the creation science 
theory…72 
 
As will be evident from the discussion in the previous chapter of this thesis, astrology 
differs from creationism on this point in that it can be, and has been, tested.  This point 
was raised by Thomas Kuhn (1922 - 1996), who observed that ‘astrologers made 
testable predictions and recognized that these predictions sometimes failed.’73  He 
therefore argued that ‘To rely on testing as the mark of a science is to miss what 
scientists mostly do’, and that testability was therefore inadequate as a demarcation 
criterion.74    
 
In similar vein Thagard dismissed ‘testability’ as a demarcation criterion, remarking 
with particular reference to the work of Michel Gauquelin that ‘astrology is vaguely 
testable.’75  He added that Gauquelin found no evidence to support much of astrology, 
and concluded: ‘Even if correct, [Gauquelin’s findings] hardly verify astrology, 
especially considering the negative results found for the most important astrological 
categories.  I have mentioned Gauquelin in order to suggest that through the use of 
statistical techniques astrology is at least verifiable.’76 
 
Gauquelin’s findings were that only a very small sub-set of astrological techniques 
yielded positive results in tests, on which basis he asserted that there was a ‘gold 
nugget’ in astrology – a small subset of the entire corpus of astrological techniques 
which deliver positive results in tests.77  This led to him being labelled a ‘neo-
astrologer’ by his critics – a label which, by his own account, he initially resented but 
eventually came to accept, using ‘Neo-Astrology’ as the title of his final book.78  I will 
adopt the term ‘neo-astrology’ for positions of this type in what follows, with Seymour 
as a protagonist – as evidenced in the following statement: 
                                                 
72 Overton, ‘McLean vs. Arkansas’, p. 319. 
73 Thomas Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’ in: Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave 
(eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the 
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74 Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery’, p. 10. 
75 Thagard, ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’, p. 225. 
76 Thagard, ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’, p. 226. 
77 First asserted in: Michel Gauquelin, Cosmic Influences on Human Behavior (New York: Stein and Day, 
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It is evident that traditional approaches to astrology do not have much scientific data to support 
the claims made for it by its adherents.  On the other hand it is also clear that there is scientific 
evidence that establishes links between personality and the positions of the planets at birth which 
cannot be ignored.  Much of this evidence comes from the work of Michel Gauquelin.79   
 
The possibility of neo-astrology is a complicating factor for discussions of astrology’s 
truth, holding out the prospect that astrology might be both true (since it contains an 
element that coheres with science) and not true (since a large part, perhaps the great 
majority of it, does not cohere with science).  The principle of testability, therefore, 
raises two kinds of issues regarding astrology’s coherence with science.  The first is the 
possibility of a ‘neo-astrology’, which complicates the evaluation of astrology’s truth-
status.  The second is that since astrology can be tested, the criterion of ‘testability’ 
would demarcate it as science, not pseudoscience. 
 
5.3.2.3   Science Defined Part 4: Falsifiability 
 
The next one of Overton’s characteristics of science to be considered is that ‘It is 
falsifiable’; a scientific theory must be ‘subject to revision or abandonment in light 
of facts that are inconsistent with, or falsify, the theory.’80  The principles of testability 
and falsifiability are closely connected.  Hence in his testimony to Overton, Ruse stated 
that ‘Falsifiability is another way of looking at what I have called testability.’81  In this 
he followed the original protagonist of falsifiability as a crucial characteristic of science, 
Popper, who asserted that ‘Testability is falsifiability’.82  This notwithstanding, 
falsifiability can be distinguished from testability insofar as the former emphasises the 
desideratum of a test of predicted behaviour which of itself could suffice to overthrow 
the veracity of a theory.   
 
The principle of falsifiability can be seen, a century before Popper, in Charles Darwin’s 
remark concerning evolution through natural selection: ‘If it could be demonstrated that 
any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, 
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successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down.’83  Darwin 
thus identified a phenomenon which, if it were found, would falsify his theory at a 
stroke. 
 
When he defined falsifiability as his favoured demarcation criterion, Popper used 
astrology as an example: 
 
Astrologers were greatly impressed, and misled, by what they believed to be confirming 
evidence – so much so that they were quite unimpressed by any unfavourable evidence.  
Moreover, by making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague they were able to 
explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the 
prophecies been more precise.  In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of 
their theory.84   
 
The charge of vagueness is a common one – for example, Dawkins argued that ‘all 
astrology works on the “Barnum Principle” of saying things so vague and general that 
all readers think it applies to them.’85  Similarly, Alec Fisher suggested that ‘Because 
astrologers make their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague, they are able to 
explain away whatever happens – and nothing refutes the theory.’86   
 
Popper contrasted the vagueness of astrology – as he saw it – with Einstein’s theory of 
general relativity, which entailed that there would be a gravitational attraction from 
heavy bodies upon rays of light.  Popper remarked that ‘the impressive thing about this 
case is the risk involved in a prediction of this kind.  If observation shows that the 
predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted.’87  His charge 
against astrology was that it lacked any such crucial test.   
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The contrary position – that astrology can be falsified – was argued by Kuhn in a 
critique of Popper’s position: ‘The history of astrology during the centuries when it was 
intellectually reputable records many predictions that categorically failed.’88  Kuhn 
therefore argued that Popper was wrong to characterise astrology as a pseudoscience on 
the grounds of vagueness and consequent unfalsifiability.  Thagard also challenged 
Popper’s position, asserting that astrology was in fact open to falsification: ‘falsifiability 
is only a matter of replaceability by another theory, and since astrology is in principle 
replaceable by another theory, falsifiability provides no criterion for rejecting astrology 
as pseudoscientific… astrology does not appear worse than the best of scientific 
theories, which also resist falsification until alternative theories arise.’89   
 
An issue here is that in order to falsify astrology it would be necessary to falsify 
astrological technique, which comprises a variegated collection of descriptions, 
interpretative rules and precedents.  It is not clear how, or if, it would be possible to 
refute the entire body of astrological technique with any single test.  Thus, Gauquelin 
stated that ‘statistical findings reject the multiplicity of horoscopic factors: zodiac, 
aspects, houses, transits, directions… the planets Mercury, Uranus, Neptune, Pluto and 
… the Sun’.90  This is based on a huge range of different tests, all of which would need 
to have yielded negative results in order to falsify astrology-as-science per se.  The 
precedents of Darwin and Einstein’s respective hypotheses being potentially falsified by 
a single finding, cited above, may not therefore be entirely applicable.  What astrology’s 
critics typically point to, rather than the outcome of any single test, is a cumulative 
failure by astrology to yield convincing results in a range of different tests.91   
 
Several people have already been referred to in this thesis who, having practised 
astrology, gave up their practice in light of test results.92  This would make it difficult to 
defend the argument that astrology is not falsifiable; a more defensible position would 
be to say that the evidence from tests should lead more astrologers to regard the subject 
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as having been falsified.  Under this reading, where astrology is concerned, the problem 
of falsifiability resides, not in astrology per se, but in a failure on the part of many 
astrologers to evaluate their subject in the light of test data.   
 
A full account of this fourth category, falsifiability, therefore merges to a degree with 
the fifth category, methodology. 
 
5.3.2.4   Science Defined Part 5: Methodology  
 
Overton defined the fourth of his five criteria, which I am treating as the final one, by 
saying of science: ‘Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final word’93  
In order to be categorised as science, then, there is a requirement for a tentative 
approach – or to put it another way, a lack of dogmatism.  Overton elaborated on this 
theme by describing a problem with creationism: 
 
The methodology employed by creationists is another factor which is indicative that their work 
is not science. A scientific theory must be tentative and always subject to revision or 
abandonment in light of facts that are inconsistent with, or falsify, the theory. A theory that is by 
its own terms dogmatic, absolutist, and never subject to revision is not a scientific theory.94  
 
Overton’s conclusion was that it would be inaccurate for anyone to describe their 
methodology as scientific, ‘if they start with a conclusion and refuse to change it 
regardless of the evidence developed during the course of the investigation.’95  A 
similar point was made by Edward W. James when he argued that, because of a lack on 
the part of astrologers of: clear thinking and reasoning; readiness to engage with 
criticism; and following the evidence, astrology should be defined as a pseudoscience.96  
In summarising his critique of astrology, James argued that: 
 
Astrology simply fails to meet the multifarious demands of legitimate reasoning.  This, to be 
sure, is vague.  But rationality is a global notion, one embracing a legion of criteria, procedures, 
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techniques, asides, qualifications, and the like.  To insist on a precise definition is to 
misunderstand it.  Rationality could be characterized as the appropriate, correct, and self-critical 
openness to ideas.97 
 
A more detailed analysis was provided by Dean et al when I asked them what they saw 
as the most harmful things to astrology’s credibility.  They cited five factors: ‘refusal to 
acknowledge the disconfirmation of claims’; ‘dramatic disagreement on fundamentals 
[of horoscopic technique]; ‘poor agreement between astrologers judging the same 
chart’; ‘the stagnation of astrology’ – specifically, the lack of ‘critical evaluation of 
ideas and claims’; and ‘ignorance of existing research and of problems due to errors in 
human reasoning’.98  Each point amounts to a failure on the part of astrologers to 
evaluate and adjust (or abandon) their horoscopic techniques in light of the scientific 
critique of their subject.   
 
Hence, central to the issues for astrology in Overton’s criterion of ‘methodology’ is the 
status of the horoscope used in western astrology.  The issue can be illuminated through 
Dawkins’ remark, ‘A planet is so far away that its gravitational pull on a new-born baby 
would be swamped by the gravitational pull of the doctor’s paunch.’99  Though it has a 
satirical slant, the question implicit in Dawkins’ statement is substantial: how it could 
be that the particular group of horoscopic factors used in western astrology would 
comprise an efficacious and sufficient toolset to enable astrological analysis.  A related 
problem is that, even if it is given (for the sake of argument) that there are natural laws 
which explain astrology as we know it, and a set of principles exists which would – if 
settled upon – enable astrological work, is it plausible that would-be astrologers would 
ever find out what those principles were?  Kuhn argued they would not: ‘astrology 
could not have become a science even if the stars had, in fact, controlled human 
destiny.’100  His position was based on the view that astrologers’ particular failures in 
astrological readings, 
 
did not give rise to research puzzles, for no man, however skilled, could make use of them in a 
constructive attempt to revise the astrological tradition.  There were too many possible sources 
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of difficulty, most of them beyond the astrologer’s knowledge, control, or responsibility.  
Individual failures were correspondingly uninformative, and they did not reflect on the 
competence of the prognosticator in the eyes of his professional compeers.101   
   
Kuhn proposed that ‘puzzle-solving’ should be the demarcation criterion between 
science and pseudoscience, and this overlaps substantially with Overton’s category of 
‘methodology’.102  Kuhn acknowledged that there was a history of disagreement and 
criticism between astrologers on matters of technique; his argument was that these did 
not mature into the pursuit of research puzzles.103  It would be difficult to sustain this 
position in regard to individual astrologers.  For instance, Brady described 
‘deconstructing… and then rebuilding’ her astrology after discovering that an 
astrological client of hers was a murderer. She had not seen this in the horoscope, and 
attributed this to a shortcoming in her astrological technique at that time.104  This could 
well be seen as an astrologer pursuing a research puzzle.  The issue for astrology 
however is that different astrologers often solve their puzzles in different ways; this was 
discussed in the previous chapter with reference to the advocacy by Cochrane and Press 
of the inclusion of asteroids in a horoscope, and Frawley’s dismissal of such an 
approach.  If astrology were to be demarcated as a science according to the criterion of 
‘methodology’, there would need to be an explanation for why a particular set of 
horoscopic factors is functional, and why no consensus has emerged on the precise set 
that is optimally functional. 
 
5.3.3   Issues Arising from Overton’s Definition of Science  
 
In section 5.3.2 I discussed the definition of science, with particular reference to 
Overton’s five criteria, so as to have in place a philosophically viable basis from which 
to evaluate astrology’s coherence with science – given, as context, the view that 
astrology would need to be coherent with science in order to be true.  In outlining 
Overton’s five criteria I introduced numerous examples to show that they contain and 
locate criticisms that are commonly made of astrology-as-science. 
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All five of Overton’s criteria can be seen to partake in, and expand upon, Dean et al’s  
assertion that ‘to adequately test astrology the participation of the astrologer must be 
eliminated.’105  ‘Natural law’ is defined by forces and processes that science can 
describe and measure; ‘testability’ and ‘falsifiability’ focus on excluding subjectivity – 
and with it, the possibility of error – from the process of evaluation; and the criterion of 
‘methodology’ raises a host of procedural issues which – if they were answered, in the 
case of astrology – would make it possible to create a computer program that would 
interpret horoscopes as well as, or better than, could be accomplished by a (human) 
astrologer.  In introducing Overton’s criteria I cited Foster and Huber’s assertion that 
‘attempting to demarcate science from nonscience requires one to run across a 
philosophical minefield.’106  I have cited criticisms of each of Overton’s principles, and 
in order to further the definition of science it is necessary to evaluate these.   
 
The criticisms that are faced by attempts to demarcate science from pseudoscience, and 
thereby define science, are of two kinds.  The first finds fault with a specific 
demarcation criterion, and argues in favour of another one.  In this approach it is 
typically assumed that there should be a single demarcation criterion, rather as there 
might be a single correct answer to a mathematical problem.  A ‘portfolio’ approach 
such as Overton’s, where several criteria are enumerated, is therefore implicitly 
dismissed as too diffuse – even if the ‘correct’ criterion were included, its presence 
would be marred by the inclusion of criteria that are unnecessary or simply wrong.  The 
second type of criticism is more general, being aimed at the entire principle of 
demarcating science from pseudoscience.  I will now evaluate these two kinds of 
criticism in order. 
 
5.3.3.1   Objection #1 to Overton: Only one demarcation criterion is needed 
 
As has already been seen, Thagard dismissed both ‘natural law’ and ‘falsifiability’ as 
demarcation criteria in his discussion of astrology as pseudoscience.  At the conclusion 
of that article he proposed a ‘principle of demarcation’ as follows:  
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A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if:    
1) it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces 
many unsolved problems; but 
2) the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions 
of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, 
and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations.107 
 
In terms of Overton’s categories, this is close to ‘methodology’.  In relation to 
Overton’s five categories, the question that therefore arises is whether four of them are 
surplus to requirement.  I suggest that by investigating Thagard’s model it becomes 
apparent that all of Overton’s demarcation criteria lurk therein.  Thus, to say of a theory 
that it is ‘selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations’ is to assume that 
it is susceptible to testing, and that the principle of falsifiability is not adequately 
applied in the evaluation of those tests.  Further, Thagard’s principle presupposes that 
astrology (as his example of pseudoscience) would – if true – work through natural law, 
understood to mean the four natural forces or something very like them.  This 
assumption is necessary to supply the context in which a true astrology would 
necessarily be capable of consensual, progressive, evaluation and development of the 
type he specifies as characteristic of science.  The assumption is that a true astrology 
would necessarily see disagreements over technique resolved over time on the basis of 
ongoing research – rather as, for example, puzzles concerning the motions of the planets 
were gradually resolved through the work of figures such as Copernicus, Galileo and 
Kepler.  The assumed model is therefore of a unitary reality which can be understood in 
terms of natural, physical, forces.  Hence I suggest that Thagard’s ‘principle’ actually 
enfolds, unacknowledged, all of Overton’s criteria. 
 
If someone were to argue against this, and to suggest that in the case of Thagard, or in 
that of some other exponent of a single demarcation criterion, no other possible criterion 
was implicated, then it would be possible to question whether this single criterion would 
not be reinforced by the addition of other criteria.  For example, if ‘methodology’ were 
taken as the sole criterion that sufficed to characterise astrology as pseudoscience, it is 
difficult to see how the case would not be strengthened if an absence of natural laws 
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through which astrological forces could operate were factored in.  Similarly, if a natural 
law with the potential to explain astrology were discovered, or if test results emerged 
that supported astrological claims, the case for considering astrology to be 
pseudoscience would surely be weakened thereby.  Since it is thus possible to find 
Overton’s criteria in Thagard’s criterion, and since Overton’s criteria can evidently be 
considered separately, I conclude that Thagard created only the appearance of a single 
criterion – beneath which a plurality of criteria are evident.  
 
When philosophers seek for a single demarcation criterion, the seeking is itself 
conditioned by assumptions about the nature of reality and truth.  Those assumptions 
are along the lines that every problem is like a mathematical equation where there is one 
right answer.  In examining demarcation criteria in the context of astrology, a strong 
case emerges for allowing a plurality of criteria.  This of course is – as discussed in 
section 5.2 above – the approach of the coherence theory. 
 
5.3.3.2   Objection #2 to Overton: Demarcation is Innately Flawed 
 
The second philosophical claim to be explored here, is that all attempts to demarcate 
science and pseudoscience are innately flawed.  Thus Laudan argued, with specific 
reference to Overton’s judgement, that ‘we ought to drop terms like “pseudo-science” 
and “unscientific” from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only 
emotive work for us.’108  At the heart of his objection was the fact that Overton’s 
criteria, and anything like them, could appear to reward failure.  Thus – for example – in 
the above discussion of astrology, the fact of the subject being testable counted against 
astrology being described as pseudoscience, despite its poor performance in those tests.  
As Laudan put it, ‘by virtue of failing the epistemic tests to which they are subjected, 
these views guarantee that they satisfy the relevant semantic criteria for scientific 
status!’109 
 
Laudan stated that he did not intend, by his argument, to lend any support to 
creationism, astrology, or any other ‘crank claim which makes ascertainably false 
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assertions’ (he supplied eighteen further examples).110  The question then would only be 
whether astrology is false because it is pseudoscience, or false because it is bad 
science.111  As Thomas Nickles remarked of Laudan’s argument, ‘the move rejects the 
traditional demarcation problem only to raise another, at least equally difficult issue: 
how can philosophers of science (and other members of society) reliably discriminate 
good science from bad science?’112  Further, it seems at least plausible that the 
characterisation of ‘bad science’ would involve something similar to Overton’s five 
categories, so that – at least for the purposes of this thesis – Laudan’s objection would 
lack substance. 
 
An objection that overlaps with that of Laudan, is that any attempt to define science is 
pointless because there is no such thing.  This perspective is associated particularly with 
Feyerabend, as when he argued that ‘the events, procedures and results that constitute 
the sciences have no common structure’.113  In another text he stated,    
 
‘the success of “science” cannot be used as an argument for treating as yet unsolved problems 
in a standardized way.  That could be done only if there are procedures that can be detached 
from particular research situations and whose presence guarantees success.  The thesis [i.e. 
Feyerabend’s own thesis] says that there are no such procedures.’114 
 
In discussing astrology, Feyerabend remarked (as was seen in chapter 3) that its modern 
evolution had reduced ‘interesting and profound ideas’ to ‘caricatures more adapted to 
the limited understanding of its practitioners’, and lamented the lack of research, the 
lack of effort ‘to proceed into new domains and to enlarge our knowledge of extra-
terrestrial influences’.115  This suggests that he might have some sympathy with the 
application of at least some of Overton’s categories to astrology.  This notwithstanding, 
Feyerabend’s overarching point – that science is not a monolithic entity – has begun to 
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emerge through developments within science itself, and can best be pursued by 
considering these developments. 
 
5.4   The Relevance of ‘New Science’ 
 
In the previous chapter of this thesis I quoted David Mermin’s remark that astrology, if 
true, ‘would require a massive radical reconstruction of our current understanding of the 
world.’116  A recurrent argument from astrologers in the last forty years has been that 
such a radical reconstruction has in fact emerged within science, with quantum theory 
and/or chaos theory often being mentioned specifically.  Thus for example in the last 
book he wrote, Michel Gauquelin stated that ‘Scientists must reinstate the idea of 
astrology in their Universe […]  We have an urgent need for a new paradigm to be able 
to understand the Universe.’117  He went on to suggest that quantum mechanics and 
chaos theory might represent such a new paradigm.118  In the terms used in this chapter, 
the argument from astrologers has been that these developments indeed recast 
astrology’s coherence with science – two instances of such arguments follow. 
 
In 1979 Dane Rudhyar, in a review of Dean et al’s Recent Advances in Natal Astrology, 
wrote that his approach to astrology could not 
 
be understood by people who, though they take the position that they speak for “science”, are 
apparently little acquainted with or refuse to accept the new concepts of many atomic and 
nuclear physicists who, as “philosophers of science” are attempting to give meaning to the 
evolution in scientific thought produced by quantum physics and related concepts. 
 
The writers of the book (and probably most astrologers occupied with statistical research) seem 
to have a Newtonian idea of the universe.  On page 2 they dispose summarily of the holistic 
approach which nevertheless is the foundation of the most recent physical theories in which the 
universe is shown to be a web of relationships…119 
 
The astrologer Charles Harvey (1940 – 2000) remarked that ‘it will indeed require a 
“New Science” to accommodate astrology’ and I will use the term ‘new science’ to refer 
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to developments in science since Newton, particularly quantum and chaos theories.120  
In sub-section 5.4.6 I will also refer to the theory of evolution. 
 
5.4.1   The Intractability of ‘New Science’ 
 
Before any discussion of quantum and chaos theories a caveat should be made: these 
fields are contentious, obscure and significantly unresolved, so that there is a certain 
irony in turning to them in the hope of clarifying the truth-issues in astrology.121  Hence 
for example Lee Smolin said of quantum mechanics: 
 
Absolutely the first thing that must be said about it is that the discussions and arguments begun 
in the 1920s about the meaning of the quantum theory remain unresolved.  Many, apparently 
equally viable, interpretations of the theory have been proposed, and there is now as much 
contention among the experts as there has ever been.122 
 
In similar vein, regarding chaos theory, Zuchowski stated that ‘it is still not clear how 
chaos should be defined and how the large number of coexisting chaos definitions relate 
to each other’.123  In what follows I will therefore aim to discuss aspects of the new 
science that are not merely conjectural. 
 
5.4.2   Quantum Physics 
 
Quantum physics addresses the behaviour of atoms and sub-atomic particles.  It had its 
beginnings in the work of Max Planck (1858 – 1947) and Albert Einstein (1879 – 
1955), but is particularly associated with discoveries made in the 1920s by a group of 
physicists that included Max Born (1882 – 1970), Niels Bohr (1885 – 1962), Erwin 
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Schrödinger (1889 – 1961) and Werner Heisenberg (1901 – 1976).124   Victor 
Weisskopf summarised an important part of the field when he remarked that whilst in 
Newtonian or classical physics, ‘fundamental concepts were not too different from those 
of our everyday experience’, when physicists attempted to understand atoms and 
molecules they found that ‘the ideas and concepts formed in dealing with the objects in 
our immediate environment no longer suffice.  Surprising forms of behavior were 
observed that not only needed a different language but required new concepts…’125 
 
A prime example of such ‘surprising forms of behavior’ is the property of quantum 
entanglement – called ‘the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics’ by Schrödinger.126   
This phenomenon is also known as non-separability, or ‘spooky action at a distance’ as 
Einstein put it.127  The physicist Bernard d’Espagnat stated that “we may safely say that 
non-separability is now one of the most certain general concepts in physics”.128  
Rosenblum and Kuttner attempted to draw out the implications by positing a 
‘reasonable world’ as described by Newtonian physics, in which objects would be both 
real (‘the properties of an object should not be created by their observation’) and 
separable (‘they should affect each other only by physical forces, not by weird, faster-
than-light “influences”).129  The outcome of tests established that ‘Our world does not 
have both reality and separability – one, perhaps, but not both.’130  They continued by 
stating, ‘we immediately admit to not truly understanding what the world being unreal 
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or having a universal connectedness would imply.’131  One consequence that is clear is 
that it is not possible to exclude the observer in the quantum realm.  As Henry Stapp put 
it, ‘A principal conceptual difference between classical mechanics and its quantum 
successor is that the former is exclusively physical whereas the latter is essentially 
psychophysical.’132   
 
5.4.3   Chaos Theory  
 
Chaos theory emerged through the confluence of several researchers’ work.  The term 
‘chaos’ was introduced by the mathematicians Tien-Yien Li (1945 -) and James A. 
Yorke (1941 -) in 1975.133  The work of Li and Yorke was based on discoveries made 
by Edward Lorenz (1917 – 2008), which in turn had substantial parallels with the work 
of Henri Poincaré (1854 – 1912) – both also mathematicians.  Poincaré had shown that 
Newtonian laws were only adequate to describe a planetary system in which two planets 
were involved; and that when a third was involved, it was no longer possible precisely 
to predict the planets’ movements.134  In the estimation of Lorenz, ‘Poincaré was not 
seeking chaos’ and therefore did not pursue the implications of his discovery.135  
Lorenz, who rediscovered the principle of chaos through his study of meteorological 
systems, described it as follows:  
 
in some dynamical systems it is normal for two almost identical states to be followed, after a 
sufficient time lapse, by two states bearing no more resemblance than two states chosen at 
random… Systems in which this is the case are said to be sensitively dependent on initial 
conditions.136 
 
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions is widely accepted as the definition of, or at 
least the central element of, chaos theory.137  This has become popularly known as ‘the 
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butterfly effect’, the principle behind which is that a tiny input such as the beating of a 
butterfly’s wings in Brazil could cause (or prevent) a tornado in Texas.138 
 
Another element of chaos theory is self-similarity.  This is a property of certain objects 
whereby – as James Gleick put it – there is ‘symmetry across scale’, which should be 
understood to imply ‘recursion, pattern inside of pattern.’139  This quality was implicit 
in Lorenz’s work but is best known, and illustrated, in Benoît Mandelbrot’s fractal 
geometry.140  In Mandelbrot’s fractals, patterns show similarities that transcend scale – 
if one zooms in, what one is looking at is (more or less) similar to what one had been 
looking at.  Self-similarity is also a property of physical objects – a commonly-used 
example being coastlines, which show a similar level of detail and complexity whether 
one looks at them from a height of (say) a kilometre or ten metres.141  
 
5.4.4   The Relevance of the New Science to Astrology’s Truth-Status 
 
An illustration of the new science’s significance for astrology can be found in the 
account of Bernadette Brady, who was working as a microbiologist when she 
encountered astrology.142  In light of her scientific background, she commented, ‘I 
never understood why astrology worked’ until she encountered quantum and chaos 
theories, in the light of which, ‘it would be a real surprise if astrology didn’t work!  If 
we take Bell’s theorem, and link that to Mandelbrot and fractals, then really it has to 
work; there has to be an interconnectedness without scale in time or in size.’143 
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In similar vein, Ken McRitchie discussed quantum and chaos theories as a congenial 
context for astrology, likening them particularly to the principle of macrocosm-
microcosm correspondence (discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis).  Writing of quantum 
entanglement, he stated: ‘It is remarkable how well this quantum observation 
accommodates the non-causal principle of astrological coevolution.  Whereas physical 
forces are mediated only locally, there also exists an unmediated non-local connection 
between the microcosm and the macrocosm.’144 
 
These examples typify a focus commonly found when astrologers discuss the new 
science; in terms of Overton’s categories, the focus is on ‘natural law’.  Brady and 
McRitchie, above, propose possible ways in which the new science might make good 
the lack of suitable explanatory principles for astrology in terms of causal principles.  
Dennis Elwell characterised the significance of the new science by emphasising the 
demands of Newtonian science from which he considered astrology to be liberated: 
 
The new physics… contrasts starkly with the old Newtonian model, with its simplistic reliance 
on cause and effect.  The new orthodoxy is agreed that Newtonian physics no longer adequately 
explains what is happening.  Yet when it comes to the business of discrediting astrology, 
scientists happily scamper back to Sir Isaac’s arms, demanding to be told how the planets can 
exert significant gravitational or electromagnetic effects at a distance.145 
 
The principal claim of astrologers who claim support from the new science – including 
those cited above – is therefore that ‘natural law’ should now allow the possibility of a 
non-causal connection between horoscopic factors and life on Earth which might 
circumvent Kanitscheider’s requirement for ‘F-Rays’.   
 
The relegation of Newton’s laws is widely accepted by scientists.  For instance, Joseph 
Ford stated that ‘deterministic Newtonian dynamics has been dealt a lethal blow.  
Relativity eliminated the Newtonian illusion of absolute space and time; quantum 
theory eliminated the Newtonian dream of a controllable measurable process; and chaos 
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eliminates the Laplacian fantasy of deterministic predictability.’146  Further, the status 
of the four fundamental forces, discussed above, has changed.  Simkin remarked that 
‘Chaos theory… has shown that we cannot hope to reduce all scientific explanations to 
manifestations of the basic laws of physics.’147  Chaichian, Rojas and Tureanu qualified 
their description of the four fundamental forces (cited earlier) by remarking that ‘purely 
quantum effects, such as Pauli’s principle, lead to effects close to the idea of forces’148 
 
If it is accepted that the new science has made astrology more plausible by undermining 
the Newtonian universe’s claim to have defined reality once and for all, this is only the 
beginning of a discussion however.  The issue was identified by Dean et al: ‘Even if 
science did turn out to be based on say interconnectedness, astrologers have not 
explained how this would support the idea that the heavens reflect what happens on 
Earth, let alone ideas such as Leos being generous… Crucial steps in the argument are 
missing.’149 
 
In terms of Overton’s criteria, this objection from Dean et al amounts to saying that 
even if the ‘natural law’ criteria are set to one side, there are still issues around 
astrology’s failure to vindicate itself through tests, and the methodology used by 
astrologers.  This line of criticism was acknowledged to some extent by McRitchie 
when he wrote, ‘This book is intended to explore only the principles and theory of 
astrology without hypotheses or testing’.150  The problem remains for astrologers, of 
explaining how it would be that the specific set of factors used in the horoscopes of 
western astrology would serve as an adequate epitome of the state of the cosmos (the 
macrocosm) in regard to an astrologer’s client (the microcosm).  Brady suggested a 
mechanism that might bridge this gap: 
 
Over time as a pattern grows and spreads through a culture, it would eventually acquire what is 
known in complexity as “lock-in”: the condition that occurs when a particular expression of an 
idea, object or pattern has become so dominant in the culture that it becomes resistant to change, 
and acquires homeostatic qualities.  Thus, for example, Venus around 3,500 B.C.E., may well 
                                                 
146 Joseph Ford, ‘What is Chaos, that we should be mindful of it?’ in Paul Davies (ed.), The New Physics 
(Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 354. 
147 Colin Simkin, Popper’s Views on Natural and Social Science (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993) p. 97. 
148 Chaichian, Rojas and Tureanu, Basic Concepts in Physics, p. 279. 
149 Dean et al quoted in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, pp.159-60. 
150 McRitchie, Environmental Cosmology, p. 14. 
 
196 
have begun to absorb symbols and meanings… Thus the astrological meanings of the planets are 
co-created by culture’s engagement with the self-organising and naturally emergent astrological 
patterns.151 
 
Brady’s is not a complete account.  For instance it does not explain how Venus would 
absorb symbols; also, the positions of the planets as seen from the Earth are a 
fundamental part of horoscopic analysis, and it is difficult to see how human 
engagement with the planets could determine their ongoing positions.  This 
notwithstanding, Brady’s remarks are important for the present discussion in two ways.  
First, they show the type of explanation that would be needed in order for a scientific 
account of astrology to develop: an explanation of why the horoscope as western 
astrologers know it should be an adequate epitome of the macrocosm.  Second, they 
introduce an interpretative crossroads for astrology.  Brady’s account endows 
horoscopic factors with meanings based on intersubjective expectations, which have 
become stable at this point in history.  In consequence, astrology should function as a 
scientific discipline – as if the planets were emitting Kanitscheider’s F-rays.  If however 
the interaction between human beings and horoscopic factors were not dependent upon 
a gradual build-up of meaning over time, the theoretical possibility would emerge of 
horoscope-reading as necessarily bound up with the subjectivity of the individual 
astrologer. 
 
At this point the discussion reaches the periphery of this chapter’s subject-matter, 
coming close to the subject of astrology-as-divination which is discussed in the 
following chapter.  It is however necessary to reflect this as a potential consequence of 
applying the new science to astrology.  Thus for instance the philosopher and astrologer 
Will Keepin, in a discussion of astrology’s relationship to the new science, remarked 
that ‘what is so profound about astrology is that, by virtue of its connection to planets 
and stars, it also precisely models the interpenetration between the invisible realms of 
meaning and the physical space-time universe.’152  He subsequently made it clear that 
he was not proposing an ‘astrological mechanism’: 
 
                                                 
151 Bernadette Brady, Astrology, a Place in Chaos (Bournemouth: The Wessex Astrologer, 2006), p.104. 
152 William Keepin, ‘Astrology and the New Physics’, The Mountain Astrologer Oct/Nov 2009, p.42. 
Keepin quoted and developed ideas from David Bohm, which can be found particularly at: David Bohm, 
Unfolding Meaning (London: Routledge, 1987) pp.90-3. 
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Astrological correlations are not due to physical causes; they are due to the mystical oneness of 
existence… Pluto does not send down “rays” that influence us to do Plutonic things.  The reality 
is far more profound and subtle than that.  The planets and the Earth and humanity are the same 
living process – unfolding at vastly different scales.153 
 
A similar sentiment came from the physicist Roger Jones, who – in light of the new 
physics – remarked:   
 
A very powerful spatial metaphor alternative to our own may be discovered through a 
sympathetic consideration of astrology.  The unity and connectedness of all things is reflected in 
the astrological blending and equating of the inner and outer realms of consciousness and space.  
Astrology holds up a mirror to human consciousness.  It reflects the medieval feeling of being 
imbedded in the cosmos.154  
 
Many astrologers have turned to the new physics to support their subject, but Jones is 
unusual in being a physicist whose involvement with the new physics led him somewhat 
toward astrology.  He told me, ‘I would not claim that I “practised” astrology’; he 
would however say that ‘I used to cast charts to understand astrology and its mechanics 
better’.155  A greater number of physicists have seen the new science as opening the way 
to religious belief – for instance, John Polkinghorne wrote that, in the light of quantum 
theory and chaos theory, ‘an honest appeal to science cannot be used to discredit belief 
in God’s providence acting within the divinely ordained open grain of nature.’156  
Russell Stannard, elaborating on Polkinghorne’s thought, proposed a ‘picture of God 
using random quantum probabilities at the atomic level, these slight effects being 
subsequently magnified by the chaos theory mechanism to produce significant changes 
at the macroscopic level where we humans operate.’157 
 
The discussion of a religious understanding of astrology – which includes the possibility 
that astrology’s operation is a function of divine providence, or of mystical oneness – 
                                                 
153 Keepin, ‘Astrology and the New Physics’, pp.45 – 6.  
154 Roger S. Jones, Physics as Metaphor (London: Abacus, 1983), pp.63-4.  
155 Roger S. Jones, email to the author, 10th July 2009, quoted with permission. In the same email he 
added, in response to my suggestion that it can be problematic to have one’s name linked with astrology, 
‘there’s no doubt that my “reputation” and standing in the University of Minnesota Physics Department 
suffered because I wrote Physics as Metaphor.’ 
156 John Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004) p. 5. 
157 Russell Stannard, The God Experiment (London: Faber and Faber, 1999) p. 40. 
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belongs to the next chapter of this thesis.  I have included this brief discussion in order 
to show that there are interpretations of the new science which point in that direction.  
The ‘new science’ also carries philosophical consequences which do not pertain directly 
to astrology, but which are relevant to science’s epistemological status and therefore 
indirectly relevant to the discussion of the truth-status of astrology-as science. 
 
5.4.5   Philosophical Consequences of the ‘New Science’ 
 
In introducing the coherence theory in section 5.2 I discussed the theory’s reliance upon 
a system that would tether it to reality.  This implies a realist view of science – 
characterised by Chalmers as a view whereby science ‘describes not just the observable 
world but also the world that lies behind the appearances’.158  The new science tends to 
undermine science’s realist credentials, an issue I will now discuss.  
 
Lee Smolin summed up a large part of the epistemological issue raised by the new 
science when he stated: 
 
There is at least one good reason not to believe the physics that is taught in most courses for 
nonscientists.  It isn’t true. […]  Newtonian physics is useful, even if it isn’t true, as an 
approximation that helps us to understand many different phenomena.  But it is completely 
discredited as an answer to any fundamental question about what the world is.159 
 
As has been seen in this chapter, astrologers are often tempted to claim victory for 
astrology because the science whose demands it was unable to fulfil has been 
overturned.  This might however be premature, for – as Smolin remarked – Newtonian 
physics is still ‘useful… as an approximation that helps us to understand many different 
phenomena.’  This point can be illustrated and developed by citing Richard Dawkins.  
Dawkins sought to address misapplications (as he saw it) of the new science, and began 
by remarking that ‘Quantum uncertainty, and chaos theory, have had deplorable effects 
upon popular culture’.160  He continued: 
                                                 
158 A. F. Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science? (3rd edn.) (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1999), p.226. 
159 Lee Smolin, Life of the Cosmos, p.25. 
160 Richard Dawkins, Science and Sensibility (A lecture at Queen Elizabeth Hall, London, 24th March 
1998). The text was moved behind a paywall in 2013/14 but may still be viewed at: 
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Quantum theory and chaos theory, each in their own peculiar ways, may call into question the 
predictability of the universe, in deep principle. This could be seen as a retreat from nineteenth 
century confidence. But nobody really thought that such fine details would ever be predicted in 
practice, anyway. The most confident determinist would always have admitted that, in practice, 
sheer complexity of interacting causes would defeat accurate prediction of weather or 
turbulence. So chaos doesn’t make a lot of difference in practice. Conversely, quantum events 
are statistically smothered, and massively so, in most realms that impinge on us. So the 
possibility of prediction is, for practical purposes, restored. 
 
In the late twentieth century, prediction of future events in practice has never been more 
confident or more accurate. This is dramatic in the feats of space engineers. Previous centuries 
could predict the return of Halley’s Comet. Twentieth century science can hurl a projectile along 
the right trajectory to intercept it, precisely computing and exploiting the gravitational slings of 
the solar system. Quantum theory itself, whatever the indeterminacy at its heart, is spectacularly 
accurate in the experimental accuracy of its predictions. The late Richard Feynman assessed this 
accuracy as equivalent to knowing the distance between New York and Los Angeles to the width 
of one human hair. Here is no licence for anything-goes, intellectual flappers, with their quantum 
theology and quantum you-name-it.161 
 
By looking through the template of the three theories of truth, it is possible to see a 
significant move in Dawkins’ argument here.  Earlier in this chapter (section 5.3) I 
showed that he had – in effect – invoked both the correspondence and coherence 
theories in order to explain why astrology was unlikely to be true.  In the passage above, 
he argued that the reason we know the laws of science to be true, is that they work; our 
knowledge of them enables us to accomplish impressive tasks.  The theory that the truth 
of a proposition (etc.) should be characterised by whether or not it works is – as 
discussed in chapter 3 – the pragmatic theory of truth.  Dawkins’ implicit invocation of 
this theory echoes Smolin’s observation that ‘Newtonian physics is useful’, and this 
carries an epistemological freight: if Newtonian science’s truth is characterised by its 
usefulness, then it lacks the realist credentials that are often assumed for it by Dawkins 
and many others.162  Newtonian science then would be simply a useful practice.  This 
position is argued for by Da Costa and French: ‘on our account Newtonian mechanics is 
                                                                                                                                               
https://web.archive.org/web/20080430153508/http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-
archive/Dawkins/Work/Articles/1998-03-24science_and_sensibility.shtml (accessed 25th August 2019).  
161 Dawkins, Science and Sensibility.  
162 Lee Smolin, Life of the Cosmos, p.25. 
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regarded “as if” it were true, rather than true per se, within its limited domain, and this 
helps express what we mean when we say that it should be taken as pragmatically true 
only.’163  A corollary of this is that if astrology were judged to work (in the sense of, ‘to 
be useful’) then it would be true in the same way as Newtonian science is true.  The 
evaluation of astrology’s truth in terms of its usefulness will be discussed, in the context 
of the pragmatic theory of truth, in Chapter 7 of this thesis.   
 
The point at issue here can be further illustrated by reference to Thagard, who – in 
discussing modern science – implicitly advocated a pragmatic approach to truth.  After 
noting that quantum theory and general relativity ‘are two theories that individually 
possess enormous explanatory coherence’, he cited Edward Witten: ‘The basic problem 
in modern physics is that these two pillars are incompatible.  If you try to combine 
gravity with quantum mechanics, you find that you get nonsense from a mathematical 
point of view.’164  (Gravity is involved because ‘general relativity… is Einstein’s theory 
of gravity’165.) 
 
On this point, Thagard argued that it would be ‘folly’ to reject either quantum theory or 
general relativity, given the amount of evidence that supported each, and suggested that 
therefore the best approach was to find an epistemic framework within which the two 
could co-exist: ‘from the perspective of a coherence theory… It may turn out at a 
particular time that coherence is maximised by accepting a set A that is inconsistent, but 
other coherence-based inferences need not be unduly influenced by the inconsistency, 
whose effects may be relatively isolated in the network of elements.’166 
 
It is implicit in Thagard’s approach that the requirement for coherence between 
scientific theories can and should be overridden when it is the case that both theories 
work.  Such an approach is therefore pragmatic and pluralist.  In order to develop the 
                                                 
163 Newton C. A. Da Costa and Steven French, Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models 
and Scientific Reasoning (Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 89. 
164 Paul Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action (Cambridge, Mass: Bradford/MIT, 2000) p. 74;  
Edward Witten interviewed in: P. C. W. Davies and Julian Brown, Superstrings: A Theory of Everything? 
(Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 90, cited at p. 74 of Thagard. 
165 Witten quoted in Davies and Brown, Superstrings, p. 90. 
166 Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action, p. 74, p. 75. 
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argument here, it is relevant to introduce evolution through natural selection – another 
form of scientific understanding that has developed since Newton’s day. 
 
5.4.6   Evolution through Natural Selection 
 
Reflecting upon the mysteries opened up by quantum physics, Dawkins said: 
 
if I have difficulties with quantum theory, it is not for want of trying and certainly not a source 
of pride. As an evolutionist, I endorse Steven Pinker’s view, that Darwinian natural selection has 
designed our brains to understand the slow dynamics of large objects on the African savannahs. 
Perhaps somebody should devise a computer game, in which bats and balls behave according to 
a screened illusion of quantum dynamics. Children brought up on such a game might find 
modern physics no more impenetrable than we find the concept of stalking a wildebeest.167 
 
This reiterates the point that humanity’s fundamental understanding of the world has a 
pragmatic basis, oriented toward survival in the savannah – not, therefore, oriented 
toward knowing things as they are in themselves, if such knowledge is even possible.  A 
similar point was made by Smolin: 
 
the reason creatures like us see a “classical world” made up of stable objects that move in 
predictable ways is that we have evolved by natural selection to be sensitive to this way of 
perceiving reality... alternative ways of telling the story of the world are equally consistent and 
equally real, but a creature that adopted such a way of seeing the world could not have counted 
so regularly on having lunch.  We have evolved sensory organs that process information about 
where things are and how they are moving because that is what we must do to survive.168 
 
This idea – that the world of human experience is filtered and conditioned by the 
perceptual mechanism, and could therefore in principle be experienced very differently 
– is something that Dawkins repeated in his book The God Delusion.169  He does not 
seem to recognise the extent to which this relativises science and thereby undermines 
                                                 
167 Dawkins, Science and Sensibility.   
168 Smolin, Life of the Cosmos, p.266. 
169 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam, 2006), pp. 405 – 8. 
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many of his claims – for instance, that ‘Science is the only way we know to understand 
the real world’.170   
 
The point can be underlined, and reframed from the perspective of quantum theory, with 
a quotation from Werner Heisenberg (1901 – 1976): 
 
What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.  Our 
scientific work in physics consists in asking questions about nature in the language that we 
possess and trying to get an answer from experiment by the means that are at our disposal.  In 
this way quantum theory reminds us, as Bohr has put it, of the old wisdom that when searching 
for harmony in life one must never forget that in the drama of existence we are ourselves both 
players and spectators.171 
 
This enquiry into the new science, therefore, somewhat diminishes the aspirations held 
by some for science to embody a definitive and absolute ontological vision.  To this 
extent, it becomes possible to consider that astrology may not need to cohere with 
science in order to be true.  The nature, and viability, of an alternative perspective will 
be considered in the following chapter. 
 
5.5   Conclusion 
 
In summing up this chapter it is necessary to distinguish between astrology and 
astrology-as-science.  It has been seen that Overton’s criteria accommodate and clarify 
extant discussion regarding the truth-status of astrology-as-science.  New science makes 
Overton’s ‘natural law’ categories less problematic for astrology by introducing the 
possibility that astrology could work through (say) quantum entanglement, but there 
still remains a formidable case to be answered by anyone who would argue that 
astrology is true as science.  What would be needed to make this convincing is an 
explanation of other issues based on Overton’s criteria, such as why the result from tests 
is generally poor and why astrologers have not converged on one particular set of 
                                                 
170 Richard Dawkins, ‘Thoughts for the Millennium’, Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 2000 (Redmond, 
WA: Microsoft Corporation, 1993 – 9) (Cited and discussed in: Mary Midgley, Science and Poetry 
(London: Routledge, 2001) p. 9, 141.  
171 Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy – The Revolution in Modern Science (New York: Harper, 
1958) p.58.  The first words are frequently cited in popular books on modern science, e.g.: Fritjof Capra, 
The Tao of Physics (London: Fonana/Collins, 1976 [1975]), p.144. 
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techniques.  Enquiry into science has, however, raised the possibility that astrology does 
not necessarily need the imprimatur of science in order to be considered true.  This will 
be considered in the following chapter.  Another issue that emerged in discussing the 
truth of science is that it may need to be defined – partly or entirely – as pragmatic truth.  
If pragmatic truth is key then it follows that astrology should also be evaluated in the 
light of pragmatic truth, and a discussion of that possibility will follow in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6: Coherence Theory Part 2 – Coherence with Divination 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter continues and concludes the analysis of the coherence theory of truth 
which began in the previous chapter.  Whereas chapter 5 focused on coherence with 
science, this chapter will consider the possibility that a system other than science could 
take the role of an explanatory system with which astrology might cohere.  This follows 
my contention that a case has not been proven for taking Newtonian science as the only 
‘explanatory system’ with which astrology’s coherence should be evaluated.  An 
overarching caveat for this enquiry is that it will need to be made clear how and why – 
under an alternative explanatory system – scientific evaluation would not be crucial for 
astrology’s truth-status.   
This chapter will therefore consider what ontological characteristics the universe would 
need to possess, in order that astrology would be both outside the purview of science, 
and true.  In pursuing this enquiry I will draw particularly on the philosophy of William 
James, which will allow me to establish a context in recent Western philosophy that 
could accommodate astrology.  The discussion of James will continue, with the focus 
moving to his pragmatic theory of truth, in chapter 7.   
In chapter 1 I said that this thesis would mainly consider science and divination as 
explanatory systems for astrology, with ‘divination’ being defined in Curry’s sense of 
‘an ongoing dialogue with more-than-human agents.’1  Divination thus defined will 
(from sub-section 6.3.2 below, onwards) be a central theme in this chapter.  It emerged 
in the previous chapter that the definition of ‘science’ has typically involved the 
exclusion of subjective mental factors.  In pursuing this chapter’s theme I will therefore 
begin by taking in a number of terms (such as intuition and psi) that have been mooted 
by various commentators as useful or essential, mental, components of horoscopic 
astrological work.  This will bring perspective to the possibility of a non-scientific 
account of astrology; it will also elucidate the meaning, and epistemological 
consequences, of the term ‘astrology-as-divination’. 
 
                                                          
1 Curry, ‘Embodiment, Alterity and Agency’, pp.114-5. Previously cited in chapter 1. 
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6.2  Intuition and Types of Knowledge 
The significance of the term ‘intuition’ for astrology was introduced in chapter 4, where 
data was cited that suggests a significant majority of astrologers regard it as a necessary 
factor in a good astrological interpretation.2  Its relevance, for astrology, can be 
suggested by quoting an introductory text-book for astrologers by Tracy Marks.  After 
describing the significance of individual horoscopic factors, and discussing procedures 
that could be used to arrive at an interpretation of the chart as a whole, she stated: ‘such 
a rational approach is usually not sufficient for conducting meaningful readings.  Only 
by drawing upon our intuition as well as our intellect can we penetrate to the essence of 
a chart and interpret it in a vital and relevant manner.’3    
It is necessary to clarify what ‘intuition’ means in an astrological context, since that is 
generally far from clear.  This point was made by Cornelius when – after reviewing 
scientific approaches to astrology – he concluded: 
If there is anything in astrology at all, we are bound to conclude that there is some other element 
involved.  Usually when this conclusion is reached, a vague mention is made of intuition and the 
analysis of the phenomenon is taken no further.  But as far as I am concerned, far from being the 
end of the discussion this has to be the place where we begin.’4   
Edward F. Kelly remarked that contemporary accounts of intuition often ‘reduce it 
without residue to “unconscious cerebration” – the automatic, fast, parallel, cheap, and 
often-reliable but sometimes error-prone out-of-sight operations of a nervous system 
tuned to its environment by factors such as genetics, learning and conditioning, priming, 
and so on.’5  Whilst believing there to be some truth in this formulation, he considered 
that ‘it does not by any means exhaust the subject matter.’6  In order to tease out the 
significations of ‘intuition’, and its possible relevance to astrology, I will apply a 
                                                          
2 The data was cited from Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 181, table 12.7 (ix).  
3 Tracy Marks, The Art of Chart Interpretation: A Step-byStep Method of Analyzing, Synthesizing and 
Understanding the Birth Chart (3rd edn.) (Lake Worth, FL: Ibis Press, 2009 [1979 as The Art of Chart 
Synthesis]) p. 79. 
4 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 55. Original emphasis. 
5 Edward F. Kelly, ‘Parapsychology in Context: The Big Picture’ in Etzel Cardeña, John Palmer and 
David Marcusson-Clavertz, Parapsychology: A Handbook for the 21st Century (Jefferson NC: McFarland, 
2015)  p. 36. As examples of the approach to intuition which he criticised, Kelly cited: D. Eagleman, 
Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain (NY: Pantheon, 2011); D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 
(NY: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2011); D. G. Myers, Intuition: Its Powers and Perils (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2002). 
6 E. F. Kelly, ‘Parapsychology in Context’, p. 36. 
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distinction, proposed by Marta Sinclair, between three forms of intuition based on 
‘where the information is located in relation to us’.7  These three forms of intuition are: 
local internal; local external; and nonlocal.8   
6.2.1 Local External Intuition 
The first two forms of intuition in this schema are local.  As Sinclair put it:   
Local intuition assumes that intuitive answers are a result of processed information that we contain in 
the raw form already (as mental schemas or affectively coded memories…) or we have been in 
contact with (through reading, learning, noticing our environment or other form of cursory 
exposure…).9  
Local external intuition, by definition, arises from sources of information that are 
external to the phenomenon in question – for the purpose of the present enquiry, 
therefore, external to the astrologer and their astrology.     
This can be exemplified through a part of Adrian Duncan’s description of how to 
conduct an astrological consultation.  He suggested that when a client arrived the 
astrologer should take notice of their clothes – ‘Colour choice can be incredibly 
revealing’ – their jewellery, and use of perfume, all of which could yield insight into the 
client’s personality and issues.10  These are potential sources of information that are 
local to the astrologer – so long as the reading is being done in person – and yet 
external to astrology, since the information does not derive therefrom.  The use of such 
information was discussed in chapter 3 as ‘cold reading’.   
Tests of astrology typically aim to exclude local external intuition – in other words, to 
preclude knowledge from any source other than astrology itself.  I take it that this is 
valid as an aspiration, though not as an absolute requirement, for any evaluation of 
astrology.  The distinction between ‘aspiration’ and ‘requirement’ seems necessary 
because in an approach predicated upon a responsive cosmos (which will re-emerge 
during this chapter), it may not be possible for the individual to prescribe the medium 
                                                          
7 Marta Sinclair, ‘An integrated framework of intuition’ in Marta Sinclair (ed.), Handbook of Intuition 
Research (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) p. 12. 
8 Sinclair, ‘Integrated framework of intuition’, pp. 12 – 13.  
9 Sinclair, ‘Integrated framework of intuition’, pp. 6 – 7. Original emphasis. 
10 Adrian Duncan, Doing Time on Planet Earth (Shaftesbury: Element, 1990) p. 92. This is similar to the 
advice of Noel Tyl on observing a client, as cited in chapter 4 of this thesis (Noel Tyl, Noel Tyl’s Guide p. 
61). 
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through which the cosmos will respond.  This is however a hypothetical point only, 
since – as will be discussed – the model of a responsive, dialogical, universe also 
invalidates the idea of testing astrology in a scientific sense. 
6.2.2 Local Internal Intuition 
When an astrologer interprets a horoscope, they may not be entirely conscious of the 
mental processes involved.  There would be some ‘unconscious cerebration’ (in Edward 
F. Kelly’s term) – intuition as a process below the threshold of awareness which would 
draw out the significance of a specific horoscope, in light of the rules for interpretation 
and knowledge of precedents which are already in the astrologer’s mind.11   
If astrology cohered with an explanatory system in which local internal intuition played 
a significant role, this could invalidate many tests of astrology.  That can be illustrated 
by reference to the New York Suicide Study, which – as discussed in chapter 4 – 
proceeded on the basis that ‘there would be some pattern discernible in the astrological 
charts of suicides’.12  In her analysis of the tests, Nona Press argued that each suicide 
had unique qualities which might be discerned by an astrologer, but which would 
remain opaque to statistical analysis.13  On this basis it would be possible to argue that 
astrology’s truth-status cannot be assessed through tests which exclude the involvement 
of astrologers and their intuition.   
It could, however, still be a viable option to test astrological work because it is possible, 
as discussed in chapter 4, to conduct tests whilst treating the working of astrology as 
mysterious, a ‘black box’.14  In this case astrologers would be asked to do whatever it is 
they do with test horoscopes, the accuracy of their interpretations being evaluated 
subsequently.  (Such tests were discussed in chapter 4 with specific reference to the 
work of Shawn Carlson, Vernon Clark and Leo Knegt.)  In such cases science, in the 
form of statistical analysis, could test if astrological analysis yields significant results.  It 
                                                          
11 Edward F. Kelly, ‘Parapsychology in Context: The Big Picture’ in Etzel Cardeña, John Palmer and 
David Marcusson-Clavertz, Parapsychology: A Handbook for the 21st Century (Jefferson NC: McFarland, 
2015)  p. 36. 
12 Press, New Insights into Astrology, p.311. 
13 Nona Press, interview, 2005. 
14 Using the term ‘black box’ in the sense introduced in chapter 4 through reference to Rescher, 
Predicting the Future, p.106. 
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could not, however, determine whether the results should be attributed to astrology, or 
to the astrologer – a point to which I will return in section 6.9 below.   
 
6.2.3 Nonlocal Intuition 
To introduce the category of nonlocal intuition, Sinclair raised the possibility that ‘we 
may tune into information that is outside of our mental and physical presence.’15  She 
described this possibility as ‘highly speculative’, but suggested that nonetheless ‘we 
should reserve space in our framework for this possibility.’16  In order to develop this 
account, and to draw out its synonymy with some existing accounts of astrology, it is 
necessary to make explicit the connection between nonlocal intuition and a group of 
terms subsumed by the blanket term ‘paranormal’ – as when, for instance, Raymond 
Trevor Bradley suggested that nonlocal intuition should be seen as a similar type of 
phenomenon to ESP, clairvoyance and psi.17   
Some astrologers have argued for the relevance of such phenomena to astrology: 
Cornelius suggested that the working of astrology involved an element which ‘is non-
regulated and mysterious… and – a significant clue – characterised as paranormal.’18  
He also discussed psi as an explanatory term for the working of astrology.19  In a 
questionnaire issued by Marcia Moore in 1959 to 900 astrologers (two thirds in the 
USA, one third elsewhere), 38% of respondents claimed to use astrological rules 
combined with intuition; 5% to primarily use ‘psychic inspiration’; and 11% to use a 
combination of the two.20  She identified ‘psychic inspiration’ as being evidenced in 
cases where, rather than working through a horoscope in a systematic, rule-based way, 
astrologers ‘obtain an immediate “psychic impression” which leads them to search out 
                                                          
15 Sinclair, ‘Integrated framework of intuition’, p. 13. 
16 Sinclair, ‘Integrated framework of intuition’, p. 7. 
17 Raymond Trevor Bradley, ‘Resolving the enigma of nonlocal intuition: a quantum-holographic 
approach’ in: Marta Sinclair (ed.), Handbook of Intuition Research (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) p. 
201. 
18 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, pp. 76 – 7. 
19 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p. 76. He refers mainly to ‘Psi-Neptune’ because of the consonance 
between the symbol and meaning of Neptune and psi. 
20 For population of the survey: Charles A. Jayne Jr., ‘Forward’ in Marcia Moore, Astrology Today: A 
Socio-Psychological Survey (Research Bulletin No. 2, Astrological Research Associates) (New York: 
Lucis Publishing, 1960) p. iii; for survey results, Marcia Moore (Moore, 1960) p. 127. 
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and find confirming evidence.’21  Before pursuing such possibilities further, it is 
necessary to consider how terms such as ‘paranormal’ and ‘psychic’ are defined. 
 
6.3 The Definition of ‘Paranormal’, ‘Psychic’ and ‘Psi’ 
A variety of terms exist to denote phenomena that are currently beyond the 
comprehension of science.  Thus for example C. J. Ducasse (1881 – 1969) wrote, in 
1954, of ‘diverse queer kinds of occurrences that have variously been termed “psychic”, 
“metapsychic”, “para-psychological”, “paranormal”, or… “Psi” phenomena.’22  He 
proposed the term ‘”paranormal” phenomenon’ as an umbrella term for ‘any occurrence 
whose cause is neither that from which it ordinarily results, nor any other yet known to 
the natural sciences as capable of causing it.’23 This is, according to Braude, the 
‘account of paranormality’ that is ‘probably the one most often advanced by 
parapsychologists and laymen alike’.24  Ducasse was refining an extant definition.  The 
term ‘parapsychology’ was coined by Max Dessoir (1867 – 1947) in 1889; he argued 
that where phenomena such as visions were concerned, it was best to regard them as 
belonging to an ‘as yet unrecognized border zone between normal and abnormal 
pathological states’ rather than necessarily indicating mental illness.25  Hans Driesch 
(1867 – 1941) subsequently introduced ‘parapsychology’, and ‘paranormal’ to the 
English-speaking world.26   
                                                          
21 Moore, Astrology Today, p. 127. 
22 C. J. Ducasse, ‘The Philosophical Importance of “Psychic Phenomena”’, The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 51, No. 25, p. 810. 
23 C. J. Ducasse, ‘Paranormal Phenomena, Nature, and Man’, Journal of the American Society for 
Psychical Research Vol. 45 No. 4 (October 1951) p. 130. 
24 Stephen E. Braude, ESP and Psychokinesis: A Philosophical Examination (Revised Edition) (Parkland, 
FL: Brown Walker, 2002 [1979]) p. 199.   
25 Max Dessoir, ‘Die Parapsychologie’, Sphinx 8 (June 1889) pp. 341 – 2; translation from Corinna 
Treitel, A Science for the Soul: Occultism and the Genesis of the German Modern (Baltimore MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004)  p. 46. 
26 ‘Parapsychology’ occurs at e.g. Hans Driesch, ‘Presidential Address (1926): Psychical Research and 
Established Science’, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research Vol. XXXVI (Parts 97 – 103), 
1928  p. 172 (Part 99); ‘Paranormal’ at e.g. Hans Driesch, Theodore Besterman (tr.), Psychical Research: 
The Science of the Super-Normal (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1933) p. vii. Driesch’s role in introducing the 
terms is identified in: Rico Sneller, ‘Science of the Future: Hans Driesch and Parapsychology’ in Hein 
van Dongen, Hans Gerding and Rico Sneller (eds.), Wild Beasts of the Philosophical Desert: 
Philosophers on Telepathy and Other Exceptional Experiences (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2014)  p. 118. 
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A closely-related term is ‘psi’, which was introduced in 1942 by Robert H. Thouless 
(1894 – 1984) and Bertold Paul Wiesner (1901 – 1972).27  The name of the Greek letter 
psi (Ψ) was adopted in order to explicitly defer explanation for the phenomena formerly 
known by terms such as ‘extra-sensory perception’ and psychokinesis.28  Thus Thouless 
argued,  ‘The objection to the term “extra-sensory perception” is that it suggests a 
theory of the nature of the phenomenon in question, and I see no reason to suppose that 
this is a true theory and some reason for suspecting that it is false.’29  He also rejected, 
as potentially misleading, terms such as telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition, and 
urged the use henceforth of ‘some term that implies no theory as to the kind of mental 
process this is.’30  He continued, ‘I suggest that we should use a term proposed by Dr 
Wiesner, and call this group of effects the “psi phenomena”, a term which has the 
important negative merit that it implies no theory as to their nature.’31  In what follows I 
will use ‘paranormal’ and ‘psi’ interchangeably and synonymously.  
A 2005 Gallup Poll showed that 73% of Americans believed in some form of the 
paranormal.32  The phenomena believed in included: extrasensory perception, or esp; 
the haunting of houses; ghosts; telepathy; clairvoyance; and astrology.  Esp was the 
most widely-believed in with 41% of the sample believing in it, while 25% believed in 
astrology. 
The explicit absence of theory puts psi phenomena outside science’s explanatory 
powers – a point made by Stanley Krippner:  
Psi phenomena are usually defined as organism-environment interactions in which it appears that 
information or influence has occurred that can not be explained through science’s understanding of 
                                                          
27 Robert H. Thouless, ‘The Present Position of Experimental Research into Telepathy and Related 
Phenomena’, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Resarch Vol. 47, Part 166, (1942) pp. 1 – 19. In 
this first published reference to psi phenomena, Thouless described it as ‘a term proposed by Dr Wiesner’ 
(p. 5). 
28 Psychokinesis was added to ESP as a component of psi in: R. H. Thouless and B. P. Wiesner, ‘The PSI 
Processes in Normal and “Paranormal” Psychology’, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 
48 (Part 174), 1947 p. 179; an instance of ‘Ψ’ being used rather than ‘psi’ occurs on the same page . 
29 Thouless, ‘Present Position of Experimental Research’, p. 3. 
30 Thouless, ‘Present Position of Experimental Research’, p. 4, p. 5. 
31 Thouless, ‘Present Position of Experimental Research’, p. 5. 
32 David W. Moore: ‘Three in Four Americans Believe in Paranormal’: 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/16915/Three-Four-Americans-Believe-Paranormal.aspx (checked 24th 
August 2019) 
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sensory-motor channels.  In other words, these reports are anomalous because they appear to stand 
outside of modern science’s concepts of time, space, and energy.33 
The lack of a positive characterisation of psi is sometimes seen as being such a problem 
as to invalidate the entire field of study – as when, for instance, James E. Alcock 
complained that, given its definition as anomalous, ‘we are left with no idea as to when 
psi might occur, and more importantly to the scientist, as to when it will not occur’ as a 
consequence of which, ‘we cannot compare conditions where psi could not occur to 
those where, were it to exist, it could be observed… [and therefore] it becomes 
impossible ever to truly ‘control’ the conditions of an experiment.34  This illustrates the 
coherence theory at work, without being identified as such: the essence of Alcock’s 
argument is that a field of study should cohere with contemporary mainstream science 
as an explanatory system, and if it does not, it – together with the evidence for its 
existence – should be disqualified from consideration. 
6.3.1 Evidence for Psi, and Consequences Thereof 
There is a considerable body of research to support the existence of paranormal 
phenomena or psi.  In 1958 Jung opined of J. B. Rhine’s research into the paranormal: 
‘The positive results of his experiments elevate these phenomena to the rank of 
undeniable facts.’35  Forty-five years later Adrian Parker and Göran Brusewitz – after 
detailing the main bodies of research – concluded that ‘science has succeeded in lifting 
the [psi] phenomena that the public commonly reports, into the laboratory and imposing 
checks and controls, and yet the phenomena do appear to persist.’36  The professor of 
statistics Jessica Utts stated, ‘The data in support of precognition and possibly other 
related phenomena are quite strong statistically, and would be widely accepted if they 
                                                          
33 S. Krippner, ‘Parapsychology and Postmodern Science’ in D. R. Griffin (ed.) The Reenchantment of 
Science: Postmodern Proposals (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1988) p. 132. 
34 James E. Alcock ‘Give the null hypothesis a chance: Reasons to Remain Doubtful About the Existence 
of Psi’,  Journal of Consciousness Studies Vol. 10 No. 6 – 7 (2003) p. 34. 
35 C. G. Jung, ‘Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth’ in: C. G. Jung, R. F. C. Hull (tr.) The Collected Works 
of C. G. Jung Volume 10: Civilization in Transition (2nd edn.) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970 
[1958 as Ein moderner Mythus: Von Dingen, die am Himmel gesehen warden]) p. 481, para 780. 
36 Adrian Parker and Göran Brusewitz ‘A Compendium of the Evidence for Psi’, European Journal of 
Parapsychology (18: 2003),  p. 49. 
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pertained to something more mundane.  Yet, most scientists reject the possible reality of 
these abilities without ever looking at data!’37   
After citing Utts, Dean Radin outlined six different tests of psi in each of which ‘the 
overall odds against chance, after careful consideration of all known experiments 
investigating the same topic, are assessed to be over a billion to one.’38  Astrology 
therefore – if understood as psi – should show positive evidence in tests on a similar 
scale to other tests of psi phenomena.  To that extent, therefore, the truth-status of 
astrology would be within the purview of scientific methodology and to that extent 
coherent with science.  In the next sub-section however I will consider how divination 
(and therefore astrology-as-divination) can be defined vis-à-vis psi, for there at least two 
possible accounts here – one of which admits of susceptibility to scientific testing, and 
one of which does not. 
6.3.2 Two Versions of Divination   
Smith and Moddel remarked that ‘Divination… is often a form of psi’ and, in their 
subsequent discussion, discussed the evaluation of divinatory outcomes in terms of their 
statistical significance.39  The only factor that qualified the subject of their study as 
divination was the involvement of divinatory tools such as the I Ching or tarot cards.  
The implicit view of divination was of a subject which is susceptible to scientific 
testing.  A more explicit statement on the definition of divination can be found in a 
work by Dean Radin: ‘Divination involves perceiving beyond the ordinary boundaries 
of space and time...  Today the euphemism remote viewing is more commonly used.’40  
Radin characterised remote viewing as involving a ‘viewer’ who is asked to sketch or 
describe a ‘target’.  ‘The target [he continued] might be a remote location or individual, 
or a hidden photograph, object, or video clip.  All possible paths for sensory leakage are 
                                                          
37 Jessica Utts, ‘Appreciating Statistics (2016 ASA Presidential Address)’, Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, Vol. 111 No. 516 (2016)  p. 1379. 
38 Dean Radin, Real Magic: Ancient Wisdom, Modern Science, and a Guide to the Secret Power of the 
Universe (New York, NY: Harmony, 2018),  p. 97.  (The experiments he mentioned are categorised by 
being based on one of the six types of psi phenomena: telepathy, remote viewing, presentiment, 
[anticipation of] random number generators, and the Global Consciousness Project (Radin, Real Magic, p. 
98).  
39 Paul H. Smith and Garret Moddel, ‘Applied Psi’ in Etzel Cardeña, John Palmer and David Marcusson-
Clavertz, Parapsychology: A Handbook for the 21st Century (Jefferson NC: McFarland, 2015) p. 385. 
40 Radin, Real Magic, pp. 86 – 7. Original emphasis. 
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blocked, typically by separating the target from the viewer by distance… or by hiding 
the target in an opaque envelope, or by selecting a target in the future.’41   
The paradigm here is essentially that of an information retrieval system, under which 
information exists – inert and accessible, as if it were data on a hard drive.  The role of 
the research subject is then to try and retrieve that information.  Such a position can also 
be seen when Dean and Kelly, in their investigation into the relevance of psi to 
astrology, defined psi by citing John Beloff’s statement that it means that the mind can 
‘extract information from an object other than its own brain.’42  The model is one in 
which information exists and the role of the test subject (whether psi or astrology is 
being tested) begins and ends with accessing that information and reporting it 
accurately. 
The information retrieval model does not, however, convey the full sense of ‘divination’ 
as I use the term in this thesis.  In particular, it does not comprehend the principle of ‘an 
ongoing dialogue with more-than-human agents’ in Curry’s definition, and the 
implications of that phrase.43  I contend therefore that a distinction is necessary between 
divination in Radin’s sense, and divination in Curry’s sense – as ‘dialogue with more-
than-human agents’.44   
In order to demarcate the two senses of ‘divination’ under discussion, I will cite three 
precedents which substantiate a distinction of the type proposed here.  The first is found 
in Hyde’s characterisation of ‘Synchronicity I’ and Synchronicity II’, as discussed in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, in which the former deals with ‘objectively observed events’ 
and the latter ‘acknowledges the subjective participation of the observing psyche’.45  
This approximates information retrieval, and dialogue, respectively. 
The second precedent is Jung’s own acknowledgement of the existence of two distinct 
manifestations of synchronicity: 
                                                          
41 Radin, Real Magic, p. 100. 
42 Dean and Kelly, ‘Is Astrology Relevant to Consciousness and Psi?’, p. 179, citing John Beloff, ‘Mind 
and Machines: A Radical Dualist Perspective’, Journal of Consciousness Studies Vol. 1 No. 1, p. 36. (The 
quotation here is as per Beloff’s original article, Dean and Kelly had ‘from objects other’ rather than 
‘from an object other’.) 
43 Curry, ‘Embodiment, Alterity Agency’, pp.114-5. 
44 Curry, ‘Embodiment, Alterity Agency’ pp. 114-5. 
45 Hyde, Jung and Astrology, p. 128. 
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with the help of the statistical method, existence of such [synchronistic] effects can be proved, as 
Rhine and other investigators have done.  But the individual nature of the more complex 
phenomena of this kind forbids the use of the statistical method, since this stands in a 
complementary relation to synchronicity and necessarily destroys the latter phenomenon, which 
the statistician is bound to discount as due to chance.46 
Under this account, synchronicity may be glimpsed – in etiolated form – through 
statistical analysis yet it is only possible to appreciate its full impact and significance in 
individual cases.  A distinction of this type may also be seen in my third precedent, 
which is Campion’s description of the range of understandings of the term ‘judicial 
astrology’: ‘In some versions of judicial astrology, the astrologer is an observer, 
dispassionately analysing the manifestation of astrological principles in terrestrial 
affairs.  In other versions… the astrologer is psychically embedded in the cosmos and 
plays a vital part in the application of astrology to human affairs.’47   
I said in chapter 2 that I would use the terms ‘astrology-as-science’ and ‘astrology-as-
divination’ rather than the more traditional terms ‘natural astrology’ and ‘judicial 
astrology’, despite the considerable overlap between them.  The reason for doing so 
comes into focus in Campion’s description: ‘judicial astrology’ is too broad a term for 
this enquiry, straddling as it does conceptions of astrology which do, and do not, 
conform to the information-retrieval model.  The epistemological import of this 
distinction is considerable.  A model of ‘divination’ which posits the separate existence 
of inert information makes it valid to evaluate how accurate an individual was in 
retrieving that information.  If astrology were understood to be divination in Radin’s 
sense of information-retrieval, therefore, there would be no objection in principle to 
making tests of astrologers.  Again, these would be tests of the kind in which what the 
astrologer does would be ‘black-boxed’. 
If however divination (and therefore astrology-as-divination) is understood as a 
dialogue with more-than-human agents, the provision of information may not be the 
primary function of the exchange.  This can be elucidated through Stephen Karcher’s 
                                                          
46 C. G. Jung, Foreword to: Fanny Moser, Spŭk: Wahrglaube oder Irrglaube? (Freiburg: Baden bei 
Zürich, Gyr-Verlag, 1950) p. 11  This translation from: C. G. Jung, Gerhard Adler (ed.), R. F. C. Hull 
(tr.), The Symbolic Life (Collected Works of C. G. Jung Vol. 18) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1976) p. 319, para. 761. 
47 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 9. 
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discussion of the underlying philosophy of divination through the I Ching.  In this 
approach there is, he wrote, a ‘Bright Spirit’ (shen) which ‘can act as an inner voice, a 
guide and healer.  It helps us connect our path to the Way.  The symbols of Change give 
it a way to speak.’48  The ‘Way’ translates Dao, which ‘is the on-going process of the 
real, the elusive movement of life, a universal experience or principle not available to 
rational or dialectical awareness.’49  Karcher told me: 
whatever Dao is, and it is ‘unknowable’, it is beyond any of our ideas or beliefs about ‘good and 
evil’. And, to me, the Yi [Ching] is all about ‘correcting’ our behaviour and thus our experience 
to bring us back into the flow of whatever Dao is (and is not). This sometimes involves setting us 
on a path where we will ‘not learn something but experience something and be set right’. And 
like initiation, the ‘setting right’ can be painful. But whatever Yi is, it cannot be ‘kept at a 
distance’ and it cannot be ‘confined by rules’ - no matter how high-minded or spiritual those 
rules may be. One of its jobs seems to be to continually keep pulling the rug out from under our 
feet…50 
The purpose of divination in this perspective is not simply to convey information – 
hence Karcher’s contention that the I Ching ‘does not describe Change; it participates 
in and articulates Change.’51  From an epistemological perspective, this has the same 
consequences as have already been noted for what Cornelius has characterised as ‘the 
unique case’, introduced in chapter 2.  This is an account of what transpires in an 
astrological reading which does not characterise it in terms of the straightforward 
acquisition of information, but as an engagement or dialogue.  A way of characterising 
the difference between these two orientations is to say that the latter involves – in 
William James’s sense – intimacy, to which I now turn.   
 
 
                                                          
48 Stephen Karcher, Total I Ching: Myths for Change (London: Time Warner, 2003) p. 65. 
49 Karcher, Total I Ching, p. 13. 
50 Email from Stephen Karcher to the author, 11th April 2008.  Reproduced with permission. The phrase 
that Karcher quotes – ‘not learn something but experience something and be set right’ – can be found, 
with attribution to Aristotle, in Dio by Synesius (c. 373 – 414 CE): ‘it is like Aristotle's view that men 
being initiated have not a lesson to learn, but an experience to undergo and a condition into which they 
must be brought, while they are becoming fit (for revelation).’ – Synesius, Augustine Fitzgerald (tr.), The 
Essays and Hymns of Synesius of  Cyrene: Including the Address to the Emperor Arcadius and the 
Political Speeches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p.48 (Dio vii, 10). 
51 Karcher, Total I Ching, p. x. Original emphases. 
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6.4 The Central Role of Intimacy 
William James’s discussion of, and emphasis on, intimacy emerged in his discussion of 
religion.  He framed it as one of two orientations toward the world, the foreign and the 
intimate: 
From a pragmatic point of view the difference between living against a background of 
foreignness and one of intimacy means the difference between a general habit of wariness and 
one of trust.  One might call it a social difference, for after all, the common socius of us all is the 
great universe whose children we are.  If materialistic, we must be suspicious of this socius, 
cautious, tense, on guard.  If spiritualistic, we may give way, embrace, and keep no ultimate 
fear.52 
Commenting on this passage, Lamberth observed that socius ‘means an ally, a partner, 
even a family member with whom one is actively and closely related.’53  The theme of 
intimacy was prefigured (for James had yet to coin the term itself) in his work Talks to 
Teachers and Students, from 1892, in which James wrote: 
Every Jack sees in his own particular Jill charms and perfections to the enchantment of which we 
stolid onlookers are stone-cold.  And which has the superior view of the absolute truth, he or 
we?…  Is he in excess, being in this matter a maniac?  Or are we in defect, being victims of a 
pathological anaesthesia as regards Jill’s magical importance?  Surely the latter; surely to Jack 
are the profounder truths revealed; surely poor Jill’s palpitating little life-throbs are among the 
wonders of creation, are worthy of this sympathetic interest; and it is to our shame that the rest 
of us cannot feel like Jack.54 
Richard M. Gale remarked that this ‘might be the most profound passage in James’.55  It 
is of particular relevance to the present thesis because it articulates the existence of an 
affective component in the definition of ‘truth’, an element which would be innately 
subjective and therefore beyond the possibility of scientific explanation.   
                                                          
52 William James, A Pluralistic Universe in: William James, Bruce Kuklick (ed.), William James: 
Writings 1902 – 1910 (New York, NY: The Library of America, 1987 [1909]), p.644. 
53 David C. Lamberth, William James and the Metaphysics of Experience (Cambridge University Press, 
1999)  p.157. 
54 William James, ‘Talks to Teachers on Psychology, and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals’ in: 
William James, Gerald E. Myers (ed.), William James: Writings 1878 – 1899 (New York, NY: The 
Library of America, 1992 [1899]) p.861. Original emphases. 
55 Richard M. Gale, The Philosophy of William James: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp.178-9. 
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Darby Costello recounted experiences which are relevant here.  In the early days of her 
astrological practice, she told me, ‘after a chart, I’d sometimes cry for hours. The person 
I was closest to then said, “You’ve got to stop this, or you’ve got to stop doing charts, 
this is ridiculous.”’56  I asked her what it was that caused her to cry, and she replied: ‘I 
think it was the impact of other people’s lives.  It was the intensity of being so intimate, 
so fast, with another person, but on an imaginal level… the power of another person’s 
life, and to be so intimately involved in it.’57 
In James’s thought, the significance of intimacy emerged particularly in his late work A 
Pluralistic Universe, where it was, in Lamberth’s words, ‘James’s most general 
criterion for distinguishing good philosophy.’58  The breadth of the term’s reach is 
matched by the complexity of its significance – Lamberth characterised it as ‘a 
phenomenological affect, a variable, concrete and independent feature of real 
metaphysical relations, and ultimately… an ideal for human action’.59    
In defining intimacy, James contrasted it to living as if against ‘a background of 
foreignness’.60  He also used the term ‘providence’ to further characterise a relationship 
of intimacy, when he invited his audience to consider the differences that followed from 
believing that ‘the facts of experience up to date are purposeless configurations of blind 
atoms moving according to eternal laws, or that on the other hand they are due to the 
providence of God’.61  
My contention – to be developed below – is that an attitude of intimacy is potentially 
congenial for astrology-as-divination, whilst an attitude of foreignness tends to preclude 
it from consideration.  Thus for instance when Richard Dawkins asserted, ‘The universe 
we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no 
design, no purpose… nothing but blind, pitiless indifference’, this showed that he 
                                                          
56 Darby Costello, interview, 2005. 
57 Darby Costello, interview, 2005. 
58 Lamberth, William James and the Metaphysics of Experience, p.156. Cf Levinson’s suggestion that 
‘Intimacy was the principle of order in James’s hierarchy of universes from 1904 on.’ Henry Paul 
Levinson, The Religious Investigations of William James (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1981) p. 192. 
59 David C. Lamberth, ‘Interpreting the universe after a social analogy: Intimacy, panpsychism, and a 
finite god in a pluralistic universe’ in Ruth Anna Putnam (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to William 
James (Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 245. 
60 James, Pluralistic Universe, p.644. 
61 James, Pragmatism, p. 530.  
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subscribed more to foreignness than to intimacy in his world-view, which may in turn 
have predisposed him towards the dismissal of providential manifestations such as 
astrology-as-divination.62  The astrologer Steven Forrest framed a similar dichotomy: 
‘The sky is alive.  How strange those words sound… But try the alternative: the sky is 
dead.  We inhabit a dead universe.  So where’s the truth?  Is the cosmos alive or 
inanimate?  Do we live inside a vast thought… or a vast clock?’63  He went on to 
characterise the recognition of a living sky as ‘the soul of astrology’.64   
William James contended that, ‘The Universe is no longer a mere It to us, but a thou, if 
we are religious; and any relation that may be possible from person to person might be 
possible here.’65  This is the type of relationship with the universe that is required for 
divination as dialogue with the more-than-human, the form upon which I will 
henceforth focus.  This was a central theme in Lindsay Radermacher’s MPhil, in which 
she discussed the relevance to astrology of two orientations – ‘I-It’ and ‘I-thou’ – as 
found in Martin Buber’s thought.66  These clearly parallel the attitudes of foreignness, 
and intimacy, respectively, as found in James’s work.  I have not been able to find any 
evidence of Buber being familiar with James’s writings, but as Gale has remarked, 
James’s ‘analysis of the I-Thou experience bears a striking resemblance to that offered 
by Martin Buber some thirty years later.’67  There is also a close parallel between 
Brockbank’s treatment of a ‘responsive cosmos’ (discussed in chapter 3), and a universe 
with which an intimate, dialogical relationship is possible.   
William James contended that there are fundamentally two kinds of philosophies, the 
materialistic and the spiritualistic.  Materialistic philosophies ‘define the world so as to 
leave man’s soul upon it as a sort of outside passenger or alien, while [spiritualistic 
                                                          
62 Richard Dawkins,River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life (New York, NY: Basic/Perseus 1995)  
p. 133. 
63 Steven Forrest, The Night Speaks: A Meditation on the Astrological Worldview (San Diego, CA: ACS 
Publications, 1993) p. 5. 
64 Forrest (1993) p. 5. 
65 James, Will to Believe, p.476. Another reference to I-thou and I-it occurs at p.557 of the same work. 
66 Lindsay Radermacher, The Role of Dialogue in Astrological Divination (MPhil, University of Kent 
2011); available from 
http://www.the9thhouse.org/docs/Lindsay%20Radermacher%20MPhil%20Thesis%202011.pdf (checked 
8th July 2012); Martin Buber, Walter Kaufmann (tr.), I and Thou: A new translation, with a prologue and 
notes (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1970 [1923 as Ich und Du]) particularly pp.53 -60; and Walter 
Kaufmann’s prologue to his translation of the text, particularly pp.11-18. 
67 Richard M. Gale, The Divided Self of William James (Cambridge University Press: 1999) p. 246. 
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philosophy] insists that the intimate and human must surround and underlie the 
brutal.’68  His concern with intimacy therefore led him to focus on spiritualistic 
philosophies, and here he proposed a distinction between Theism (Dualistic 
Spiritualism) and Pantheism (Monistic Spiritualism).69  In what follows, I will use the 
terms ‘theism’ and ‘pantheism’ in accordance with James’s definition, which I will 
elaborate upon in the following section.  It is necessary to specify that I follow James’s 
usage, since the term ‘theism’ is historically ambiguous and has at times had a meaning 
diametrically opposed to James’s definition.  Thiselton described this state of affairs in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: “Whereas theists believed in God’s active 
agency within the world, deism denotes a rationalist concept of God as the Source of 
Creation who remains above and beyond it, but is not immanent within it.”70  This 
usage is substantially opposed to that of James. 
6.5 Theism  
Theism, for James, depicts ‘God and his creation as entities distinct from each other, 
[and so] still leaves the human subject outside the deepest reality in the universe’.71  
This form of religion, he wrote, lacked intimacy: ‘philosophic theism makes us 
outsiders and keeps us foreigners in relation to God… his connexion with us appears as 
unilateral and not reciprocal.  His action can affect us, but he can never be affected by 
our reaction.’72  The God of theism has been characterised with terms such as ‘absentee 
landlord’ or ‘roi fainéant [do-nothing king]’.73  The only supernatural event in the 
universe, according to a strict interpretation of theism, would be its creation.  
Thereafter, everything would unfold according to natural laws.  If theism were taken as 
the explanatory system for astrology, its truth-status would be evaluated by its 
coherence with natural laws.  Insofar as science is the repository of natural laws, the 
epistemological consequence of theism is that astrology would need to cohere with 
science in order to be true.  The truth-status of astrology, therefore, judged by its 
                                                          
68 James, Pluralistic Universe, p.640. 
69 James, Pluralistic Universe, pp. 640 – 1. 
70 Anthony C. Thiselton, ‘Deism’ in A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Anthony 
C. Thiselton (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2002), p.61. 
71 James, Pluralistic Universe, p.641. 
72 James, Pluralistic Universe, p.642. 
73 For instance in – respectively - William L. Rowe, ‘Immanence’ in Audi, Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy, p.418; W.R. Inge, ‘Theism’ Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 84 (Jan 1948), p. 38. The image of an 
absentee landowner appears in Matthew 21:33 – 41.  
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coherence with a theistic universe, would coincide exactly with the truth-status of 
astrology judged by its coherence with science, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
6.6  Pantheism  
 
Pantheism (Monistic Spiritualism) is, for James, ‘the vision of God as the indwelling 
divine rather than the external creator, and of human life as part and parcel of that deep 
reality.’74  This is a conventional definition, fully concordant (for instance) with that 
provided by H.P. Owen and repeated by Michael P. Levine, that ‘Although pantheists 
differ among themselves at many points, they all agree in denying the basic theistic 
claim that God and the world are ontologically distinct.’75   
 
6.6.1 Monistic Pantheism 
James applied the criterion of intimacy to pantheism and found it necessary to 
distinguish ‘two subspecies [of pantheism], of which the one is more monistic, the other 
more pluralistic in form’.76  This yielded a distinction between Monistic Pantheism 
(‘philosophy of the absolute’77) and Pluralistic Pantheism (‘radical empiricism’78) 
James characterised monistic pantheism by citing Spinoza’s contention that ‘all things 
are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be 
conceived…’.79  Spinoza’s monistic pantheism was not satisfactory, in James’s view, 
because of ‘the impossibility of being intimate with his God’.80  James’s objection was 
that a monistic account of ‘Absolute Mind’ ‘does not account for our finite 
consciousness.’81  The point here is that under a thorough-going monist account, 
‘nothing exists but as the Absolute Mind knows it’.82  This would deny all reality to 
human experiences of ‘change… history… novelties, struggles, losses, gains’, with the 
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82 James, Some Problems, p.1052. 
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‘Absolute Mind’ disengaged from the vicissitudes of individual human lives.83  Hence, 
for James, monistic pantheism lacked intimacy and this made it inadequate as an 
explanatory system for the relationship between the human and the more-than-human.  
If it were invoked as an explanatory system for astrology similar problems would arise, 
for horoscopes are read in order to gain insight into human issues – career and 
relationships for instance – to which monistic pantheism would deny reality and 
significance.  There is therefore nothing in monistic pantheism to explain how astrology 
could function dialogically. 
  
6.6.2  Pluralistic Pantheism 
James’s alternative to monistic pantheism was pluralistic pantheism, which ‘admits 
miracles and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual difficulty in mixing the 
ideal and the real worlds together by interpolating influences from the ideal region 
among the forces that causally determine the real world’s details.’84   
The very concept of pluralistic pantheism involves what can seem to be an incongruous 
combination of the absolute and the relative, the cosmic and the personal.  There is a 
similarity here with astrology, insofar as astrological interpretation finds personal 
significance in the positions of cosmic bodies.  This parallel will be explored further 
below, but it is first necessary to consider whether pluralistic pantheism is internally 
incoherent – for coherence with an incoherent system could carry little epistemological 
weight.   
6.6.2.1 The Incongruity of the Finite God 
The possible existence of internal incoherence in James’s thought is perhaps best 
approached through his discussion of the finite God.  This was, for him, an integral part 
of pluralistic pantheism.  Hence his contentions, ‘I believe that the only God worthy of 
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the name must be finite…’; ‘superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be, has 
itself an external environment, and consequently is finite.’85  For James the finite God 
was ‘the only way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities that a consistently 
thought-out monistic universe suffers from’.86  Pawelski wrote that ‘James’s God is… 
both small enough and large enough to have intimate relationships with human beings’, 
and this is precisely the attraction of a finite God to James: it makes intimacy viable.87  
The notion of a finite God is not, itself, unusual as Dilley observes:   
The ideas of a limited God and the eternity of matter have a very fine lineage, from Plato, 
through John Stuart Mill, Samuel Alexander, William James, Alfred North Whitehead, Charles 
Hartshorne, and Edgar Sheffield Brightman, and some scholars think that the notion of a limited 
God and the eternity of matter are compatible with Biblical tradition as well.88 
What is unusual in James’s account is his simultaneous espousal of pantheism and a 
finite God, hence Barnard’s description of the latter as ‘a puzzling irritant’ and ‘an 
apparent contradiction in terms’, and Vanden Burgt’s observation that ‘one must 
wonder about its viability’.89  To postulate a God who is at one and the same time 
pantheistic, and finite, seems to attribute mutually contradictory qualities to God, as if 
one were to speak of a square circle.90   
The dilemma for James’s thought here is very close to a dilemma for astrology when it 
is considered as a form of divination.  Astrology-as-divination presupposes a responsive 
cosmos, as discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis.  James wrote, ‘we inhabit an invisible 
spiritual environment from which help comes, our soul being mysteriously one with a 
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larger soul whose instruments we are.’91  This is a close cognate of a responsive 
cosmos.  The form in which astrological ‘help’ is typically presented, however, is in the 
form of  personally meaningful propositions and (in the sense discussed in section 6.4 
above) in dialogue, as if one were interacting with a personal, finite, God.  The tension 
that is found between James’s pantheism and his finite God is, therefore, replicated in 
the concept of astrology-as-divination, and it seems plausible that a resolution of 
James’s seemingly incompatible modes of divinity will also be relevant to astrology-as-
divination.  On this basis I will pursue the issue of James’s finite God in the following 
sub-section.     
6.6.2.2 The Finite God: Context and Precedent  
A crucial factor to contextualise the finite God of James is the latter’s distrust of 
ontological absolutes.  Thus for example he argued that ‘our science is a drop, our 
ignorance a sea… this at least is certain – that the world of our present natural 
knowledge is enveloped in a larger world of some sort of whose residual properties we 
at present can frame no positive idea.’92  Hence, for James, ‘God’ is a useful way of 
thinking about what is by nature beyond human conceptualisation.  This can be seen 
when he characterised his finite God as ‘the name not of the whole of things, but only of 
the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a superhuman person who calls us to co-
operate in his purposes, and who furthers ours if they are worthy.  He works in an 
external environment, has limits, and has enemies.’93  The phrase, ‘believed in as a 
superhuman person’ in turn echoes James’s pragmatic argument that ‘if the hypothesis 
of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true’; or, again, that 
‘God is real since he produces real effects’.94  His finite God, therefore, should be seen 
as a useful way of thinking and not as an ontological absolute.  At this point it becomes 
relevant to consider a parallel in Vedānta.   
James was aware of the philosophy of Vedānta both through reading and through 
meetings with Swami Vivekananda (1863 – 1902).95  Although James characterised 
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Vedānta as ‘The paragon of all monistic systems’, there is a case for considering that it 
would be more correct to characterise it as nondual rather than monistic.  Hence, 
Barnard argued: ‘These (Eastern religious) traditions are nondual rather than monistic in 
that they refuse to say that the world is ultimately one, or not one, or both, or neither; 
instead… they advocate a ruthless apophatic negation of any and all conceptual 
structures’.96  As Barnard also remarked, it is plausible that had he been more clearly 
aware of it, James would have valued the ‘empirical grounding and metaphysical 
flexibility’ of Eastern traditions such as Vedānta.97  The closeness of fit between 
James’s religious thought and the Vedic tradition may be seen in the distinction in the 
latter between two forms of Brahman – nirguṇa Brahman and saguṇa Brahman, 
meaning God without, and with, characteristics respectively.  Saguṇa Brahman provides 
a close parallel for James’s finite God – a point I will argue after  introducing the 
concept. 
Sharma suggested that the distinction between nirguṇa and saguṇa first appeared in the 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, around the eighth century BCE.98  Nirguṇa and saguṇa 
Brahman provide precedents for James’s advocacy of pantheism and a finite God.  Thus 
for instance in John Hick’s account:  
Nirguna God is the eternal self-existent divine reality, beyond the scope of all human categories, 
including personality; and Saguna God is God in relation to his creation and with the attributes 
which express this relationship, such as personality, omnipotence, goodness, love and 
omniscience.  Thus the one ultimate reality is both Nirguna and non-personal, and Saguna and 
personal, in a duality which is in principle acceptable to human understanding.99   
If the individual is a participating element in the whole, then what are experienced as 
dialogical exchanges are possible; in such exchanges, saguṇa Brahman is the name 
given to that which engages and responds.  A consequence of saguṇa Brahman’s role as 
mediator was expressed by a recent exponent of the Vedantic tradition, Ramana 
Maharshi (1879 – 1950) when he said that ‘God assumes any form imagined by the 
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devotee through repeated thinking in prolonged meditation.’100  There is a parallel here 
with James’s contention that ‘faith in a fact can help create the fact’.101  A further 
parallel can be seen in James’s discussion of prayer when he quoted, with approval, his 
friend F.W.H. Myers: 
If we then ask to whom we pray, the answer (strangely enough) must be that that does not much 
matter.  The prayer is not indeed a purely subjective thing; - it means a real increase in intensity 
of absorption of spiritual power or grace; - but we do not know enough of what takes place in the 
spiritual world to know how the prayer operates; - who is cognizant of it, or through what 
channel the grace is given.102 
Reflecting on this element of James’s thought, Amos Funkenstein summarised it as the 
principle that ‘we make our God or gods in our image’, and remarked that ‘It is this 
mechanism, the ways of the self in projecting itself, that was one of James's most 
interesting (albeit hardly recognized) contributions to the philosophy of religion’.103   
A number of further parallels for James’s finite God can be found in other spiritual and 
philosophical traditions.104  A parallel with particular relevance is that mentioned by 
Hick between saguṇa Brahman and providence, specifically as providence is found in 
the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius (5th or 6th century CE) because this offers a potential 
link to synchronicity – often cited as an important theoretical basis for astrology, as 
discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis.105  Providence is characterised as a way in which 
the more-than-human relates to the individual human.106  This can be seen when, for 
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example, Dionysius wrote of God making truth known ‘by way of representative 
symbols’, adding, ‘this divine ray [i.e. the light of God] can enlighten us only by being 
upliftingly concealed in a variety of sacred veils which the Providence of the Father 
adapts to our nature as human beings.’107  The overlap in meaning between 
synchronicity and providence has been discussed by Main – as when, for instance, he 
suggested that ‘Synchronistic experiences… can easily suggest the operation of 
providence’.108  In his analysis, Main implied that providence might have been more of 
an influence on the formulation of synchronicity than was acknowledged by Jung, given 
the latter’s ‘efforts to highlight the scientific evidence for his theory’, and to introduce 
‘the religious influences on it covertly’.109   
James’s conception of divinity changed during his life.  Throughout his philosophical 
life he was opposed to ideas of an absolute insofar as it fostered an attitude of 
foreignness, and in consequence for most of his life he was wary of ideas of an absolute 
per se.  When however in 1908, two years before his death, he delivered the lectures 
that made up A Pluralistic Universe, and in which he advocated a finite God, he also 
acknowledged a change in his view, saying that ‘The absolute is not the impossible 
thing I once thought it’, and that ‘the absolute is entitled to a patient hearing.’110   
A clue to this development in James’s thought is contained in Barnard’s remark that 
‘although James claims that his theology in A Pluralistic Universe is pantheistic, in 
actuality, it is closer to being panentheistic.’111  (Panentheism being the view that God’s 
being ‘is more than, and is not exhausted by, the universe’112).  John W. Cooper also 
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identified James as a panentheist.113  This identification is, I believe, a valid one 
although it can be considered to duplicate the distinction that James himself made when 
he professed his advocacy of pluralistic pantheism.  Pluralism brings agency to 
individual elements within the absolute, thereby liberating God from a merely static 
role: 
We are indeed internal parts of God and not external creations… Yet because God is not the 
absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions can be 
taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other smaller parts, - as similar to our functions 
consequently.114 
In order to formulate a God who would subsume all of existence and yet retain the 
capacity for involvement as if a finite being, it is necessary to take the panentheistic step 
of defining God as not simply the sum total of all existence, but also in some way 
beyond it.  The specific relevance of pluralism to astrology-as-divination lies in the 
potential it offers for seemingly-disparate elements of the cosmos such as human beings 
and stars to engage and re-engage.  This follows as a possibility from James’s assertion 
that ‘if a is once out of sight of b or out of touch with it… then, according to monism, it 
must always remain so, they can never get together; whereas pluralism admits that on 
another occasion they may work together, or in some way be connected again.’115  Such 
connections are the basis for James’s desideratum of intimacy.  
6.7  Consequences of Intimacy for Astrology  
A consequence of the involvement of intimacy between astrologer and the more-than-
human is that tests of astrology which look for objective correlations between 
horoscopic factors and their manifestations in the world would not be applicable, to the 
extent that astrology is seen as a form of divination.  Such tests, and the world-view that 
often informs them, exclude by design the intimacy which is, in this view, an integral 
part of astrology-as-divination.  This is a position which has been put forward by some 
astrologers – for example, Adrian Duncan: 
Astrology ascribes meaning to planetary events and assumes that the energy that moves the 
universe has a kind of inherent intelligence.  The astrologer maintains that there is a natural 
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resonance between the evolving motion of the universe and the development of the human soul.  
This is a very effective working hypothesis, and the astrologer who puts doubt about its 
effectiveness aside and embraces the hypothesis wholeheartedly is rewarded by this intelligent 
universe.  The clinical and objective approach of the skeptic will lead to very poor results in the 
interpretation process, while the enthusiastic believer will become engaged in dialogue with a 
supportive universe, magically geared to his or her development.116 
In this chapter I have discussed what Duncan characterised as a ‘supportive universe’ by 
particular reference to William James’s term, intimacy.  Two consequences of intimacy 
for astrology can be brought out and emphasised now. 
The first is a consequence for astrological technique.  If astrology is to be beyond the 
evaluatory range of science, it cannot work in a mechanical way, where horoscopic 
factor (x) would always correspond to interpretation (y).  The element of intimacy needs 
to extend, not only to the existence of interaction between human and more-than-
human, but also to flexibility and context-dependency in the interpretation of 
astrological symbolism.   That this is the case has been argued by some astrologers.  For 
instance, Alexander Ruperti (1913 – 98) commented that ‘most astrologers seem to 
think that there is an astrology with a capital A which exists somewhere, has always 
existed, and which we should all submit ourselves or be faithful to’117  His perspective, 
though, was that ‘All that exists are astrologers, that is, people who try to interpret the 
relationship they have with the universe, through astrological symbols.  Each astrologer 
has his system, his way of looking at it, that’s why there are so many schools [of 
astrology]…’118  Similarly, in discussing horary astrology, Marc Edmund Jones (1888 – 
1980) wrote that ‘Every good practitioner makes modifications in the techniques 
according to his own tastes, because his private universe of thought has its own 
specialized way of ordering things.’119   
Up to this point however the relevance of scientific tests has not been precluded.  Tests 
could be made in which (as discussed above) astrology was black-boxed and astrologers 
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asked to read charts on whatever basis they would normally follow.  The validity of 
such an approach is called into question only if the ascription of significance from a 
horoscopic reading is considered also to be context-dependent.  This possibility was 
described by Maggie Hyde: 
A chart might be adequately interpreted along the lines of traditional astrology, with its 
symbolism clearly located in the ‘facts’ of the client’s life.  It might show the astrologer-client 
relationship.  It might turn out to have nothing much to do with the astrologer.  Or the client.  We 
cannot presuppose how the chart will read.120 
This can be seen as a consequence of intimacy: the astrologer is intimately involved in 
the process of consulting the more-than-human, which has agency; hence, the response 
may reflect and comment upon some facet of the situation other than that which the 
astrologer, or the client, intended to be the focus of the horoscopic reading.  This type of 
phenomenon has also been remarked on in the context of I Ching divination – an 
example being Furnald-Smith’s observation that ‘Questions asked with hostile intent 
tend to receive nonsensical answers.’121   A parallel statement from an astrologer is 
Anthony Louis’s assertion that ‘Silly questions will produce trivial charts with 
contradictory or confusing indications.  The more sincere and meaningful the question, 
the more precisely the astrological symbolism will fit.  Such charts give the astrologer 
an uncanny feeling and a sense of awe at the concordance between the universe and the 
mind of man.’122  The sense of awe to which Louis refers will receive further discussion 
in section 6.10.2. 
An illustration of the context-dependent character of divination that is mooted here may 
be found in an experience Michael Fordham had when consulting the I Ching.  He 
consulted the oracle twice on the same question, in the expectation of receiving 
confirmation; instead, on the second occasion he received the hexagram Mêng which 
reads – in part – ‘If he asks two or three times, it is importunity/If he importunes, I give 
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him no information.’123  In a letter to Fordham, Jung remarked that in this episode the I 
Ching was ‘calling him to order’, adding that he had a similar experience which ‘gave 
me a wholesome shock and at the same time… opened wholly new vistas to me.’124 
If astrology is understood to interact with those who consult it in this way, rather than 
simply providing information, the truth-status of each horoscopic reading would be 
inextricably bound up with the subjectivity of the astrologer and/or client, and an 
apparently nonsensical reading might be relevant and appropriate to the situation.  The 
evaluation of the relevance and appropriateness of a reading would then belong 
primarily to the subjectivity of the individual(s) concerned, and this would put the truth-
status of astrology-as-divination altogether beyond the scope of scientific testing.  This 
is the ‘unique case’ as defined by Cornelius, introduced in chapter 1 and discussed in 
detail in chapter 2 of this thesis.125  At this point, therefore, an explanatory system has 
been teased out which would establish the question of astrology-as-divination’s truth-
status as one that could only be evaluated by the individual for her- or himself.   
6.8 Recapitulation  
This chapter began with an investigation into what consequences might follow for 
astrology, and the evaluation of its truth-status, if the mind were permitted an active role 
in astrological work.  Three possible understandings of ‘intuition’ were used to 
explicate the possible consequences.  It emerged that the only way in which astrology 
would move altogether beyond the analytical competence of scientific testing would be 
if Jamesian intimacy (or something like it) were involved as an integral element.  The 
position thus arrived at is, I have argued, astrology-as-divination properly understood. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will offer an extended procatalepsis for the account 
that is emerging; specifically, I will raise questions as to whether astrology-as-
divination is internally coherent.  For it is possible that astrology has itself been 
jettisoned in reaching this point in the discussion.  In order to elucidate and consider 
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that point I will – in sections 6.9 and 6.10 below – pursue two particular issues for this 
formulation of astrology; the ensuing discussion will also serve to add more detail to the 
characterisation of astrology-as-divination. 
6.9 Intimacy and the Problem of Planets  
In chapter 1 I said that I would use Curry’s definition of astrology, ‘the practice of 
relating the heavenly bodies to lives and events on earth, and the tradition that has thus 
been generated’.126  Some commentators have argued, in regard to both psi and 
divination, that they each – if taken as an explanatory system for astrology – bypass the 
heavenly bodies and therefore bypass horoscopic work.  Thus for example Ertel, at the 
conclusion of a discussion of tests of astrologers, remarked, ‘Confirmations of classical 
astrological predictions… do not verify astrological beliefs.  Correct astrological 
diagnoses, if they occur, might be due, e.g., to paranormal intuitions of psi-gifted 
astrologers.  Parapsychological phenomena are likely to eventually become reconcilable 
with the growing body of scientific knowledge; astrology is far from having the same 
chance.’127   
This charge – that when astrology works it has nothing to do with astrological 
methodology – was also made, as seen in chapter 4, by Augustine when he attributed 
the functioning of astrology to ‘spirits of evil’.128  It is possible that a similar 
implication lay behind William Lilly’s account of the astrologer Simon Forman (1552 – 
1611): ‘some of his astrological judgments did fail… I shall repeat some other of his 
judgments, which did not fail, being performed by conference with spirits.’129 
The issue here is that if psi (or conference with spirits) functions without the 
involvement of astrology, there would seem no reason to believe that psi which occurs 
in an astrological setting is significantly different.  Astrology, then, would be at most a 
set of techniques to establish a mental state conducive to psi.  This was argued by Dean 
and Kelly in a discussion of Cornelius’s divinatory astrology: ‘In this “all in the mind” 
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view of astrology there is nothing actually “out there” that involves planets.  Instead 
what matters is the mental state of the astrologer.  The technique used for reading the 
chart is then merely a ritual that leads to the right mental state.’130 
The phrase ‘all in the mind’ is Dean and Kelly’s understanding of Cornelius’s approach, 
not a way in which Cornelius has described divinatory astrology.  It serves however to 
elucidate the issue under discussion.  If astrology worked only through psi, and if psi 
were defined as a purely mental phenomenon, then no role would remain to be fulfilled 
by the physical heavenly bodies.  In explaining astrology, then, psi would also render it 
redundant.   
If astrology-as-divination is to withstand this critique, and constitute a viable 
explanatory system, two ontological elements are needed.  Firstly, there would need to 
be an alternative to the dualistic view that mind and materiality are entirely separate, in 
a form that would permit meaningful relationship between material objects such as 
planets, and the mind of the diviner.  This relationship could not however be physical 
causation, for then the explanatory system would be scientific.  Secondly, there would 
need to be an explanation for how planets could hold divinatory significance, when 
divination typically involves ‘an act of… randomization’ such as throwing yarrow 
stalks or coins to consult the I Ching, and the movement of the planets is not at all 
random.131 
The resolution of these issues is implicit in several concepts that have already been 
discussed, most particularly pluralistic pantheism.  I will nonetheless address the issues 
explicitly here for two reasons: it will make clear the ontological requirements of 
astrology-as-divination; and, it will enable me to show how concepts that address both 
issues are found in William James’s philosophy, and that in both cases these concepts 
can be seen as applications of his guiding principle of intimacy. 
6.9.1 James’s ‘Pure Experience’   
William James defined dualism by saying that ‘“Thoughts” and “things” are names for 
two sorts of object, which common sense will always find contrasted and will always 
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practically oppose to each other.’132  He regarded it as a problem to be overcome, and 
proposed ‘pure experience’ as a corrective: 
My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in 
the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff ‘pure experience’, 
then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into 
which portions of pure experience may enter.  The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one 
of its ‘terms’ becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the 
object known.133 
In James’s philosophy, therefore – as Lamberth puts it – ‘Faced with the question of 
how epistemologically to bridge the metaphysical gap, James responds, “What makes 
you think that there is a gap?”’134  Rather than a gap, James offered a ‘reconciliation 
between mind and matter’ as Barnard put it.135   
A parallel exists here between astrology-as-divination and Jung’s theory of 
synchronicity, in that both involve connivance between the mental and the physical that 
would be impossible if mind/body dualism was absolute.  Jung found himself compelled 
by his experience to postulate a non-dualistic position close to James’s ‘pure 
experience’; as David Tresan remarked, ‘James’ conception [of pure experience] is not 
far from Jung’s implicit contentions.’136  This can be seen – for instance – in Jung’s 
assertion that ‘If we give due consideration to the facts of parapsychology, then the 
hypothesis of the psychic aspect must be extended… to matter in general.  In that case 
all reality would be grounded on an as yet unknown substrate possessing material and… 
psychic qualities.’137  The name he adopted for the reality which comprised both 
mentality and materiality was ‘unus mundus’: ‘The common background of 
microphysics and depth-psychology is as much physical as psychic and therefore 
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neither, but rather a third thing… The background of our empirical world thus appears 
to be in fact a unus mundus.’138 
In order for horoscopic bodies to hold potential relevance to individual minds and lives, 
and therefore for astrology-as-divination to be viable, a non-dualistic schema of the sort 
propounded by James and Jung is a prerequisite.  In summarising ‘pure experience’, 
Wilshire also began to draw out its consequences for the understanding of truth: 
There is no ‘mind,’ and no ‘external world.’  Pure experience in its various articulations 
constitutes the world as we know it. So he must say that truth cannot correspond to something 
‘out there,’ but is the fruitful leadings and workings of experience within the domain of the 
experienceable. Truth is no mere subjective happening in our minds, but is comprised of those 
fruitful leadings and workings that hold the experienceable world together—the only world we 
can know.139 
In chapter 4 of this thesis I cited Mermin’s remark on ‘the truly spectacular degree to 
which compelling evidence in support of astrology would require a massive radical 
reconstruction of our current understanding of the world.’140  I take it that the challenge 
posed, by pure experience, to a common-sense view of mind and matter would fall 
under this description.141  In the following section it will emerge that – under the 
account of astrology-as-divination put forward here – this radical reconstruction of an 
individual’s understanding of the world would be evidence to support astrology’s truth-
status. 
6.10 Personal Religion, Mysticism and Knowledge  
The next challenge to the internal coherence of astrology-as-divination is derived from 
the knowledge-content of mystical experience in James’s philosophy.  In the first 
lecture of his Varieties, James announced his intention to ‘ignore the institutional 
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branch [of religion] entirely… to consider as little as possible the systematic theology 
and the ideas about the gods themselves, and to confine myself as far as I can to 
personal religion pure and simple.’142  He went on to define ‘personal religion’ as: ‘the 
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.’143  
A closely-related term is ‘mysticism’; James wrote that ‘personal religious experience 
has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness’.144   
In sub-section 6.6.1 above I discussed the issue that, under monistic pantheism, the 
more-than-human would take no account of the vicissitudes and ephemera of individual 
human lives.  Since astrology is – to reiterate Curry’s definition – ‘the practice of 
relating the heavenly bodies to lives and events on earth…’, this is a significant issue 
for an account of astrology-as-divination as a source of truthful statements.145  At that 
point the issue was addressed through the introduction of James’s pluralistic pantheism 
and a finite God with a providential orientation toward the concerns and expectations of 
individual beings.  A parallel issue emerges however when the focus falls on the nature 
of the knowledge that would be acquired by the individual human engaged in astrology, 
for so long as astrology is modelled on James’s personal religion, and is therefore 
(somehow) involved with mysticism.  An explicit assertion of such a position can be 
found, for instance, in Robert Hand’s statement that ‘astrology is applied mysticism’, 
where mysticism is ‘the understanding that beneath the apparent diversity of the 
universe and despite the seeming alienation of all beings from each other and nature, it 
is all One.’146  
The relevance of mysticism and astrology to one another may be explored by 
considering James’s definition of mystical experience as having four characteristics: 
ineffability, noetic quality, transiency and passivity.147  He wrote that the presence of 
the first two qualities ‘entitle any state to be called mystical, in the sense in which I use 
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the word’ and it is upon these that I will focus, for this locates the dilemma for astrology 
and a closely parallel dilemma for James’s thought.148   
Ineffability means that mystical experience ‘defies expression… no adequate report of 
its contents can be given in words.  It follows from this that its quality must be directly 
experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others.’149   
Noetic quality means that mystical experiences are ‘states of knowledge… states of 
insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect.’150  The awkwardness 
inherent in juxtaposing these two characteristics was identified by Bernard McGinn: 
James, at least here, does not really provide an adequate epistemological analysis of the relation 
of perceptual and conceptual knowing to buttress this crucial part of his account.  In what sense 
can both kinds of knowing be considered activities of the intellect, or is perceptual knowing only 
a particular kind of feeling?  James’s Varieties does not give us immediate answers to these 
questions.151 
The distinction between two kinds of knowing – ‘perceptual’ and ‘conceptual’ in 
McGinn’s terms – is often met with in epistemological discussion, as was shown in 
chapter 3 of this thesis.  In James’s terminology, they are ‘knowledge of acquaintance’ 
and ‘knowledge about’ respectively.152   
The apparent contradiction identified by McGinn in James’s definition of mysticism can 
be brought into focus by applying it in astrology-as-divination.  Since ineffability is a 
defining characteristic of mystical experience, in James’s words, ‘its quality must be 
directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others.’153  This would 
preclude all knowledge which can be adequately conveyed in a proposition – such as 
informing a person that their lost keys are in the conservatory, or that they are 
uncomfortable with emotional displays – and this is the type of knowledge concerning 
‘lives and events on earth’ which astrology is generally considered to provide.154  One 
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consequence of this is that, whatever an astrologer might say to a client, it would not 
convey the direct, experiential knowledge arrived at by the astrologer.  This is a 
problem for any account of astrological truth as purely ‘knowledge of acquaintance’ or 
‘revelatory truth’, which I raised in chapter 4 during my discussion of Brockbank’s 
thesis.  
6.10.1 Concatenated Knowledge in Divinatory Experience 
I suggest that in order to resolve this dilemma it is necessary to postulate that in 
divinatory astrology the two kinds of knowing – ‘perceptual’ and ‘conceptual’ in 
McGinn’s terms, ‘knowledge of acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge about’ in James’s 
thought – are concatenated.155  To elaborate: suppose that a particular horoscopic 
reading yields knowledge which is factually accurate, or otherwise significantly relevant 
(‘significantly relevant’ in the sense discussed in section 6.7 above, as in – for instance 
– the case of Fordham’s I Ching readings).  This is ‘knowledge about’ – for example, 
knowledge about the whereabouts of one’s lost keys, or knowing that one has asked a 
wrong question.  The provenance of this knowledge is taken to be the more-than-
human.  Consequent upon this, there is a sense of awe and amazement that what may 
have seemed a part of one’s individual, isolated, life is somehow known, commented 
upon and communicated by the more-than-human.  Hence there arises a sense of what 
James calls intimacy between the individual human subject and the more-than-human.  
This is a form of personal religious, or mystical, knowledge; in James’s analysis it 
would be ‘knowledge of acquaintance’ – the ‘acquaintance’ in this case being direct, 
non-conceptual acquaintance with the more-than-human.  This is concatenated, in the 
literal sense of ‘chained together’, with the initial knowledge – without the information 
about lost keys, the subsequent personal religious experience would not arise.  
This analysis can be seen as an interpretation and development, in an epistemological 
context, of some of Cornelius’s comments regarding astrology-as-divination.  For 
instance, he wrote of ‘realised interpretation’, that ‘As with synchronicity there appears 
to be some emotional affect attending realisation of the symbol’.156  The key parallel 
here is Cornelius’s account of what are – I suggest – two types of knowledge: the 
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specific knowledge of that to which some horoscopic symbolism refers; and, knowledge 
(affective, non-verbal) of surprising intimacy with the more-than-human.  I further 
suggest that, in a divinatory context, the two types of knowledge are concatenated in the 
sense that without the quotidian truth (such as the whereabouts of lost keys), the sense 
of awe at the nearness of the more-than-human would not arise.  The concatenated 
relationship between two kinds of knowledge was captured by Curry: ‘Most practising 
astrologers know the truth of the poet Michael Longley’s observation that “when you 
capture something with precision, you also release its mysterious aura.  You don’t get 
the mystery without the precision”.’157 
The account being developed here of two kinds of knowledge concatenated in 
divinatory truth has a parallel in Main’s account of synchronicity.  He discussed the 
impact of a series of symbolically-significant experiences upon the wool merchant and 
Jungian Edward Thornton, which Thornton understood to be examples of 
synchronicity.158  The experiences, Main argued, were associated with a sense of 
numinosity, of ‘minor miracle’ and of being ‘revelatory’.159  Finally – and I suggest that 
this is the most fundamental and relevant point for the present discussion – these 
experiences of synchronicity 
had a profound unifying effect on the whole field of Thornton’s experiences.  The very fact that an 
intimate noncausal connection can be experienced between the outer physical world and one’s inner 
subjectivity implies that the separateness usually experienced between inner and outer, psychic and 
physical, or self and world can to a significant degree be dissolved.160 
This is consonant, at points at least, with some accounts of astrological work.  For 
example, the astrologer Lynn Bell said that in astrological consultations, ‘The space that 
opens between me and the other person allows this larger self to be present and within 
the presence of the larger self is something larger than “you and I”, or “us and 
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them”’.161  There is, then, ‘a flow of energy and a heightened perception, a heightened 
awareness, an exchange with another person that is of a very different nature than 
anything I do in my life.’162   
In Thornton’s experiences there were two kinds of truth: a more or less quotidian fact, 
and arising upon that, an affective, incommunicable sense of separateness dissolving.  
Main reflected:  
Even if it is only a question of the synchronicity seeming to further some short-term and 
relatively unimportant interest… the experiencer may nonetheless be led by this to infer that a 
similar kind of benevolent ordering could also be operating more widely and in more important 
matters.163  
My contention is that in order for astrology-as-divination to be beyond the 
epistemological reach of science, there would need to be a relationship between two 
forms of knowledge, as found in Main’s account of Thornton’s experiences.  This 
would be a relationship between the specific information derived from a horoscope 
(knowledge about), and a different, primarily affective, form of knowledge (knowledge 
of acquaintance).  If an individual were to try to put words to the latter, they might say 
something to the effect that – borrowing James’s words – there are ‘but accidental 
fences’ keeping the individual consciousness from the ‘mother-sea’ of ‘cosmic 
consciousness’.164   
A remark from Mansfield illustrates the concatenation of kinds of knowledge in 
astrology: 
it can be a moment of great spiritual uplift to have any experience of the indivisible and infinite 
aspect of soul within which we continuously live.  To experience how, for example, a sense of 
limitation correlates with a Saturn transit, is to glimpse at evidence of our indivisible nature, to 
get a little peek beyond our finite and limited selves.165 
                                                          
161 Lynn Bell, quotations from interview in: Darrelyn Gunzburg, ‘The Horoscopic Place: The Encounter 
between Astrologer and Client’, Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture, Vol. 13 No. 1, 
March 2019, p. 52. 
162 Lynn Bell quoted in: Gunzburg, ‘The Horoscopic Place’, p. 49. 
163 Main, Revelations of Chance, p.57. 
164 James, ‘Confidences of a Psychical Researcher’, pp.1263-4. 
165 Victor Mansfield, Head and Heart: A Personal Exploration of Science and the Sacred (Wheaton, IL: 
Quest Books, 2002), p.159. 
 
241 
 
In proposing a concatenated relationship between two forms of knowledge I draw on 
Barnard’s proposal that, in order to address the apparent contradiction between the two 
forms of knowledge in James’s account of mysticism, there is a need for ‘a dialectical 
relationship between experience and interpretation.’166  Barnard’s example was of a 
yogi meditating on the form of Kālī and attaining a mystical experience.  The mystical 
experience in itself would be ‘knowledge of acquaintance’.  However, 
this mystical experience also possessed important elements of knowledge-about.  For instance, 
knowledge-about was present in the cultural constructs that helped to create a visionary form of 
Kālī instead of Jesus or Muhammad… However, when the visionary form of Kālī disappeared, 
and the yogi’s experience shifted to a non-dual state of oneness, it could be theorized that the 
‘percentage’ of knowledge-about that was previously present during the yogi’s mystical 
experience was significantly lowered.167 
What I am proposing follows Barnard’s general principle, albeit with different content: 
in the case of astrology, the ‘knowledge about’ would be propositional information 
derived from a horoscope, and the ‘knowledge of acquaintance’ would be an experience 
of intimacy with the more-than-human.  The former conditions the latter, which may 
strike the individual as belonging to a different order of truth than information 
concerning the whereabouts of lost keys and all the other matters, essentially mundane 
in nature, which are the overt subjects of astrological judgements.  I prefer the term 
‘concatenated’, rather than Barnard’s ‘dialectical’, for this discussion because the latter 
could be taken to imply a potential for synthesis between the two forms of knowledge, 
and that does not seem to be a meaningful possibility here.168  The term ‘entangled’ 
could fit well, but given the possibility for confusion with quantum entanglement it 
seemed best to avoid it.  
6.10.2 The Mysterium Tremendum  
Radermacher argued that in the discovery of the significance of astrological symbolism, 
‘Its showing, its appearance to the astrologer can have the full numinous impact of 
Otto’s mysterium, tremendum and fascinans.’169  This builds, significantly, on 
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Cornelius’s description of ‘emotion’ arising when astrology is seen to work.170  
Radermacher has argued for the mysterium tremendum as a crucial concept for a 
phenomenology of astrological experience, predicated on the assumption that astrology 
is a form of divination.   
In the analysis of Rudolf Otto (1869 – 1937), the ‘real innermost core’ of religion is 
dubbed ‘the numinous’.171  ‘Mysterium tremendum is the term he proposed for the 
experience that results when the individual mind perceives the numinous.172  This is an 
affective form of knowledge, for the numinous ‘can only be suggested by means of the 
special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling.’173  It is beyond 
conceptual knowledge, for it means to feel oneself ‘In the presence of that which is a 
mystery inexpressible and above all creatures.’174 
Otto’s work was influenced by the examples and discussion in James’s The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, and Otto’s analysis corresponds to that of James in all the ways 
significant for the present epistemological discussion.175  In the first place, the 
provenance of religious experience is defined as beyond the conceptual power of the 
human mind.  In addition, James’s discussion of intimacy is mirrored by Otto’s account 
of contact with the numinous: ‘what in all religion is surely the most tender and living 
moment, the actual discovery of and encounter with very deity.’176  
It is necessary to mark the variation in the focus of the experience, and its strength.  
Concerning the former, Otto remarked that the mysterium ‘is in one of its aspects the 
element of daunting “awfulness” and “majesty”… but… it has at the same time another 
aspect, in which it shows itself as something uniquely attractive and fascinating’ (hence 
the term is sometimes extended to mysterium, tremendum and fascinans ).177 
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Otto, and subsequently Radermacher, proposed a gradation of levels of intensity of such 
experiences.178  Hence Radermacher argued that individuals engaged in divination are 
sometimes  
shocked by their encounter with what they perceive to be a divine or spiritual response.  These 
range from a slight ‘tingle’ to the full impact of the mysterium tremendum. One can, for instance, 
experience a slight tingle in the spine when listening to certain music, a sensation familiar to 
many people. At the other end of the spectrum, one can undergo an extraordinary process of 
physical and emotional shock evoked by an experience of a powerful other presence. The middle 
area of this spectrum might be described as a bodily shiver, which is more than a mere tingle and 
less than awe. We would contend that this shiver, neither pleasurable nor frightening, can be the 
sign that an authentic divinatory experience is taking place…179  
 
6.10.3 The Mysterium as Part of Astrological and Divinatory Experience  
In its awe-full manifestation, the relevance of the mysterium to the astrologer was 
articulated by the Roman astrologer Marcus Manilius (fl. 1st century CE) when he wrote 
that astrology had been given to humankind ‘that awe might be roused not only by the 
appearance but by the power of things, and that mankind might learn wherein lay God’s 
greatest power.’180   
A contemporary precedent for Radermacher’s discussion of the mysterium can be found 
in Hyde’s discussion of the ‘judder’: 
When an astrological prediction, or occasionally a striking piece of non-predictive astrology, 
manifests, it spooks people and gives them what we have come to call at the Company of 
Astrologers the ‘Blackett Judder’, in honour of Pat Blackett who insisted on naming the 
phenomenon.  She believes that this is more than just a shiver down the spine.  It is disturbing 
and unpleasant, a physically nauseous feeling, accompanied by disorientation and a mood of 
resistance.  It is opposite to the joyous, uplifting thrill which an astrologer gets from seeing a 
pertinent and remarkable piece of radical symbolism played out.  The judder is like a parallax 
problem, a misalignment of reality which occurs when a person tries to fit disturbing experiences 
into their usual framework of how the world works.  It is a severe type of what psychologists call 
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cognitive dissonance, in which things feel askew in the attempt to fit together paradoxical 
possibilities.181   
This account raises the question of why the experience of astrologer and client would 
differ in the way described: why the astrologer would experience a ‘joyous, uplifting 
thrill’ while their client experienced cognitive dissonance.  There is an echo here of the 
issue raised in chapter 4 in regards to Brockbank: whether astrology might only work 
for astrologers, and not for their clients.  In his discussion of Hyde’s ‘judder’, Curry 
cited Lévy-Bruhl: ‘before the unintelligibility, at least relative, of the mystical world, 
where the most extraordinary and inexplicable transformations occur… our mind 
experiences discomfort, confusion and perplexity’.182  Curry concluded that in the case 
of a contemporary westerner, whose belief-structure was fundamentally scientific or 
theistic, divinatory experience would render them ‘vulnerable to being overwhelmed by 
what both of them rule out of court: the experience of objects turning out to be also 
subjects, for example the planets, coins, book or cards knowing and communicating 
something – and not just anything, either, but something intimately personal.’183  This is 
substantiated by some remarks from the Danish astrologer Arlette Gürtler:  
It is still mind-blowing.  You never lose that kick.  I can at any time lose my breath by seeing 
things mirrored in that way, and this is one of the reasons why I simply love astrology!... It is 
magic.  It is so unbelievable, that even what you are thinking is mirrored in the horoscope.184 
There is consonance in such accounts with the discussion, in sub-section 6.9.1 above, of 
‘pure experience’ undercutting dualistic ‘common-sense’.   
The experience of intimacy with a pantheistic universe which exhibits agency where 
(from a theistic or scientific perspective) no agency should be, can therefore be a 
challenging and frightening experience.  The astrologer Howard Sasportas (1948 – 
1992), co-founder of the Centre for Psychological Astrology, asserted that ‘In order to 
                                                          
181 Maggie Hyde, ‘The Judder Effect—Astrology and Alternative Reality’ in The Astrological Journal, 
vol.43 no.5, Sept/Oct 2001, pp. 51 – 2. 
182 Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, P. Rivière (tr.), The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1975) p. 56; Curry in Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, pp. 119 – 21. 
183 Curry in Willis and Curry, Astrology Science Culture, p. 120. 
184 Arlette Gürtler, interviewed by Kirstine Munk in: Munk, Signs of the Times, p. 158. I have changed 
two instances of ‘loose’ to ‘lose’ in this citation. 
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connect to the Self, we have to let go of our separate self-sense.  And that’s a scary 
prospect.’185 
Parallels for this discussion of encounters with the more-than-human as awe-inspiring 
can be found in a number of religious traditions.  St John of the Cross (1542 – 1591) 
quoted the Gospel of Matthew: ‘For those who want to save their life will lose it, and 
those who lose their life for my sake will find it’, and remarked: ‘This negation must be 
similar to a complete temporal, natural and spiritual death…’.186  He remarked how 
unappealing this annihilation appeared, even to spiritual aspirants: ‘they run from it as 
from death and wander about in search only of sweetness and delightful 
communications from God’.187  In the Theravadan Buddhist tradition, Buddhaghosa (fl. 
C5th CE) compared the ‘terror’ that arose upon acquaintance with a reality beyond the 
individual self to that experienced by ‘a timid man who wants to live in peace’ seeing 
‘lions, tigers, leopards, bears, hyaenas, spirits, ogres… (etc)’.188  Making an explicit 
connection with Otto’s thought, Donald S. Lopez Jr. suggested that ‘In Oriental art there 
may be no more evocative portrayal of what Rudolf Otto calls the mysterium 
tremendum than the wrathful deities of Tibetan Tantric Buddhism.’189   
In the preceding discussion I have suggested that Radermacher’s use of the mysterium 
to articulate divinatory experience can be understood as an expression of Jamesian 
intimacy.  The mysterium in this reading is a form of knowledge.  It is primarily 
affective and in any given instance may be anywhere on a spectrum of intensity from 
weak to overwhelming.  Also, the experience can be interpreted by the individual in a 
range of ways that includes: threat of annihilation by forces beyond the self, reassuring 
closeness to the more-than-human, and all points between.  The contention that I have 
developed is that in any account of astrology as entirely outside the epistemological 
                                                          
185 Howard Sasportas, ‘The Quest for the Sublime’ in Greene & Sasportas, Dynamics of the Unconscious 
(London: Arkana/Penguin, 1989) p.175. 
186 Matthew 16.25 (this translation: J.R.C. Cousland in: Michael D. Coogan (ed.), The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible; New Revised Standard Version with the Apocrypha (4th edn.), (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010 [1962]), p.1749); St John of the Cross, The Ascent of Mount Carmel in: St John of 
the Cross; Kieran Kavanaugh, Otilio Rodriguez (trs.), The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross 
(Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1979), p.123 (II.6). 
187 St John of the Cross, The Ascent of Mount Carmel, p.122 (II.5). 
188 Buddhaghosa, Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (tr.), The Path of Purification (Visuddhi Magga ) (4th edn.), (Kandy, 
Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1979 [1956]), p. 753 (XXI.29).   
189 Donald S. Lopez Jr., Approaching the numinous: Rudolf Otto and Tibetan tantra, Philosophy East and 
West Vol. 29 No. 4 (Oct. 1979) p. 467. 
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competence of science – what is termed astrology-as-divination in this thesis – the 
direct affective knowledge deriving from the mysterium, the experience of intimacy, 
would need to be included in evaluating the practice’s truth-status.  The experience of 
intimacy would then be a type of knowledge (knowledge of acquaintance), at least as 
significant in evaluating the truth-status of this model of astrology as any propositional, 
factual knowledge (knowledge about) that derives from the practice. 
To illustrate, here is an example of what can be interpreted as an experience of the 
mysterium from the astrologer Deborah Houlding.  Recalling the moment when she was 
‘struck by the realisation that astrology actually works’, she said: 
I was looking at a chart at the time; I can’t remember whose chart it was, but this time instead of 
analysing it (like I usually did) I just lost myself in it. It was like a momentary lack of 
concentration where the creative part of my brain must have found time to rise up and kick a bit 
a space for itself alongside the rational part. Before that my approach to ‘studying’ a chart was to 
take each part of it to pieces and make lots of little notes that I later had to wrestle with to rule 
out the contradictions and generate themes for my analysis. But this time the connection of 
everything to everything just made perfect sense and I had some sort of emotional or 
sympathetic reaction to the energy of that chart, so that I felt very strongly affected by it. I’m 
sure it’s a common experience amongst astrologers, that you start to feel the energy of the chart 
to the extent that you feel the physical disabilities of the person whose chart you are looking at 
and become affected by their manner of expression and sense of humour. But it was my first 
experience of reading a chart as a whole, where everything fit perfectly and nothing left me 
confused.  Appropriately I was on my knees bending over the chart – I remember that because 
although this didn’t occur to me until later, there was a quality of feeling very special, but also 
very humble and blessed; that was really why I was so awed by it.190 
It is significant for the discussion of types of knowledge that Houlding did not 
remember the specific chart or any information she derived from it, whilst the emotional 
experience was both powerful, and was experienced as knowledge of intimacy.  Thus 
she also said, ‘It was a very powerful moment in which I let go of my innate disbelief, 
suddenly realised I loved astrology, and trusted it completely.’191  Further characterising 
the experience by reference to her own horoscope, she described it as ‘a very positive 
                                                          
190 Deborah Houlding, interview, 2005. 
191 Deborah Houlding, interview, 2005. 
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Jupiter-Neptune experience because of the idealistic sense of pure love, trust and 
expansion of mind.’192 
In the previous chapter I made use of the image of a trial by jury to elucidate the way in 
which the truth of astrology-as-science would be evaluated: intersubjective findings 
would be interrogated and tested to see if they cohered with a set of criteria which 
defined science.  The case here is very different, since it would not be possible for 
anyone except the individual themselves to evaluate an experience such as Houlding 
recounted.  This was the position taken by William James when he questioned what 
epistemological consequences followed from mystical consciousness.  His conclusion 
was that there are three consequences: they can rightly be authoritative so far as the 
individual who had the experience is concerned; there is no authority which would 
compel other people to accept this authority uncritically; and, ‘They break down the 
authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the 
understanding and the senses alone.  They show it to be only one kind of consciousness.  
They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us 
vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith.’193 
6.11 Circularity and Isolation 
Understandings of astrology as true in a way that bypasses contemporary science are 
often dismissed by critics of astrology.  The manner of this dismissal can be understood 
in the context of the coherence theory of truth.  Often, it is simply assumed that if 
astrology is described as not coherent with science, that in itself would make it untrue.  
Hence for example Popper’s contention that ‘by making their interpretations and 
prophecies sufficiently vague [astrologers] were able to explain away anything that 
might have been a refutation of the theory [i.e. astrology]’.194  Popper’s position largely 
coincides with that of Thagard, already cited in chapter 5: ‘coherence can lead to 
truth… under the assumption that natural science is the major source of human 
knowledge.’195  And this in turn is the perspective that often informs critics of astrology, 
                                                          
192 Deborah Houlding, interview, 2005. 
193 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p.423; pp.422-3 for the three points. 
194 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 37. 
195 Thagard, ‘Coherence, Truth, Scientific Knowledge’, p. 29. 
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as for instance in Mather’s assertion that ‘ordinary science accommodates astrology 
perfectly well, at least astrology as performed in consulting rooms.’196 
It is therefore rare to find critics of astrology who discuss, in any depth, its possible 
coherence with an explanatory system other than science.  Dean characterised the idea 
‘that everything in the universe is interrelated’ as the ‘most popular vague assumption’ 
by which, through a ‘subsequent circular argument’, astrologers tried to justify the 
practice of astrology.197  And subsequently, along similar lines, Dean et al argued: 
both synchronicity and time quality are examples of circular reasoning, as in ‘astrology is 
explained by X, which, if it exists, explains astrology.’ It is like claiming that levitation is 
explained by mysterious forces that, if they exist, explain levitation. Which is hardly a reason to 
be confident when jumping off a cliff.198  
Again, in a discussion of astrology-as-divination, Dean took issue with my suggestion 
that astrology ‘hovers on the margins of comprehensibility’, contending that ‘Phillipson 
presents no evidence for his claim other than assertions and circular arguments 
(astrology is barely comprehensible because it is untestable and therefore barely 
comprehensible).’199 
Circularity is a common characterisation of, and objection to, the coherence theory.  For 
instance, Roger Scruton characterised the theory as follows: ‘The basic idea is this: try 
as you may, you will not be able to step outside thought and lay hold of some 
independent realm of facts.  To say what makes one thought true is to express a thought: 
usually the same thought.’200  In similar vein, Huemer remarked that ‘Perhaps the 
                                                          
196 Arthur Mather, ‘Modern Science, Epistemology…’, p. 54. 
197 Geoffrey Dean, ‘Does Astrology Need to be True?  Part 1’, p. 176. 
198 Dean, Geoffrey, Suitbert Ertel, Ivan Kelly, Arthur Mather, Rudolf Smit, ‘The Phillipson Interview: 
Five leading researchers face 150 questions about scientific research into astrology’ (2000, minor 
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a version of the interview in Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, expanded subsequent to the book’s 
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Lebensbuch (5th edn.) (Zurich: Rascher)]), pp. 56 – 7 (82).  
199 Geoffrey Dean, ‘Divination: Astrology shows clear links with divinatory practices’ (2013) - 
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200 Scruton, Modern Philosophy, p.101. Original emphasis. 
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central intuitive objection to the coherence theory is that the theory is committed to 
endorsing circular reasoning’.201   
In circular reasoning, ‘one of the premisses [of an argument] depends on, or is even 
equivalent to, the conclusion.’202  An example provided by O’Brien in a discussion of 
the coherence theory is: ‘why believe God exists?  It says so in the Bible.  Why believe 
what is said in the Bible?  Because God wrote it.’203  O’Brien observed, ‘just because it 
hangs together doesn’t mean it is true.  It may be true, but its coherence doesn’t make it 
so.’204  The fact that an explanation can be presented as circular does not invalidate it, as 
can be exemplified through the law of gravitation.  Michael Shermer (founder of  the 
Skeptics Society) pointed out the circularity here as follows: ‘What is gravity?  The 
tendency for objects to be attracted to one another. Why are objects attracted to one 
another?  Gravity.’205 
The appearance of circular reasoning does not therefore, in itself, suffice to dismiss the 
coherence theory of truth; rather, the problem is a combination of circularity with the 
absence of any other means of evaluation.  Hence the importance, in Dean et al’s 
account cited above, of the qualifier ‘if it exists’ applied to a possible explanation of 
astrology such as synchronicity.  The fundamental problem they see in non-scientific 
explanations is the lack of evidence, which circular reasoning then serves to obfuscate.  
This concern with a lack of evidence can be seen, for instance, in their comment: ‘we 
                                                          
201 Michael Huemer, ‘Foundations and Coherence’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup 
(eds), A Companion to Epistemology (2nd edn.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), p.25.  Another account of the 
problem of circularity is: O’Brien, Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, pp.77 – 9. 
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are supposed to believe simultaneously, that astrology, like gravity, is writ most 
exceedingly large, while its influence is most exceedingly difficult to demonstrate.’206   
The weight of the critique against non-scientific explanations of astrology therefore 
largely coincides with the primary critique of the coherence theory, known as the 
‘isolation objection’.  This was discussed in the previous chapter and can be 
summarised here with John L. Pollock’s criticism that the coherence theory ‘cuts 
justification off from the world.  A person could be justified in believing anything’, and 
his assertion:  ‘All justification must eventually terminate with some epistemologically 
basic beliefs that do not require independent justification.  And some of these beliefs 
must have something to do with the evidence of our senses.’207   
Such considerations do not however offer a way beyond the problems of circularity and 
isolation.  At the conclusion of chapter 4 I cited Horwich’s, observation that if truth is to 
be defined by correspondence to fact, then ‘accounts of what facts are, and what it is for 
a belief to correspond to a fact’ will be needed.208  
In discussing the truth-status of astrology, however, it has emerged that there is more 
than one explanatory system: astrology-as-science, and astrology-as-divination, have 
been considered in the previous chapter and this one.  Each eventuates in a different 
account of how astrology would manifest in the world and what form, therefore, the 
facts required to justify belief in astrology’s truth would take.   
It is a feature of astrology, as a subject for epistemological discussion, that it not only 
permits such disparate interpretations, but finds advocates of each position, and many 
intermediate positions, in the contemporary West. 
The consequence of this is that an invocation of ‘fact’ as final arbiter cannot end the 
problem of isolation or circularity commonly attributed to the coherence theory of truth, 
because the definition of ‘fact’ is itself dependent upon explanatory systems – of which 
there can be more than one.  
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6.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered an ontological and epistemological framework under which 
the evaluation of astrology’s truth-status would be beyond the competence of scientific 
methodology.  The model of the universe that has been put forward to substantiate 
astrology-as-divination diverges widely from contemporary common-sense.  It may be 
that many critics of astrology would conclude that the divergence is so wide as to mean 
that the case for astrology as true but not coherent with science has been proved 
untenable for all practical purposes, as when Dawkins argued: ‘most of us happily 
disavow fairies, astrology and the Flying Spaghetti Monster, without first immersing 
ourselves in books of Pastafarian theology etc.’209  As was discussed in the previous 
chapter, such positions tend to presuppose a unitary account of truth, wherein coherence 
with one explanatory system would define all truth.   
In a similar way, it is typically assumed in epistemological discussion that the 
coherence theory would need to be unitary.  Hence Blanshard’s observation: ‘the 
coherence theory… holds that one system only is true, namely the system in which 
everything real and possible is coherently included.’210  Although having written this, 
Blanshard immediately wondered, ‘whether all that is actual might not be embraced in 
more than one system.’211  William James argued that ‘the science and the religion are 
both of them genuine keys for unlocking the world’s treasure-house to him who can use 
either of them practically.  Just as evidently neither is exhaustive or exclusive of the 
other’s simultaneous use.’212  The principle that a definition of truth should allow a 
plurality of ways in which truth could obtain is a foundation of  James’s pragmatic 
theory of truth, which I will consider in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7: The Pragmatic Theory of Truth 
The pragmatic theory of truth was introduced in chapter 3 as an approach that gives pre-
eminence to practical consequences, so that the truth of a proposition or practice would 
be defined by whether it worked, or was useful – these qualifications being effectively 
synonymous.  Under the pragmatic theory of truth, therefore, astrology would be true if 
it worked.  This chapter will illustrate and evaluate that position.  A major feature of the 
history of pragmatism is the distinction between Peirce’s and James’s accounts of the 
philosophy; this was introduced in chapter 3, and will be returned to in sections 7.2 and 
7.3 below.  First, to establish an astrological context, I will introduce some instances 
where it has been asserted that astrology works. 
 
7.1 Assertions that Astrology Works 
When astrologers assert that astrology works, or is useful, their intention is sometimes 
to claim primacy for the experiential knowledge gained by using astrology, which (in 
their view) would override negative scientifically-based evaluations of the subject’s 
truth-status.  Hence the astrologer Sydney Omarr (1926 – 2003) wrote in 1965, ‘I 
“believe in” astrology because it works.  Just as I believe that two and two equal four.’1  
This followed his account of astrology being generally seen as a pseudoscience, and 
therefore as a subject for belief rather than a source of knowledge.2  A similar view was 
expressed by the astrologer Jane Ridder-Patrick in a meeting in 1990 when, asked if she 
believed in astrology, she replied: ‘No, I don’t believe in astrology.  I know from more 
than ten years of almost daily hands-on experience that astrology is a valid and useful 
tool for understanding our world and our relationship with it.’3  She subsequently 
elaborated: 
Belief for me is a leap of faith which is not based on concrete personal experience.  When 
working with any tool or system, including astrology, I need some kind of PROOF that makes 
                                                          
1 Sydney Omarr, My World of Astrology (Hollywood, CA, Wilshire: 1975) p.24.  Omarr also refers to 
astrology working at p. 19 and p.26. 
2 Omarr, My World of Astrology, p. 20 and p. 22 respectively. 
3 Jane Ridder-Patrick at a meeting of students in the astronomy department, Glasgow University, 1st 
March 1990, recalled by Nick Campion, confirmed by personal communication from Ridder-Patrick to 
Campion, 5th December 2000: Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 87, p. 87 n. 12. 
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sense to me.  It doesn’t have [to] be formal scientific proof which is so often, in any case, a 
complete non-sense for looking at astrology.’4   
A similar emphasis on the primacy of personal experience and the inadequacy of 
science as an explanatory system for astrology was made by the astrologer Brad 
Kochunas: 
I do not know why I believe what I believe, as it comes from the heart and not the head. After 25 
years of experiencing astrology, my faith in it rivals the empiricist's faith in reason. I can offer 
words like elegance, beauty, mystery, but, in the end, I can only borrow from Martin Luther by 
saying, ‘Here I stand, I can do no other.’5 
When I interviewed Campion in 1998 he advocated an approach to judicial astrology 
that seemed as if it would bypass epistemology altogether – an approach whereby: 
‘we’re asking not whether astrology is “true”, a question which leads into all sorts of 
philosophical tail-chasing, but is it “useful”? Or, to put it another way, what use does it 
serve?’6  Subsequent to this interview, and after collecting a total of 837 completed 
questionnaires from astrologers between 1999 and 2011, Campion concluded:  
Astrologers, as I found in my fieldwork, justify their use of astrology overwhelmingly on the 
pragmatic grounds that it is not a matter of belief but of knowledge based on personal 
experience, often citing C. G. Jung who, when asked whether he believed in God, replied ‘I 
don’t believe, I know’.7 
Campion also, in describing interviews with two people who used astrology despite the 
disfavour with which it is regarded by their strongly Christian backgrounds, stated that 
both ‘use astrology for purely pragmatic purposes; because it is useful... [and is] a 
practice which has helped them both.’8   
                                                          
4 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p.87. 
5 Brad Kochunas, The Astrological Imagination: Where Psyche and Cosmos Meet  (Bloomington, IN: 
iUniverse, 2008) p.36. (Philosophically speaking it would make more sense to refer to ‘the rationalist’s 
faith in reason’; the context suggests that this is what he intended.) 
6 Nick Campion, Garry Phillipson (interviewer), ‘Interview with Nick Campion (Part 1)’, The 
Astrological Journal, Vol. 41, No. 3, May 1999 (interview recorded 27th March 1998), p. 11 
7 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p.88; description of his questionnaires is at pp.167-8. The 
quotation from Jung is from his 1959 interview with John Freeman on the BBC’s Face to Face television 
programme; Campion cited it from David Cox, I Don’t Need to Believe in God – I Know (London: Guild 
of Pastoral Psychology, 1985). Jung clarified the intention behind his words in letters to Hugh Bennett 
and M. Leonard, both dated 5th December 1959: Jung, Letters Vol. 2, pp. 524 – 6. 
8 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p.200. 
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A similar perspective amongst some astrologers was reported by Bridget Costello in her 
thesis – the perspective that, in her words, ‘the whole point of astrology is that it is 
useful and it “works”’.9  She substantiated this by quoting a post from ‘one of the online 
astrology forums that I monitored during the course of this study… which is sponsored 
by one of the national astrology credentialing institutions and appears to attract mainly 
professional astrologers’.10  In the post an astrologer stated, ‘i can verify the success of 
my techniques by the fact that i have been in practice for 30 years, and my predictions 
and advice have proven to be accurate.’11   
That claim highlights an issue which would need to be addressed by any account of 
astrology as pragmatically true: if the meaning of ‘astrology works’ is that it provides 
accurate information, it is unclear how and why an astrology that worked would not 
therefore yield sufficient data under statistical analysis to be deemed true under the 
correspondence theory of truth.  This in turn evokes the distinction between two forms 
of pragmatism – that of James, and that of Peirce.  Rescher’s perspective on the 
distinction was as follows: ‘With Peirce, the objectivity of rational inquiry was 
paramount; in science, our results are robust since what works out for you works out for 
me because nature plays no favorites.  With James, however, what counts is a matter of 
potentially idiosyncratic personal satisfactions.’12  An approach such as that of Peirce, 
with its emphasis on objectivity and scientific methodology, would naturally seek 
correspondences between astrological propositions and facts in the world.  If one sets to 
one side for a moment Rescher’s preference for Peirce’s approach (which is clear 
enough in the above quotation), one is left with the dichotomy between science and 
personal experience as arbiters of truth which has been a structural element in this 
thesis, particularly chapters 5 and 6.  This dichotomy will be further explored in the 
present chapter, beginning with a consideration of Peirce’s and James’s versions of 
pragmatic truth in sections and 7.2 and 7.3 below. 
 
 
                                                          
9 Costello, Astrology in Action, pp. 162 – 3. 
10 Costello, Astrology in Action, p. 160. 
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7.2  Pragmatic Truth according to Peirce 
 
In formulating a definition of ‘truth’ for a philosophical dictionary, Peirce wrote: 
Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless 
investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may 
possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an 
essential ingredient of truth.13   
The involvement of ‘scientific belief’ as the arbiter of truth is central to this definition.  
Peirce made it clear that he saw truth as being approximated, not by philosophers – 
‘These minds do not seem to believe that disputation is ever to cease’ – but by scientific 
research, wherein ‘Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but 
the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and 
the same conclusion.’14  He argued that ‘Science and philosophy seem to have been 
changed in their cradles.  For it is not knowing, but the love of learning, that 
characterizes the scientific man; while the “philosopher” is a man with a system which 
he thinks embodies all that is best worth knowing.’15  In his dictionary definition, Peirce 
characterised the search for truth as an aspiration to ever-greater accuracy, citing the 
example of π (the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter) as a value which may 
never be finally arrived at without remainder, yet nonetheless ‘in the progress of science 
its error will indefinitely diminish’.16  
Peirce’s perspective reflects the fact that he was a realist.  Thus, for example, he argued 
that, ‘it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused 
by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by something upon which our 
thinking has no effect.’17  There is a close parallel here to the approach advocated by 
Dean et al. when they stated: ‘to adequately test astrology the participation of the 
astrologer must be eliminated.’18  The parallel can be further illustrated through the 
                                                          
13 Charles S. Peirce, ‘Logical [Truth]’, section of article ‘Truth and Falsity’ in: James Mark Baldwin (ed.), 
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, revised edn. (Vol. II) (New York: MacMillan, 1920 [1901]) p. 
718; also in: Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 5.565. 
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15 Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 1.44. From unpublished notes. 
16 Peirce, ‘Logical [Truth]’, p. 718, also in: Collected Papers, CP 5.565. 
17 Peirce, ‘The Fixation of Belief’ , The Popular Science Monthly Vol. 12 (1877 – 8), p. 11.  CP 5. 384. 
18 Dean et al in Recent Advances, p.554 (previously cited in chapter 5 of this thesis). 
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analysis by Dean, Mather and Smit of their experience of astrology working, or at least 
appearing to work.  As remarked in chapter 1 of this thesis, they recounted that, as 
astrologers, they 
started in much the same way as any astrologer starts – we calculated charts, saw that they 
seemed to work, and were hooked… We read more and more books, we did more and more 
charts for more and more people, we went to meetings and talked to more and more astrologers 
(whose experience was much the same as ours), and we became more and more convinced that 
astrology worked.19 
Astrologers, they continued, ‘see with their own eyes that astrology works even though 
science (apparently) cannot explain it.  This is their everyday experience, and on this 
experience they rest their claims.  What could be more fair, more reasonable, and more 
disarming of criticism?  Who could argue against “it works”?’20   
This was not however their final position.  Given the existence of reasoning errors 
(discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis) as an alternative explanation for astrology seeming 
to work, they concluded that this should be the explanation of choice, rather than 
astrology actually working, unless and until reasoning errors had been altogether ruled 
out.  Hence their analysis continued: ‘But consider what “it works” actually means.  It 
means that all non-astrological influences leading to the same result have been ruled 
out.’21  This interpretation of the phrase ‘it works’ raises questions; as Campion 
observed, the assumption that reasoning errors should be the preferred explanation 
whenever possible raises the question, ‘why such arguments should apply particularly to 
astrology’.22 The answer seems to be that such arguments are predicated upon the view, 
shared with Peirce, that subjective experience is unreliable and that one should therefore 
reserve the epithet ‘true’ only for practices capable of the intersubjective substantiation 
afforded by science. 
                                                          
19 Dean et al in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.125.  As remarked in chapter 1, although they 
contributed to the interview, I do not attribute these comments to Ertel and Kelly since they are not 
described as ever having been practising astrologers (see Astrology Year Zero p.125).  
20 Dean et al in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, pp.131 – 2. Dean has also discussed the experience that 
astrology seems to work in: Dean, ‘Case for and Against Astrology’, particularly p.122.  See also 
Campion’s discussion of Dean on astrology ‘working’ at Campion 2012 p.98. 
21 Dean et al in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p. 132 (original emphasis). 
22 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 98. 
 
258 
 
To analyse the phrase ‘astrology works’ under a Peircean account of pragmatism is, 
therefore, substantially to recapitulate the scientific critique of astrology that has already 
been considered in this thesis, particularly in chapters 4 and 5.  This is the view that 
truth should be defined by correspondence between proposition and fact, with the 
proviso that the meaning of ‘fact’ should be defined in a way that coheres with science.  
James K. Feibleman asserted that, for Peirce, pragmatism was ‘nothing more than the 
method that complements the correspondence theory of truth’.23  This is an incomplete 
account, for Peirce had a fallibilist approach to the term ‘fact’, even in science.  He 
characterised science as ‘not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a 
bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it 
begins to give way.’24  For Peirce, therefore, any individual fact was not to be relied on.  
As has been seen in this section however, he saw science as the way to truth – 
notwithstanding this potential for error to emerge in any particular judgement.  Because 
the present thesis is concerned with the evaluation of the truth-status of astrology as a 
whole rather than with any specific astrologically-derived proposition, the net effect of 
Peircean pragmatism would be to treat the evaluation of astrology’s truth-status as a 
scientific, not a philosophical, task.  Since scientific critiques have already been pursued 
in chapters 4 and 5, there will be little further discussion of Peirce in this chapter, and 
references to ‘pragmatism’ and its cognates will henceforth – unless qualified – be to 
Jamesian pragmatism. 
 
7.3  Pragmatic Truth According to James  
The brief treatment accorded to Peirce’s conception of pragmatic truth here can claim 
further support from James’s contention that science is sufficiently well-established as 
an authority in contemporary thought, that positions which regard it thus require 
relatively little description: 
                                                          
23 James K. Feibleman, An Introduction to Peirce’s Philosophy: Interpreted as a System (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1946) p. 294. 
24 Charles S. Peirce, ‘The First Rule of Logic’ – a lecture delivered by Peirce on 21st February 1898, in 
Cambridge. In: Peirce, Collected Papers CP 5.589. For fallibilism in the thought of Peirce and James: 
Thayer, Meaning and Action, pp. 349 – 352. 
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There is included in human nature an ingrained naturalism and materialism of mind which can 
only admit facts that are actually tangible.  Of this sort of mind the entity called “scientist” is the 
idol.  Fondness for the word “scientist” is one of the notes by which you may know its votaries; 
and its short way of killing any opinion that disbelieves in it is to call it “unscientific”.25 
He went on to argue that this leaning was understandable in light of the advances 
brought about by science, but that for all this, ‘our science is a drop, our ignorance a 
sea.’26   
In introducing his version of pragmatism, James began by reiterating Peirce’s 
‘pragmatic maxim’: ‘consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our concept to have.  Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object’.27  He immediately added however, 
‘I think myself that it should be expressed more broadly than Mr. Peirce expresses it.’28  
The extra breadth of definition that James desired made his form of pragmatism very 
different from that of Peirce.  As was seen in the previous chapter of this thesis, James 
saw some subjective experiences (such as mystical experience) as a source of truth.  
Barnard suggested that Jamesian pragmatism could ‘help us to assess the “truth” not 
only of our beliefs about God, but also the “truth” of our beliefs in other intangible 
phenomena as well... [including] beliefs about the unconscious/subconscious; beliefs 
about intuitions; beliefs about psychical phenomena, and so on.’29  In this spirit I will 
pursue the possibility that James’s understanding of pragmatic truth can contribute 
significantly to the discussion of astrology’s truth-status. 
In one of the talks he delivered in 1906-7, which were published as Pragmatism, James 
said: 
“The true,” to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as “the 
right” is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.  Expedient in almost any fashion; and 
expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently all the 
                                                          
25 William James, ‘Is Life Worth Living’, in: James, William, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy in: William James, Gerald E. Myers (ed.), William James: Writings 1878 – 1899 
(New York, NY: The Library of America, 1992 [1895]) p. 496. 
26 James, ‘Is Life Worth Living’, p. 496. 
27 Peirce, ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, p. 293, also in: Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 5.402. (previously 
cited in ch. 3 of this thesis). Cited by James (with minor variations): ‘Philosophical Conceptions and 
Practical Results’, p. 1080. 
28 James, ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’, p.1080. 
29 Barnard, Exploring Unseen Worlds, p.402, n.271. 
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experience in sight won’t necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily.  
Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present 
formulas.”30 
He repeated this definition in The Meaning of Truth, published in 1909, and it therefore 
seems clear that he regarded it as an accurate reflection of his thought.31  In that volume 
he went on to assert that ‘truth for each man is what that man ‘troweth’ at that moment 
with the maximum of satisfaction to himself’.32  As will emerge in the following 
section, James’s use of the terms ‘expedient’ and ‘satisfaction’ in the context of truth 
served as foci for criticisms of his version of pragmatism.33 
 
7.4 Criticisms of Jamesian Pragmatism as Relativistic 
 
Peirce looked dimly on the innovations made by some of his successors in the nascent 
pragmatist movement (chiefly James and F. C. S. Schiller), seeing in them an infusion 
of relativism into the philosophical movement he had started.  Thus he wrote: ‘It seems 
to me a pity they should allow a philosophy so instinct with life to become infected with 
seeds of death in such notions as that of... the mutability of truth...’34  Johnson remarked 
that ‘Peirce... feared that James would admit the merely expedient as true.’35  The term 
‘expedient’ was used repeatedly, and in the face of criticism, by James.  I remarked in 
chapter 3 of this thesis that astrology is often criticised on the grounds that, if its truth-
status was not challenged, this would invite relativism and a collapse of all 
epistemological authority.  James, too, has been repeatedly accused of condoning 
relativism.  I suggest that this commonality hints at the congeniality of pragmatism as a 
context for astrology – a possibility I will explore in the remainder of this chapter, with 
evaluation of relativism to follow in section 7.10, below. 
                                                          
30 James, Pragmatism, p.583.  Original emphases. 
31 James, Meaning of Truth, p.823, p.824. 
32 James, Meaning of Truth, p.874. 
33 In addition to the terms ‘expedient’ and ‘satisfaction’, James also reaped opprobrium for his discussion 
of the ‘cash-value’ of beliefs – this is discussed by: George Cotkin, ‘William James and the Cash-Value 
Metaphor’, Et Cetera (Spring 1985) pp. 37 – 46. 
34 Peirce, ‘A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’, in Peirce: Collected Papers, CP 6. 485. 
Originally published in Hibbert Journal, Vol. 7 (1908), pp. 90 – 112. 
35 Johnson, Focusing on Truth, p.68, original emphasis. 
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James’s pragmatic account of truth has been criticised in many quarters: in The 
Meaning of Truth he mentioned fifteen critics of the theory on one page alone.36  Many 
of these criticisms can be epitomised by Russell’s treatment of pragmatic truth in his 
History of Western Philosophy.37  Russell quoted James’s statement (cited in the 
previous chapter of this thesis) that ‘if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the 
widest sense of the word, it is true’, then remarked: ‘I have always found that the 
hypothesis of Santa Claus “works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word”; 
therefore “Santa Claus exists” is true, although Santa Claus does not exist.’38  His 
objection was that ‘With James’s definition, it might happen that “A exists” is true 
although in fact A does not exist.’39  Bradley made the same point even more forcefully 
when he argued that a Jamesian pragmatist ‘must hold any idea, however mad, to be the 
truth, if any one will have it so.’40   
James, and subsequent advocates of his thought, have regarded these and similar 
critiques of his thought as misguided.  Before turning (in section 7.6) to a detailed 
account of the metaphysical underpinning of James’s pragmatism, I first turn to 
accounts of astrology as being (like Russell’s Santa Claus) useful but not true.  This will 
exemplify pragmatic thought’s relevance to astrology.   
 
7.5 Accounts of Astrology as Not True but Useful 
An account of astrology as not true but useful was introduced by Dean et al, when they 
wrote that users of astrology, 
                                                          
36 James, The Meaning of Truth, p.829. 
37 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social 
Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1946) pp. 
844 – 6. 
38 James, Pragmatism, p. 618, cited at: Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 844; Russell, History of 
Western Philosophy, p.845. 
39 Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 845. 
40 F.H. Bradley, ‘On Truth and Practice’, Mind Vol.13, No.51 (July 1904), p.322. Cited by James, The 
Meaning of Truth, p.866.  Some terminological elision is involved in applying Bradley’s critique to 
Jamesian pragmatism, thus: Bradley’s critique was specifically directed against ‘the Personal Idealist’, 
whom he identified by footnote as F. C. S. Schiller and specifically the latter’s essay ‘Axioms as 
Postulates’ in Henry Sturt (ed.), Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the 
University of Oxford (London: Macmillan, 1902) pp. 47 – 133. In his essay, Schiller stated that ‘the 
whole subsequent argument [of the paper] has already had its main lines mapped out by… the 
Weltanschauung which Prof. James has called pragmatism and  radical empiricism.’ (Schiller 1902, p. 
63). Further, Bradley himself identified the object of his attack as pragmatism at p. 321 and p. 323 of his 
paper. 
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tend to focus on feelings: they seek spiritual insight, emotional support, and direction to life, so 
when they claim that “astrology works”, they tend to mean that it “feels good” or “it is 
meaningful”.  But many things are meaningful without being true (Santa Claus, Superman, faces 
in clouds).  So this kind of astrology does not need to be true, and attacking it is on a par with 
attacking Santa Claus.41   
In a subsequent elaboration of two possible accounts of astrology, they proposed the 
terms ‘objective astrology’ (which ‘needs to be true’) and ‘subjective astrology’ (which 
‘does not need to be true’).42  In the terms of this thesis, Dean et al’s conception of 
‘objective astrology’ means astrology which science could validate as a source of 
information.  In their account, ‘subjective astrology’ would be evaluated according to 
whether it ‘give[s] a direction and purpose to our life... provide[s] benefit, self-
understanding, insight, empowerment.... enrich[es] our lives in ways that the rational 
cannot as religion, myth, poetry and fiction do’.43   
Similarly, Culver and Ianna concluded that astrology ‘does work, but only in the mind 
of the believer’.44  In her thesis, Kirstine Munk suggested that ‘the type of women that 
one often finds in astrological consultations’ are people for whom ‘truth is not 
something in the outside world, but resides within the individual and is accessible 
through intuitive processes… They consider truth to be a private matter.’45  She cited, 
and accepted, Dean et al’s distinction between subjective and objective astrology, taking 
‘subjective astrology’ to define – exclusively – the subject-matter of ‘any 
anthropological, ethnographic or religious science study’ of astrology.46  Her 
perspective was that ‘just like stories, astrology or other divination systems and the 
myths that surround them do not have to be true’; and that, ultimately, ‘astrology does 
not work from an epistemological point of view’.47   
In her thesis, Costello also raised the possibility that astrology could work without being 
true:  
                                                          
41 Geoffrey Dean, Ivan W. Kelly, Arthur Mather and Rudolf Smit, ‘Astrology’ in Michael Shermer (ed.), 
The Skeptic Encyclopedia of Pseudoscience (Volume One) (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002) p.38.   
42 Dean et al in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.129, original emphases. 
43 Dean et al in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.129. 
44 Culver and Ianna, , Astrology: True or False?, p. 220.  They cited Geoffrey Dean’s perspective on this 
matter as it appeared in: Geoffrey Dean, ‘Does Astrology Need to be True?’ (Parts 1 and 2). 
45 Munk, Signs of the Times, p. 108. 
46 Munk, Signs of the Times,p. 18, citing Dean et al in Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, pp. 129 - 30. 
47 Munk, Signs of the Times, p. 282, p. 25. 
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a faulty astrological prediction can be judged successful from the point of view of the actor 
whose goal is the creation of a certain relational or emotional state, insofar as the act of 
prediction facilitates that particular construction.  I’m not concerned here that astrology may not 
‘work’ from a scientific standpoint (by a failure to specify mechanisms, or to lend itself to 
repeatable findings, etc.).48  
The idea of ‘subjective astrology’ may be fleshed out through Rudolf Smit’s account.  
As seen in chapter 2 of this thesis, Smit became disillusioned with astrology as a source 
of truth in the wake of disappointing results from scientific tests.  He recounted that, 
years after giving up astrological practice, 
I… tried reading horoscopes where I warned their owners in advance that there was no factual 
truth in astrology. I warned them that the reading would be an exercise in looking at astrological 
symbolism, that's all. The result might seem insightful but in reality would be only make-
believe. All of them agreed to this in advance. Amazingly, there was still a Moment Supreme, 
and they went away quite happy!49 
The term ‘Moment Supreme’, for Smit, signified the moment at which ‘to [an 
astrological client’s] unspeakable astonishment, their horoscope analysis seemed to 
correctly describe not only their inner being but also the circumstances in their life’.50  
He argued that astrology in itself was ‘not a source of factual knowledge’, and indeed 
was ‘something that is untrue’ but suggested that through the involvement of a 
sympathetic astrologer it could nonetheless be ‘a wonderful tool for promoting therapy 
by conversation.’51  In his view therefore, ‘what matters is the astrologer not the 
astrology’, with the horoscope being ‘like a celestial inkblot, not a source of 
information’.52   
A possible elaboration of how it could be that a horoscope could function as an inkblot 
in a Rorschach test can be found in Munk’s thesis.  Drawing a parallel with Zulu 
divination rituals, she argued: ‘In an astrological divination session the use of 
metaphors, myths, and anecdotes, allusive language and too much verbal information 
                                                          
48 Costello, Astrology in Action, p. 31 n.12 
49 Both quotations from: Rudolf Smit, ‘Moment Supreme: Why Astrologers Keep Believing in Astrology’ 
(2011) - www.astrology-and-science.com/a-mome2.htm (accessed 30th August 2019). This is a translated 
and updated version of an article published in the Dutch journal Skepter in March 1983. 
50 Smit, ‘Moment Supreme’. 
51 Smit, ‘Moment Supreme’. 
52 Smit, ‘Moment Supreme’. 
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also forces the client to actively select pieces of information and the meaning-making 
efforts place the ritual subject in the centre of negotiation’.53 
The view of astrology as useful but not true can also be seen in a book by Kochunas, 
who characterised astrology as ‘one example of humanity’s numerous and rich forms of 
imagining.’54  Elaborating on this, he argued: ‘Astrology works, not because of its 
factual validity (the literal truth of things) but because of its functional validity (its 
usefulness in providing a satisfying aesthetic). [...]  Astrology works in the fashion of 
great drama, lyric, narrative, or religious experience.’55  In substantiating his 
perspective, Kochunas cited the psychologist Rollo May (1909 – 94) and the 
psychotherapist Thomas Moore, both of whom have espoused positions consonant with 
the ‘subjective astrology’ of Dean et al.56  Thus, May contended that ‘Astrology is a 
myth and... has both the shortcomings and the positive effects of myths’ – and in his 
view, ‘Myth making is essential in gaining mental health’.57  Moore described astrology 
as ‘a form of imagination emerging from nature… an applied poetics’58  He referred to 
astrology as ‘a way to find deep guidance’, ‘Whether or not we practice astrology 
technically’, and on another occasion described ‘the ritual of astrology itself’ as ‘in no 
way necessary and not even important’.59  A description which clarifies that attitude 
came when he stated that, at times when he found it difficult to write, ‘rather than 
looking for some circumstance in the physical world around me to explain the “block”, I 
assume that my moon is “void of course”… and I wait for the “sky” to change.’60  (In 
horary astrology, the Moon is ‘void of course’ when it forms no aspect before leaving 
its current sign; Lilly remarked that in such a case, ‘All manner of matters goe hardly 
on’.)61 
                                                          
53 Munk, Signs of the Times, p. 234. 
54 Kochunas, Astrological Imagination, p. xiii. 
55 Kochunas, Astrological Imagination, pp. 32. 
56 Kochunas, Astrological Imagination: p. 27 and p. 32 for May, pp. 25 – 26 and p. 54 for Moore. 
57 Rollo May, The Cry for Myth (New York, NY: Delta, 1991) p.22 n.1; p.1. Both cited in: Kochunas, 
Astrological Imagination, p. 32. 
58 Thomas Moore, The Re-Enchantment of Everyday Life (New York: Harper Collins, 1996) p. 317 
59 Moore, Re-Enchantment of Everyday Life, p. 320; Thomas Moore, The Planets Within: The 
Astrological Psychology of Marsilio Ficino (revised edn.) (New York: Lindisfarne, 1989 [1982]) p. 120. 
60 Moore, Re-Enchantment of Everyday Life, p. 320. 
61 Lilly, Christian Astrology, p. 299, sic for ‘goe’. This definition is common, being repeated e.g. in: 
Louis, Horary Astrology, p. 139. 
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Moore’s description brings a particular issue into focus.  He used the idea of a void of 
course Moon, without reference to physical events in the sky.  Curry’s definition of 
astrology, which I introduced in chapter 1, refers to ‘the practice of relating the 
heavenly bodies to lives and events on earth…’.62  If the movements of the physical 
planets and other horoscopic factors are not referred to, it is therefore open to question 
whether the practice under discussion would qualify as ‘astrology’.  I will return to this 
point in section 7.8.1 below.  Before that it is necessary to explore the ‘useful but not 
true’ paradigm in a pragmatic context.  The term ‘satisfaction’ is key to this endeavour. 
 
7.5.1 The Contested Definition of Satisfaction 
The term ‘satisfaction’ recurs in discussions of pragmatic truth, and also of astrology, in 
ways which reiterate the proposed split between subjective and objective forms of 
astrology.  Thus for example Peirce wrote that ‘as soon as a firm belief is reached we 
are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be false or true.’63  In this account, satisfaction 
is not related to truth.  The critique of Jamesian pragmatism as relativistic is sometimes 
expressed as if this were James’s position – as when, for instance, Thomas S. Knight 
(1921-) asserted: ‘For James ideas become true as individuals engage in satisfying 
conduct.  They have no ontological status independent of action.  Truth is thus 
subjective – the satisfaction of one person.’64   (This hardly does justice to James’s 
perspective, but I will reserve discussion of that for the next section.) 
A similar view of satisfaction can be seen when Dean argued that ‘the truth delivered by 
astrology is actually satisfaction (it provides meaning, it enriches life, it does good) 
rather than accuracy (freedom from error)’.65  By deploying the categories of subjective 
and objective astrology, or satisfaction and accuracy, Dean et al provided an account of 
the experience that ‘astrology works’ which allows some value to the experiences 
gained through using astrology, whilst at the same time characterising astrology as not 
true.  The tension inherent in this conception is revealed by Smit’s remark that ‘to 
                                                          
62 Curry, ‘Astrology’ in Encyclopaedia of Historians, p.55. 
63 Peirce, ‘The Fixation of Belief’, p. 6, CP 5. 375. 
64 Thomas S. Knight, Charles Peirce (New York: Twayne, 1965) p. 61. 
65 Dean, ‘Truth of Astrology Competition’, p.51.  Dean referred back, for the first iteration of the 
satisfaction/accuracy distinction, to: Geoffrey Dean & Arthur Mather, ‘Key Topic 1: Is the Scientific 
Approach Relevant to Astrology?’ Correlation, Vol.13 No.1 (1994).  
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receive therapy by conversation, and their Moment Supreme, [astrologers’ clients] still 
have to believe in something that is untrue.’66   
 
7.6  The Case for Jamesian Pragmatism  
Jacques Barzun argued that the significance of James’s philosophy has been slow to be 
acknowledged by philosophers, largely because ‘some of [his] formulations have been 
distorted and others taken too fragmentarily to be useful’.67  Such distortion and 
fragmentation may be glimpsed in the fact that Kirkham and Englebretsen, in their 
respective recent works on epistemology, cite James’s statement ‘truth may vary with 
the standpoint of the man who holds it’ as representative of his position, when in fact he 
used those words to characterise a misconception of his position, arising from what he 
called ‘vicious abstractionism’.68  Similarly, Russell’s argument (cited above) that ‘the 
hypothesis of Santa Claus “works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word”’ 
disproved a caricature of James’s position, not the position as James actually formulated 
it.69  Graham Bird pointed out that in his analysis, Russell ‘seems to regard the question 
of “working satisfactorily” as excluding all the normal tests which provide us with 
evidence on the matter, and on which Russell relies in his own view that Santa Claus 
does not exist.’70 
In similar vein, Eames suggested that ‘An analysis of some of the early critics [of 
James’s pragmatic theory of truth] shows that most of them did not understand the 
context in which James was writing.’71  Eames gave as an example A. J. Ayer’s 
criticism of James’s theory of truth:  ‘When we verify a proposition we discover it to be 
true, but we do not confer truth upon it.  Its truth or falsehood belongs to it quite 
independently of our knowledge, because of its relation to the objective facts.’72  As 
Eames remarked, such a criticism does not refute James’s argument but simply restates 
                                                          
66 Smit, ‘Moment Supreme’ 
67 Jacques Barzun, A Stroll with William James (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983) p. 301. 
68 Kirkham, Theories of Truth, p. 97; Englebretsen, Bare Facts and Naked Truths, p. 47; James, The 
Meaning of Truth, p.951. 
69 Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p.845. 
70 Graham Bird, William James (The Arguments of the Philosophers) (New York, NY: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1986), p.36. 
71 S. Morris Eames, ‘The Meaning of Truth in James’ in: Walter Robert Corti (ed.), The Philosophy of 
William James (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1976), p.173. 
72 A. J. Ayer, The Origins of Pragmatism: Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce and 
William James (London: MacMillan, 1968) p. 204. Cited in: Eames, ‘Meaning of Truth in James’, p.173. 
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the premises of an opposing position, in the process begging various questions such as: 
‘What is meant by independent?  What is meant by relation?  What is meant by 
objective?  What is meant by facts?’.73  The presentation of a conflicting view as if it 
had already (off-camera, as it were) disproved some or all of James’s thought is a 
recurrent phenomenon, and I will remark upon similar instances later in this chapter.  If 
an ontology had been established beyond doubt whereby objective facts could always 
be consulted when truth needed to be determined, then James’s approach to truth would 
indeed be otiose.  The impossibility of ever arriving at the requisite objectivity is 
however a central premise of James’s metaphysics, as shown for instance in his 
assertion: ‘Purely objective truth... is nowhere to be found... The trail of the human 
serpent is thus over everything.’74  In the next two sub-sections (7.6.1 and 7.6.2) I will 
survey, respectively, this perspective, and its grounding in science. 
 
7.6.1  Limits to Objectivity and Rationality  
A central element in James’s thought is his partial skepticism – his view that human 
knowledge of the world is limited.  He used the image of household pets to make this 
point on several occasions: 
That the world of physics is probably not absolute, all the converging multitude of arguments 
that make in favour of idealism tend to prove; and that our whole physical life may lie soaking in 
a spiritual atmosphere, a dimension of being that we at present have no organ of apprehending, is 
vividly suggested to us by the analogy of the life of our domestic animals.  Our dogs, for 
example, are in our human life but not of it.  They witness hourly the outward body of events 
whose inner meanings cannot, by any possible operation, be revealed to their intelligence, - 
events in which they themselves often play the cardinal part.75 
James’s reference here to a ‘spiritual atmosphere’ shows the crucial relevance to his 
ontological perspective of mystical experience.  As was seen in the previous chapter of 
this thesis, James considered such experiences to ‘break down the authority of the non-
mystical or rationalistic consciousness… [showing] it to be only one kind of 
                                                          
73 Eames, ‘Meaning of Truth in James, p.173. 
74 James, Pragmatism, p.515.  
75 James, ‘Is Life Worth Living’, p. 499. Variants of the canine simile recur at: James, Pragmatism, 
p.619; James, Pluralistic Universe, p.771.    
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consciousness.  They open out the possibility of other orders of truth’.76  In A Pluralistic 
Universe – first delivered in lecture form in 1908 and published in 1909, the year before 
his death – James wrote, “That secret of a continuous life which the universe knows by 
heart and acts on every instant cannot be a contradiction incarnate.  If logic says it is 
one, so much the worse for logic.”77  He concluded: 
For my own part, I have finally found myself compelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and 
irrevocably.   It has an imperishable use in human life, but that use is not to make us theoretically 
acquainted with the essential nature of reality […]  Reality, life, experience, concreteness, 
immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it… I prefer 
bluntly to call reality if not irrational then at least non-rational in its constitution, - and by reality 
here I mean reality where things happen, all temporal reality without exception.78 
James’s position is controversial; for instance, Mueller contended that James arrived at 
his philosophical position through something akin to a religious conversion,  and argued 
that  ‘Anyone who disregards logic should quit writing philosophical books which 
intend to be true and not false – and take to football instead.’79  This however is another 
instance of a philosopher attacking a caricature of James’s true position: as will emerge 
below, his attitude to logic and conceptual thought was not dismissive.  His point was 
simply that they did not provide a complete approach to truth; and whilst his philosophy 
was clearly informed by spiritual experience, it also grew from James’s observations of 
the development of scientific thought – to which I now turn.  
 
7.6.2 James on the Application of Science in Philosophy  
 
James recognised the contribution of science to contemporary society, writing that ‘Our 
debt to science is literally boundless’ and acknowledging that ‘the excesses to which the 
romantic and personal view of nature may lead, if wholly unchecked by impersonal 
rationalism, are direful.’80  He was, therefore, aware of the dangers of relativism.  He 
also, however, saw dangers in what might now be dubbed scientism: 
                                                          
76 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p.423; pp.422-3 for the three points. 
77 James, Pluralistic Universe, p.723. 
78 James, Pluralistic Universe p.725 – 6. 
79 Gustav Emil Mueller, ‘On William James’ “Radical Empiricism”’ in: Walter Robert Corti (ed.), The 
Philosophy of William James (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1976), p.151. 
80 James, ‘What Psychical Research Has Accomplished’, p. 698. 
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Although in its essence science only stands for a method and for no fixed belief, yet as habitually 
taken, both by its votaries and outsiders, it is identified with a certain fixed belief – the belief 
that the hidden order of nature is mechanical exclusively, and that non-mechanical categories are 
irrational ways of conceiving and explaining even such things as human life.81 
James identified three arguments against taking science as the sole arbiter of truth.  I 
will give a brief treatment of these in the remainder of this section, followed by a 
definition of the worldview (‘radical empiricism’) he developed to address them in 
section 7.7 below, with more detailed analysis of the issues treated here following.  To 
begin, then, I proceed to James’s tripartite account of the philosophical issues he saw 
arising from the scientific advances of his time: 
First, developments in contemporary philosophy ‘have emphasized the incongruence of 
the forms of our thinking with the “things” which the thinking nevertheless successfully 
handles.’82  James mentioned John Stuart Mill (1806 – 73), Hermann Lotze (1817 – 81) 
and Christoph von Sigwart (1830 – 1904) as exemplars of such developments.  He cited 
Mill to this effect: 
The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents at every instant a chaos followed by 
another chaos.  We must decompose each chaos into single facts… [in order to do this] mental 
analysis, however, must take place first.  And every one knows that in the mode of performing it, 
one intellect differs immensely from another.83 
 
The issue, for James, was the lack of direct correspondence between experience and 
conceptual thought: ‘What we experience, what comes before us, is a chaos of 
fragmentary impressions interrupting each other; what we think is an abstract system of 
hypothetical data and laws.’84   
 
James’s second point began with a different field of science – evolutionary theory – and 
arrived, again, at the conclusion that human beings are in touch only with an 
                                                          
81 James, ‘What Psychical Research Has Accomplished’, p. 698. 
82 William James, ‘Humanism’, in: William James, Ralph Barton Perry (ed.), Collected Essays and 
Reviews by William James (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920), pp.448 – 9. Originally published 
in: Nation, 78, 1904, pp. 175 – 6. 
83 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the 
Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (8th edn.) (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1882 [1843]) p. 272, Book 3 Chapter VII § 1. Cited in: James, Principles Vol. II p. 634, n.1. 
84 James, Principles, Vol. II, p. 634. 
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interpretation of reality.  The theory of evolution, James wrote, ‘has made us ready to 
imagine almost all our functions, even the intellectual ones, as “adaptations,” and 
possibly transient adaptations, to practical human needs.’85  The implications of 
evolution for humanity’s epistemological capacity was a concern for Darwin himself, as 
evidenced when he wrote: 
The horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been 
developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.  Would any 
one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?86  
Concluding his three points which undermine any claim for science to be an absolute 
standard for truth, James wrote, ‘Lastly, the enormous growth of the sciences in the past 
fifty years has reconciled us to the idea that “Not quite true” is as near as we can ever 
get.’87  Levinson elucidated this as ‘the recognition that natural scientists have 
abandoned the quest for certainty in favor of statistical analysis and the generation of 
probability statements.’88  James was writing in 1904, and therefore before much of the 
‘new science’ discussed in chapter 5 had emerged, but it seems likely that he would 
have recognised further support for his principle in some elements thereof.  For 
instance, the indeterminacy principle ‘claims statistical analysis is essential because we 
cannot predict the future behavior of a particle precisely in the individual case because 
of the indivisible relation of an observer and observed.’89  
It may well be expedient, in scientific analysis, to aspire toward the exclusion of 
subjective factors.  But then the distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ is made 
true by its usefulness – it is not an absolute ontological truth.  For James, the concept of 
dualism itself is subject to pragmatic, functional considerations.  Thus he argued that 
‘the attributions “subject” and “object”, “represented” and “representing”, “thing” 
and “thought”, indicate a practical distinction of the utmost importance, but which is 
                                                          
85 James, ‘Humanism’, p.449. 
86 Charles Darwin, Francis Darwin (ed.), The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin Vol. 1 (London: John 
Murray, 1887), pp.315-6, letter to William Graham, 3rd July 1851. Quoted in Taliaferro, Charles, 
Evidence and Faith, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.259. 
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88 Levinson, Religious Investigations of William James, p. 178. 
89 Yutaka Tanaka, ‘The Individuality of a Quantum Event’ in Timothy E. Eastman and Hank Keeton 
(eds.), Physics and Whitehead: Quantum, Process, and Experience (Albany: NY, State University of New 
York, 2003) pp. 166-7. 
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merely of a FUNCTIONAL order, in no way of an ontological order, as classical 
dualism conceives of it.’90   
Commenting on this aspect of James’s thought, Seigfried commented that, 
James incisively undercuts the naiveté of the presumption that the scientific method alone 
discloses the real world by situating science along a continuum of selective, creative activity.  He 
dislodges scientific explanations as paradigmatic for all explanations by showing that such 
explanation itself is a subset of the creative imposition of form on an otherwise chaotic world.91 
Having looked at James’s reservations regarding humanity’s epistemological 
capabilities, I turn now to the broad philosophical context which informed his 
pragmatism. 
 
7.7 Radical Empiricism  
 
William James described radical empiricism as ‘my Weltanschauung’; it is (as Cormier 
put it) ‘a theory of the real and how we know it’.92  Its breadth of application has led to 
a variety of interpretations: some of James’s commentators have categorised it as an 
ontology, others as an epistemology.93  In what follows it will emerge that, for James, 
the term comprises both ontology and epistemology.  James’s definition of radical 
empiricism is tripartite, comprising a ‘postulate’, a ‘statement of fact’, and a 
‘generalized conclusion’.94  A consideration of each now follows – beginning with a 
concise definition and then a broader discussion of the ways in which radical 
empiricism is relevant to the pragmatic characterisation of astrology’s truth-status.  
 
                                                          
90 William James, Stanley Appelbaum (tr.), ‘The Notion of Consciousness’ in: William James, Essays in 
Radical Empiricism (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003 [1912]) p. 122. This talk was written and delivered in 
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version quoted here is from a translation into English by Stanley Appelbaum, made for the 2003 reprint of 
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91 Seigfried, William James’s Radical Reconstruction, p. 161. 
92 Cormier, Truth is What Works, p. 9; William James, ‘A World of Pure Experience’, in: William James, 
Bruce Kuklick (ed.), William James: Writings 1902 – 1910 (New York, NY: The Library of America, 
1987 [1904]) p. 1160. 
93 Ruth Anna Putnam, ‘Introduction’ in: Ruth Anna Putnmam (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
William James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p.5; Donald A. Crosby, The Philosophy 
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7.7.1 Radical Empiricism – Concise Definition 
 
First, the ‘postulate’ is that ‘the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers 
shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.’95  The focus on experience is 
what qualifies James’s approach as belonging in the tradition of empiricism – a 
philosophy, as James put it, ‘like that of Hume and his descendants’96  Already however 
at this stage of the definition, a departure is implied from the tradition of empiricism; 
James elaborated upon this in the second and third portions of his definition, but it lurks 
here in the term ‘experience’.  As was discussed in the previous chapter, for James this 
meant ‘pure experience’, which is ‘subjective and objective both at once.’97   James’s 
restriction of debate to matters with an experiential base therefore amounts, as John J. 
McDermott put it, to a rejection of ‘the age-old philosophical tendency to consider as 
legitimate subjects for philosophical analysis only the products of an exclusively 
conceptual apparatus.’98   
The second part of James’s definition is the ‘statement of fact’: ‘the relations between 
things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular 
experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.’99  This is an 
explicit break with the empiricist tradition; James lamented that ‘ordinary empiricism... 
has always shown a tendency to do away with the connections of things’.100  An 
example of the atomistic approach that he criticised can be seen in Hume’s statement 
that ‘the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences’.101  By 
contrast, in the third part of his definition – the ‘generalized conclusion’ – James 
asserted that ‘the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that 
are themselves parts of experience.  The directly apprehended universe... possesses in its 
                                                          
95 James, Meaning of Truth, p.826.   
96 James, ‘World of Pure Experience’, p. 1160. 
97 James, ‘Does “Consciousness” Exist?’, p. 1145. James’s understanding that the ‘experience’ treated in 
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own right a concatenated or continuous structure.’102  This may seem to suggest that 
experience would be such a flux that all aspiration to truth would be vain.  In sub-
sections 7.7.2 and 7.7.3, directly following, I will discuss the practical ramifications of 
James’s radical empiricism, beginning with this wild aspect of experience. 
 
7.7.2  Percepts and Concepts 
 
James wrote that a baby, ‘assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it 
all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion’103  Flanagan contended that James’s 
‘greatness as a philosopher and as a person comes from allowing this “blooming, 
buzzing confusion” to continually present itself to himself.’104  It is a complexity that 
manifested, for James, both in the microcosm of individual sensory experience, and in 
the macrocosm of an unfolding universe: 
The real world as it is given at this moment is the sum total of all its beings and events now. But 
can we think of such a sum? Can we realize for an instant what a cross-section of all existence at 
a definite point of time would be? While I talk and the flies buzz, a sea gull catches a fish at the 
mouth of the Amazon, a tree falls in the Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes in Germany, a 
horse dies in Tartary, and twins are born in France. What does that mean? Does the 
contemporaneity of these events with each other and with a million more as disjointed as they 
form a rational bond between them, and unite them into anything that means for us a world? Yet 
just such a collateral contemporaneity, and nothing else, is the real order of the world. 105 
The complexity of experience was further compounded, for James, by the ephemeral, 
perpetually transmuting, nature of experience.  This can be illustrated through James’s 
description of radical empiricism as a ‘mosaic philosophy’, where each piece of the 
mosaic is a moment of experience - with the caveat that, to be accurate, the analogy 
would have to include the fact that  
the more substantive and the more transitive parts run into each other continuously, there is in 
general no separateness needing to be overcome by an external cement… Experience itself, 
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taken at large, can grow by its edges… one moment of it proliferates into the next by transitions 
which, whether conjunctive or disjunctive, continue the experiential tissue.106 
The significant point for the present enquiry is that the complexity of the world subsists, 
not only in the sheer volume of disparate phenomena, but also in the fact that experience 
is forever transmuting; and human beings are not equipped to understand such a world 
without mediation.  Hence, as James put it, ‘It is an order with which we have nothing 
to do but to get away from it as fast as possible.’ 107  In describing what he meant when 
he spoke of getting away from the chaos of sensory experience, James went on to speak 
of how concepts are imposed upon the world: 
we break it: we break it into histories, and we break it into arts, and we break it into sciences; 
and then we begin to feel at home. We make ten thousand separate serial orders of it. On any one 
of these, we may react as if the rest did not exist. We discover among its parts regulations that 
were never given to sense at all, - mathematical relations, tangents, squares, and roots and 
logarithmic functions, - and out of an infinite number of these we call certain ones essential and 
lawgiving, and ignore the rest. 108 
In James’s thought, ‘percepts are singulars that change incessantly and never return 
exactly as they were before.  This brings an element of concrete novelty into our 
experience.  This novelty finds no representation in the conceptual method…’109  
Concepts ‘are post-mortem preparations, sufficient only for retrospective understanding; 
and when we use them to define the universe prospectively we ought to realize that they 
can give only a bare abstract outline or approximate sketch, in the filling out of which 
perception must be invoked.’110  For James, ‘Percepts and concepts interpenetrate and 
melt together, impregnate and fertilize each other.  Neither, taken alone, knows reality 
in its completeness.  We need them both, as we need both our legs to walk with.’111  
James acknowledged that such an approach could seem to be a retrograde step.  
Summing up his position (whilst also acknowledging the influence Henri Bergson’s 
philosophy had on him in the last eight years of his life), he wrote: 
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We are so subject to the philosophic tradition which treats logos or discursive thought generally 
as the sole avenue to truth, that to fall back on raw unverbalized life as more of a revealer, and to 
think of concepts as the merely practical things which Bergson calls them, comes very hard.  It is 
putting off our proud maturity of mind and becoming again as foolish little children in the eyes 
of reason.  But difficult as such a revolution is, there is no other way, I believe, to the possession 
of reality…112 
Thus far in this discussion of radical empiricism there has been nothing that would 
preclude the Peircean conclusion that – in the face of a wild and unknowable reality – 
the wisest course is for philosophy to cede epistemological authority to science.  The 
issue on which James’s thought departs from that of Peirce emerges in the next sub-
section. 
 
7.7.3 Personal Responsiveness as a Quality of the Given Order 
 
As has already been seen, James regarded contemporary science as extremely useful; 
his only quarrel was with the claims sometimes made by its advocates that it held a 
monopoly on truth.  He characterised his philosophy as opposed to the view that 
‘Reality... stands ready-made and complete, and our intellects supervene with the one 
simple duty of describing it as it is already.’113  The pragmatist conception – in James’s 
account – was that ‘The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final 
touches at our hands.  Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers human violence willingly.  
Man engenders truths upon it.’114  This is a corollary of James’s pluralistic pantheism, 
discussed in the preceding chapter of this thesis – the individual cannot ultimately be 
separated from the universe in which (s)he lives.  Hence, in Barnard’s words, ‘What 
James did was to claim that the connectivity that is present within our consciousness is 
not limited to the confines of our consciousness, but is also an inherent ontological 
quality of the universe itself.’115 
If this is extrapolated to astrology, it portrays a basis upon which astrology-as-
divination could function, with the various (apparently incompatible) methodologies of 
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astrologers eliciting more or less equally effective responses from the cosmos because 
‘the miracle of miracles, a miracle not yet exhaustively cleared up by any philosophy, is 
that the given order lends itself to…remodelling. It shows itself plastic to many of our 
scientific, to many of our æsthetic, to many of our practical purposes and ends.’116   
It may seem at this point as though James’s approach would inevitably lead to a 
relativistic approach wherein ‘truth’ would be an entirely individual matter.  But he was 
also aware of, and strove to preclude, this eventuality, remarking on ‘the presence of 
resisting factors in every actual experience of truth-making, of which the new-made 
special truth must take account, and with which it perforce has to “agree”.’117  For 
James, ‘there is something in every experience that escapes our arbitrary control... There 
is a push, an urgency, within our experience, against which we are on the whole 
powerless...’118  Barnard summarised James’s position: ‘we discover the world as much 
as much as we create it... the world seems to come to us containing certain inherent 
tendencies, patterns, and consistencies.’119   
The participatory relationship between an individual and the world in which they live is, 
therefore, central to James’s epistemology.  For James, as Knapp puts it, ‘One half of 
knowing was grounded in personal experience… because knowledge manifested an 
irreducible subjective quality.  That is, reaching objective knowledge of any given 
phenomenon depended to a degree on how any one individual actually experienced 
it.’120  From this it follows that there can be no absolute distinction between ontology 
and epistemology; the only basis we have for talking of how things are, is the stream of 
experience which is inherently non-dual – ‘pure experience’ to use James’s term.  
Radical empiricism is therefore both epistemology and ontology.  On this basis James 
argued that science should not be regarded as having supplanted divination: he 
contended that ‘the verdict of pure insanity, of gratuitous preference for error, of 
superstition without an excuse, which the scientists of our day are led by their 
intellectual training to pronounce upon the entire thought of the past, is a most shallow 
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verdict.’121  And amongst the ‘thought of the past’ he included the belief  ‘that events 
may happen for the sake of their personal significance… the notions of our grandfathers 
about oracles and omens, divinations and apparitions, miraculous changes of heart and 
wonders worked by inspired persons, answers to prayer and providential leadings’.122  
Support may be taken therefore, from James’s thought, for the possibility that astrology-
as-divination could be true. 
What has been presented thus far has been a primarily theoretical outline of radical 
empiricism.  In the next two sub-sections I will present some practical applications 
which illustrate the relevance of radical empiricism to astrology. 
 
7.7.4  The Mind-Cure 
 
James used, and advocated, what he dubbed the ‘Mind-cure’ – also known as ‘New 
Thought’, a movement primarily shaped by Phineas Quimby (1802 – 66).123  James 
characterised it as having at its core a ‘belief in the all-saving power of healthy-minded 
attitudes as such, in the conquering efficacy of courage, hope, and trust, and a 
correlative contempt for doubt, fear, worry, and all nervously precautionary states of 
mind.’124  Mary Baker Eddy (1821 – 1910) was a patient of Quimby and her ‘Christian 
Science’ was influenced by his approach.125  The movement was popularised in the 
twentieth century by writers such as Dale Carnegie (1888 – 1955) and Norman Vincent 
Peale (1898 – 1993).  Both Carnegie and Peale discussed William James’s presentation 
of the ‘Mind-cure’ in their works, and the title of Peale’s book The Power of Positive 
Thinking supplied the term by which the movement is now probably best known.126 
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James twice argued in public fora, in 1894 and 1898, against proposed legislature in 
Massachusetts that would have made it illegal to practise the Mind-cure.127  As Donald 
F. Duclow observed, James was motivated to involve himself in this way largely from 
concern that whilst the Mind-cure was genuinely helping people, ‘medical regulars 
denounced these methods without bothering to consider the evidence.’128  This 
illustrates the primacy he assigned to pragmatic considerations in evaluations of self-
help practices that lacked the imprimatur of science.  For the present thesis, the question 
naturally arises whether a Jamesian case for practising astrology could reasonably be 
extrapolated from this.  Whilst – as is evident by now – there are many elements in 
James’s thought that are congenial to astrology, the extrapolation is by no means 
certain.  For instance, regarding the Mind-cure practitioners, James wrote: ‘I am not 
fond and cannot understand a word of their jargon except their precept of assuming 
yourself well and claiming health rather than sickness which I am sure is 
magnificent.’129  It seems likely on this basis that, had he evaluated astrology, his focus 
would have been on its impact on the lives of individuals – an issue to which I will 
return in section 7.8.2 below. 
James suffered from depression – albeit, as Richardson remarked, ‘a kind of 
depression… that can be accompanied by a paradoxical but real gain in insight.’130  His 
belief in the mind-cure was therefore a matter of direct personal evaluation.  He 
summed it up as follows: 
Live as if I were true, she says, and every day will practically prove you right.  That the 
controlling energies of nature are personal, that your own personal thoughts are forces, that the 
powers of the universe will directly respond to your individual appeals and needs, are 
propositions which your whole bodily and mental experience will verify.131 
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This is an account of intimacy – in James’s sense, developed in the previous chapter – 
with a responsive cosmos, which is to say that it is substantially the same model as that 
on which astrology-as-divination is predicated.132   
Protagonists and critics of astrology often agree that positive thinking is relevant to 
astrology, but disagree why that is the case.  In listing the reasoning errors which might 
account for astrology seeming to work, Dean et al included positive thinking and 
equated it to ‘the Pollyanna principle’.133  According to the ‘Pollyanna Principle’, ‘We 
typically process pleasant items more accurately and efficiently than unpleasant or 
neutral items, and we tend to make positive judgments about a wide variety of people, 
events, situations, and objects.’134 
This is not the same as positive thinking, or the Mind-cure, as James defined it.  The 
idea behind positive thinking is that a positive attitude helps to create positive 
outcomes, whereas the Pollyanna Principle amounts only to misremembering.  The 
conflation of the two presupposes an absolute distinction between subjective and 
objective, discussed in section 7.5 above, which is precisely what is challenged by 
James’s radical empiricism.  This issue is explored further, with a change of examples, 
in the following section.  
 
7.7.5  Psi, Magic and the Placebo Effect 
 
There is considerable overlap in the definitions of psi, magic, and the placebo effect.  In 
the previous chapter I cited Krippner’s definition of psi phenomena as (in part) 
‘organism-environment interactions in which… information or influence has occurred 
that can not be explained through science’s understanding of sensory-motor 
channels.’135  Dennis D. Carpenter commented, ‘This definition of psi phenomena can 
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also be regarded as an appropriate description of magic as I understand it.’136  In an 
attack on James’s pragmatic thought, which he regarded as leading to subjectivism, and 
in particular on James’s use of ‘satisfaction’ as a criterion of truth, Durkheim described 
a magic ritual: 
The initial idea may be false, and yet satisfaction nevertheless be obtained.  Let us suppose, for 
example, that a sane man has been persuaded that the physical distress he is afflicted with is due 
to the fact that evil spirits have entered into his body (a case which is common in certain 
primitive societies).  He is given an unpleasant substance which, he is assured, will drive away 
the spirits which are tormenting him.  He believes this, and is cured.  The result is certainly the 
one expected, and is even the ‘suitable’ one.  Nevertheless, the idea was false.137  
Durkheim’s conclusion can be compared to Smit’s analysis of astrology as a practice 
which works, but which is not true.  As a critique of James’s thought, it exemplifies the 
failing (previously remarked in Ayer’s analysis) that the notion of an independently-
existing material reality is smuggled in and James’s thought – which would deny that 
such a thing exists in the first place – disproved thereby.  A relevant term here is the 
placebo effect, whereby ‘the patient’s belief in the effectiveness of a drug or treatment 
often brings about a cure or improvement in itself’.138  Durkheim’s description, above, 
characterised the ritual to expel evil spirits as – in effect – a placebo.   
Although James did not write about the placebo effect by name, it can be seen as an 
aspect of the Mind-cure’s emphasis on the power of mind.  Further, a passage from a 
letter he wrote in 1864 – when he was training to be a medical doctor – shows sympathy 
for the underlying idea.  Of his medical training he wrote, ‘My first impressions are that 
there is much humbug therein, and that, with the exception of surgery, in which 
something positive is sometimes accomplished, a doctor does more by the moral effect 
of his presence on the patient and the family, than by anything else.’139  The professor 
of bioethics Franklin G. Miller has suggested that ‘[James’s] psychology and 
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philosophy are remarkably well suited for elucidating the placebo effect and its 
implications for medicine’.140   
The idea of astrology as a placebo is sometimes used by critics of astrology.  Thus Dean 
gave the placebo effect – which he defined as ‘it does us good if we think it does’ – as 
one of numerous ‘reasoning errors’ that lead to and perpetuate belief in astrology.141  
Culver and Ianna suggested that ‘the placebo effect can work in astrology.  Just as 
taking a harmless sugar pill may “cure” an illness if you think you are taking the proper 
drug, believing astrology works may lead to beneficial good feeling in the client.’142   
In a similar way to that seen in the previous section in the conflation of positive 
thinking and the Pollyanna effect, the contentions of Dean, and Culver and Ianna, 
presuppose the validity of an absolute split between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ and use 
the placebo effect as a synonym for the former, even though it might be seen as 
undermining any such distinction.  For so long as it is accepted that the placebo effect 
belongs only on the side of the mind and the subjective, the impact of the term in a 
discussion of astrology is only to provide a synonym for ‘subjective astrology’.  
However, the placebo effect underscores the contentious nature of any distinction 
between subjective and objective and in this capacity provides a precedent in scientific 
analysis for James’s suggestion that the subjective and the objective are not ultimately 
separable.  Hence Harrington’s remark: 
The problems raised for medicine by placebo phenomena... are not only ethical: they are also 
epistemological. Placebos are the ghosts that haunt our house of biomedical objectivity, the 
creatures that rise up from the dark and expose the paradoxes and fissures in our own self-
created definitions of the real and active factors in treatment.143 
This perspective is supported by Drs. Daniel E. Moerman and Wayne B. Jonas’s 
contention that ‘the most recent serious attempt to try logically to define the placebo 
effect failed utterly’, and suggestion that a recent attempt at a rigorous definition ‘makes 
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no sense whatsoever. Indeed, it flies in the face of the obvious’ insofar as its central 
concept is an effect produced by something which supposedly cannot have any effect.144   
The relevance, to divination, of the puzzle posed by the placebo emerged in a discussion 
by C. A. Meier (1905 – 1995).  He remarked that ‘It seems unintelligible to us how the 
psyche can produce an arrangement in the physis, no matter whether the physis is intra 
corpus (cf. psychosomatic symptoms) or extra corpus, i.e. whether it is part of the 
subject or not.’145  He went on to give as an example of the latter type (i.e. the mind of 
the individual affecting physical objects outside the individual’s body) ‘all forms of 
divination’, with the specific example of the I Ching where it might be assumed that the 
psyche somehow influenced the fall of the yarrow stalks in order to create a specific 
hexagram.146  Meier however found such causal explanations inadequate as a way of 
understanding either divination or the mind-body relationship in medicine, and therefore 
suggested that ‘in view of the failure of causal explanations, the psycho-physical 
functioning should be interpreted synchronistically’.147   
The dilemma raised by placebo phenomena is therefore, in Meier’s view, a part of the 
greater dilemma of how mind and matter – were they entirely disparate – could interact 
at all.  This issue was epitomised by Kant when he remarked, ‘that my will moves my 
arm is not more intelligible to me than if somebody said to me that he could stop the 
moon in his orbit’.148  Such a mind/matter dichotomy was challenged – as discussed in 
the previous chapter – by James’s conception of ‘pure experience’ and Jung’s ‘unus 
mundus’, both of which deny ontological validity to such a dichotomy.  In Meier’s 
analysis therefore there is a connection between placebo phenomena and divination, in 
that both of them can and should be understood as manifestations of synchronicity.  
This would require an understanding of synchronicity as more ubiquitous than Jung 
generally intended.  Thus, in reporting his discussions with Meier, Jung remarked that 
‘the relation between body and soul may yet be understood as a synchronistic one.  
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Should this conjecture ever be proved, my present view that synchronicity is a relatively 
rare phenomenon would have to be corrected.’149  Both senses of ‘synchronicity’ can be 
accommodated within James’s philosophy, with the sense of occasional subjectively 
significant happenings manifesting what he termed ‘providence’ and the underlying 
non-duality being ‘pure experience’. 
In summary, James’s philosophy of radical empiricism is an approach which can 
highlight and resolve issues faced by dualistic philosophies.  This is potentially a 
congenial context for an understanding of astrology-as-divination, which – under 
James’s pragmatic definition of truth – could then be judged true if and to the extent 
that it worked.  This evokes the question of whether, in fact, astrology works. 
 
7.8 Does Astrology Work? 
 
In this section I will consider two issues which challenge the assertion that astrology 
works, and could therefore preclude any deduction along the lines that astrology is true 
because it works.  In section 7.8.1 I will look at the possibility that if something works, 
it would not be accurate to call it astrology.  In section 7.8.2 I will discuss the question, 
if and how astrology can be useful in the life of an individual. 
 
7.8.1 The Planet Question and ‘Wrong Charts’ 
 
Curry’s definition of astrology, cited in chapter one and in section 7.5 above, refers to 
‘the practice of relating the heavenly bodies to lives and events on earth…’.150  In the 
previous chapter, Ertel’s suggestion was considered – that when astrology seems to 
work, this should be attributed to ‘paranormal intuitions of psi-gifted astrologers.’151  
The contentions of Rollo May and Thomas Moore, cited earlier, that astrology is – 
respectively – a ‘myth’ and ‘a form of imagination’ have a similar consequence, 
namely, that whatever it is that works has only a tenuous relationship to astrology.152  If 
the actual astronomical locations of heavenly bodies for the time(s) under consideration 
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are not involved, then it can reasonably be asked whether – under Curry’s definition – 
whatever it is that works, is astrology. 
This question is brought into sharp focus by the common experience amongst 
astrologers of finding after an accurate and well-received horoscopic reading that a 
‘wrong chart’ had been used – that is, a chart calculated for a time or date which did not 
belong to the astrological client.  Rudolf Smit had an experience of this type, where he 
gave a successful reading to a client and then found that he had used the wrong person’s 
chart.  He cited the experience as one that encouraged him to begin questioning the truth 
of astrology. 153  Similarly, David Hamblin gave a successful reading for a client, who 
subsequently realised that he had been born in a different year.154  As was the case with 
Smit, this caused Hamblin to question the truth of astrology.  In a recent thesis, Keith 
Burke cited the ‘wrong chart’ experience of Hamblin and a similar one for Peter 
Niehenke (involving a successful interpretation based on a chart with an error of 20 
years in the birth date) and then added, ‘I had the same “wrong chart” experience’.155  
Further examples could be adduced and in fact the experience is sufficiently ubiquitous 
that Cornelius, after describing a ‘wrong chart’ experience of his own asked, ‘Which 
astrologer is there who has not had this experience, or one very similar?’156  A similar 
estimate of the experience’s frequency came from Alie Bird who argued that 
astrology’s inherent magic really comes to the fore in cases where what later transpires to have 
been the ‘wrong’ chart works; not only works, but works far, far better than the ‘right’ chart 
would have done.  I would suggest that all experienced astrologers have examples of this 
phenomenon in their portfolios.157 
Bird went on to comment on how the ‘wrong chart’ issue divides astrologers.  She 
remarked that it has become ‘an adjunct to the “astrology is divination” camp; never 
will it be openly acknowledged in the “astrology is an unproved science” group’.158  
The problem posed by these cases brings into focus the two perspectives to which I 
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have returned throughout this thesis, astrology-as-divination and astrology-as-science.  
The polarisation between these options has at its heart a disagreement on what it means 
to say that astrology works, and therefore how and if astrology is true.  In chapter 2 of 
this thesis I cited Cornelius’s contention that ‘the horoscopes we work with are not 
astronomical records of an event in the physical world.  They are symbols in a world of 
human significance.’159  By distancing horoscopy from astronomy, he thereby opened 
up the theoretical possibility that a ‘wrong chart’ could work – insofar as a wrong chart 
could still be a collection of symbols in a world of human significance.  This raises the 
question of whether – if this approach works – it would follow that astrology worked, 
and was therefore pragmatically true.  It is by no means clear that, in such a case, the 
heavenly bodies are being related to life on Earth.  If they are not, Curry’s definition of 
‘astrology’ would not be met, and it would be necessary to take the position proposed 
by Ertel – that what transpires when ‘astrology’ is practised would be more accurately 
described as psi.160 
Although the possible validity of ‘wrong charts’ tends to undermine the scientific ideal 
of one-to-one correspondences between astronomical events and life on Earth, it does 
not necessarily destroy all such relationship.  When I interviewed Cornelius I 
questioned whether astrology would work as well if astrological software created 
randomised locations for planets, rather than calculating astronomically accurate 
positions for a given time.  He acknowledged that there was some basis for the question, 
given that astrologers  ‘get correct readings from wrong maps, on sufficient occasions 
for it to be, clearly, an astrological phenomenon.’161  He did not, however, think that a 
randomised approach would ultimately be effective: 
it is so ruthlessly undermining of the status of astrology that it can become an unskilful means – 
as if we could just pick a moment in an ephemeris, and that would be as true as a genuine horary 
moment that has come to us; no, it is not. But the genuine horary moment that comes to us hasn’t 
become true because of physical planets at a certain time and space, either. It’s subtle!162 
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Cornelius went on to refer to ‘the ritual of attending the world around us, which is given 
in the physical planets, and the ephemeris, and the time and space.’163  The idea of a 
ritual component in astrology, which brings its own requirements, was also put forward 
by Curry when he argued: 
The astrologer’s work would be impossible without a notion of truth that is ultimately as 
demanding and precise, and potentially possesses as much integrity in his or her own sphere, as 
the corresponding notion for scientists in theirs.  And the attempt to work with the appropriate 
kind of accurate data is as much, and as important, a requirement for astrologers as it is for 
scientific experimentation.  But... it is a ritual requirement.164 
This perspective is compatible with James’s philosophy, wherein the mental orientation 
and mental actions of the individual play a co-creative role in shaping reality as it 
unfolds – ‘co-creative’ because, as cited in section 7.7.3, ‘the world seems to come to us 
containing certain inherent tendencies, patterns, and consistencies.’165  The practical 
consequences of this for an astrologer can be illustrated through Bernard Eccles’s 
perspective: 
a wrong chart, if it is not known to be wrong, will yield very valid astrology, excellent 
symbolism, and indeed predictive qualities – until the very second that you discover it’s the 
wrong chart, calculated for three years too soon or whatever.  At that point your ‘wrong chart’ 
collapses, and your next chart springs into being – and can be read from that point forwards.166 
This is supported by the experience the astrologer Judy Hall described in her interview.  
She reported that she had used a birth time for herself for almost thirty years that turned 
out to be wrong by about two hours.  She continued, ‘I have to say that the first chart 
‘fitted’ my experience up to that point, and the second my experiences since.  This is 
something I cannot explain.  It doesn’t make me doubt but it does incline me towards 
the divination theory rather than the scientific one.’167   
The consequence of this discussion is that the quality of responsiveness that is 
sometimes attributed to the universe in explaining astrology is pervasive, so that – for 
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instance – the fact of an astrologer miscalculating a chart or being in a bad mood would 
be subsumed within the astrological process.  In this way the subjective involvement 
and attitude of the astrologer, far from being something to be eliminated before 
astrology could be assessed, would be an integral part of astrology.   
This was believed to be the case by at least some astrologers before astrology-as-science 
had become the dominant paradigm in the west.  For instance, William Lilly advised the 
‘student in astrology’ that ‘... the more holy thou art; and more near to God, the purer 
Judgement thou shalt give.’168  Guido Bonatti (C13th CE) wrote that before 
approaching an astrologer, a person ‘ought to pray to the Lord God… that it should fall 
to him to reach to an understanding of the truth of those things about which he intends 
to ask’; further, the intention to ask should be something which ‘he retains in his heart 
for a day and a night (or more), not touched by just any motion of the mind’.169 
Such beliefs were in evidence amongst some of the astrologers I interviewed.  For 
instance Jessica Adams said of her preparations to write her Sun-sign columns for 
Cosmopolitan magazine, ‘I absolutely, sincerely, commit myself to every single line 
that I write: I light a candle, ring a Tibetan temple bell and ask for assistance from Tara, 
who is the Tibetan goddess of compassion.’170  She added that her approach is 
‘basically influenced by what I learned about the way Lilly worked’.171 Nicola Smuts-
Allsop told me ‘I have noticed that the more serious the question, the more pure the 
intent, the more close to the heart it is, and the more relevant and meaningful it is to the 
person, the better my reading, the more meaningful the interchange.’172  On the issue of 
wrong charts, Smuts-Allsop said, 
I don’t particularly have a problem with the ‘wrong chart’ issue at all.  Because I believe that 
there are actually three people in the room – there’s you, me, and God and it doesn’t actually 
matter what chart you give me, so long as I believe it’s the right chart, I’ll work with any chart.  
So when people ring me up and say, ‘I’m not sure when I was born…’  I say, ‘Pick a time and 
don’t round it off’.  That focuses them, and I then use that time.  I come from South Africa, 
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where we have a strong feeling for astrology as divination, and not as an empirical science, and 
we are brought up in a cultural milieu where people read omens in the throwing of bones or in 
chicken entrails.  So the idea that a chart, too, is an omen is not foreign to me.173 
This integration of momentary thought and circumstance into interpretation may be 
considered to subsist in the basic concept of horary astrology.  Horary, introduced in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, is based on the assumption that a horoscope drawn for the time 
and place at which a question comes to an astrologer’s attention will contain relevant 
guidance.  The position that seems to emerge here with regard to ‘wrong charts’ is that a 
responsive, providential cosmos might at times interpolate into the life of astrologer and 
client a chart which is astronomically wrong, but appropriate in terms of meaning.  And 
that this possibility coexists with, rather than supplanting, the significance of 
astronomical bodies as they are actually positioned. 
John Frawley once wrote that ‘it is an inescapable consequence of the very premises of 
horary that the judgment given will be the right one, whether it be ‘correct’ or not.  
What happens happens.’174  I asked him to elucidate, and he replied: 
If the q[uestion] can fall only at its appropriate time, it must fall also at its appropriate place - i.e. 
onto the head of the appropriate astrologer in whatever state of good or bad form he is in at that 
moment. As Al-Ghazali says… every raindrop has its own angel appointed to guide it to its 
destined place (i.e. the essence of the life of that thing, whether a raindrop or a question or a 
human, can unfold only as it is destined to unfold).175 
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Cornelius articulated a similar position when he wrote of astrologers’ ‘trust in the nature 
of reality’, contending that ‘Astrologers have an innate trust that what is shown and 
understood, is good to be shown and understood.’176 
Under the account of astrology-as-divination presented here, the relationship of the 
planets to life on Earth would not be the one-to-one correspondence between planet and 
event, or character trait, that many astrological clients, and indeed astrologers, might 
assume to be the case.  It would not qualify as astrology under the definitions of some 
commentators – for instance the definition of David Pingree already cited in chapter 1 
of this thesis, that ‘astrology’ entails the idea that ‘the planets, in their eternal rotations 
about the earth, transmit motion (change) to the four elements and to the assemblages of 
elements, animate and inanimate, in the sublunar world.’177  If astrology is defined in 
this way – by a causal connection between horoscopic bodies and life on Earth – then 
what I have described as astrology-as-divination would not qualify as astrology.  Under 
such a definition, it would be entirely within the competence of science to evaluate 
whether or not astrology worked and was therefore true.  In this thesis I have taken an 
approach which allows a broader definition of astrology.  This should not however 
exclude the consideration that astrology often is thought of as a causal system.  One 
consequence of this, which is discussed in the following sub-section, is that the 
assumption of a causal model can have an impact on the question of whether astrology 
works. 
 
7.8.2 Experiential Evaluations of Astrology’s Utility  
Astrologers sometimes acknowledge that specific instances of astrological work are 
neither useful nor true.  For instance Dane Rudhyar wrote: ‘Since I started writing on 
astrology in 1933 (over 1,000 articles and some 25 books ago), I have received many 
letters from people telling me how fearful or psychologically confused they had become 
after consulting even a well-known astrologer and being given biased character analyses 
and/or predictions of illness, catastrophe, or even death.’178  
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The possibility that harm may come from astrology has been recognised for at least two 
millennia.  Thus Cicero, in his discussion of divination – of which he understood 
judicial astrology to be one form - wrote:  ‘I do not even think that the knowledge of 
futurity would be useful to us.  How miserable would have been the life of King Priam 
if from his youth he could have foreseen the calamities which awaited his old age!’179  
In this case the prediction itself would have been accurate, but its consequences 
detrimental to the individual.  It is also possible to consider that such prophecies may be 
self-fulfilling.  For instance in a letter written to a friend in 1640, Descartes criticised a 
specific astrological reading for the astronomer Martin Hortensius:  
Hortensius was in Italy for several years, got mixed up in having his horoscope done, and said to 
two young men of that country who were with him, that he would die in the year 1639, and told 
them they would not live for very long thereafter: now he died that summer, as you know, and 
those two young men were then in such a state of fear that one of them is already now dead; and 
the other, who is the son of Heinsius, is languishing and so sad as to make it seem that astrology 
was not wrong.  What a wonderful science, that serves to kill people who perhaps wouldn't have 
been ill without it!180 
The possibility that astrology could cause harm in such ways can be accommodated in 
James’s philosophy as the creative power of thought being applied in a detrimental way.  
An excerpt from a contemporary post by ‘BrokenHearted88’ on the forum of an 
Australian support service for anxiety and depression illustrate the continuing potential 
for astrology to have a detrimental effect on the life of an individual: ‘I have recently 
realized that I have developed an addiction to astrology… I use horoscopes, tarot 
readings, angel card reading & yes/no Q&A apps to decide how I feel, what I should do 
and what other people must be feeling about me.  I am using these in an obsessive 
way…’.181  The issues described by BrokenHearted88 could be understood, in 
psychiatric terms, as ‘dependent personality disorder’ – the first two diagnostic criteria 
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for which are that an individual ‘Has difficulty making everyday decisions without an 
excessive amount of advice and reassurance from others’, and ‘Needs others to assume 
responsibility for most major areas of his or her life.’182  Insofar as BrokenHearted88 
sought absolution from personal responsibility through astrology, Augustine’s criticism 
would be relevant:  
sweet it is to praise the Lord and say “Have mercy on me; bring healing to a soul that has sinned 
against you”… This truth is our whole salvation, but the astrologers try to do away with it.  They 
tell us that the cause of sin is determined in the heavens and we cannot escape it, and that this or 
that is the work of Venus or Saturn or Mars.183   
Astrologers have long been aware that astrology might harm instead of helping.  Thus 
for example Lilly exhorted astrologers, ‘afflict not the miserable with terror of a harsh 
judgment; in such cases, let them know their hard fate by degrees; direct them to call on 
God to divert his judgments impending over them’184  The ethical codes of 
contemporary astrological organisations often urge a similarly sensitive approach upon 
their members.  For instance the National Council for Geocosmic Research (NCGR) 
states that ‘Astrologers do not make astrological statements, predictions or forecasts in 
the course of the solicitation of clients or students that are misleading either in their 
optimism or their negativity, or that are frightening or intimidating.’185  The 
International Society for Astrological Research (ISAR) posits ‘the prime directive that 
supersedes all other ethics: do no harm’, and continues, ‘Never needlessly frighten a 
client with extreme predictions, nor create false hopes in a client, and always affirm that 
every astrological configuration can manifest in a variety of ways.’186 
In the previous chapter I elaborated on the conflicting ideas of astrology as either an 
information retrieval system, or as dialogue with a responsive cosmos.  These are 
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relevant here, since the picture emerging is that the potential for astrology to cause 
psychological difficulties may arise upon the view that it delivers objective information.  
The ‘information retrieval’ view of astrology was epitomised by Dean et al when they 
postulated ‘a world where astrology works to the extent claimed in astrology books’.187  
As emerges in the following quotation they regarded their postulated world as a 
reductio ad absurdum: 
Hunger and hardship have disappeared because economic trends and climate are predictable.  
Science has disappeared because horary astrology answers any question.  So has competitive 
sport for the same reason.  Cars and planes are hazard-free because assembly times conducive to 
accidents are routinely avoided.  Crime, war, illness and divorce are unknown because 
predictable.  Every person is empowered, self-actualised, spiritually enlightened, and knows 
their individual purpose and direction.  Abuse of astrological knowledge is prevented by 
restricting it to those whose charts reveal due merit.  This is astrology world.  Now compare 
astrology world with the actual world.  Bearing in mind that astrology has had two thousand 
years to get it right, can we conclude that it really does deliver?  Probably not.188 
Whilst it is valid as a critique of many of the more exuberant claims to be found in 
astrology books, I suggest that Dean et al’s discussion of ‘astrology world’ can equally 
function as a critique of the views that are commonly brought to bear by critics of 
astrology, including themselves.  ‘Astrology world’ is the apotheosis of the view of 
astrology as an information-retrieval system, from which all trace of subjective 
involvement is absent.  Since all things are known in advance, it must be impossible for 
the individual to participate in and change the world, or even their own life.  In light of 
the experiences from astrological clients reported in this sub-section, it must be open to 
question whether this would in fact be a world in which astrology worked or was useful 
in James’s understanding of those terms; it seems as though it might be a dystopia rather 
than a utopia for at least some of its citizens.  I turn now to a Jamesian critique of this 
state of affairs. 
‘Astrology world’ exemplifies James’s description of ‘rationalistic philosophy’ which 
‘has always aspired to a rounded-in view of the whole of things, a closed system of 
kinds, from which the notion of essential novelty being possible is ruled out in 
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advance.’189  He compared this to empiricism as he understood it, under which ‘reality 
cannot be thus confined by a conceptual ring-fence.  It overflows, exceeds, and alters.  It 
may turn into novelties, and can be known adequately only by following its singularities 
from moment to moment as experience grows.’190 
In chapter 2 I quoted Curry’s assertion that, in astrology, ‘every prediction is also an 
intervention’, and his deduction that ‘this truth precludes any fantasies of perfect and 
complete foreknowledge’.191  This perspective insists on the existence of novelty in 
human experience.  It is therefore in conflict with the assumptions which inform 
‘astrology world’, chief amongst them being the implicit assumption of a ‘view from 
nowhere’ – which, as was seen in chapter 1, is Thomas Nagel’s caricature of the 
viewpoint needed for entirely objective knowledge.  A precursor of the ‘view from 
nowhere’ can be seen James’s assertion that ‘The truth is too great for any one actual 
mind, even though that mind be dubbed ‘the Absolute’, to know the whole of it.  The 
facts and worths of life need many cognizers to take them in.  There is no point of view 
absolutely public and universal.’192   
In the previous chapter of this thesis I discussed James’s insistence that ‘the only God 
worthy of the name must be finite’.193  This was another way in which James denied the 
existence of an ‘Absolute’, however conceived.  As Pawelski remarked, for James, ‘God 
must be small enough to leave us room for meaningful contributions’.194  Further, ‘Just 
as the theistic God is too big to allow for the meaning James seeks, he is also too big to 
satisfy James’s need for intimacy.  Because he is independent of us, he cannot be 
affected by our prayers or moved by our pleas for aid.’195  The connection I want to 
make here is that ‘astrology world’ casts astrology in the role of an Absolute, defining 
life on Earth to the last detail and – therefore – denying the possibility of human beings 
finding either meaning or intimacy.  If astrology is to be compatible with James’s 
philosophy, it would need to be finite in a similar way to James’s finite God.  That is to 
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say that it would not be omniscient or omnipotent, and – in consequence – it might not 
always work. 
In my interview with Bernard Eccles I asked him if astrology always worked.  He said:  
No… There are times when it doesn’t work.  But that doesn’t rock my faith in astrology – it’s 
part of the mystery.  If it worked all the time, it would be too mechanistic.  It would be a reliable 
technology.  And one of the great things about astrology is that it is not a reliable technology...  I 
don’t want astrology to be like Meccano, with simple bits bolted together and a structure which 
is entirely understandable.  That’s not how it is; there has to be that mystery.  And if sometimes 
things are withheld from you, well, that’s the game.  But that’s the game with any kind of 
divination, I think.  You seek to penetrate this veil of unknowing; and sometimes you reach out 
into the fog and you get more fog!  That’s what makes it scary, and that’s what makes it – I 
won’t say ‘fun’, but it makes you realise that you are dealing with something.  It’s an essential 
quality in life.  If life was entirely predictable and knowable, mechanical in that sense, then I 
think you’d die of boredom.  So for astrology not to work every so often is quite good!196 
Eccles’s account characterises the way astrology works as unpredictable, 
unquantifiable, even idiosyncratic.  These qualities are reminiscent of several of the 
descriptions of divination in the previous chapter of this thesis.  The question remaining 
to be answered in this section is, what – under this account of astrology – would it 
mean, at a practical level, to say that ‘astrology works’?    
Rafael Nasser compiled a book entitled Under One Sky in which he presented detailed 
interpretations from twelve astrologers of the horoscope of one lady, to whom he 
assigned the pseudonym ‘Joyce’.197  I asked him what Joyce had found useful in the 
readings and he replied: ‘She appreciated most the insights that reverberated at a core 
level and expanded her self understanding. In other words, the interpretations that 
engendered a sense of meaning had a relatively stronger impact on her.’198  In similar 
vein, Rudhyar argued, ‘If, after having studied astrology and his exactly calculated birth 
chart, a person for the first time… is able to feel a direction and purpose inherent in his 
life as an individual… then astrology is “existentially proven” to be effective in this 
particular case.  It “works” – for him.’199 
                                                          
196 Bernard Eccles, interview, 2005. 
197 Rafael Nasser, Rafael, Jodie Forrest (ed.), Under One Sky (Chapel Hill, NC: Seven Paws Press, 2004). 
198 Rafael Nasser, email to the author 2nd August 2013, quoted with permission. 
199 Rudhyar, ‘How Can Astrology’s Claims Be Proven Valid’. 
 
295 
 
The argument that astrology can furnish a life with meaning was also made by Geoffrey 
Dean when (as seen above) he argued that astrology ‘provides meaning, it enriches life, 
it does good’. 200  This was made in the context, already discussed, of such qualities 
being subjective ‘satisfaction’ and not objective ‘accuracy’.201  When set in the context 
of pragmatic truth, however, a sense of meaning in life is not qualified in that way.  In 
addition to the description already given above of James’s understanding of ‘meaning’ 
as an ability to engage creatively with life, the following quotation can be added which 
illustrates this aspect of his thought: 
If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, 
it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will.  But it 
feels like a real fight – as if there were something really wild in the universe which we, with all 
our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem; and first of all to redeem our own hearts 
from atheisms and fears.  For such a half-wild, half-saved universe our nature is adapted.202  
Building on the discussion in this sub-section, it can be postulated that in order for 
astrology to work in a way that is congenial for human happiness and mental health, it 
may be necessary for it to be finite – to involve vaguenesses and lacunae which invite 
the individual’s engagement, rather than leaving them a spectator to their own life. 
 
7.9  Epistemic Pluralism  
 
Epistemic pluralism is opposed to a position that is commonly assumed in epistemology 
with little or no discussion.  Hence Pascal Engel contended that ‘One of the most 
common assumptions of contemporary epistemology is that… there is but one notion of 
truth, of justification, of rationality and of evidence.’203  He suggested the term 
‘epistemic monism’ for this approach.204  By contrast, ‘epistemic pluralism’ (also called 
‘truth pluralism’) is ‘the view that there are several ways of being true… in particular, 
different ways of being true apply to different domains of discourse.  The way in which 
                                                          
200 Dean, ‘Truth of Astrology Competition’, p.51.   
201 Dean, ‘Truth of Astrology Competition’, p.51.    
202 James, Will to Believe, p. 502. 
203 P. Engel, ‘A Plea for Epistemic Monism’ in: Annalisa Coliva and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen 
(eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan/Springer, 2017)  p. 96. 
204 Engel, ‘A Plea for Epistemic Monism’, p. 96. 
 
296 
 
propositions about physics are true could differ from the way in which the propositions 
of morality are true.’205 
Epistemic pluralism was recently described as ‘an emerging area of research in 
epistemology with dramatic implications for the discipline.’206  It is, however, 
substantially present in James’s work – as was noted by José M. Medina when he 
discussed James’s pluralistic approach in which ‘Different epistemic standpoints engage 
each other and enter into negotiations.’207  James himself argued that ‘Our account of 
truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realized in rebus, and 
having only this quality in common, that they pay.’208  Perhaps the most obvious 
example of this pluralism is found in the relationship (or lack thereof) between scientific 
and religious conceptions of truth which has been discussed throughout this thesis, 
particularly in chapters 5 and 6.  For James, 
Science gives to all of us telegraphy, electric lighting, and diagnosis, and succeeds in preventing 
and curing a certain amount of disease.  Religion in the shape of mind-cure gives to some of us 
serenity, moral poise, and happiness, and prevents certain forms of disease as well as science 
does, or even better in a certain class of persons.  Evidently, then, the science and the religion are 
both of them genuine keys for unlocking the world’s treasure-house... Just as evidently neither is 
exhaustive or exclusive of the other’s simultaneous use.209 
In describing and elaborating on his position, Seigfried noted that for James: 
Correct interpretation requires a recognition of context, which includes the occasion for the 
discourse, the time and place as well as the audience addressed, and the universe of discourse, 
for example, sub-atomic particles as the ultimate data in the realm of physics and phonemes as 
the assumed basis for language development in linguistics.210  
A consequence of the difference in humanity’s potential range of experiences is that 
different theories of truth may apply with different levels of relevance in different 
situations.  Hence Lynch’s assertion that ‘Pluralist theories of truth have significant 
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advantages.  Most important, they account for the fact that every traditional theory of 
truth seems plausible in some domains but not in others.’211  A significant facet of 
James’s pragmatic theory of truth is that it can subsume, rather than replacing, other 
theories of truth.  This may be seen in regard to the correspondence theory of truth.  
James remarked that ‘every living man would instantly define right thinking as thinking 
in correspondence with reality.’212  He further argued, however, that the correspondence 
theory of truth needed to be fleshed out by pragmatic considerations: 
The pragmatizing epistemologist posits… a reality and a mind with ideas.  What, now, he asks, 
can make those ideas true of that reality?  Ordinary epistemology contents itself with the vague 
statement that the ideas must ‘correspond’ or ‘agree’; the pragmatist insists on being more 
concrete, and asks what such ‘agreement’ may mean in detail.  He finds first that the ideas must 
point to or lead towards that reality and no other, and then that the pointings and leadings must 
yield satisfaction as their result.213 
Although, as discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, the coherence theory had not emerged 
as a distinct theory of truth under that name during James’s lifetime, a case can be made 
for considering that his pragmatic approach could also have subsumed the coherence 
theory.  Continuing on from his discussion of the correspondence theory, James argued:  
As we humans are constituted in point of fact, we find that to believe in other men’s minds, in 
independent physical realities, in past events, in eternal logical relations, is satisfactory.  We find 
hope satisfactory.  We often find it satisfactory to cease to doubt.  Above all we find consistency 
satisfactory, consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, 
including the whole order of our sensations, and… our whole stock of previously acquired 
truths.214 
Given the propensity to find satisfaction in consistency; and given the pragmatic 
equation of satisfaction (in the long run) with truth, it would follow that the consistency 
of a proposition with a broader explanatory scheme would support the truth of the 
proposition.  I suggest that this shows the potential for a pragmatic theory of truth to 
include the principle of coherence.   
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Unless one wished to argue that the pragmatic theory of truth should be exempt from its 
own strictures – and I have not encountered such an argument in my research – it would 
follow that it should operate reflexively.  This is to say that in some situations – such as 
scientific tests – it would be more useful to characterise truth in terms of 
correspondence between a theory and data, than by expedience.  To do so would be 
expedient in that situation, and hence the pragmatic theory of truth would be present as 
an underlying principle, but would efface itself if and when correspondence was the 
most useful measure of truth.   
When James qualified the scope of ‘the expedient’, he also stated that he meant 
‘Expedient in almost any fashion’ and – as Johnson notes – this means that for James, 
‘the expedient’ ‘may perhaps be only the psychologically expedient’.215  This brings us 
back to the question, whether James’s entire conception of truth leads, despite his best 
intentions, to relativism. 
 
7.10  Relativism – an Evaluation  
 
As discussed in section 7.4, James’s account of pragmatic truth has been widely 
criticised as inherently relativistic.  Having surveyed the way in which pragmatism fits 
into James’s broader philosophy, I will now revisit that criticism.  In particular I will 
focus on the question of whether astrology, which has also been accused of fostering 
relativism, can be substantiated by a pragmatic theory of truth when they (allegedly) 
share this weakness.   
In chapter 3 I cited Kirkham’s definition of relativism: ‘The truth value of propositions 
varies from person to person.’216  Janet Radcliffe Richards’s discussion of astrology and 
relativism shows the type of challenge this can pose.  Assuming the position of devil’s 
advocate she put forward the argument that ‘Astrology should be taught in schools... 
Astrologers have as much right to be heard as anyone else.’217  In dismissing that 
position, she then wrote of ‘part-time relativists who want trained surgeons rather than 
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witch-doctors to operate on them’ and asserted that ‘relativism... cannot be used 
selectively, to discredit particular scientific claims.’218  In her view, astrologers invoke 
relativism to dismiss the scientific perspective on, and research into, astrology; and this 
is untenable because to dismiss science as the basis for truth in any area would be to 
dismiss all the benefits of science, such as modern surgery.  A similar argument, quoted 
by Radcliffe Richards, came from Richard Dawkins: ‘show me a cultural relativist at 
30,000 feet and I’ll show you a hypocrite’.219   
The basic trope of such arguments is an extrapolation from relativism to undesirable 
consequences, ranging from hypocrisy to avoidable pain or death.  It is predicated on 
the idea that relativism is innately indiscriminate, so that it would sweep away all the 
gains of modern science.  This characterisation can be challenged.  Because the 
perceived problem of relativism is tied in with the epistemological status of pragmatism 
and of astrology, I will devote some analysis to its status in the context of the three 
theories of truth, before proceeding to the question of how the term ‘relativism’ can be 
understood. 
The emphasis given by Radcliffe Richards and Dawkins to the importance of practical 
consequences may make it seem as if they would give primacy to the pragmatic theory 
of truth.  When examined, however, the position is not so straightforward.  This can be 
seen when, elaborating on his statement above, Dawkins added, ‘Airplanes built 
according to scientific principles work… Airplanes built to tribal or mythological 
specifications… don’t.’220  With this statement he conflated the pragmatic and 
coherence theories, assuming complete equivalence between coherence with scientific 
principles on one hand, and pragmatic functionality on the other, thereby omitting 
human involvement in the evolution and application of scientific theories.  Dawkins 
thus exemplified the approach criticised by Feyerabend: ‘The idea of a method that 
contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the 
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business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of 
historical research.’221 
Feyerabend’s point can be illustrated, using Dawkins’s example of aircraft design, with 
the example of the wing design of the Consolidated B-24 (‘Liberator’) bomber used 
extensively by the Allies during World War 2.  Regarding this wing, David Bloor 
observed: ‘When… the secret of its design was revealed, it turned out to have no 
intelligible relation to the laws of fluid dynamics.  The procedure was pseudoscientific 
hocus-pocus.’222  By contrast, a wing designed by Albert Einstein in conformity with 
the laws of fluid dynamics proved to be unusable in practice.223  In the first case, what 
worked did not cohere with science; in the second, what cohered with science did not 
work.  It could be objected that such instances are mere missteps in the forward march 
of a science that moves inexorably closer to a complete account of reality; this 
interpretation would (as seen in section 7.2 above) fit with Peirce’s conception of 
science’s role in human knowledge.  For James, on the other hand, science was finite in 
scope and its theories would always require interpretation and judicious application: ‘no 
hypothesis is truer than any other in the sense of being a more literal copy of reality.  
They are all but ways of talking on our part, to be compared solely from the point of 
view of their use.’224  At the conclusion of his investigation of the history of 
aerodynamics, Bloor arrived at a conclusion consistent with James’s: ‘we should not 
allow ourselves to think that, as these historical relativities are exposed, knowledge 
progressively sheds its relative character and moves closer to something absolute.  To 
cherish such a picture is to indulge in metaphysics.’225   
As discussed in section 7.8.2 above, a significant part of James’s philosophy consisted 
in a refutation of ‘rationalistic philosophy’ which offered ‘a rounded-in view of the 
whole of things, a closed system of kinds, from which the notion of essential novelty 
being possible is ruled out in advance.’226  Even if one believes, contra James, in the 
possibility of a perfected and comprehensive scientific account of reality, this is a belief 
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regarding a possible future, so that it cannot be acceptable to assume, as does Dawkins, 
that it is already the case.  As Feyerabend put it: 
we may one day find a theory that can explain everything in our world.  Such a development is 
not likely, one might almost be inclined to say that it is logically impossible, but I would still not 
want to exclude it.  The point is that the development has not yet started: today we have to do 
science without being able to rely on any well defined and stable ‘scientific method’.227 
With this context, I turn to the characterisation of relativism used by Radcliffe Richards 
and Dawkins.  It has the curious quality of being simultaneously absolutist as well as 
relativist, in the sense that it is invested with the quality of sweeping away absolutely all 
criteria and standards for truth.  This exemplifies what Barbara Herrnstein Smith has 
called ‘the Egalitarian Fallacy’, which she defined as ‘the idea that a denial of objective 
value commits one to the view that all judgements are “equal”, “equally good”, or 
“equally valid”.’228  The ‘Egalitarian Fallacy’ portrays relativism as making the claim 
(which, as seen above, is sometimes made on behalf of science) to provide an absolutist 
definition of truth.  Smith remarked that the ‘Egalitarian Fallacy’ qualifies as fallacious 
because, ‘if someone rejects the notion of validity in the classic (objectivist) sense, what 
follows is not that she thinks all theories (and so on) are equally valid but that she thinks 
no theory (and so on) is valid in the classic sense.’229  She had previously defined ‘the 
classic sense’ of judgement as meaning ‘justifiable on totally context-transcendent and 
subject-independent grounds.’230   
The term ‘relativism’, as defined through its use by Radcliffe Richards and Dawkins, 
would negate advances in scientific understanding in fields such as surgery and 
aerodynamics.  The relativism that is entailed by James’s pragmatism follows from 
giving primacy to pragmatic considerations, so that scientific theories can be used 
insofar as it is useful to do so, without thereby overruling the need for human 
involvement in assessing the efficacy of the theory when it is applied. 
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Neither pragmatism nor astrology, under this view, entail the thorough-going 
epistemological relativism which would reduce knowledge in all fields to a matter of 
idiosyncratic individual preference.  There is however a sense in which – under the 
account of divinatory astrology discussed in this chapter and the previous one – the 
truth value of the proposition ‘astrology works’ will vary from person to person and 
therefore be to that extent relativistic.231  It has been seen that, in the context of radical 
empiricism – specifically the non-separability of perceiving mind and perceived events 
– expectation and belief play a role in determining what is experienced.  If this is so 
then it might be expected that both the belief that astrology is not true, and the belief 
that it is true, would tend to evoke events from the responsive universe conducive to the 
perpetuation of those beliefs. 
The truth of astrology-as-divination, under a pragmatic conception, can therefore be 
described as relativistic to a limited extent.  O’Grady’s description of ‘moderate 
epistemological relativism’ is relevant here.232  He defined this position as one where 
‘reasons are offered as to why one alternative is appropriate in a particular scenario and 
not in another.  Thus there is an underlying conception of a means of judging 
appropriateness or viability.’233  This describes astrology-as-divination seen in the 
context of Jamesian pragmatism.  Astrology, seen this way, retains a way of judging its 
viability – albeit, that way is necessarily the subjective one of whether a particular 
individual finds the practice useful.  And there is an explanation for why astrology 
would not be evaluated on the same basis as surgery, so that the case put forward by 
Radcliffe Richards does not obtain – to consider astrology true in this way does not 
commit one to a preference for treatment by witch doctor over surgery.   
In the pragmatic context discussed in this chapter, the individual can evaluate the 
proposition ‘astrology works’ on the basis of experience.  In light of the distinction 
made in chapter 6 between astrology as an information retrieval service, and astrology 
as dialogue, it follows that in the latter case – which I have taken as the model for 
astrology-as-divination – the evaluation would depend upon intimacy, in James’s sense.  
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So that if an individual felt that their engagement with astrology revealed a responsive, 
providential engagement of the more-than-human in the details of their lives, then they 
would have reason to conclude that astrology works and is therefore true.  In section 
7.8.2 above I cited Eccles’s conclusion that ‘There are times when [astrology] doesn’t 
work’.234  If this is the case, it would be necessary for anyone involved with astrology to 
remain on the qui vive in their dealings with it – to take, therefore, the approach 
advocated by Herrnstein Smith when – in denying the validity of epistemic monism – 
she stressed the need, in the face of ‘different ideas, theories or beliefs’ to ‘assess them 
continuously, in and as the very process of playing and living them out in the relative 
domains of our lives’.235  Under the account of astrology-as-divination, the universe is 
responsive, but may not always respond in the way expected, or at all.  The onus 
therefore – on this view – would be on astrologers and their clients to always question 
if, and how, an astrology reading connected to their lives. 
In this chapter an account has emerged whereby – under the pragmatic theory of truth – 
astrology-as-divination could be judged to work, and therefore to be true, without this 
opening the gates to relativism.  Its starting point is the experience that astrology works 
– discussed above, particularly in sections 7.1 and 7.8.  This can also be explained – as 
seen in section 7.2 and subsequently – by invoking ‘reasoning errors’ to explain the fact 
of astrology seeming to work.  Both of these positions regarding astrology’s truth-status 
depend on a set of beliefs about the nature of the world and the place of human beings 
within it.  I turn now to James’s discussion of such beliefs. 
 
7.11 The Right to Believe 
 
James’s major work on the role and power of belief is The Will to Believe; he 
subsequently regretted his choice of title, suggesting that ‘the right to believe’ conveyed 
his intention more accurately.236  The significance of the ‘right to believe’, and its 
relevance to astrology, can be framed by first considering the view to which it is 
opposed.  James presented The Will to Believe as a counterargument against the 
positivist position propounded by the philosopher, mathematician and admirer of Peirce 
                                                          
234 Bernard Eccles, interview, 2005. 
235 Smith, Belief and Resistance, p. 149. Original emphases. 
236 At e.g. James, Pragmatism, p.600. 
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W.K. Clifford (1845 – 79) that ‘It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence.’237  In Clifford’s view, evidence of the 
kind found in physics is the exemplar of what evidence should be – historical evidence, 
for example, is ‘more precarious and less exact’ in comparison.238   
In its emphasis on the danger of individual errors of judgement, Clifford’s position 
anticipates that taken by some contemporary critics of astrology.  It recalls the 
insistence of Dean et al. on avoiding reasoning errors – seen for instance in their 
statements that, compared to astrologers, ‘we are more careful.  In fact hugely more 
careful’, and that ‘We want to avoid being misled, and avoiding being misled is part of 
what being scientific is about’.239  Another example of such an attitude can be found 
when Richard Dawkins wrote that belief in ‘astrology, paranormalism and alien 
visitations’ stems from ‘a normal and, from many points of view, desirable credulity in 
children which, unless we are careful, can spill over into adulthood, with unfortunate 
results.’240 
The common theme in these quotations can be elucidated with Clifford’s example of a 
ship owner who trusts to ‘Providence’ rather than undertaking a thorough overhaul and 
refit of an aged ship which subsequently sinks, resulting in the death of all its 
passengers.241  His conclusion: ‘It is admitted that he did sincerely believe in the 
soundness of his ship; but the sincerity of his conviction can in no wise help him, 
because he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him.’242  The model 
of how evaluation should proceed is that of an observer, standing back from the thing 
observed, and reaching a rational evaluation, consonant with the evidence.  And by 
‘evidence’ is meant objectively-verifiable data.   
James’s ‘right to believe’ is an argument against Clifford’s position.  In discussing it, 
James also used a nautical metaphor: ‘If I refuse to bale out a boat because I am in 
                                                          
237 Cited by James in The Will to Believe, p.462. Original at: Clifford, ‘The Ethics of Belief’, p.186. 
Clifford’s admiration of Peirce – specifically as a logician – is recorded in a letter by Edward L. Youmans  
in: John Fisk, Edward Livingston Youmans (New York: Appleton, 1894), p.340.  
238 Clifford, ‘The Ethics of Belief’, p.209. 
239 Dean et al in Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.131, p. 132. 
240 Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, p. 138. 
241 Clifford, ‘The Ethics of Belief’, p.177. 
242 Clifford, ‘The Ethics of Belief’, p.178. Original emphasis. 
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doubt whether my efforts will keep her afloat, I am really helping to sink her.’243  
Although he would not deny that Clifford’s evaluation of the ship-owner was fair and 
true, James denied the universal validity of the model.  For James, two distinct 
philosophies are in play here – the ‘spiritualistic’ and the ‘materialistic’, which were 
discussed in the previous chapter.244  He regarded these as expressions of individual 
temperament – ‘the sympathetic and the cynical temper’ respectively.245  James denied 
the possibility that an individual could stand altogether outside the preferences and 
biases inherent in their psychological make-up: ‘the agnostic “thou shalt not believe 
without coercive sensible evidence” is simply an expression (free to anyone to make) of 
private personal appetite for evidence of a certain peculiar kind.’246  Under this account, 
the requirement that subjective factors should be excluded from the evaluation of 
astrology would, itself, be an expression of a subjective propensity. 
James also argued against the competence of materialistic science to evaluate religious 
experience:  
There are... cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming.  
And where faith in a fact can help create that fact, that would be an insane logic which would 
say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the “lowest kind of immorality” into which 
a thinking being can fall.  Yet such is the logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to 
regulate our lives!247   
James had earlier identified the source of the passage he cited – not quite verbatim – 
here as the argument of the biologist Thomas Henry Huxley (1825 – 95) that faith in a 
religious dogma in the absence of proof constitutes ‘the lowest depths of immorality’.248  
The possibility that many westerners feel similar censure to attend belief in astrology 
was raised by Campion, in a discussion of studies which showed that 70 per cent of 
people in the UK and USA read horoscopes but only 20 per cent admitted to belief in 
                                                          
243 James, The Will to Believe, p. 538. 
244 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p.640. 
245 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 640. 
246 James, The Will to Believe, p. 498 
247 James, The Will to Believe, p.474. (Original emphasis)  James’s discussion continues to p. 477. 
248 James, The Will to Believe, p.461.  The original source is T. H. Huxley’s contribution to ‘A Modern 
“Symposium”’ on ‘The Influence upon Morality of a Decline in Religious Belief’ in the journal 
Nineteenth Century 1 (May 1877), which he concluded by suggesting that ‘so long as [people] hold by the 
plain rule of not pretending to believe what they have no reason to believe because it may be to their 
advantage so to pretend, they will not have reached the lowest depths of immorality.’ p. 539. 
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astrology.249  He suggested that Jahoda’s observation may apply to astrology – that 
people are ‘apt to be somewhat shamefaced about superstition and liable to deny 
holding any such beliefs when faced with a strange interviewer’.250     
This may be elucidated through Herrnstein Smith’s observation that a manifestation of 
‘epistemic authority’ is a tendency for those who subscribe to beliefs outside the 
consensus to be judged ‘ignorant, silly, outlandish, wildly radical, or fraudulent.’251 It 
seems at least plausible that many people tend not to publically admit to belief in 
astrology because they do not wish to be classified as gullible; they do not allow 
themselves the ‘right to believe’ in this sense.   
Bernard Eccles, in my interview with him, put forward an argument that is relevant 
here.  He suggested that doubt in astrology tends to arise upon the basis of a 
mechanistic, scientific world-view, typically acquired at school.  Seeing this as being a 
particular problem for males, he suggested that ‘boys are very bothered about losing 
control and not being able to control their environment and themselves’; that therefore 
they like to ‘feel that the world is understandable, and that if they knew enough science 
they could master it – and then, nothing would catch them by surprise.’252 
In section 7.2 above I cited Campion’s question regarding the use of reasoning errors as 
a way to explain instances of astrology apparently working, and his question, ‘why such 
arguments should apply particularly to astrology’.253  Eccles’s comments, coupled with 
James’s discussion of the ‘right to believe’, raises the possibility that the insistence of 
many critics on evaluating astrology exclusively by intersubjective evidence may itself 
be a reasoning error. 
 
7.12 Conclusion  
James stated: ‘On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily 
in the widest sense of the word, it is true.  Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, 
                                                          
249 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p.133. The source of this data is: Dean et al, Recent 
Advances p.79, p. 83; Campion also discusses similar data at p. 133 of his text. 
250 Gustav Jahoda, The Psychology of Superstition (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1969) p.26, cited at 
Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p.133. 
251 Smith, Belief and Resistance, p. 148. 
252 Bernard Eccles, interview, 2005. Original emphasis. 
253 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 98. 
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experience shows that it certainly does work...’254  Similarly, if the hypothesis of 
astrology worked satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, under James’s form of 
pragmatism, astrology would by that token be true.  If something works – and providing 
it works in line with James’s stipulation of being ‘expedient in the long run and on the 
whole’ – then, for James, that is an entirely sufficient basis upon which to call it true.255   
This point can be underscored by reference to an exchange between James and Walter 
B. Pitkin.  James asserted, ‘I am perfectly willing to admit any number of noumenal 
beings or events into philosophy if only their pragmatic value can be shown.’256  When 
James used the term ‘noumena’, he did so in Kant’s sense of ‘intelligible entities’ – that 
is, entities accessible only through the mind – as opposed to phenomena, ‘sensible 
entities’ which are experienced through the physical senses.257  Barnard remarked, 
apropos of this exchange, that for James, ‘metaphysical speculations are... acceptable as 
long as the spiritual realities they postulate have, in some way or another, observable 
effects within our experience.’258  For James the hypothesis of God is such a postulate.  
The argument developed in this chapter is that astrology – specifically, astrology-as-
divination – can also be taken as such a postulate.   
It was not James’s intention to argue that religious belief was incumbent upon any right-
thinking person.  His intention, rather, was to oppose the view represented in his day by 
figures such as Clifford and Huxley that there is a moral imperative not to believe 
anything that has not been proven by science.  This being the case, it is naturally also 
the case that the foregoing analysis of astrology’s truth-claims under Jamesian 
pragmatism does not prove the statement ‘astrology is true’.  It does, however, offer an 
account – grounded in a philosophical school of thought which is still current – whereby 
an astrology that did not yield substantial proof in scientific terms, could still be a 
                                                          
254 James, Pragmatism, p.618. 
255 James, Pragmatism, p.583.  Original emphases. 
256 William James, ‘Mr Pitkin’s Refutation of “Radical Empiricism”’ in: William James, Essays in 
Radical Empiricism (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003 [1912]) pp. 127 – 8. Originally in: Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. 3 No. 26 (20th December 1906), p.712. 
 Subsequently included as chapter 10 of the posthumous collection Essays in Radical Empiricism, p.242. 
257 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.266, p.267; A249, B306. For James’s discussion of the 
noumena/phenomena distinction with reference to Kant see e.g.: James, Principles of Psychology Vol. I, 
p.363; William James, ‘Phenomenalism’ (1879 – 80), in: William James; Frederick H. Burkhardt, 
Fredson Bowers, Ignas K. Skrupskelis (eds.) Manuscript Essays and Notes (The Works of William 
James) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), p.173. 
258 Barnard, Exploring Unseen Worlds, p.140. 
 
308 
 
practice susceptible of being evaluated by individuals in their own experience and – 
potentially – judged to work, to be useful, and therefore to be true. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion    
 
8.1  Key Terms 
In chapter 1 I described this thesis as ‘an investigation of claims regarding the truth-
status of astrology’.  In order to pursue this aim it has been necessary to elucidate, and 
evaluate the consequences of, different ways of characterising the terms ‘astrology’ and 
‘truth’.  Both terms are understood and defined in a variety of ways by different 
commentators, and a challenge I faced in formulating and testing my approach was to 
find characterisations of each that would be broad enough to comprehend disparate 
understandings and definitions, yet also precise enough to facilitate discussion in the 
thesis, and – I hope – promote discussion subsequent to the thesis.  The 
characterisations I have used were introduced in chapter 1 and have been referred to 
continually through this thesis.  The term ‘astrology’ has largely been characterised 
through a bipartite division into astrology-as-science and astrology-as-divination.  The 
term ‘truth’ has been characterised through the tripartite division formed by the three 
major theories of truth.  (The three – the correspondence, coherence and pragmatic 
theories – were introduced, and their characterisation as ‘major theories’ discussed, in 
chapter 1.) 
 
The pursuit of this thesis’s central aim has involved continually evaluating these two 
sets of terms one against the other.  This has been in order to see whether the 
characterisation of astrology as either science or divination is both necessary and 
sufficient for the purpose of evaluating astrology’s truth-status; and, whether the three 
theories of truth suffice for the purpose of drawing out and examining the truth of 
astrology.  This means that whilst the relationship between astrology and truth is the 
focus of this thesis, the enquiry necessarily also has tested and evaluated the meaning of 
the terms ‘astrology’ and ‘truth’, so that a significant part of the conclusions have to do 
with the characterisation of each term.   
 
In sections 8.2 and 8.3 below I will present the conclusions arising for the 
characterisation of the terms ‘astrology’ and ‘truth’ respectively.  I will then consider 
the particular relevance of William James’s thought in 8.4.  A consideration of 
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conclusions arising for the question ‘is astrology true’ will follow in 8.5, concluding 
with a discussion of James’s ‘right to believe’ in 8.6.    
 
8.2  The Characterisation of Astrology 
 
In chapter 1 I cited a definition of astrology from Curry: ‘the practice of relating the 
heavenly bodies to lives and events on earth, and the tradition that has thus been 
generated’.1  This is a suitable introductory definition for this thesis, because it does not 
prejudge how the truth-status of astrology would be evaluated.  It differs in this from 
definitions which impute a specific type of mechanism to astrology, an example of 
which is the causal definition from Pingree whereby ‘the planets, in their eternal 
rotations about the earth, transmit motion (change) to the four elements and to the 
assemblages of elements, animate and inanimate, in the sublunar world.’2  It is 
necessary, for the purposes of this thesis, to define astrology in a way that does not pre-
judge what manner of phenomenon it is, otherwise this enquiry would be incomplete.   
 
In chapters 5 and 6 respectively I discussed the complications around definitions of the 
terms ‘science’ and ‘divination’.  In chapters 1 and 5 I cited Popper’s discussion of 
‘scientific objectivity’, wherein through ‘repeatable experiments… we convince 
ourselves that we are not dealing with mere isolated “coincidence”, but with events 
which, on account of their regularity and reproducibility, are in principle inter-
subjectively testable.’3  I have taken the factor of intersubjective testability in repeatable 
experiments as the primary defining quality of science as the term is used in this thesis, 
both in its own right and in the compound ‘astrology-as-science’. 
 
For the term ‘divination’ I drew my central definition (cited in chapters 1 and 6) from 
Curry’s definition (cited in chapters 1 and 6) of ‘an ongoing dialogue with more-than-
human agents.’4  In chapter 6 I drew out the contrast between the dialogical relationship 
to which Curry refers, and what I dubbed the ‘information-retrieval’ model.  The latter 
model, I showed, is typically presupposed to be the mode in which astrology-as-science 
                                                          
1 Patrick Curry, ‘Astrology’ in Encyclopaedia of Historians, p.55. 
2 Pingree, From Astral Omens to Astrology, previously cited in chapters 1 and 7. 
3 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p.23.  
4 Curry, ‘Embodiment, Alterity and Agency’, pp.114-5. Cited more fully in chapter 1. 
 
311 
would – if true – function.  It is also sometimes taken as the paradigm for divination – 
by Radin for instance.5  The term ‘divination’ as used in this thesis, however, refers to a 
phenomenon that cannot be adequately defined as viewing and retrieving pre-existing 
information.  Without wishing to dismiss the possible reality of such phenomena, I 
reserve the term ‘divination’ in this discussion for instances of a dialogical relationship 
between human and more-than-human. In doing so I follow a number of recent 
precedents including Cornelius, Bird, Brockbank and Radermacher.6 
 
Whether the two terms, science and divination, constitute a sufficient taxonomy to use 
in this thesis is a question that needs to be addressed.  In the text just cited, for instance, 
Campion put forward nine different possible characterisations of astrology, including ‘a 
psychological tool’ and ‘a religion’.7  As was seen in chapter 3, Liz Greene argued that 
astrology can be conceived of in different ways, including ‘as science, art, philosophy, 
psychology and poetic metaphor’, and that therefore ‘it is irrelevant to attempt to define 
astrology as “science” or “divination”’.8  This notwithstanding, there is a case for 
characterising astrology as either science or as divination for the purpose of this thesis.  
In order to illustrate this point I will begin, in the following paragraph, by considering 
what is implied by evaluating astrology’s truth-status in the first place; upon that basis, 
the distinction between science and divination will then be explored.  
  
To say, as Curry does in his definition, that astrology is a ‘practice’ and a ‘tradition’ 
does not provide a basis for the evaluation of its truth-status.  For instance quiltmaking 
is a practice and a tradition, and it is by no means clear how or why one would ascribe a 
truth-status to quiltmaking.9  Similarly, to the extent that it is a practice and a tradition, 
astrology can be studied from the perspectives of (for instance) history, cosmology, 
anthropology, history of philosophy and phenomenology (in the sense of the 
perceptions and experiences of astrologers and their clients).  The crucial element, 
epistemologically speaking, is found in the part of Curry’s definition which asserts that 
                                                          
5 Radin, Real Magic, pp. 86 – 7, previously cited in chapter 6. 
6 Cornelius, Moment of Astrology, p.45; Bird, Astrology in Education, p. 85; Brockbank, Responsive 
Cosmos, p.19; Radermacher, The Role of Dialogue in Astrological Divination, p. i.   
7 Campion, Astrology and Popular Religion, p. 178 
8  Greene, ‘Is Astrology a Divinatory System?’, p. 28. Previously cited in chapter 3. 
9 Quiltmaking is referred to as a practice and a tradition at e.g.: John Forrest and Deborah Blincoe, The 
Natural History of the Traditional Quilt (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1995) p. 320. 
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astrology relates the heavenly bodies ‘to lives and events on earth’.10  Because of this, 
the practice of astrology involves or eventuates in propositions such as ‘Mars in the 
First House indicates aggressive, outgoing people who have abundant energy’ and ‘[the 
lost envelope will be found] close to the east wall of the house, at mantlepiece level, 
near heat.’ 11  It is these propositions that are true or false; they are true or false 
individually, and (in ways which are a matter for philosophical characterisation) the 
propensity to truth or falsehood in aggregations of such cases can be taken to determine 
the truth of astrology per se. 
It is possible to question the provenance and mode of such astrological propositions.  As 
regards ‘provenance’, this means asking whether they are a result of natural physical 
forces existing independently of human interpretation, or whether they arise in the 
human mind in a way which cannot be adequately captured by science.  By ‘mode’ I 
refer to the distinction (mentioned above, and introduced in chapter 6) whereby 
astrology-as-science presupposes a mode I described as ‘information retrieval’, whilst 
astrology-as-divination involves a responsive, dialogical relationship with the more-
than-human.  
I have taken as a convenient way of characterising the split between the two versions of 
astrology (as science and as divination) the statement from Dean et al, quoted in chapter 
2, that ‘to adequately test astrology the participation of the astrologer must be 
eliminated.’12  An astrology whose truth-status could be assessed without the 
involvement of astrologers would therefore be astrology-as-science.  On the other hand, 
an astrology in which the astrologer is necessarily involved in the interpretation of 
horoscopic factors – because such interpretation requires the existence of a responsive, 
dialogical relationship to the more-than-human – would be astrology-as-divination.   
My contention is that for so long as the truth-status of astrology is under discussion, its 
characterisation as either science or divination is both necessary and sufficient.  For any 
other characterisation – psychological astrology, for instance – it would be possible to 
question whether or not it was supposed to function independently of the astrologer’s 
                                                          
10 Curry, ‘Astrology’ in Encyclopaedia of Historians, p.55. 
11 Respectively: Sakoian and Acker, Astrologer’s Handbook, p. 154; Derek Appleby, Horary Astrology: 
The Art of Astrological Divination (Bel Air, MD: Astrology Classics/The Astrology Center of America, 
2005 [1985]) p. 166. 
12 Dean et al, Recent Advances, p.554. 
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participation, thereby deciding whether – for an epistemological evaluation – it was 
astrology-as-science or astrology-as-divination. 
I thus refer to this pair of terms as characterisations, rather than definitions, of 
astrology.  This is because they are not intended to be exhaustive or definitive of the 
subject in the round, but only when it is viewed in an epistemological context.  The 
plurality of possible definitions of astrology dependent on context may be illustrated 
through William James’s observation that ‘A Beethoven string-quartet is truly… a 
scraping of horses’ tails on cats’ bowels, and may be exhaustively described in such 
terms; but the application of this description in no way precludes the simultaneous 
applicability of an entirely different description.’13  On this basis he asked, ‘Why may 
there not be different points of view for viewing [the world], within each of which all 
data harmonize, and which the observer may therefore either choose between, or simply 
cumulate one upon another?’14 
 
The term ‘astrology-as-divination’ is potentially ambiguous and needs to be closely 
framed.  As discussed in chapter 2, ‘hermeneutic astrology’ could be preferable, were it 
not that the former term is now established in academic discourse.  A source of potential 
misunderstanding emerged in chapter 6 in the distinction found in William James’s 
religious philosophy between ‘theism’ and ‘pantheism’.  If astrology were a 
manifestation of a theistic cosmos (in James’s sense of the term), it would follow 
reliable laws and would therefore function through the application of fixed rules.  Such 
an astrology would therefore differ little from astrology-as-science in terms of practice; 
dialogue between astrologer and more-than-human agents could not be relevant.  In 
chapter 6 I argued that such dialogue is integral to divination in many accounts 
(including Curry’s definition and Radermacher’s discussion) and concluded that 
‘divination’ as it would operate in a theistic cosmos would not fulfil the definition of 
divination in the sense generally intended when astrology-as-divination is discussed.  
Given this, it is integral to the idea of astrology-as-divination that it exists within a 
universe that is pantheistic rather than theistic (as James uses these terms).  This 
position is discussed at length, and given context in William James’s philosophy, in 
chapter 6. 
                                                          
13 James, Will to Believe, p. 513 
14 James, Will to Believe, p. 513 
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In addition to recent academic works on astrology such as those of Brockbank and 
Radermacher, precedent for the distinction between astrology-as-science and astrology-
as-divination can also be found in the three theories of truth.  As has emerged, 
particularly in chapters four to seven, each of the three theories of truth fissures along an 
idiographic/nomothetic fault line.  This reaches its apogee in the disagreement between 
Peirce and James on the question of how the pragmatic theory of truth should be 
characterised.  As shown in chapter 7, Peirce argued that science should be the final 
arbiter of truth whilst James argued that science is only one kind of truth, and devoted 
much of his philosophical life to exploring and discussing religious experience.  In 
theories of truth, as in astrology, the role of science is disputed. 
 
8.3 Theories of Truth 
 
The three theories of truth which I use in this thesis are open to criticism on the grounds 
that it is not necessary to analyse truth to such an extent.  Thus for example Dawkins 
argued that ‘Scientists tend to take a robust view of truth and are impatient of 
philosophical equivocation over its reality or importance.’15  In chapter 3 I cited Dean et 
al as (in effect) exponents of naïve realism, according to which it is obvious what is and 
is not true, with no further discussion being required about what ‘truth’ means.  As I 
argued there, this position is untenable for two reasons.  First, if the truth were obvious 
it would be difficult to account for the need – generally believed to exist by critics – to 
disabuse many people of belief in astrology’s truth.  If the truth is obvious and astrology 
is not true, it would be obvious that astrology was not true.  Second, as I have shown 
throughout this thesis, many commentators – both critics and advocates of astrology – 
have used arguments which invoke the central principle of one or more of the three 
theories of truth, often seemingly without awareness that this is the case.  I see no valid 
way in which any of these commentators could dismiss the need for the three theories of 
truth, when their own arguments use the principles found in these theories. 
Throughout this thesis I have put forward instances in which one or other of the three 
theories of truth describe the principles at work in discussions of astrology’s truth-status 
by both astrologers and critics.  On the basis of this analysis I conclude that each of the 
                                                          
15 Richard Dawkins, A Devil’s Chaplain: Reflections on Hope, Lies, Science and Love (New York, NY: 
Mariner, 2004) p. 5. 
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three theories has a role to play in a discussion about the subject’s truth-status; in other 
words, it is necessary to deploy the three theories in order to achieve a full and balanced 
discussion of astrology’s truth-status.  
It is often assumed in epistemological discussion that only one theory of truth can be 
valid, and hence many epistemologists who espouse a particular theory have tried to 
justify taking that theory as competent to define truth in all situations.  This 
phenomenon was dubbed ‘epistemic monism’ by Engel.16  The alternative to taking one 
or another theory of truth as omnicompetent is epistemic pluralism, which was 
introduced in chapter 3 and discussed more fully in chapter 7.  This thesis has found 
epistemic pluralism to be a useful and indeed necessary approach in real-world 
situations such as the evaluation of astrology’s truth-status, since it has emerged that 
astrology’s truth can be, and often is, discussed from the perspective of the three 
theories of truth, with each shedding light from a different perspective.  In the basic 
terms of the three theories of truth: if astrological propositions correspond to facts then 
that would support the case for astrology’s truth; if the derivation of astrological 
propositions can be explained as cohering with an overarching explanatory system, then 
that would (depending on the explanatory system) support or undermine the case for 
astrology’s truth; and if astrology is judged to work, then that would support the case 
for astrology’s truth.  The discussion in this thesis has demonstrated that each of these 
positions can shed light on the truth-status of astrology.  This, in a nutshell, is epistemic 
pluralism as it applies to astrology. 
In chapter 7 I argued that although it is sometimes characterised as a recent 
development in philosophy, epistemic pluralism is an integral part of James’s pragmatic 
theory of truth.  Given this, and further given that the three theories have (individually 
and together) proved sufficient to analyse every extant view of astrology’s truth-status, I 
conclude that the case for the sufficiency of the three theories for an analysis of the kind 
presented in this thesis is strong.  The need to deploy the three theories as a schema in a 
discussion of this kind is accentuated by the fact that, as has emerged at points 
throughout this thesis, there is often a mutual suspicion from both astrologers and critics 
that the other side glosses over arguments and facts which do not conduce to arrival at 
their preferred conclusion.  Just as it would be unacceptable to dismiss experimental 
                                                          
16 Engel, ‘A Plea for Epistemic Monism’, p. 96 (previously cited in chapter 7). 
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data without consideration or explanation, so, I suggest, it should be considered 
unacceptable to elide any consequences of the three theories of truth without 
justification. 
8.4  The Significance of William James for the Discussion 
James was critical of all attempts to enforce a unitary account of truth – as embodied in 
his discussion of Beethoven quartets, cited above.  He therefore provides a precedent 
within epistemology for challenging the frequent critical claim that ‘the scientific 
method is the only way of demonstrating the truth of [astrologers’] claims’.17   
Beyond this, the significance of James’s thought for this thesis comes from the 
confluence in it of two major philosophical themes.  The first is his version of the 
pragmatic theory of truth.  This opens out the possibility that if astrology were judged to 
work, it would by that token be true, whether or not it conformed to other frequently-
demanded criteria such as scientific principles or positive statistical findings.  From this, 
the question arises of what types of experience would justify using the phrase ‘astrology 
works’.  This can be addressed by turning to the second theme, which is James’s 
philosophy of pluralistic pantheism, supported by his principles of pure experience and 
radical empiricism.  This provides an account – ontological, cosmological, theological – 
of the universe in which the individual human being is a meaningful, connected, part of 
a larger scheme.  As I argued in chapter 6, this can be understood as an elaborated 
context for astrology-as-divination, which would ‘work’ by bringing to the individual 
intimations of their non-separation from the larger universe.  As Barnard suggested, in 
James’s philosophy, since 
a nondual pluralistic pantheism postulates a self that is simultaneously united with, yet distinct 
from, an underlying divine presence, it is possible to say, with equal validity, that following 
intuitive guidance is both a way to become attuned to one’s inner promptings and a way to align 
oneself with a distinct, although not ontologically separate, divinity.18  
The argument was developed in chapter 6 of this thesis that James’s pluralistic religious 
philosophy has the potential to make sense of astrologers’ frequent assertions that their 
craft is a spiritual phenomenon.  As was also discussed, a facet of this is the possibility 
                                                          
17 Dean et al, Tests of Astrology, p. 326 (a similar statement can be found at e.g. Culver and Ianna, 
Astrology: True or False?, p. 28). 
18 Barnard, Exploring Unseen Worlds, p. 267 
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in James’s thought to articulate and elaborate upon synchronicity (also frequently cited 
in an explanatory capacity by astrologers) as a description of the way in which 
astrology-as-divination functions. 
8.5  Is Astrology True?   
The question of astrology’s truth-status has not been definitively resolved by this thesis.  
The underlying reason for this is the existence of a more general, and irresolvable, 
problem for anyone who would attain a once-and-for-all definition of truth.  This was 
framed by Thomas Nagel when he observed that there is no ‘view from nowhere’ – no 
source of knowledge that comprehends and transcends individual perspective.19  This 
issue has emerged in discussing each theory of truth: it is outside the scope of the 
correspondence theory of truth to define what will count as a fact; the coherence theory 
similarly cannot say which explanatory scheme propositions should cohere with; and the 
meaning of ‘it works’ is a subject of debate by proponents of the pragmatic theory of 
truth.  
What has emerged from the discussion in this thesis is the variety of assumptions that 
underpin, and consequences that follow from, the arguments and evidence that are 
mustered when astrology’s truth-status is discussed.  A clear illustration of this context-
dependency emerged in chapter 6, through Richard Dawkins’s characterisation of the 
universe as showing ‘no design, no purpose… nothing but blind, pitiless indifference’.20  
This position specifically precludes him from considering the possibility of a responsive 
cosmos which might speak through astrology.  Dawkins’s cosmological and ontological 
framework thus has direct consequences for his evaluation of astrology’s truth-status, 
and I have shown that this is necessarily the case for anyone who approaches the 
subject.   
What this thesis has demonstrated is that statements about the truth-status of astrology 
are necessarily conditional, if-then statements.  It has also emerged that this 
conditionality is rarely acknowledged, let alone explored and developed, by either 
astrologers or critics.  In the following two sub-sections I will illustrate this 
                                                          
19 Nagel, View from Nowhere, p. 70. Previously cited and referred to in chapters 1 and 7. 
20 Dawkins, River out of Eden, p. 133. Previously cited in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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conditionality through a recapitulation of the two forms of astrology, and the three 
theories of truth, which have been discussed throughout this thesis. 
8.5.1 Is Astrology-as-Science True?   
For astrology-as-science, the ‘facts’ demanded by the correspondence theory of truth 
would necessarily conform to scientific definition, which is to say they would be 
intersubjective and resilient under repeated testing.  In terms of the coherence theory of 
truth, the explanatory system with which astrology would need to cohere would be 
science.  An example of what would be required is found in Kanitscheider’s discussion 
of ‘F-Rays’ – that is, planetary rays which would provide a causal explanatory 
mechanism for astrological phenomena.21   
As was discussed in chapter 5, the prospect has been raised by some commentators that 
discoveries and developments will redefine science to the point that astrology, or some 
element thereof, becomes scientifically plausible.  For instance Michel Gauquelin 
argued that developments such as chaos theory would provide the basis for a ‘neo-
astrology’.22  In that case, a change in the understanding of science would entail a 
change in the meaning of coherence with science.  I argued in chapter 5 that 
developments in science such as chaos and quantum theories currently have more 
significance for astrology-as-divination than for astrology-as-science.  This follows 
because, whilst there is as yet no generally-acknowledged pathway opened by such 
developments to the realisation of an astrological mechanism, a number of them 
undermine realist accounts of the universe.  This has the consequence that the basis 
upon which applications of classical science can claim to be true shifts from coherence 
with a known physical universe, to the pragmatic consideration that they work.  
Moving on to the pragmatic theory of truth: as was seen in chapter 7, astrology-as-
science could be accommodated under either James’s or Peirce’s characterisations of 
the theory.  James’s pluralistic approach however precludes the insistence that astrology 
(or anything) must work in the sense of functioning as a science, which is the hallmark 
of Peirce’s account of pragmatism. 
 
                                                          
21 Kanitscheider, ‘A Philosopher looks at Astrology’, previously cited in chapter 5. 
22 Gauquelin, Neo-Astrology, p. 3, pp. 174 – 8. Previously cited in chapter 5. 
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8.5.2 Is Astrology-as-Divination True?   
In the terms of the coherence theory, the explanatory system that is presupposed by 
divination is a dialogical/responsive cosmos.  A significant part of this thesis, 
particularly chapters 6 and 7, has been given over to discussion of the ways in which 
elements of William James’s philosophy – particularly his pluralistic pantheism, radical 
empiricism and pragmatic theory of truth – can accommodate astrology as a divinatory 
form. 
Given this context, the facts that emerge from horoscopic readings – and which the 
correspondence theory requires – can only be evaluated by the individual for her or 
himself.  These are not the intersubjective facts required by Popper.  In chapter 6 I 
argued that the presence, or not, of objective descriptions of the world in chart readings 
is secondary in a specific sense.  My contention is that in order to cohere with, and work 
in, a pluralist pantheistic cosmos, the experience of being in dialogue with a responsive 
cosmos must be the primary phenomenon of astrology.  I discussed this phenomenon 
primarily in chapter 6 with reference to Jung’s ‘mysterium tremendum’ as discussed by 
Radermacher, Hyde’s discussion of the ‘judder’, and James’s ‘intimacy’. 
In a closely related way, the pragmatic requirement that astrology (like everything else) 
would be true if, and to the extent that, it worked would acquire a different sense from 
that which follows from the scientific model.  Under the account of divination 
developed here, a true astrology would qualify for that epithet not by imparting 
information – though that is part of the process – but by evoking an awareness within 
individuals that they participate and interact with the more-than-human.  
Given a Jamesian pluralist pantheistic universe, then, the crucial test of whether or not 
astrology-as-divination worked would be whether a sense of intimacy with this 
responsive cosmos was engendered through the practice of astrology.  As was shown in 
chapter 7, this is necessarily a subjective judgement.  And, crucially, it is also a 
subjective judgement whether to believe in a responsive cosmos.  From this emerges the 
relevance of James’s ‘right to believe’. 
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8.6  The Right to Believe 
A recurrent theme in criticisms of astrology is that astrologers are not sufficiently 
parsimonious with their belief, when they believe in astrology.  Thus for example the 
statements of Dean et al that, in comparison to astrologers, ‘we are more careful.  In fact 
hugely more careful’, and that ‘We want to avoid being misled, and avoiding being 
misled is part of what being scientific is about’.23   
James’s discussion of the ‘right to believe’ characterises such carefulness as a two-
edged sword.  As was shown in chapter 7, he saw the view that one should shun a 
practice whose epistemological status may be doubted (and this could be applied to 
astrology) as ‘simply an expression (free to anyone to make) of private personal appetite 
for evidence of a certain peculiar kind.’24  James was accused of relativism on the basis 
of such statements.25  The overriding point for him however was the pluralistic nature of 
truth.  This is a perspective from which it would be possible, at least in principle, for 
astrology to be true in a way different from the way in which a law of physics is true.  
This is a perspective from which, as Gutowski put it, ‘philosophy does not give us any 
ultimate knowledge but rather justifies our right to believe in this or that vision of the 
world… By accepting a personalistic ontology, James equips himself with good reasons 
for scepticism about [the] metaphysical meaning of present scientific results based on 
naturalistic presumption.’26 
Belief in gods, in James’s sense, can be a precursor to experience of the more-than-
human, whilst disbelief can exclude the individual from such experience.  Both attitudes 
would then be self-fulfilling prophecies.  James summed this up in a homely simile: 
just as a man who in a company of gentlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every 
concession, and believed no one’s word without proof, would cut himself off by such 
churlishness from all the social rewards that a more trusting spirit would earn – so here, one who 
should shut himself up in snarling logicality and try to make the gods extort his recognition 
                                                          
23 Dean et al in: Phillipson, Astrology Year Zero, p.131, p. 132.  Previously cited in chapter 7. There is a 
similar statement in: Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, p. 138. 
24 James, Will to Believe, p. 498 
25 Discussed at e.g. Lamberth, William James and the Metaphysics of Experience, pp. 217 – 8. 
26 Piotr Gutowski, ‘To Be in Truth or not to Be Mistaken?’ in Dariusz Łukasiewicz, Roger Pouivet (eds.), 
The Right to Believe: Perspectives in Religious Epistemology (Frankfurt: Ontos/De Gruyter, 2012) p. 99. I 
have interpolated ‘[the]’ which was missing from the original. 
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willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making 
the gods’ acquaintance.27 
 
If the universe is responsive, so that individuals may interact with it in the way 
characterised by James as ‘intimacy’, then the scientific ideal of eliminating bias by 
excluding merely subjective apprehensions could itself be a form of bias.  Whether the 
universe is really like that is a question that cannot be resolved through a consensual, 
intersubjective enquiry.  The issue of what would constitute allowable evidence for such 
an enquiry cannot stand outside (in a ‘view from nowhere’) of ontological and 
cosmological models developed to describe that universe. 
For so long as astrology-as-science is under evaluation, by definition the established 
paradigm of realist, material science obtains.  In that case the implications of a 
responsive cosmos are not relevant and there is little basis to judge the practice true – as 
has been witnessed through numerous critical perspectives cited in this thesis.  When 
astrology-as-divination is considered, however, a basis can be seen – which I have 
explored through James’s philosophy in chapters 6 and 7 above – whereby it is 
philosophically defensible for an individual to assert that, in their experience, astrology 
works; and on this basis, to consider that astrology is true. 
                                                          
27 James, Will to Believe, p. 476. 
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